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This thesis tests financial contagion from the US to ten African markets during the 
2007-09 financial crisis. For comparative purposes, testing procedures are also extended 
to cover a number of developed-economy markets.  
There is considerable debate within the literature as to how to measure contagion. A 
central focus of my research is therefore to compare alternative econometric 
methodologies. VAR based constant-correlation based techniques are examined 
alongside dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) based techniques. I find that the DCC 
approach is superior in respect to my dataset. 
The 2007-09 crisis was unique from a contagion perspective in that its impact was truly 
global. This provided a unique opportunity to examine the subject across different 
continents and market types. African markets were found to have lower levels of 
integration (correlation) with the US than developed-economy markets and this resulted 
in considerable differences in the way that the contagion event spread across these two 
groups. 
As well as being truly global, the 2007-09 crisis was a contagion event that lasted more 
than a year. I use the volatility index (VIX) to identify both a long crisis period and a 
series of sub-events.  The former ran from 15 September 2008 to 15 October 2009. The 
four sub-events were 15/09/2008-10/10/2008, 15/09/2008-17/10/2008, 15/09/2008-
27/10/2008 and 15/09/2008-20/11/2008. 
Correlations (and contagion) changed significantly as sub-events unfolded. At the onset 
of the crisis, correlations with all African markets increased relatively quickly.  I 
suggest that this can possibly be considered as being consistent with fast herding 
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behaviour. The impact on developed markets was very different in that contagion spread 
slowly.  I suggest that this can possibly be considered as being consistent with slow 
herding.   
I argue that differences in contagion found between African and developed markets 
reflect differences in social network effects in investor communities. I apply behavioural 
finance theory to more fully explore this issue and identify the channels through which 
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1.1 CONTAGION BACKGROUND 
 
The term “contagion” became widely used in the financial lexicon following the 
seminal works of King and Wadhwani (1990) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002) on the 
1987 and 1990s financial crises. The term is usually defined in terms of “a significant 
increase in cross-market linkages resulting from a shock hitting one country or group of 
countries” (Forbes and Rigobon 2002:2223). 
Contagion has become increasingly significant within the academic literature in recent 
years. Searching for the word “contagion” in the EconLit database over the period 1969-
2000, Edwards (2000) found it returned 147 entries. In comparison, “devaluation” (a 
word strongly associated with the 1990s crises) returned 1,031. Following Edwards 
(2000), I ran a similar search from 1990 to 2011. This yielded 1,446 entries for 
contagion and 1,560 for devaluation. This is indicative of the pace at which research on 
contagion has increased following the 1990s crash and the recent 2007-2009 global 
financial crisis. 
Within the contagion literature the strongest focus is on the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
the 1998 Russian financial crisis and the Mexican economic crisis in 1994. Other 
studies have examined the Brazilian crisis of 1999 and the European exchange rate 
mechanism collapse of 1992. More recently we have started to see studies relating to the 
2007-09 crisis and I hope to be able to make a contribution in this area. 
Financial contagion has been viewed in literature as mainly a concern for emerging 
markets, markets of similar structures or belonging to the same region. For instance, the 
great depression of 1929, which affected primarily the United States and Europe; the 
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United States market crash of 1987, which led to the fall of major stock markets in 
developed markets such as the London Stock Exchange and Tokyo Stock Exchange; 
and the 1997 devaluation of the Thai baht, which created crises in Asian countries. 
Although, the origin of the 2007-09 crisis was located as the US, the effects were not 
limited to markets of similar structures or in the same geographical area. As a result it 
became known as the “global financial crisis”; even the media could not find a more 
suitable name. The unique and never-before-seen nature of this crisis has presented 
academics with the opportunity to develop further their understanding of contagion and 
I hope to make a contribution to this in this thesis. 
The 2007-09 crisis saw many developed-country markets suffer greatly as a result of 
exposure to US sub-prime mortgages. Huge investment banks (Bear Sterns, Lehman 
Brothers, BNP Paribas and IKB Industriebank) across the US and European countries 
had to be bailed out or went bankrupt. In African markets the effects of the crisis did not 
become apparent until late 2008. When it did manifest itself it was most apparent in the 
larger and most liquid markets, namely, Egypt and Nigeria. Losses in these markets 
during the financial turmoil surpassed losses in any developed market in percentage 
terms (AfDB, 2009). 
How severe was this crisis and what caused it? Malik et al. (2009:86) argued it was “the 
most severe since the stock market crash of 1929”. Bartlett (2008:2) argues there were a 
series of reasons for it. He identified that: “mark-to-market losses on mortgage-backed 
securities, collateralised debt obligations and related assets through March 2008 
approximate $945 billion. In absolute terms this represents the largest financial loss in 
history, exceeding asset losses resulting from Japan’s banking crisis in the 1990s ($780 
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billion) and far surpassing losses emanating from the Asian crisis of 1997-98 ($420 
billion) and the US savings and loan crisis of 1986-95 ($380 billion)”. 
 
1.2 THE THESIS: GENERAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
Within the existing literature, a number of studies have focused on identifying the 
causes and channels of transmission of financial contagion. As will be examined in 
Chapter 2, these factors include asset market effects, banking and currency channels, 
fundamental effects such as common shock and trade effects, investor behaviour-related 
effects, and issues relating to liquidity problems and information asymmetries. I would 
add another issue to this list; I believe that the study on financial crisis needs to consider 
the impact of differences in the extent of financial market integration between the 
source country (US) and contaminated country. 
As the contagion literature has developed, so has the number of competing econometric 
methodologies that can be applied. This thesis identified that this makes it difficult to 
select a preferred one. The most widely used tests for contagion effect are based around 
constant correlation coefficient analysis and dynamic conditional correlation 
coefficient analysis. Other approaches are based around co-integration techniques and 
the direct mechanism approach (Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1). The thesis applies first, 
constant correlation coefficient analysis (Chapter 4), based on the work of Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002), and, second, dynamic conditional correlation analysis (Engle 2002) in 
Chapter 5. These approaches are used to examine the correlation of daily market returns 
between the US market and selected African markets, and the US and selected 




As well as focusing on the econometric issues relating to the measurement of contagion, 
this thesis also has a second objective of identifying the channels that contagion 
follows. A promising avenue to follow in this respect is presented by behavioural 
finance theory, given that uncertainty is the key driver of behaviour during crisis 
situations. The thesis discusses whether behavioural drivers such as herding might have 
a role to play in contagion and whether differences can be identified in respect to 
contagion events in Africa and contagion events in developed markets. 
The 2007-09 crisis was different in that it was not a single short sharp shock, but was an 
event that unfolded in the US over a period of more than a year. The event can be 
characterised as being a series of crisis waves (see Figure 3.5, Chapter 3). The question 
arises from a behavioural perspective of how will the markets respond? Will they treat 
each sub-event as separate and unrelated and anchor their decisions on the US market in 
each instance? Will they become used to crisis in the US and stop responding to events 
in the US altogether? Or will each sub-crisis in the US have a diminishing impact on 
these African markets? These are the types of questions I consider in this thesis. 
 
1.2.1 The Thesis: Scope 
The contagion literature is vast, with a large number of alternative competing objectives 
and methodologies. It is therefore important to be clear in respect to the scope of my 
work. The scope of the research is outlined as follows: 
1. The research shall focus on the relationship between the US (using the S&P500 
index) and ten emerging/frontier African stock markets. Academic research 
generally categorises the impact of financial crisis in terms of (i) contagion (ii) 
interdependence (iii) spill-over effect (see Figure 3.4 for details). The scope of 
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the thesis is limited to examining contagion effects. The thesis did not test for 
secondary spill-over effect from the largest market in Africa, the Johannesburg 
stock exchange, to other markets within the African continent. This is because 
the thesis focuses on testing the direct vulnerability of African markets to the 
crisis of a developed market (US).  
It would not have been overly surprising if contagion did exist between South 
Africa and other African countries, especially, in the presence of regional 
integration which exists in the different sub regions of Africa. All the African 
markets in this thesis are members of African Stock Exchanges Association 
(ASEA) whose plan is to eventually integrate African markets. ASEA also stand 
to provide first-hand information to investors on African markets. An 
examination of these effects could possibly be made the subject of post-doctoral 
research. 
2. For comparative purposes the relationship between the US and a number of 
developed and high-growth emerging markets are also examined. 
3. The methodological scope of the thesis is limited to the constant correlation 
coefficient analysis and the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) analysis. It is 
identified in Chapter 6 (Section 6.3) that DCC can be applied from an 
asymmetric correlation approach (Asai 2013). This thesis considers this 
approach beyond its scope, given that it had not come into the mainstream 
literature until after the thesis was started. 
4. The thesis is also limiting the scope of the behavioural analysis to the 
interpretation of the econometric results. The undertaking of surveys as seen in 
other parts of behavioural literature (Aduda, Oduor and Onwonga 2012, Lowies, 
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Hall and Cloete 2013, Shiller, Konya and Tsutsui 1988) could be another PhD in 
itself. 
It is observed from the review of literature that previous studies on financial contagion 
relating to the 1990s crises largely ignored African markets (except South Africa). This 
was possibly a reflection of the low level of correlations between African market and 
developed markets at the time. As such, previous studies on financial contagion are 
unlikely to have much relevance to African Investors. It is however, noted that African 
stock market have developed dramatically over the last 10-15 years. This resulted in the 
linkages between US and African markets becoming stronger. The changes that have 
occurred means studying financial contagion in Africa is now of utmost relevance. 
It is also identified in Section 2.8 page 96, that a further motivation of the study is to 
examine possible behavioural explanations for differences in contagion from US to 
Africa and from US to other developed markets. The discussions of my result in this 
context are provided in Chapter 6.  
 
1.2.2 Research questions 
The justifications for my research questions are given in Chapter 2, where they are 
presented in the context of the existing academic literature. These research questions are 
summarised as follows: 
1. Methodology: to identify which of the constant correlation and the dynamic 
conditional correlations methodologies are most appropriate for the examination 
of contagion effects in Africa and selected other international markets. 
2. The application of contagion testing to a cross-section of both emerging and 
frontier African markets. 
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3. Identifying the channels through which contagion events develop within the 
context of appropriate theory (behavioural and/or non-behavioural models). 
4. Identifying differences in the ways that contagion events unfold in developed 
markets and emerging/frontier African markets (in the context of appropriate 
behavioural and/or non-behavioural models). 
 
1.3 THESIS NOVEL CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
• The thesis adds to our knowledge of contagion from the US to a broad cross-
section of African markets. The thesis has also undertaken a comparative study 
of the contagion effects found in African markets and developed markets. It has 
found differences in these groups. 
The author of the thesis asserts that very few studies exist on financial contagion 
regarding African markets. Most studies in this area are focused on the emerging 
markets of Asia, Latin America and Europe. Collins and Biekpe (2003), Morales and 
Andreosso-O’Callaghan (2010) and Asongu (2011a and 2011b) have incorporated 
African markets in their study but this was done on a limited basis. This thesis will 
therefore contribute to literature in terms of a more in-depth application of contagion 
modelling to African markets. Furthermore, the thesis compares the level of contagion 
found in African markets and those found in developed markets. Clear differences are 






• The thesis contributes to the analysis of the financial contagion from the 
perspective of behavioural finance theory in both African and developed market 
contexts. The principle finding being the differences in suggested behavioural 
biases affecting the two groups. 
This thesis develops a model of the channels that financial crisis follows (Figure 3.12, 
Chapter 3). The thesis also contributes to contagion literature in terms of identifying 
behavioural-based channels and identifying differences in respect to these channels in 
relation to African and developed markets (Chapter 6). 
• The thesis has identified that the use of DCC to measure contagion is the 
preferred statistical methodology, given the problems found in applying 
alternative methodologies. 
The different methodologies are applied in Chapters 4 and 5 of the thesis, and which is 
the most appropriate methodology to use is discussed in Chapter 6. This is undertaken 
in the context of the dataset that the application is made to. 
 
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE 
 
The thesis is essentially divided into six main parts, as follows: 
1 Introduction (Chapter 1): This provides a background on contagion and 
introduction to the thesis topic. The scope of the thesis and the research questions 
are identified in this chapter. 
2 Literature (Chapter 2): Definitions, theories and empirical evidence of contagion 
is examined in this chapter. The chapter also discusses financial integration and 
behavioural finance. The chapter provides the foundation for Chapters 3, 4 and 5 
and the theoretical discussion in Chapter 6. 
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• Major objectives of this chapter are to understand financial contagion, its 
guiding theories and to identify gaps from existing studies on financial 
contagion. 
3 Data, methodological notes and hypotheses development (Chapter 3): The type 
of data used and sources of data are the starting point of this chapter. The statistical 
hypotheses tested in the thesis are developed here along with a proposed theoretical 
model of the channels of contagion. 
• Major objective of this chapter is to create a process flow from the type of 
data used, methodology employed, hypotheses developed and expected 
results. 
4 Empirical tests (Chapters 4 and 5): Chapter 4 deals with the first testing 
framework adopted for the thesis, which is the correlation coefficient analysis 
adjusted as per Forbes and Rigobon (2002). This chapter also embodies a novel 
contribution to the thesis in terms of the correlation coefficient analysis. Chapter 5 is 
the application of the second testing framework, which is the dynamic conditional 
correlation analysis based on GARCH (1, 1). This chapter also carries out a test of 
robustness using dummy variables to strengthen the findings of the DCC approach. 
• The objective of these chapters is to test if contagion has occurred during the 
2007-09 financial crisis. 
5 Comparative discussion of results and application of proposed model (Chapter 
6): The findings of Chapters 4 and 5 are discussed in this chapter in a pair-wise 
approach. First the chapter compares the methodologies of Chapters 4 and 5. It then 
examines the evidence for contagion found in the African and developed markets. 




• The objective is to provide an understanding of the results obtained in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
6 Conclusions and future research areas (Chapter 7): The final part of the thesis 
summarises the study. This chapter provides a summary of major findings, a 
summary of novel contributions and identifies potential future research areas. 
• The objective of this chapter is to summarise the whole thesis and identify 



















2 THEORETICAL REVIEW OF LITERATURE1 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The period under study (2007 to 2009) witnessed the worst financial crisis since the 
Great depression of 1929. This event sparked greater interest on the impact of the 
financial crisis of one country on another, otherwise referred to as financial contagion. 
The definition of financial contagion depends largely on what information researchers 
are looking for from their data. As such, definitions vary among researchers. In view of 
this, several definitions of the term and what contagion constitutes are discussed in 
Section 2.2. 
Contagion literature is vast and difficult to systemise. To develop a framework for 
examining this literature, Section 2.3 explores the different theories of contagion in 
terms of the causes of contagion (fundamental and investor behaviour) and channels of 
contagion (asset market, banking and currency channels). This section also provides an 
overview of the different testing methodologies (Section 2.3.3). Fuller details of the 
different methodologies are discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
Although many models of contagion in the literature attempt to explain the process 
using behavioural-finance-related terms such as “herding”, few have attempted to 
explore the differences between contagion events in developing regions such as Africa 
and contagion events in developed markets. In this thesis I explore the possibility that 
any differences found might relate to differences in the extent of financial linkages, or 
integration, between the originating market and the contaminated market. In Section 
                                                 
1 Some elements of the materials in this chapter were originally submitted as part of my post graduate programmes. These relate to 
modules taken in respect to my Master programme, the critical review of literature and also annual performance review panel 




2.4, I therefore examine the literature for evidence of differences in financial market 
integration between developed and emerging markets. I lay a particular focus here on 
examining the literature from an African perspective. 
There is a strong focus in the literature on explaining contagion from a behavioural-
finance-related perspective. For this reason, in Section 2.5, I examine in detail the types 
of behavioural-finance-related decision biases that may potentially have roles to play in 
contagion events during a crisis or periods of uncertainty. Material from this section is 
used in Chapter 6 in my discussion of reasons for possible differences between 
contagion events from the US to developed markets and contagion events from the US 
to emerging/frontier African markets. 
I believe that there is a possible relationship between the strength of financial 
linkages/integration between markets and the types of behavioural bias that may be 
observed during contagion events. For this reason Section 2.6 examines the literature 
for evidence of the relationship between market integration and observed biases. 
Section 2.7 gives a detailed description of the different contagion methodologies or 
testing frameworks that are found in the literature (it should be noted that detailed 
analysis of the econometric issues is left to later chapters). This is done as part of the 
process of identifying the “gap in the literature” that my subsequent research will focus 
on. The section starts with a selection of papers to highlight the development of 
contagion literature and methodology in Section 2.7.1, before providing general 
evidences of contagion in Section 2.7.2. 
This chapter concludes in Section 2.8 by identifying gaps in the literature and the 
research questions that will provide the basis of the thesis. The key focus identified is to 
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examine the differences between contagion events in African markets and contagion 
events in developed markets. The novelty of the thesis is outlined in Section 2.8.  
 
2.2 DEFINITIONS OF CONTAGION 
Despite the growing literature on financial contagion, the term has no universally 
accepted definition. This is particularly seen in the different approaches adopted in 
testing for contagion effect. Rigobon (2001:4) expressed the agreement among 
economists on which one of the crashes (from 1982 to 2000) is a case of contagion. In 
his words, “paradoxically, on the other hand, there is no accordance on what contagion 
means”. In the opinion of Caporale, Cipollini and Spagnolo (2005:477); “there is no 
consensus among economists on what constitutes contagion and how it should be 
defined. For instance, it is argued by some that it is necessary to identify exactly how a 
shock is propagated across countries and that only certain types of transmission 
mechanism (such as “herding” or irrational investor behaviour) constitute contagion”. 
The World Bank2 (2013) proposes several definitions of contagion: the three key 
definitions proposed by the Bank are referred to as: 
1. Broad definition 
2. Restrictive definition 
3. Very restrictive definition 
Broad definition  
“Contagion is the cross-country transmission of shocks or the general cross-country 
spill-over effects”. 
                                                 




“Contagion is the transmission of shocks to other countries or the cross-country 
correlation, beyond any fundamental link among the countries and beyond common 
shocks. This definition is usually referred as excess co-movement, commonly explained 
by herding behaviour”. 
Very restrictive definition 
“Contagion occurs when cross-country correlations increase during “crisis times” 
relative to correlations during “tranquil times”. 
Other definitions of contagion include: 
1. Edwards (2000:879) reports that “Eichengreen and Rose (1999) and Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999) defined contagion as a situation where the knowledge that 
there is a crisis elsewhere increases the probability of a domestic crisis”.  
2. According to Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2000:3): “Contagion is a 
significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to an individual 
country (or group of countries)”. 
3. Forbes and Rigobon (2002:2223) defined contagion effect as “a significant 
increase in cross-market linkages resulting from a shock hitting one country or 
group of countries”, and described the terminology as “shift contagion”. This 
definition has been accepted and cited by many researchers. Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002) explain that if markets exhibit high positive correlations during stable 
periods and follow suit after a shock hitting one market, these might not 
necessitate instances of contagion. A significant increase in the markets’ co-
movement (positive correlations) after a shock must be established to constitute 
contagion, otherwise continued high levels of correlations are attributed to the 
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strong linkages that exist between the markets. This situation is termed 
“interdependence” (Forbes and Rigobon 2002:2224). 
Often researchers classify contagion definitions into two: broad definition and narrow 
definition. 
4. In the opinion of Claessens and Forbes (2004), it is important to differentiate 
between the narrow and broad definitions. They assert that the broader definition 
is most preferred by government officials and policy-makers since it captures the 
exposure of one country to events occurring in other countries in spite of why 
that exposure occurs, whether or not those linkages exist at all times. Claessens 
and Forbes (2004) termed the narrower definition as “shift contagion”. They 
explained that differentiating the definitions is important in measuring the 
effectiveness of interventions and rescue packages. In their view, a short-term 
loan could be effective to support a country and avoid contagion in terms of a 
shift contagion if, for example, a country is affected by the crisis of another but 
only for a short period of time provided there exist few linkages through trade, 
finance and other channels of transmission. In terms of the broader definition, 
where two countries are closely linked through trade and other financial 
linkages, a crisis in one country will require the other country to adjust to the 
shock. Government intervention in this situation except for other reasons would 
only lengthen the adjustment period. 
2.3 THEORIES OF CONTAGION 
The difficulty in identifying the precise definition of contagion has led to a wide variety 
of approaches in the literature. In this section, I begin by developing a cognitive map to 
identify how the different theoretical approaches relate to each other.  
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• Asset Market Channel
• Banking Channel
• Currency Channel
• Cross-market correlation 
coefficient analysis
• DCC-GARCH approach
• Co-integration technique 
















Several theoretical explanations have been given on the existence of contagion. For 
instance, Masson (1998) has emphasised the multiple equilibrium theory where changes 
in investors’ expectations or sentiments can result in the sudden shift of an economy 
from a good to a bad equilibrium. Calvo and Mendoza (2000) developed formal models 
where cost of information may lead investors to follow supposedly informed market 
participants, which will subject the market to rumours resulting in herd behaviour. 
Consequently, this will create swings in financial variables even in countries with strong 
fundamentals. 
There is also the theory of liquidity squeezes investigated by Valdes (1998), where 
international investors in a particular emerging country are faced with difficulties and 
decide to sell off their investments in the same asset class. As a consequence, there will 
be declines in asset prices in other countries that were not originally affected by the 
crisis and that have strong fundamentals. 
Edwards (2000) classified contagion into three theoretical groups: multiple 
equilibriums, where  changes in investors’ expectations or sentiments occur; incomplete 
and/or asymmetric information, where information cost leads investors to follow other 
supposedly informed market participants; and liquidity squeezes, where international 
investors face difficulty in an emerging country which could lead to the sell-off 
securities in the same asset class. 
Investigating the spread of a crisis across borders, Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2003) 
separate contagion theories into three groups – herding behaviour, trade linkages and 
financial linkages – and deduce that financial linkages and investor behaviour are the 
more prominent theories explaining contagion in their paper. Offering another 
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theoretical explanation, Schmukler (2004) identified three classes of contagion theories: 
real linkages, financial linkages, and herd behaviour or unexplained high correlations. 
The market condition problem is another way in which investor behaviour can cause 
contagion. Here, investor behaviour involves changes in expectations that are self-
fulfilling in financial markets that can generate multiple equilibriums (Diamond, 
Douglas and Philip 1983, Obstfeld 1986). For instance, a crisis in an emerging market 
can cause another emerging market to jump from a good to a bad equilibrium. This type 
of investor behaviour even though it is individually rational can create volatility in 
financial markets (Dornbusch, Park and Claessens 2000). 
The theoretical literature on financial contagion is vast and often tedious to deal with. 
To systemise it, the literature is discussed under the following categories: 
1. Channels of contagion: This section helps to clarify the various channels 
through which crisis can be transferred from one market to another. 
2. Causes of contagion: Another way of categorising the literature is in the way in 
which the crisis is transferred. The main two theories of contagion causes are 
fundamental causes and investor behaviour. 
3. Empirical approaches of contagion: Contagion literature can be discussed by 
looking at the different methodologies adopted in analysing market co-
movement. These are the testing frameworks employed in contagion studies. 
Section 2.3.3 gives an introduction to the testing frameworks. Further details are 





2.3.1 Channels of contagion 
Huang (2000) identifies three channels of contagion, which he calls the ABC channels, 
meaning the asset market channel (see also Fry-McKibbin, Martin and Tang 2013, 
Galesi and Sgherri 2009, Beirne and Gieck 2012), the banking channel (Tonzer 2013) 
and the currency channel (Eichengreen and Rose 1999, Lau and Li 2001). These are the 
channels in which risk can be transferred from one market to another. Similar to 
Huang’s (2000) work is the work of Pritsker (2001), who studied contagion through real 
sector linkages, financial market linkages and through the interaction of financial 
institutions and financial markets. More recently, Forbes (2012) reports that the 
channels of contagion can be categorised in terms of: (i) theoretical models (such as 
imperfect information, information cascade and compensation structures) and (ii) actors 
that cause contagion (such as banks and investors). Forbes (2012) decided to divide this 
categorisation into four channels. These are trade, banks, portfolio investors and wake-
up calls. 
For simplicity, the sub-headings below elaborate the categorisation of contagion 
channels according to Huang (2000). 
 
A. ASSET MARKET CHANNEL 
This channel of transmission focuses on contagion as a financial market phenomenon. 
King and Wadhwani (1990) explain this as a situation whereby changes in the price of 
assets in one market reveal imperfect information in the value of assets in other markets; 
not all information is publicly available or arrives at the same time and investor will 
judge on the information available from price changes in other markets. In light of this, 
contagion is perceived as rational attempts to use imperfect information about 
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significant events to equity values. Extending the argument by King and Wadhwani 
(1990), Schinasi and Smith (1999) submitted that contagion does not necessarily depend 
on market imperfections; it can occur from portfolio diversification and leverage. 
Investor will sell off their high-risk assets provided that they are leveraged in order 
diversify their portfolio in response to a shock hitting one asset. 
 
B. BANKING CHANNEL 
The banking system channels explain how a run on one bank can lead to the subsequent 
collapse of other banks and the entire banking system. Most research on this theory 
seems to extend the seminal work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983); their research 
explains the vulnerability of banks to runs. The major problem leading to bank run is 
the imperfection of the interbank market resulting from information asymmetry or 
limited liquidity. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) examined the potential for contagion 
through exposure to a common lender. They found that common bank lenders have 
played a significant role in the spread of currency crises. Their study supports the theory 
that the banking channel outperforms trade channels in explaining the likelihood of 
countries to suffer from contagion effect. 
Aghion, Bolton and Dewatripont (1999) reported that liquidity insufficiency in the 
domestic interbank market may result in contagious bank failures. If a bank run occurs, 
depositors will assume that their interbank market will not have enough liquidity to 
assist and will therefore start to run on their own banks. Huang and Xu (2000) on what 
they called the “lemon” problem explains that information asymmetry among banks 
trading in the interbank market could prevent banks with liquidity surplus from assisting 
other banks in trouble. With improvement in technology providing fairly reachable 
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access to information, one might predict that information asymmetry among banks will 
be limited over time. 
 
C. CURRENCY CHANNEL 
The currency channel is one channel highly connected to the fast spread of crises in the 
Asian region in the late 1990s (Lau and Li 2001). After the Thai baht was devalued on 2 
July 1997, crises were quickly sparked in Malaysia, Indonesia and other East Asian 
countries. Some researchers concluded that the crises led to contagion. Taketa (2004) 
studied contagion of currency crises across unrelated countries and found that currency 
crises can spread from one country to another even if their economic fundamentals are 
not related. Empirical evidence such as Jeanne (1998) reported that mismatch in 
international liquidity creates conditions for currency crises.  
This channel of transmission is often related to the banking channel; as such, they are 
collectively referred to as “twin crises” (see Goldfajn and Valdes 1997). Pesenti and 
Tille (2000) explain that currency crisis adversely affects the banking sector when its 
liabilities are in foreign currency. In the event of devaluation, the value of the liabilities 
expressed in domestic currency increases; because domestic bank lending is normally in 
local currency, devaluation will expose the banks to a sizeable currency mismatch and a 
deterioration of their balance sheets. In a reversal, currency crisis can emerge through a 
burden imposed on the fiscal side of the economy by a banking crisis. Pesenti and Tille 
(2000:8) also submitted: “In the absence of common shocks, a currency crisis can be 
transmitted from one country (A) to another (B) if structural links and international 
spill-overs make the economies of countries A and B interdependent”. This channel is 
the most related to the financial crises of the late 1990s. 
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2.3.2 Causes of contagion 
We have looked at different channels through which certain risks can spread contagion. 
One way of dealing with contagion literature, according to Claessens and Forbes 
(2004), is to classify the literature as the way contagion emerges. Claessens and Forbes 
(2004) classified the causes of contagion into two broad categories: fundamental causes 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart 1998) such as common shock, trade and financial linkages and, 
investor behaviour such as liquidity problems, incentive problems, informational 
asymmetries, market coordination problems and investor reassessment. 
 
A. FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES 
Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005) define contagion as excess correlation above what 
would be expected from economic fundamentals; they clearly identified the 
disagreement on what fundamental means, the nature of country-specific fundamentals 
and the link between fundamentals and asset correlations. In a more recent study, 
Ahnert and Bertsch (2014), “A wake-up call for theory of contagion”, found that the 
reassessment of fundamentals increases the probability of a crisis in one region 
spreading to a second region. They defined contagion as an increase in the probability 
of a financial crisis in the second region after a crisis in the first region (Ahnert and 
Bertsch 2014:1). The main contribution of their study shows that contagion can occur 
after a wake-up call even where fundamentals are found to be uncorrelated. Their study 
follows Forbes (2012), who submits that common examples of contagion are “wake-up 
calls”. Forbes (2012) explains that a crisis in one region is a wake-up call to investors in 
other regions, which leads to the reappraisal of risks. Investors reassess local 
fundamentals, resulting in financial crises in these regions. Both weaker fundamentals 
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(due to the exposure to the initial crisis region) and merely an enhanced perception of 
risk about fundamentals are consistent with the notion of wake-up calls. 
a. Common shock 
Often referred to as global shock and sometimes the monsoonal effect, common shock 
can lead to excess co-movement in asset prices and capital flows (Dornbusch, Park and 
Claessens 2000). It is explained as a situation where a crisis in developed countries such 
as currency devaluation, interest rate changes, a change in commodity prices, and/or a 
reduction in global growth could generate crises in emerging countries and large capital 
outflows. A financial crisis may spread from one country to another as a result of some 
common shocks. For example, “a major economic shift in industrial countries (such as 
changes in interest rates or currency values), a change in commodity prices, and/or a 
reduction in global growth can trigger crises and large capital outflows from emerging 
markets. Any of these common shocks can lead to increased co-movements in asset 
prices and capital flows” (Claessens and Forbes 2004). 
b. Trade 
The likelihood of crisis transferring from the country of origin to another is very high 
with direct trade linkages. Reduction in income as a consequence of financial crisis will 
also lead to a reduction in the demand for imports off-setting the balance of trade by 
also affecting exports and related economic fundamentals in other economies. Trade 
linkages often lead to competitive devaluation among countries (Dornbusch, Park and 
Claessens 2000, Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini 1999). For instance if crisis affects a 
country, forcing its currency to be devalued and thereby reducing the export 
competitiveness of other countries competing in the third market, its trading partners 
will also resort to devaluing their currency to maintain a balance (Dornbusch, Park and 
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Claessens 2000). Successions of competitive devaluation will, however, lead to large 
currency depreciations required by the initial deterioration in fundamentals. Hermandez 
and Valdes (2001) identified trade links and neighbouring effects as the most relevant 
channels of contagion during the Thai and Brazilian crises. An earlier study by 
Eichengreen and Rose (1999) emphasised the international trade channel as the 
financial transmission mechanism in advanced nations. 
c. Financial linkages 
Studies on financial crises and growing market integration are becoming more apparent 
in finance literature (see Wongswan 2003, Gilmore and McManus 2002, Patev and 
Kanaryan 2003, Bekaert, Harvey and Ng 2005). With growing market integration, the 
direct financing effect arising from the crisis of one country can be felt by other 
countries either through reductions in trade credit, foreign direct investment and other 
capital flows. For example, if country A supplies capital to country B, a crisis in country 
A will reduce capital supply in the form of bank lending and other forms of investment 
to country B (Claessens and Forbes 2004). Financial linkages are similar to trade 
linkages. It is demonstrated by Račickas and Vasiliauskaitė (2012:91) that “the debate 
on the relative importance of trade linkages versus financial flows continues to be 
unresolved. However, researchers agree that it is difficult to separate these two ways of 
financial contagion, because most countries that are linked in trade are also linked in 
finance”. 
 
B. INVESTOR BEHAVIOUR 
Contagion can also be caused by factors other than fundamentals, as discussed above. In 
situations where there are no fundamental causes such as common/global shock, 
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contagion is said to be caused by investor behaviour and other financial agents. For 
example, a crisis in one country might make investors in other countries withdraw their 
investments, ignoring the differences in economic fundamentals among countries. This 
type of contagion is strongly linked to herding behaviour (Dornbusch and Claessens 
2000). “Although investor behaviour is often ex-ante, individually rational, it can still 
lead to excessive co-movements in market prices, in the sense that market prices are not 
explained by real fundamentals” (Račickas and Vasiliauskaitė 2011:1178). Identified 
below are five categories of investor behaviour that could cause contagion. 
a. Liquidity problems 
Liquidity problems are often associated with certain types of investors such as investors 
in hedge funds, open-ended fund managers and banks facing calls to margin (Claessens 
and Forbes 2004). This aspect of investor behaviour can cause prices outside the 
country/region of crisis to fall, making it possible for the initial crisis to escalate 
affecting different financial instruments, markets other than the original market of crisis 
and borrowers. Here, investors react to losses in one country by selling their securities 
in other markets to raise cash (Claessens and Forbes 2004). This kind of investor will 
usually keep the assets whose prices have fallen and have become less liquid and sell 
other assets in their portfolio. Emerging markets are also expected to be greatly affected 
with a liquidity problem because of their riskiness. For instance, banks could experience 
a decline in their loan quality to another country and decide to reduce overall riskiness 
of their loan portfolio by reducing exposure to high-risk investments, typically 
emerging markets (Claessens and Forbes 2004). Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2000) 




b. Incentive problems 
Another means of provoking contagion is through incentive structures and changes in 
risk aversion, where investors will sell their holdings in one market as a result of crisis 
in another to maintain certain proportions of a specific stock in their portfolios. In the 
same manner, an increase in risk aversion can cause investors to sell off assets with 
higher risk to closely track their benchmarks. This behaviour can cause tremendous 
decline in prices and even cause currency depreciation if similar benchmarks are used in 
evaluating a large number of investors, or if the investors own huge fixed currency in 
their portfolios (Claessens and Forbes 2004:7).  
c. Informational asymmetries 
Emergence of contagion can also be caused by information asymmetries or the lack of 
perfect information (Claessens and Forbes 2004, Scardovo, Gatti and Ventola 2010, 
Račickas and Vasiliauskaitė 2011). Often, investors do not have a clear picture of the 
situation in another country that could affect the returns on their investment. Lack of 
adequate information can cause investors to think that the crisis of one country can be 
transmitted to other countries, or other countries might be having a similar crisis as 
well. As such, investors could sell their assets in other countries, especially those assets 
similar to the ones in the origin of the crisis, thereby causing contagion (Račickas and 
Vasiliauskaitė 2011). This type of investor behaviour could either be rational or 
irrational. In the presence of weak fundamentals, then investors could rationally assume 
that countries with related structures could face similar problems subsequently leading 
to contagion. Investor behaviour, however, is not only determined by the level of 
information available to them from other countries in their portfolio but also by 
information on the behaviours of other investors in other markets (Calvo and Mendoza 
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1998, Summers 2000, Crotty 2009, Račickas and Vasiliauskaitė 2011). Information is 
not often cheap to process; uninformed investors might find it cheap to follow the 
pattern of informed investors, adding more effects from informational asymmetries on 
investor behaviour (Claessens and Forbes 2004). “This type of herd behaviour may not 
only be an outcome of optimal portfolio diversification, but may also become more 
common as the fixed cost of gathering and processing country-specific information 
increases, the number of countries with investment opportunities grows and the range of 
investors widens. Also, with more diverse investors, establishing individual reputations 
becomes more costly, making it more likely that investors will follow the herd”. 
(Claessens and Forbes 2004:8) 
d. Market coordination problems 
Market condition problem is another way in which investor behaviour can cause 
contagion. Here, investor behaviour involves changes in expectations that are self-
fulfilling in financial markets, which can generate multiple equilibriums. For instance, a 
crisis in an emerging market can cause another emerging market to jump from a good to 
a bad equilibrium characterised by currency devaluation, drops in asset prices, capital 
outflows or debt default. This kind of investor behaviour commonly occurs during a 
bank run. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) explain that this behaviour is individually 
rational among depositors; they could either hold funds or withdraw funds, depending 
on the action of all other depositors. The shift can either be bad for a bank if there is 
bank run, or good if depositors retain their money. In the outbreak of crisis, similar to 
what would happen in a bank run; depositors will quickly withdraw their money from 
another country as they fear that they might not be able claim a limited pool of foreign 
exchange reserve. Although this cause of contagion is regarded as one of the most 
general causes, it is hardly differentiated from fundamental causes because a shift 
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between equilibriums could be caused by a jump in investor expectations; many factors 
are responsible for these jumps, which analysts argue appear to be fundamentals. 
Drazen (1999) reported that political factors may be associated with contagion during 
the European exchange-rate mechanism crisis. This type of investor behaviour even 
though it is individually rational can increase volatility and contagion in domestic 
financial markets (Dornbusch, Park and Claessens 2000). 
e. Investor reassessment 
Contagion may occur as result of investor reassessment. This is what Dornbusch, Park 
and Claessens (2000) referred to as “changes in the rule of the game”. Investors can 
change their assessment of the rules that govern international financing. The case of the 
Russian default in 1998 reflects a concern about other countries following similar 
unilateral policies on how foreign private creditors will be treated or the credibility of 
international financial institutions on bailouts during crisis. This could also lead to an 
increasing concern over the availability of supply of funds from international financing 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund to assist countries facing a liquidity 
crisis. Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2000) reported that the IMF aided several 
countries in late 1998, which raised concerns among economists whether it can cope 
with more liquidity crises. This theory of reassessment could lead to emergence of 
contagion. For instance, if an international financing institution lent to a country in 
crisis, other countries could fear there are insufficient funds to assist them during crisis, 
thereby triggering a run in those other countries; investors will sell off their assets in 
other countries outside the origin of the crisis. Shift in investor sentiment is more likely 
to affect a country with weak financial market fundamentals, usually from shocks that 
occurred elsewhere (Khalid and Rajaguru 2005). 
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2.3.3 Empirical approaches 
Most of the methodologies3 fall under the broad, restrictive or very restrictive 
definitions provided in Section 2.3 above. 
Some of the empirical studies are based on unidentified channels of transmission such 
as the latent factor model, which originated from Sharpe (1964), and co-movement 
analysis, popularised by King and Wadhwani (1990) and later by Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002). Other studies focused on identifying various transmission channels of contagion 
leading to spill-over effects such as financial linkages or trade (Cheung, Tam and Szeto 
2009). The most popular group of theories are those based on co-movement analysis 
with no identified linkages. Cheung, Tam and Szeto (2009) provided a summary of the 
empirical methodologies in Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2:  Summary of empirical methodologies of contagion 
 
Source: (Cheung, Tam and Szeto 2009:8) 
                                                 
3 See Dungey et al (2005a) for an extensive survey on the empirical methodologies of contagion. 
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Forbes and Rigobon (2002) identified four different methodologies for testing contagion 
and the international transmission of crises: 1) cross-market correlation coefficient 
analysis; 2) DCC-GARCH approach; 3) co-integration technique and 4) transmission 
mechanism approach. This categorisation is the most referenced classification in 
contagion literature. In a more recent paper, Forbes (2012) categorised the testing 
frameworks into five: 1) probability analysis; 2) cross-market correlations; 3) VAR 
models; 4) latent factor/GARCH models and 5) extreme value analysis. 
Further methodological details on Forbes and Rigobon’s (2002) classification are 
examined in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
 
2.4 INTEGRATION AND FINANCIAL CRISIS 
As I highlighted in the introduction to this chapter, differences in which contagion 
events spread throughout the world may, in part, reflect differences in the extent to 
which financial markets are linked/integrated. Differences in these relationships are 
explored in this section with a particular focus on US-African market relationships. 
Waves of financial crises from the 1990s to the most recent in 2007-2009 affected both 
developed and developing countries globally. This strongly reinforced the debate on 
financial integration and globalisation (Schmukler 2004, Morales and Andreosso-
O’Callaghan 2010, Mendoza and Quadrini 2010, Asongu 2011b, Mulyadi and Anwar 
2012, Ozkan and Unsal 2012, Rose 2011, Inci, Li and McCarthy 2011, Račickas and 
Vasiliauskaitė 2012, Huang and Chen 2014). Schmukler (2004:39) offers this 
perception of globalisation and integration as: “Financial globalisation is understood as 
the integration of a country’s local financial system with international financial markets 
and institutions. This integration typically requires that governments liberalise the 
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domestic financial sector and the capital account. Integration takes place when 
liberalised economies experience an increase in cross-country capital movement, 
including an active participation of local borrowers and lenders in international markets 
and a widespread use of international financial intermediaries”. Schmukler (2004) 
further asserts that financial globalisation carries risks that are more likely to appear in 
the short run when countries open up, one such risk is financial crisis. This viewpoint is 
provided by Sinha and Pachori (2014:90): “The global market has given a lot to the 
economy of every country. But every growth and success comes with a cost so as the 
globalisation. The integration of various financial markets sometimes has resulted in 
financial crisis and contagion”. 
Collins and Biekpe (2003:1) reported that: “When a market becomes financially 
integrated, companies can access a large new pool of investors. The cost of equity may 
decline and more investment projects are then viable. The result is increased growth and 
employment”. Collins and Biekpe (2003:2) further provided this perspective: “The 
downside to increased global integration is an increased exposure to global crises. If a 
country is highly integrated with global markets, their financial market may suffer a 
dramatic market downturn that may or may not be related to that country’s own 
sovereign risk. Open capital accounts and increased global market integration then seem 
to be a mixed blessing. The positive implications of cost of capital and growth are 
counterbalanced by vulnerability to global economic events. Economic crises usually 
have damaging effects on economic growth and stability. The spread of a crisis would 
then depend heavily on the degree of financial market integration, that the more 
integrated markets are, the higher could be the contagious effects of a shock to another 
country. Countries that are less financially integrated, either by capital controls or the 
32 
 
lack of access to international financing, should then be relatively immune to 
contagion”. 
Schmukler (2004) submitted that countries around the world have become more 
integrated, driven by the potential benefits of financial globalisation such as financial 
sector development. The crises of the 1990s after many countries have liberalised raised 
the question of gains from globalisation; the downside is that countries become more 
exposed to contagion effects from other countries. 
Claessens and Forbes (2004) and Račickas and Vasiliauskaitė (2011) are of the opinion 
that countries are likely to be linked together through periods of weakness or strength as 
financial integration increases around the world. Kassim (2013:80) reports that “a 
review of studies reveals the time-varying aspect of stock market integration and 
indicates that the nature of stock market integration changes due to financial crises. 
Essentially, stock markets tend to move in unison during a down market but exhibit low 
integration during normal times”. For instance, Cuñado, Gil-Alana and Perez de Gracia 
(2008), tested stock market volatility in the US during bull and bear phases. The study 
estimated the order of integration in the squared returns in the S&P 500 over the sample 
period August 1928 to December 2006. The results suggest that in many cases volatility 
is more persistent in the bear market than in the bull market. Tuluca and Zwick (2001) 
studied the effect of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on 13 international stock markets 
and found increased feedback relationships between the stock markets post the financial 
crisis. Cheng and Glascock (2006) investigated stock market linkages between the US 
and three Asian stock markets (China, Hong Kong and Taiwan) before and after the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997. They found increased feedback relationship between the 
markets after the crisis. Earlier, Hon, Strauss, and Yong (2004) tested for contagion 
after the terrorist acts in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. They 
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showed that European markets in particular responded more closely to US market 
shocks in the three to six months after the terrorist attack. 
Kang and Yoon (2011), in their study “The Global Financial Crisis and the Integration 
of Emerging Stock Markets in Asia”, examined whether the global financial crisis of 
2008 has increased the integration of the Chinese stock market with other emerging 
stock markets in Asia. The markets studied are China, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore 
and Taiwan. The findings of Kang and Yoon (2011) suggest that the 2008 financial 
crisis increased the integration of the Chinese stock market into Asian stock markets. 
The strengthening of this integration implies limitation to international gains from 
equity portfolios. 
Kassim (2013) investigated the impact of the 2007 financial crisis on the integration of 
Islamic stock markets in: Indonesia- Jakarta Islamic Stock Index (JAKIS); Kuwait- 
Dow Jones Islamic Index of Kuwait (DJIMKW); Malaysia- Dow Jones Islamic Index of 
Malaysia (DJIMY); Turkey- Dow Jones Islamic Index of Turkey (DJIMTR); Japan- 
Dow Jones Islamic Index of Japan (DJIJ); UK- Dow Jones Islamic Index of the UK 
(DJIUK) and the US- Dow Jones Islamic Index of America (IMUS). The study covers 
the period 9 January 2005 to 10 January 2010, divided into pre-crisis and crisis periods. 
Their findings suggest that the Islamic stock markets studied are not fully sheltered 
from the global financial crisis. However, it is observed that the impact of the crisis on 
the Islamic stock markets has not been as severe as it has been on the conventional 
stock markets. It is also found that Islamic stock markets in developing countries 
provided higher average returns compared with their counterparts in developed 
countries. Analysis of the integration of the markets during the crisis suggests that all of 
the Islamic stock markets are interrelated in the long run. The author suggests that it can 
be explained by the structural similarity produced by the requirement to observe Islamic 
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laws. The author concludes that in the non-crisis period, investors can gain from 
portfolio diversification by considering both developed and developing countries’ 
Islamic stock markets in their investment portfolios. 
In terms of mainly the benefits of international portfolio diversification (Longin and 
Solnik 1995, Harvey 1995, Errunza 1994), there are many studies that deal with 
emerging stock markets, which are said to have lower exposure to world factors, hence 
lower levels of integration. Therefore, they may offer greater opportunities for risk 
diversification across countries. A study by Errunza (1994), suggests that emerging 
markets still offer international money managers opportunities to diversify risk and seek 
higher returns. Harvey (1995) explains that part of the reason why emerging markets 
were a viable asset class in the early 1990s was due to their low correlation with 
developed markets, which enables them to serve as a hedge in a global portfolio. 
However, Harvey (1995) pointed out changing correlations between emerging markets 
and developed markets, as emerging markets become integrated into the global financial 
system. More recently on diversification, Ampomah (2008), in “An empirical 
examination of the interlinkages between African stock markets”, provided evidence 








2.4.1 Integration from Africa’s perspective 
While financial market integration has been extensively documented in developed 
countries and emerging Asian countries, the integration of Africa’s emerging and 
frontier stock markets has received little attention in the literature. Few African markets 
have been included in extensive research (see Harvey 1995, Mobarek, Muradoglu and 
Mollah 2014), especially in the 1990s and early 2000s. This is expected given the size, 
illiquidity and erratic nature of the markets. However, the degree of integration of some 
African markets into global financial markets tends to change over time as a result of 
increased liberalisation and efforts to promote integration of these markets into the 
global economy. Still, researchers such as Hatemi-J and Morgan (2007) in their study of 
17 emerging markets including Nigeria and Zimbabwe found that the liberalisation 
efforts of the markets towards the world market appear insignificant. The Nigerian and 
Zimbabwean markets, in particular, are less globally integrated. Pukthuanthong and 
Roll (2009) found that integration has improved in South Africa, Mauritius and Egypt 
but declined in Ghana, Nigeria and Zimbabwe.  
Bekaert et al. (2011) studied segmentation in equity markets. They found that the US, 
Australia, UK, Switzerland and Denmark are the least segmented countries, while 
Ghana and Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire) are the most segmented emerging markets in 
their sample. Berger, Pukthuanthong and Yang (2011) analysed frontier market equities 
with respect to world market integration and diversification. They found little evidence 
of integration in some African countries including Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria, 
whereas Botswana, Ghana, and Tunisia exhibit some level of positive world market 
integration. Also on integration of African markets, Agyei-Ampomah (2011) found that 
African stock markets except South Africa are still segmented from global markets 
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despite recent structural improvement. They also found low correlation between the 
African markets themselves, for example, the markets within the ECOWAS bloc: these 
are Nigeria, Ghana and Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire). Agyei-Ampomah (2011) also found 
that the markets experienced time-varying integration that has diminished over time 
making the markets more segmented in recent times. 
Boamah (2014) investigates the integration of 11 African markets relative to the world 
and emerging markets over the period March 1997 to January 2013. Boamah’s sampled 
countries include; Botswana, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia and Zambia, Africa value weighted and Africa equally 
weighted. The study shows a stronger relationship between South Africa and the world 
market compared with other African countries, which implies that South Africa is the 
most accessible and integrated market in Africa. The findings also support the 
hypothesis of partially integrated African markets relative to the world and emerging 
markets and that the integration of African markets has changed through time. 
 
2.4.2 Conclusions: the integration of African markets with the US 
Despite the growth of African stock markets, they are still generally perceived to be 
weakly integrated with developed markets. The question arises: 
• Were emerging African markets shielded from the crisis because of their low 
integration with the US? OR 
• Did correlations with African markets increase to the extent that it can be 
described as a contagion event? 
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In this thesis, I argue that the impact of the 2007-09 crisis can be characterised in terms 
of its differing impact on correlations with the US and (i) highly integrated markets and 
(ii) low-integrated markets. 
Highly integrated markets will refer to markets closely related to the US. These are 
likely to be the developed country markets such as Canada, the UK and Germany. 
Low-integrated markets, on the other hand, will include low-growth emerging markets 
or frontier markets. These are represented by African markets in this thesis. 
 
2.5 INVESTOR BEHAVIOUR: A BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE PERSPECTIVE 
In the introduction to this chapter, I argued that differences in levels of financial 
integration between markets could possibly result in contagion events manifesting 
themselves in terms of different behavioural-finance-related decision biases. Bearing 
this in mind, in this section I examine in detail the types of decision biases that could 
potentially manifest themselves in contagion events. Elements of these will then be used 
in Chapter 6 in my discussion of differences in the nature of contagion between the US 
and African markets and contagion between the US and developed markets.  
This section will focus on the impact of behavioural biases on investor behaviour and 





Figure 2.3: Cognitive map showing behavioural biases in stock markets 
































2.5.1 Financial crisis and investor behaviour 
Evanoff, Kaufman and Malliaris (2012), submit that bursting of asset price bubbles 
have generated turmoil in financial markets and the wider economy. It can be argued 
that these bubbles are consequence of behavioural biases in investor behaviour.  
An economy bubble has been identified in financial crises as the most important origin 
of an economic crisis. Popular crises preceded by bubbles include the: Tulip Mania of 
1634 to 1637 in the Netherlands (Garber 1989, Thompson 2006, French 2006, Malkiel 
2010); the South Sea Bubble of 1716-1720 in Britain during the 18th century (Garber 
1990, Thomas 2003, Carswell 1960, Malkiel 2010, Frehen, Goetzmann and 
Rouwenhorst 2011); the Mississippi Bubble of France also in the 18th century(Garber 
1990, Irving 2008, Theirs 1859); Japan’s Bubble Economy of the 1980s (Okina, 
Shirakawa and Shiratsuka 2000, Barsky 2009, Ishikawa 2011, Shimizu and Watanabe 
2010, Malkiel 2010); the dot-com bubble in the 1990s in the US (Kraay and Ventura 
2007, Malkiel 2010); the stock market crash of October 1987 (King and Wadhwani 
1990, Fortune 1993, Shiller, Konya and Tsutsui 1988 and, Yang and Bessler 2006). 
Citing these past crises, one could describe the stock market fall of 2007-2009 across 
the globe as a speculative bubble crash developing from the housing bubble experienced 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s in the US. 
Lin, Dinh and Im (2010:23) have this viewpoint: “But how did the financial crisis in the 
United States spread over to other advanced countries? In order to understand this, first 
we need to note that the credit boom in the years preceding the crisis was not only 
limited to the United States but also to other advanced countries as well. Many of these 
conditions, for example, low credit risk and spreads, very high asset and housing prices 
pre-existed worldwide. On the other hand, many non-US financial institutions invested 
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heavily in subprime backed securities and other complex derivatives. When the housing 
bubble in the United States burst, other advanced countries were not able to escape the 
financial turmoil due to the linkages in the financial sectors. Moreover, uncertainty 
over the exposure of other financial intermediaries further exacerbated the credit crunch 
in other advanced countries”. 
Behavioural finance literature has documented many behavioural biases that affect 
decision-making especially during periods of uncertainty, as experienced during the 
2007-09 financial crisis. For instance, one of the most popular and well-documented 
behavioural explanations for the existence of variability and short trends in financial 
market is the herding behaviour of both individual and private investors.  
Behavioural finance can be described as cognitive psychology and limits to arbitrage 
(Ritter 2003). A number of biases from both cognitive psychology and limits to 
arbitrage influence decision-making. Although this area is fairly new and still evolving, 
its contribution to market behaviour is quite reasonable.  
The four main categories of psychological factors identified by researchers such as 
Hirshleifer (2001:1533-1597) are presented in Figure 2.4 below. The biases4 that are 






                                                 
4 Note that studies have identified more than 100 behavioural risk indicators that affect decision-making (See, for example, 
Ricciardi, 2008). This thesis focused mainly on indicators related to financial markets as reported in several literatures. Biases 
preceded by an asterisk are not identified by Hirshleifer (2001). 
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Figure 2.4: Showing behavioural biases in stock markets 
 
 
2.5.1.1 Heuristic simplification 
“Heuristic simplification arises from the limitations of people’s cognitive powers (such 
as memory and thought). It involves the process of using shortcuts to deal with complex 
decisions. Rules-of-the-thumb are examples of heuristic simplification. Such short cuts 
can produce a tainted perception of the situation being thought about” (Redhead 
2008:26). Heuristic simplification is sometimes referred to as information processing 
errors. When individuals face complex situations such as statistical probability, 
frequency or incomplete information, they utilise a limited number of heuristics to 
reduce the decision to a simpler task (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982). In the 
opinion of Myers (1989:286), “all of us have a repertoire of these strategies based on 
bits of knowledge we have picked up, rules we have learned or hypotheses that worked 
in the past”. Plous (1993:109) submitted that: “For example, it is easier to estimate how 
likely an outcome is by using a heuristic than by tallying every past occurrence of the 
outcome and dividing by the total number of times the outcome could have occurred. In 
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most cases, rough approximations are sufficient (just as people often satisfice rather 
than optimise)”. In other words: “Heuristics are mental shortcuts or strategies derived 
from our past experience that get us where we need to go quickly, but at the cost of 
sending us in the wrong direction” (Ricciardi and Simon (2001:19). Further biases 
under heuristic simplification are discussed below. 
Prospect theory 
The prospect theory is a mathematical alternative to the theory of expected utility 
maximisation. It is advocated under conditions of risk-taking behaviour and uncertainty. 
The theory was developed by the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky in 1979. It is 
noted by Olsen (1997: 63) that the theory “gives weight to the cognitive limitations of 
human decision-makers”, (in Ricciardi 2008:98). Under the assumptions of prospect 
theory, Thaler and Johnson (1990) found that when faced with chronological gambles, 
investors prefer to take risk if they will make money on initial gambling than if they 
lose. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) explained that this theory is based on the notion 
that people are loss-averse, in that they are more concerned with losses than gains. 
Investors’ interpretation of this theory is assigning more significance to avoiding losses 
than making gains. 
The major foundation of the prospect theory is the value function of Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), illustrated in Figure 2.5 below. The figure is a hypothetical value 
function of wealth based on a reference point that determines the subjective impression 
of individuals. If wealth levels fall under the reference point, the function will be 
upward-sloping but if wealth levels fall after the reference point, the value function will 
be downward sloping. The reference point is the comparison level of individuals. For 
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instance, people who are not risk-averse will make risky betting to stay above their 
preferred intended level of wealth. 
Figure 2.5: A hypothetical value function of prospect theory
 
Source: Kahneman and Tversky (1979)5. 
The important result of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) work is that it demonstrates 
people’s attitude towards risks and gains, as it is different from the risk of making a 
loss. “Investors treat outcomes as losses or gains from a subjective reference in two 
aspects: (1) people are risk-averse with their investments which are performing well 
(that is, investment gains) and as a result they have an inclination to cash in their profits 
too early and (2) individuals are risk-seekers for losses (that is, loss-averse) and in order 
to avoid a realised loss they will take a gamble (by avoiding to sell the asset) that could 
result in an even greater loss (Ricciardi 2008:99)”. Further biases related to this theory 
include mental accounting, regret and loss aversion. 
 
 
                                                 




Kahneman and Tversky (1979) explained loss aversion under the prospect theory. It 
shows how decision-makers behave when faced with the issue of choice under 
uncertainty. The theory observes to see if people feel more pain for what they lose than 
pleasure with an equivalent gain, (Rabin 1998, Shalev 1996). Ang, Bekaert and Liu 
(2005) and Fielding and Stracca (2007) suggest that the reference point could change 
over time with the result that loss aversion is accompanied by disappointment aversion. 
“Under loss aversion, an investor has a fixed reference point, which might be the current 
level of stock prices or the current value of personal wealth. Gains and losses are 
evaluated under the reference point (Redhead 2008:37)”. Also from Redhead (2008:37): 
“In the case of loss-aversion the pain of losses exceeds the pleasure of gains, when the 
gains and losses are of the same magnitude. In the case of disappointment aversion the 
pain or pleasure is brought about by deviations from expectations. The disappointment 
related to outcomes below expectations is stronger than the pleasure related to outcomes 
that exceed expectations”. The value function in Figure 2.5 above shows the sharp 
asymmetry relationship between the importance investors put on gains and losses. 
Loss aversion explains the inclination investors have towards retaining losing stocks 
while selling the stocks that are making gains too early. Shefrin and Statman (1985:778) 
called this investor behaviour the “disposition effect”. Scott, Stumpp and Xu (1999) 
explains that risk in losses will make investors hold onto the stock for too long even 
when the price declines, thereby causing the price of the stock with negative momentum 
to overstate its fundamental values. In conclusion, if we view loss aversion in the 
context of the 2007-09 financial crisis, we would expect that investors might take a long 




Shefrin and Statman (1985) suggested the disposition effect. This is explained by 
investors’ attitude to sell stocks that have gained in value and hold unto those that have 
lost in value. The disposition effect is found to be consistent with the prospect theory of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), which suggests that investors choose a value as a 
reference point and make decisions based upon gains or losses from that value. As 
explained above, the prospect theory requires investors to be risk-averse concerning 
gains, but risk-seeking concerning losses.  
Odean (1998a) found evidence of the disposition effect in all months except December 
when examining the reluctance of investors in realising their losses. Furthermore, 
Odean (1999) concluded that excessive trading behaviour of investors’ is a result of the 
disposition effect. More recently, Barber et al. (2007) found evidence of the disposition 
effect in the Taiwan Stock Exchange, where investors are more likely to sell stock 
showing gains than those showing loss, although institutional investors, in particular in 
mutual funds, did not show evidence of the disposition effect. 
 
Anchoring 
Anchoring is made popular in behavioural finance literature from the work of Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974). This is a phenomenon whereby people’s decisions are highly 
influenced. Redhead (2008:27) reports: “People are heavily influenced by past or 
suggested prices when forming judgements about appropriate prices. The past or 
suggested price acts as an anchor that becomes the basis for forming a judgement”. 
According to Ricciardi and Simon (2001), anchoring explains the strong inclination we 
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all have for holding on to a belief that may or may not be truthful and using it as a 
reference point for future decisions.  
Shiller (1998:9) reported: “Values in speculative markets, like the stock market, are 
inherently ambiguous. Who would know what the value of the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average should be? Is it really ‘worth’ 6,000 today? Or 5,000 or 7,000? Or 2,000 or 
10,000? There is no agreed-upon economic theory that would answer these questions. In 
the absence of any better information, past prices (or asking prices or prices of similar 
objects or other simple comparisons) are likely to be important determinants of prices 
today”. 
In Shiller’s (2008) opinion, “the anchoring phenomenon may help to explain certain 
international puzzles observed in financial markets”. For example, in the late 1980s, US 
investors who thought that the Japanese stock price-earnings ratios were shockingly 
high may have been influenced by the readily available anchor of US price-earnings 
ratios, which are much lower. However, in the mid-1990s, many US investors felt that 
the Tokyo market was no longer overpriced, though the price-earnings ratios remained 
higher than the US (Shiller, Kon-Ya and Tsutsui 1996). This is attributed to the widely 
publicised high Tokyo price-earnings ratios of the late 1980s, which appear to be the 
anchor in this case. 
Applying the concept of anchoring to the recent financial crisis, it can be described as 
the situation where market participants have become used to the crisis as it develops and 
they anchor on their initial position. As such, people are not making any effort to 
explore the market and therefore reductions in trading could be expected. This will 





Fischer (1986) divides traders into information traders (those who use relevant 
information) and noise traders. In financial market literature, noise is referred to as 
immaterial information on market prices causing them to depart from their true values. 
Shefrin and Statman (1994) suggest that information trading is driven by the 
fundamental values of stocks as well as securities, while noise trading is driven by 
sentiment. In other words: “Noise trading is trading based on sentiments rather than 
market fundamentals, and such trading can cause stock prices to deviate from 
fundamental values for long periods of time” (Redhead 2008:249). Redhead (2008:545) 
also reports that Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), “suggested that noise traders, as 
a result of misinterpretation of information, see patterns where there are none”. 
Investors who have no access to inside information in the stock market act irrationally 
on information provided through noise trading. This can lead to herd behaviour when 
investors operate as a crowd. 
Research has shown that noise traders have a substantial impact on price movement. For 
instance, bullish noise trading can push prices higher as fundamental values fall while 
bearish trading can push prices down even when fundamental values increase. Noise 
traders make use of irrelevant information such as rumours to draw investment 
decisions. Rumour is highly vindictive as professional traders fall prey. If trading on 
rumours is regarded as noise trading, then market professionals are sometimes noise 
traders. Pressure to act speedily prompts anxiety and stress, which leaves people 
vulnerable to accepting the rumour. For instance, competent professionals might not 
have time to check for the accuracy of rumours. As such, they might engage in noise 
trading (Redhead 2008). Rumours emerge in conditions of uncertainty, which is quite 
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often in the financial market in particular when emotions, especially feelings of fear, are 
high (Kimmel 2004). 
 
Representativeness 
The representativeness heuristic is one of the characteristics of intuitive probability, 
identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) which explains the possibility of investors 
to track the market. In the opinion of Redhead (2008), representativeness helps in 
explaining why many are found to extrapolate price movements. Investors tend to 
believe that if prices have been rising in the past, then they will continue to rise. If, on 
the other hand, prices have been falling then they will continue to do so. Redhead 
(2008) further elaborated that the concept of representativeness suggests that investors 
see investments with a current rise in price as a representative of long-term successes 
and those with price falls as a representativeness of losses. This explains a pattern of 
trading where investors buy when prices are rising, thereby causing further price rises, 
and sell when prices are falling and the momentum makes prices fall further. 
Representativeness explains the emergence of opinions on price trends and through 
affecting trading those opinions become self-fulfilling. Determination of such opinion 
results in bubbles or crashes that can be explained by conservatism (where people are 
unwilling to change their opinion in the light of new information) and confirmation 
biases (where people pay attention only to information that supports their opinions). 
“Human beings utilise mental shortcuts that make it complicated to analyse new 
investment information accurately without bias. Representativeness reflects the belief 
that a member of a category (for example, risky behaviour or hazardous activity) should 
resemble the cause that produced it” (Ricciardi 2008:100). Earlier, Ricciardi and Simon 
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(2001:21) purported: “Representativeness is but one of a number of heuristics that 
people use to render complex problems manageable. The concept of representativeness 
proposes that humans have an automatic inclination to make judgements based on the 
similarity of items, or predict future uncertain events by taking a small portion of data 
and drawing a holistic conclusion”. 
Representativeness bias has the tendency to make people see patterns in a random data 
and feel comfortable about the pattern. Cooper, Dimitrov and Rau (2001) investigated 
the companies with.com or.net added to their names between June 1998 and July 1999 
(the period of the internet stock bubble). They found that investors saw companies 
with.com or.net in their names as representative of prospective companies. 
Another psychological bias closely related to representativeness is narrow framing. 
When investors focus on short-term investment, they are said to be narrow framing. For 
instance, investor might chose to ignore the current behaviour of share prices because it 
is centred on long-term investment. Redhead (2008:550) reports that: “This is consistent 
with the emergence of stock price bubbles and crashes. Recent price increases cause 
expectations of future increases and investors buy shares. This pushes prices up further, 
and hence generates an expectation of more increases and leads to yet more buying. 
There is an upward spiral, often referred to as positive feedback trading or ‘chasing the 
market’. There is a corresponding, but opposite, pattern as the market falls”. 
 
Status quo bias 
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) observed the existence of a status quo bias (also 
known as an endowment bias). People have a tendency to maintain the investments they 
already have and exhibit some reluctance to change them regardless of changes in their 
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environment. Status quo bias increases as the number of investment options increases. 
“In sum, status quo bias is pervasive. It is a natural consequence of many well-known 
psychologically based deviations from the rational choice model. As a result the 
canonical choice model is unlikely to provide a reliable explanation for a substantial 
range of behaviour, including economic behaviour” (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 
1998:41). Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1998) identified further biases that will make 
people feel the status quo bias. These include regret avoidance, drive for consistency, 
self-perception theory and illusion of control. However, these biases are not necessarily 
present at the same time to generate the status quo bias.  
In their experimental test on behaviour in a simplified stock market, Brown and Kagel 
(2009) tested for status quo bias, the disposition effect and the ostrich effect. Their 
experiment found a robust status quo bias across individuals, over time and independent 
of a stock’s performance. They assert that status quo bias is present in an environment 
with a very low cost of identifying better performing stocks. 
 
2.5.1.2 Social effect/Networking Effect  
Social effects produce biases from social influence. The degree to which a person is 
influenced by the actions and thinking of others is related to a number of social factors 
(Schachter et al. 1986). “Social influence is strongest in conditions of uncertainty and 
when self-confidence is low. It is also strong with substantial changes in circumstances, 
and rises with the extent that previously held views are demonstrated to be incorrect” 
Redhead (2008:32). 
In an earlier experimental work, Asch (1952) found that people are inclined to follow 
others even if they felt that the people they are following are wrong. He referred to this 
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behaviour as “conformity”. Shiller and Pound (1989) found that when investors pay 
attention to a stock, often more than 50% of the time it is because another person 
mentioned the stock to them. And before buying the stock, the investor is also likely to 
speak about the stock to others. Smith (1991) identified “social influence”, which may 
imply following the leader. Social influence could be stronger when there is the feeling 
of uncertainty and when individuals find no direct personal experience. Social effect is 
strongly associated with networking effect. For instance, those who are well connected 
in a social network will be listened to by numerous other people; this gives the well 
connected people social influence. Social influence itself is affected by other 
characteristics such as status, expertise and social mood. The combination of these 
features can be described as socionomics (Redhead, 2008). 
 
Herding 
Herd entails “everybody doing what everyone else is doing even when their private 
information suggests doing something quite different” (Banerjee 1992:798). Redhead 
(2008) explains that when uniformity exists concerning the market’s direction, there is 
the likelihood that there will be market movement towards that direction. However, 
herding could be quite slow and persistent, thereby causing some stock market bubbles 
to take years before developing (Hwang and Salmon 2007). “Speculative bubbles, like 
those seen in the NASDAQ into 2000, the real estate market into 2006, the stock market 
into 2007, and the commodity markets into 2008, such bubbles are clearly not the result 
of independent, objectives, and rational investors’ research on new fundamental 
developments. Such bubbles are the result of herding behaviour. Behavioural 
economists defined such behaviour as a social contagion of emotions causing collective 
euphoria or fear” (Mackay, United-ICAP 2011:4). 
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Furthermore, the theory of herding distinguishes between different types. For instance, 
Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001:281) separate herding into intentional (sentiment 
driven) and unintentional or spurious herding (fundamental driven). They explained that 
spurious herding, for instance, could arise as a reaction to sudden increase in interest 
rates which results to stocks becoming less attractive investment. In such situations, 
investors might prefer to hold small percentage of stocks in their portfolio indicating 
that investors are reacting to the common public information on interest rates increase. 
Intentional herding on the other hand reflects the imitation of other individuals which 
results in buying or selling of stocks irrespective of previous information (Kremer 
2010). According to Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001:283), intentional herding could be 
caused by “informational cascades, reputation-based herding, or the compensation 
systems for the portfolio managers”. In a similar fashion  Lutje and Menkhoff (2003:5) 
reported 3 reasons of intentional herding: “Imperfect information in markets where 
participants deliberately copy others assuming the others have relevant news about 
investment; Individual’s inherent preference for conformity and; asset managers face 
incentives for reputational herding due to their typical compensation scheme”. 
Although the distinction between intentional and unintentional herding is very 
important, Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001:281) assert that empirical distinction 
between the two is “easier said than done and may even be impossible, since typically, a 
multitude of factors have the potential to affect an investment decision”. For instance, 
Kodres and Pritsker (1996) examined the intensity of herding using probit analysis. The 
authors made no distinction between intentional and unintentional herding. However, 
researchers such as Kremer (2010) found evidence of unintentional herding from their 
data on the German DAX 30. Kremer (2010) attributed this finding to the sharing of the 
same preference and investment style as supposed to less information availability or 
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information asymmetry. Blasco, Corredor and Ferreruela (2011) tested intentional 
herding behaviour of market participants in the Spanish stock market. They first 
analysed the whole market and a selection of large trading volume stocks, then they 
analysed heavily traded stocks using both intraday data and daily data. They found out 
that the Spanish market, especially the heavily traded stocks exhibit tendencies 
consistent with imitation. They further submitted that intentional herding is better 
revealed using intraday data instead of overall market data and lower frequency data. 
Other papers which focused on intentional and unintentional herding behaviour include: 
Walter and Weber (2006); Malik and Elahi (2014); Holmes, Kallinterakis and Ferreira 
(2011). 
Herding among fund managers has been importantly and extensively documented 
because of the important role institutional investors have on the performance and 
development of stock exchanges. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) carried out a 
study on quarterly portfolio holdings of 769 tax-exempt equity funds in the United 
States and reported that, in their sampled portfolio holdings, fund managers do not show 
evidence of significant herding behaviour. However, they found evidence that herding 
could be more common in stocks of small companies than those of large companies. 
Henker J., Henker T. and Mitsios (2003) described herding as an intraday phenomenon. 
They explained that on the release of information into the market, traders being unsure 
of what line of action to take may turn to each other. At intraday levels, traders cannot 
make rational decisions because they lack the time to seek complex models in 
predicting future price movement. Rational individuals are not immune to this herd-like 
behaviour when they take into account the judgements of others. Although it looks like 
a rational behaviour, it creates a group behaviour that is irrational and causes market 
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fluctuations. Investors with no right to inside information act irrationally on noise as if it 
were a useful piece of information (Thaler 1993). 
In financial contagion literature, herding behaviour seems to be generally accepted as a 
major cause of contagion (Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh 2003, Edwards 2000, 
Claessens and Forbes 2004). Information asymmetry stands at the root of herding 
behaviour, where information becomes costly and investors have to rely on other 
supposedly informed market participants (Edwards 2000). Additionally, investor 
behaviour could also be determined by information about the behaviours of other 
investors in other markets (Claessens and Forbes 2004). Other cognitive biases are also 
found to result in herding behaviour during a crisis or periods of uncertainties. These 
include information cascade and noise trading. 
 
Information cascade 
Cipriani and Guarino (2010) explained this bias as a situation where market agents do 
not use their own private information and herd, and that it can spread from one market 
to another causing financial contagion. To demonstrate this bias, they studied an 
economy in which privately informed traders’ trade information with a market maker. 
They assert that traders trade for two reasons: (1) an information advantage over the 
market because of private information and (2) they gain from trading. Their finding 
suggests that as trades accumulate, the gains derived from trade overwhelm the 
informational advantage. As a consequence, traders act independently of information on 
the asset value, creating an information cascade. In the event of information cascade, all 
informed traders do the same thing. That is they herd by following the market, or go 
against the market resulting in contrarianism.  
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Cipriani and Guarino’s (2010) study focused on correlated assets, as informational spill-
overs are expected in such assets. Information cascade in one market can cause a 
cascade in another, thereby pushing prices even in the long run away from 
fundamentals. Cipriani and Guarino (2010) described the long-lasting spill-over as a 
form of contagion. 
 
2.5.1.3 Self-deception 
“Self-deception is the process whereby people exaggerate their abilities. They think that 
they are better than they really are” (Redhead 2008:24). Self-deception is also identified 
by Redhead as a bias that can be distorted by memory and planning. “Self-deception is a 
trait that some evolutionary theorists believe was actively selected for when humans 
were evolving. The argument is that sometimes it is easier for an individual to deceive 
others if he genuinely is fooled himself” (Coval, Hirshleifer and Teoh 2004:6). The 
most popular biases under this are the overconfidence bias, conservatism bias, the 
hindsight bias, optimism or self-enhancement bias, outcome bias, confirmation bias and 
illusion of control. Overconfidence and conservatism are discussed below. 
 
Overconfidence  
In the opinion of Daniel and Titman (2000), overconfidence is one of the most 
documented biases in literature of behavioural finance. It is a psychological bias that 
arises partly from self-attribution bias. It create belief that investors can predict the 
market. There is a tendency for investors to regard successes as arising from their 
expertise while failures are due to bad luck or the actions of others, resulting in 
excessive confidence in one’s own powers of forecasting. To quote Myers (1989:293) 
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on the decision-making process: “Our use of quick and easy heuristics when forming 
judgements and our bias towards seeking confirmation rather than refutation of our 
ideas can give rise to the overconfidence phenomenon, an overestimation of the 
accuracy of our current knowledge”. 
In the context of stock market trading, rational investors obtain information in order to 
increase their level of expected utility. Overconfident investors in this case involve 
themselves in more trading activity and by doing so they lower their expected utilities, 
given that the higher the trading level, the lower the expected returns (Odean 1998b). 
Overconfident investors also tend to hold very risky portfolios than rational investors 
will do when they are both on the same level of risk aversion (Odean 1998b). This bias 
is regarded as a good instrument for explaining the irrationality of investors. 
Another category of overconfidence bias is the notion of “it won’t happen to me”. This, 
as asserted by Ricciardi (2008:98), is where: “Individuals consider themselves 
invulnerable to specific risky activities or events on an individual basis while they 
would readily concede to these risks on a societal level”. Another bias closely related to 
overconfidence is the illusion of control. In this case, investors behave as if they are in 
control of making a good forecast where it is not possible. This is associated with 
underestimation of risk. 
 
Conservatism 
Edwards (1968) identified the phenomenon of conservatism. This explains the 
reluctance of people to change their opinions when new information is introduced. 
“Fear of change, and fear of the process of change, can prevent action. This is 
particularly so if there is uncertainty about costs and benefits of a decision” (4E Journal 
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2010:9). Conservatism offers an explanation as to why small investors delay investing 
until the market has risen for a period of time. Small investors often invest just before 
the market reaches its peak and sell before it troughs (Redhead 2008). Conservatism and 
anchoring are similar and often difficult to distinguish, for instance, the attitude of 
people towards changes; in other words anchoring to what they already have and are 
used to can be defined as conservatism. 
 
2.5.1.4 Emotions and moods 
The role of social mood in behavioural finance plays a major part in decision-making. 
Forgas (1995) submitted that emotions influence decisions on complex and uncertain 
matters. Redhead (2008) asserts that when people interact socially, they not only receive 
information and opinions, moods and emotions are also received in the process of 
interaction. He explains that moods and emotions could affect decision-making even 
without being related to the decision. Redhead (2008) further distinguishes between 
moods and emotions, as emotions are related to a particular person, situation or object 
and occur mostly on a short-term basis, whereas moods have no particular target or 
stimulus and can persevere for long periods. Moods can be grouped under either 
positive or negative moods. Positive moods are linked with emotions such as happiness, 
hope and optimism while negative moods are linked with emotions such as antagonism, 
fear and pessimism.  
Nofsinger (2005) submitted that social mood is reflected in stock markets rapidly and as 
such the market develops into an indicator of social mood. Nofsinger (2005) referred to 
the impact of mood on financial decision as the “misattribution bias”. Further biases 
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under emotions and moods are familiarity bias (ambiguity aversion) and decision 
fatigue, discussed below. 
 
Familiarity bias (ambiguity aversion) 
Familiarity bias, alternatively called ambiguity aversion, suggests that investors prefer 
to invest in companies that they feel they understand. Whittlesea (1993:1235) suggests: 
“A feeling of familiarity is the sine qua non of remembering. Judgements about one’s 
personal past that are not accompanied by a feeling of familiarity do not feel like 
remembering, but instead feel like guessing or problem-solving. In contrast, a feeling of 
familiarity is usually sufficient to make one feel one is remembering, whether or not the 
feeling is accompanied by recall of the detail of a prior experience”. Ricciardi (2008) 
defined the familiarity bias from a risk perspective as an inclination or prejudice that 
alters an individual’s perception. This insinuates that people are often more tolerant of 
what they know with specific circumstances. Risks that are familiar are less feared than 
unfamiliar risk; this explains people’s reaction to unexpected information. 
Also from a behavioural finance point of view, Baker and Nofsinger (2002:101) stated 
that: “People often prefer things that have some familiarity to them. Consequently, 
investors tend to put too much faith in familiar stocks. Because those stocks are 
familiar, investors tend to believe that they are less risky than other companies or even 
safer than a diversified portfolio”. “Over 90 per cent of the equity investments of 
investors in the US, UK and Japan is in companies in their own countries. This home 






Behavioural finance explains decision fatigue as a phenomenon whereby “prolonged 
periods of decision-making deplete investors’ mental energy, resulting in poor decision 
or decision paralysis” (Opiela, CFA Institute Magazine 2012: 35). 
Decision fatigue came into limelight when it was documented among a group of judges 
presiding over parole hearings for Israeli prisoners (Lo 2011, Green 2011 and, Tierney 
2011). During each day of hearings, there were two food breaks that divided the day 
into three sessions. Researchers found evidence of a pattern over these sessions. At the 
start of the session, it was found that the judges gave favourable parole decisions up to 
65% of the time. These parole decisions would systematically decline to nearly 0% by 
the end of each day. It appears that difficult decisions can be mentally taxing in some 
manner, so as these sessions wore on, the judges became more inclined to avoid such 
decisions by denying parole (Lo 2011:34-35). 
From the perspective of an investor, it was submitted by Kevin Gardiner (COMPASS 
2012:19): “For either fiscal or monetary policy to be effective, investors need to 
maintain their willpower to stay invested or have the emotional resolve to get invested 
when long-term buying opportunities present themselves. Unless you have set up 
investment strategies in periods of calm this can be difficult. You will likely be faced 
with countless nervous moments where you have to decide what to do with your 
investments. Each time you face this decision your willpower is eroded slightly and 
decision fatigue can set in. Fatigued investors have two options: either stop following 
the markets’ response to current events so closely to reduce the potential for further 
decision fatigue or, get out of the markets to remove the main source of fatigue. The 
first requires emotional resilience and is the more likely reaction of high-composure 
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investors. The second is more typical of low-composure investors, who are more 
sensitive to short-term market movements. Either way, the fatigued investor is unlikely 
to commit more money to risky assets no matter how attractively priced from a longer-
term perspective”. 
In conclusion, we can argue that the 2007-2009 global financial crisis might have left 
investors fatigued. The long nature of the crisis will mean that investors were trying to 
make decisions that would be favourable to them. As the crisis extended, investors 
became exhausted and eventually they stopped making decisions. This fatigue, I 
speculate, could lead to other cognitive behaviours such as anchoring, conservatism and 
representativeness, and even loss aversion. 
 
2.5.2 Conclusion and understanding of behavioural biases 
Papers in the behavioural finance literature usually use specific bias types to explain 
specific behavioural shocks. Few, however, attempt to apply the types of potential 
biases identified by Hirshleifer (2001) as relating to financial crises. And none, to my 
knowledge, attempt to distinguish between the impact of a single crisis in highly 
integrated markets and low-integrated markets. This is what I will do in this thesis in 
Chapter 6 after examining, from an econometrics perspective, whether contagion has 







2.6 BEHAVIOURAL BIASES, MARKET STRUCTURE AND FINANCIAL 
INTEGRATION 
I stated in the introduction to this chapter that I believe there is a possible relationship 
between the strength of financial linkages/integration between markets and the types of 
behavioural bias that may be observed during contagion events. Although evidence in 
this respect is quite limited in the literature, a number of papers can be cited that suggest 
that this may indeed be the case. These are considered in this section. 
A number of articles have emphasised channels of contagion such as the asset market, 
banking and currency channels (Fry-McKibbin, Martin and Tang 2013, Tonzer 2013, 
Lau and Li 2001) and the two broad causes of contagion: fundamental causes and 
investor behaviour (Claessens and Forbes 2004, Dornbusch, Park and Claessens 2000). 
Others have emphasised that contagion is a result of integration and that during crisis 
integration increases (Collins and Biekpe 2003, Kassim 2013, Cheng and Glascock 
2006). The behavioural concept of investor behaviour has also provided views on how 
the decisions of market participants can lead to contagion effect, in particular herding 
behaviour (Edwards 2000, Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh 2003, Claessens and Forbes 
2004). What these literatures fail to buttress extensively are: 
1. The identification of behavioural biases that are more prominent in different 
groups of markets (developed and emerging); 
2. Market integration and the role of behavioural biases during a financial crisis. 
These two points are very rarely documented and have posed a serious challenge to this 
thesis. However, because of the low levels of financial integration or high market 
segmentation between US and African financial markets (Hatemi-J and Morgan 2007, 
Berger, Pukthuanthong and Yang 2011, Bekaert et al. 2011) as documented above in 
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Section 2.4.1, I argue that if contagion is found in African markets, it is best attributed 
to behavioural biases such as herding or information asymmetries during period of 
uncertainty. Therefore, this thesis will contribute to behavioural literature on African 
markets. As discussed in Section 2.4, financial crises prompted a surge of literature on 
integration as a mechanism of crisis transmission (Schmukler 2004, Morales and 
Andreosso-O’Callaghan 2010, Mendoza and Quadrini 2010, Asongu 2011b, Mulyadi 
and Anwar 2012, Račickas and Vasiliauskaitė 2012). As integration refers to 
liberalisation of financial systems, I argue that in the presence of integrated markets 
such as the US and other developed markets, the channels of contagion are likely to be 
both the banking system and financial markets (see Pritsker 2001 and Huang 2000 on 
channels of contagion). My argument to support this is that the 2007-09 crisis had it 
most prominent manifestation in banking and stock market crashes around the world, 
particularly in countries that are exposed to the US. In view of the differences in the 
level of integration between US and African markets and US and other developed 
markets, this thesis also argues that differences may be reflected in the way in which 
behavioural factors identified in Section 2.5.1 have an impact on the different group of 
markets. 
One major link identified across the behavioural biases discussed in Section 2.5.1 is that 
information plays a major role in most types of investors’ behaviour. This finds support 
in Schmukler (2004) who reports: “Financial globalisation leads to a better financial 
infrastructure, which mitigates information asymmetries and, as a consequence, reduces 
problems such as adverse selection and moral hazard”.  
The notion of crowd psychology, herding behaviour, is the most documented bias 
associated with contagion effect. A study of herding in the market indices of the 
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developed and emerging financial markets of Asia and Latin America found higher 
levels of herding in emerging markets than in developed markets and higher correlations 
of herding between two markets belonging to the same region compared with two 
markets in different regions (Wang 2008). Chen et al. (2005) studied whether emerging 
market investors are more or less inclined towards behavioural biases and trading 
mistakes, compared with developed market investors. They took this approach because 
many studies have documented heuristics in relation to developed markets. The authors 
found that Chinese investors make trading mistakes, they suffer from the disposition 
effect and they exhibit representativeness bias. In a comparison of Chinese individual 
investors and American individual investors, Chen et al. (2007) found that Chinese 
individual investors are more overconfident than US investors but that individual 
investors from both countries suffer from a disposition effect and representativeness 
bias. Chen et al. (2007) assert that people raised in Asian cultures exhibit more 
behavioural biases than those raised in the US. Khawaja, Bhutto and Naz (2013) studied 
seven human biases and market development on the Pakistani stock market. The biases 
investigated include overconfidence, confirmation bias, loss aversion, anchoring, 
framing bias, status quo and myopic loss. Their results show that most of the biases are 
significant and have a positive relationship with market development. Only loss 
aversion provided a negative insignificant relationship with the market. The authors 
could not conclude that biases have an impact on market development. 
A major bias that has been documented in relation to financial integration is the equity 
home bias. Empirical evidence such as Tesar and Werner’s (1998) has shown that in 
developed countries (presumably where integration is higher) behavioural biases such 
as the home country bias are decreasing. Coeurdacier and Rey (2011:1) report that 
despite better financial integration, equity home bias has not reduced much and it was 
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found that: “in 2007, US investors still hold more than 80% percent of domestic 
equities, which is much higher than the share of US equities in the world market 
portfolio and the home bias in equities is observed in all developed countries”. Baxter 
and Jermann (1997) earlier submitted that despite the growing integration of 
international financial markets, investors do not significantly diversify internationally. 
Hatemi-J and Morgan (2007), who found no increase in integration despite efforts to 
liberalise in Nigeria and Zimbabwe, suggest that the home bias hypothesis or 
informational inefficiency might be the reason for their findings.  
Some biases were mainly discussed in terms of their impact in specific country markets 
without making a comparison between emerging and developed markets. For instance, 
behavioural biases of disposition effect and overconfidence and their impact on the 
Estonian stock market was analysed by Čekauskas and Liatukas (2011). Other studies 
analysed investors’ attitudes in the presence of behavioural biases. For example, 
Kudryavtsev, Cohen and Hon-Snir (2013) studied the effect of availability heuristic, 
disposition effect, gambler’s fallacy, herd behaviour and hot-hand fallacy on the 
magnitude of stock market decision-making and the cross-sectional correlations 
between the magnitude of these biases for both professional and non-professional 
investors. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) found that people do not change because 
of the status quo bias. One major concern about the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) 
submitted by Magnus (2008) is the conservatism bias. Magnus (2008) reported that the 
GSE has been in existence for nearly two decades but the total number of enlistment 
companies shows an average of two enlistments per year, which implies that firms still 
prefer to use the traditional financing institutions, especially the banks, rather than the 
stock market. Babajide and Adetiloye (2012) found strong evidence that 
overconfidence, loss aversion, framing, status quo biases and myopic loss aversion exist 
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in the Nigerian security market but their result further shows the negative relationship 
between the biases and the market. As investors exhibit behavioural bias, the market 
depreciates in value. Evidence of stock market overreaction is found in South Africa by 
Page and Way (1992/1993). The authors also reported that investors pay too much 
attention to dramatic news. 
 
2.7 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF CONTAGION 
Section 2.7 gives a detailed description of the different contagion methodologies or 
testing frameworks that are found in the literature (it should be noted that detailed 
analysis of the econometric issues is left to later chapters). This is done as part of the 
process of identifying the gap in the literature that my subsequent research will focus 
on. This section is divided into two. Section 2.7.1 identifies key papers in detail. These 
papers reflect on some contagion theories and show the development of contagion 
methods of estimation over time. Section 2.7.2 provides general evidences of contagion. 
 
2.7.1 Major papers 
 
1. King and Wadhwani (1990) 
The first major study that popularised contagion effect was the seminal work of King 
and Wadhwani (1990). This forms the basis of the contagion model based on correlation 
coefficients analysis. The study is based on changes in correlations coefficients between 
markets before and after a shock. If the correlation coefficients increase significantly 
after a crisis, contagion is said to have occurred. The authors pointed out that it is not 
surprising for markets in different countries to be correlated and asserted that a standard 
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asset-pricing model allows for such correlation. King and Wadhwani (1990) reported 
that to interpret data within a framework that assumes all agents are fully informed 
(Walrasian equilibrium) is inadequate because of the difficulty associated in identifying 
fundamental links to a crash and the high instability of correlations between markets 
during a crisis.  
King and Wadhwani (1990) tested for contagion in the stock markets of New York 
(Dow Jones index), London (Financial Times 30 index) and Japan (Nikkei Dow index) 
during the 1987 US market crash. The purpose of their study was to find out why, 
during the 1987 crash, all stock markets despite being in different regions and having 
varied economic circumstances fell at the same time. Their study examined rational 
expectations and price equilibrium, and modelled contagion as a result of rational 
attempts to use imperfect information about significant events to equity values. They 
explained that with rational expectations, relevant information is revealed to agents in 
market prices as long as the information structure is simple. In such a situation, markets 
are said to be information-efficient, where prices reflect fundamentals. If, however, the 
information structure is complex, it will result in a not-fully revealing equilibrium. 
Consequently, in a not-fully revealing equilibrium, price changes in one market depend 
on price changes in the markets of other countries by means of structural contagion 
coefficients. This explains that a market’s mistake or idiosyncratic changes can be 
transmitted to other markets, thereby causing an increase in volatility. As high volatility 
is associated with an increase in correlations, it is this feature that provided King and 
Wadhwani (1990) with the explanation of the uniform decline in equity prices around 
the world during the 1987 crash. 
67 
 
Their research aimed primarily to explore the possibility of contagion effect as a result 
of a not-fully revealing equilibrium. To this effect, they paid attention to the problem of 
identifying Walrasian efficient markets from not-fully revealing rational expectation 
models. The contagion model covers the period from July 1987 to February 1988. Their 
research looked at factors such as overlapping and non-overlapping trading hours 
among the markets, time zone trading and tests for price jumps. They reported that only 
the effect of New York on London was an observed price jump of an opened market; 
other price jumps in the model were of shadow prices of closed markets. The 
assumption of the price jumps test is that when New York opens, the volatility in 
London should rise. To achieve this, they computed the volatility of half-hourly returns 
at 15-minute intervals in London using the FTSE 100 index for three sub-periods. 
The contagion model is estimated based on hourly data for stock price changes for New 
York, Tokyo and London covering the period from September to November 1987. They 
gave priority to the hypothesis that during and immediately after crash, the contagion 
coefficients increased as volatility was high and then later decreased with a reduction in 
volatility. The model did not estimate that contagion coefficients are necessarily 
constant. However, the coefficients are expected to be an increasing function of 
volatility. 
Their result suggests that cross-market correlations increased significantly during the 
crisis. For London (FT30) and New York (published Dow Jones), which have 
overlapping trading hours from 13:30 to 16:00 GMT, contagion is supported both 
before and after crash. Correlation increased from 0.27 between 01/07/1987 and 
16/10/1987 to 0.38 between 19/11/1987 and 30/11/1987. Because of circumstances that 
might have affected the actual prices on both New York and London stock markets 
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around the time of the crash, the correlations for these markets were recalculated using 
the same period. For the recalculation, the percentage change on the S&P’s futures price 
and the percentage change on the FTSE Futures index were used instead of changes on 
the Dow Jones and FT30 indices. Again, contagion was supported with even higher 
correlation, recorded at 0.47. Also, using data on the futures price index for both 
markets gave a relatively high correlation of 0.75. The high correlation between the 
indices might be as a result of the market crash, as the correlation fell to nearly the pre-
crash level by early 1988; correlation was recorded at 0.194 between 01/12/1987 and 
28/02/1988. Similarly, volatility also rose during the crisis then fell back to its pre-crash 
level in February 1988. 
To identify the contagion coefficients between London and New York using time zone 
trading, a regression model was used. The model estimates the close to open price 
change in London on the change in the New York price on the previous day from the 
close of London to the close of New York. Contagion coefficients measuring New 
York’s effect on London increased from 0.21 before the crash to 0.4 after the crash. The 
coefficient measuring the effect of London on New York increased from 0.18 before the 
crash to 1.11 during the crash then fell to 0.44 after the crash between 01/12/1987 and 
28/02/1988. 
With different time zone trading, the contagion coefficient showing the effect of Japan 
on the US and London and the effect of the US and London on Japan also showed an 
increase during and immediately after the crash, then returned to its pre-crash level.  
It is worth mentioning that this research only focused on advanced markets with no 
reference to any emerging market. As is rightly stated by the authors, there is the need 
to extend the research to other markets. Later studies, for example Forbes and Rigobon 
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(2002), pointed out a number of methodological problems such as heteroscedasticity 
bias in correlation assessments and proposed an adjustment that led to subsequent 
development of the correlation coefficient analysis approach. 
 
2. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) enhanced the correlation coefficient analysis. Their 
enhancement has been cited, extended and criticised by several researchers. The 
majority of papers favour the heteroscedasticity argument raised by Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002). Their study identified flaws in the simple correlation contagion model that could 
bias the contagion test. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argued that testing for contagion 
based on conditional correlations is subject to a heteroscedasticity bias associated with 
high frequency data. 
Their research focused on three major financial crises: the 1997 Asian crisis, 1994 
Mexican devaluation and 1987 US stock market crash. Although Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002) identified a universal fall in markets during several crises, they found it 
necessary to define contagion and what it constitutes in the first instance before 
ascertaining whether or not it was the case in the crises they were investigating. 
Accordingly, they defined contagion as “a significant increase in cross-market linkages 
after a shock to one country or group of countries” (Forbes and Rigobon 2002:2223). 
They were of the opinion that if two markets exhibit a high degree of co-movement 
during a tranquil period and remain strongly correlated after a shock to one market, 
contagion may not be the reason for such high correlations. They referred to such a 
situation as interdependence. According to them, contagion occurs only when co-
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movements among markets increase significantly after a crash, otherwise an increase in 
correlations might result from strong linkages that exist among the markets. 
Their definition of contagion is restrictive. The reasons for using such a restrictive 
definition are: (1) it provides a straightforward framework for testing the occurrence of 
contagion by means of comparing linkages during periods of tranquillity and directly 
after a shock; (2) it allows for a clearer distinction between alternative explanations on 
how crises are transmitted across markets.  
The test for contagion in Forbes and Rigobon (2002) aimed to prove the inaccuracy and 
biasness of a simple correlation test for contagion due to its problem of 
heteroscedasticity. The basis of their argument was that cross-market correlations are 
conditional on market volatility as such in a crisis period, estimates of correlation 
coefficients increase and are biased upward. If an adjustment for this bias is not done, a 
test based on correlation coefficients will usually conclude that contagion occurs. It is 
worth mentioning that Forbes and Rigobon (2002) credited Ronn (1998) for motivating 
the discussion on how changes in market volatility bias correlation coefficients.  
The origins of crises are identified as the US for the 1987 crash, Mexico in 1994 and 
Hong Kong in 1997. Their contagion model compares correlations between high 
volatility and low volatility periods. In this case, the high volatility period is the crisis 
period, while the full sample is the low volatility period.  
The cross-market correlations are estimated using a VAR framework, to adjust for the 
fact that stock markets open at different times and to control for the serial correlation in 
stock returns as well as exogenous global shocks. Rolling average two-day returns are 
calculated based on each country’s aggregate stock market index. The returns are 
calculated in both US dollars and local currency but focused on US dollars. The 
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intuition behind this is that US dollars are used more often in testing for contagion. To 
adjust for the serial correlation and variations in trading patterns, they utilised five lags 
for the transposed vector of returns. Interest rates were also included to control for 
aggregate shocks and/or monetary policy coordination. 
a. Asian crisis 1997 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) tested contagion without any adjustment for 
heteroscedasticity bias from Hong Kong as the country of origin to other markets 
around the world. The stable period for the 1997 crisis is defined as 1 January 1996 to 
16 October 1997, while the unstable period is defined as the period starting 17 October 
1997. A one-sided 𝑡-test was used to determine if the cross-market correlations were 
significantly greater during the full period than the crisis period. Their sample markets 
included East Asian markets, Latin American markets, OECD markets and other 
emerging markets (India, Russia and South Africa): in total they had 28 countries. Out 
of 28 markets, 15 markets supported contagion from Hong Kong. Among them, Hong 
Kong to Indonesia recorded an increase in correlation from 0.38 during the stable period 
to 0.75 during the turmoil period and 0.428 for the full period. Hong Kong and France 
had a full period correlation of 0.299 and an increase from 0.227 during the stable 
period to 0.886 during the turmoil period. Only Mexico recorded the same correlation 
during the stable period and the full period (0.238). 
The adjusted correlation test found no significant increase in correlations from Hong 
Kong to other parts of the world during the Asian crisis of 1997. The 𝑡-test statistics for 
all the countries failed to support contagion after adjusting for heteroscedasticity, except 
for Italy, which recorded correlations of 0.191 during the stable period, 0.818 during the 
turmoil period, and 0.236 for the full period. A test statistic of 1.79 gave evidence of 
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contagion. According to the definition of contagion in Forbes and Rigobon’s (2002) 
research, the high increase in unconditional correlations observed during the turmoil 
period between Hong Kong and Korea (0.380) and Hong Kong and Germany (0.642) 
confirmed interdependencies in the markets. 
b. Mexican crisis 1994 
The turmoil period for the Mexican crisis is defined as 19/12/1994, following the 
devaluation of the peso, to 31/12/1994. The full sample is defined as 01/01/1993 to 
31/12/1995.  
A test for contagion was carried out without correcting for heteroscedasticity bias, as in 
the first case of the 1997 Asian crisis. A total of six countries (Korea, Argentina, Brazil, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and South Africa) showed a significant increase in cross-
market correlations, supporting the evidence of contagion. Many of the 28 countries 
showed an increase in correlation during the turmoil period, although it is not 
statistically significant. Correlation between Mexico and Russia increased from −0.009 
to 0.0077. All the Latin American countries in the sample showed a strong degree of co-
movement. However, correlations between Mexico and the Philippines, Spain, Sweden, 
India and even the US fell during the turmoil period. 
After adjusting for heteroscedasticity bias and retesting for contagion, all the 
unconditional correlations became smaller than the conditional correlation during the 
turmoil period. For example, the cross-market correlation between Mexico and 
Australia was 0.092 for the full period, the conditional correlation increased to 0.565 
during the turmoil period, but the unconditional correlation increased to only 0.223. The 
overall result for the Mexican crisis showed no significant increase in cross-market 
correlation during the turmoil period after adjusting for heteroscedasticity. Various 
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sensitivity tests were employed such as varying the interest rates or adjusting lags and 
using returns in local currency, which eventually came to a similar result. For the 
conditional correlation some evidence of contagion was found. 
c. US stock market crash 1987 
For the US market crash of 1987, the turmoil period is defined as 17 October 1987 to 4 
December 1987, the stable period covers 1 January 1986 to 17 October 1987 and the 
full sample period is the stable period and the turmoil period. The sample markets 
include the US as the origin of the crisis, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong 
Kong, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK. The same procedure for testing 
contagion in the case of the Asian and Mexican crises was used.  
The first set of results, unadjusted for heteroscedasticity, showed a significant increase 
in cross-market correlations during the turmoil period in more than half of the countries, 
with four countries (France, Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK) showing evidence of 
contagion. After adjusting for heteroscedasticity bias, it was immediately apparent that 
changes occurred in the correlation coefficients. The unconditional correlation was 
substantially lower than the conditional correlation during the turmoil period. For 
instance, the full period cross-market correlation between the US and France was 0.256 
but the conditional correlation during the turmoil period increased to 0.610 while the 
unconditional correlation only increased to 0.441 compared to the unadjusted 
correlation. 
All the financial crises studied by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) [Mexican crisis (1994), 
East Asian crisis (1997) and the US stock market crash of (1987)] provided no support 
for evidence of contagion in emerging markets after correcting for heteroscedasticity. 
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Forbes and Rigobon (2002) acknowledged evidence of a high level of market co-
movement during the crises periods, which they termed as interdependence. 
 
3. Collins and Biekpe (2003) 
Collins and Biekpe (2003:6) in their study, “Contagion and Interdependence on African 
Stock Markets” used the narrow definition of contagion as “a significant increase in 
correlation coefficients over a period of financial turmoil”. The purpose of their work 
was to understand the relationship between African markets and global emerging equity 
market returns, as well as the relationships between African equity market returns. 
The study adopted the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) heteroscedasticity adjustment for 
correlations to measure contagion from Hong Kong to African markets during the 1997 
Asian crisis. The study used daily data on market indices for eight African countries. 
Rolling two-day averages of daily returns were calculated to allow for differing open 
market times. The adjusted and unadjusted correlations were only used to investigate 
contagion from Hong Kong to African markets. The African markets in their sample 
were Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. The sample period was divided into tranquil and crisis periods. The tranquil 
period runs from 2 January 1997 to 17 October 1997 while the crisis period is from 20 
October 1997 to 28 November 1997. They measured contagion by the significance of 
increases in correlations during the turmoil period against the tranquil period. This 
differed from Forbes and Rigobon (2002), who measured contagion between the low 
volatility periods (full period) against the crisis periods. 
Lower weekly frequency data and a longer time frame were used to access the 
relationship between the African markets. In this case, a simple correlation matrix with 
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unadjusted correlations was utilised. Botswana and Ghana were added to make it 10 
African markets in total for this analysis. They explained that the correlation 
coefficients were not adjusted as the patterns of variances of the African markets 
differed. A steady increase in variances was observed in some markets over time while 
in some markets, there were pockets of higher variance. They asserted that the changes 
in correlations were due to the changes in variances observed through time. 
The unadjusted contagion test provided evidence of contagion in Egypt, Mauritius, 
South Africa and Namibia, while the remaining countries found no contagion. After 
adjusting for heteroscedasticity, the contagion effect found in Mauritius and Namibia 
disappeared but South Africa (2.100 test statistic) and Egypt (3.022 test statistic) 
remained significant. Collins and Biekpe (2003:10) provided this viewpoint: 
“Intuitively, South Africa is a significant player in the emerging market arena, in terms 
of market capitalisation, value traded and its weight in the International Finance 
Corporation Investibles (IFCI) index, and therefore would be more heavily influenced 
by international investors. Within an African context, Egypt is the next largest market 
included in the IFCI index. It stands to reason that those countries would be more likely 
to experience contagion, perhaps via herd behaviour or a portfolio rebalancing by an 
international investor base, than the smaller markets in Africa”.  
Regarding the relationship between African markets, the researchers found that the 
strongest relationships were within the Southern Africa region: between South Africa 
and Botswana, Namibia and South Africa, and Botswana and Namibia. Again South 
Africa demonstrated a strong interregional relationship. 
Their result was inconsistent with Forbes and Rigobon (2002), who found no contagion 
in South Africa during the Asian crisis in 1997. This difference in result they attributed 
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to the slight difference in the estimation of their 𝑡-test statistics from that of Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) and the sample period used. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) used a tranquil 
period starting at the beginning of 1996 while Collins and Biekpe (2003) used a tranquil 
period starting at the beginning of 1997.  
The researchers concluded that the evidence of contagion found in Egypt and South 
Africa could be that African equity markets offer diversification for global emerging 
market managers. As for the relationship between African markets, the researchers 
reported that: “This would be explained by fundamental trade and economic links, such 
as the strong relationships within Southern Africa, rather than investor behaviour links. 
The only relationship that appears not to be linked by fundamental influences are those 
that show evidence of contagion to global financial events, Egypt and South Africa. The 
explanation may lie in the role international investors have come to play in both 
markets”. (Collins and Biekpe 2003:13) 
 
4. Arestis et al. (2005) 
Arestis et al. (2005), enhanced the conditional correlation analysis by detecting 
structural breaks on the full sample. The authors tested for contagion as a positive shift 
in correlation between asset returns from the four largest emerging markets of Asia, 
namely Thailand, Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia, to a set of developed markets, namely 
Japan, the UK, Germany and France (major lenders) during the 1997 East Asian crisis. 
In their research, they defined contagion as a significant increase in cross-market 
linkages after a shock to one market. Although they employed other tests, they also 
adopted the corrections by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Rigobon (2004) for biases 
resulting from heteroscedasticity, endogeneity and omitted variables. The main focus of 
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this research was the exposure of the major international lenders to contagion from the 
four largest emerging economies. 
The contagion model estimated in their research was based on the conditional 
correlation analysis between assets returns. This research differs from earlier work in 
the field of contagion by the estimation of a full sample period instead of dividing the 
period into crisis and non-crisis periods or low volatility and high volatility periods, as 
seen in King and Wadhwani (1990) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002). They also selected 
breakpoints that matched the beginning and end of the contagion period through a series 
of dummy tests and computed the critical values of the test by means of a bootstrap.  
Arestis et al. (2005) indicated that Caporale, Cipollini and Spagnolo (2005) introduced 
the sequential dummy test they employed in determining the endogenous breakpoints 
that denote the period of contagion. They asserted that the test relied on a more 
plausible identifying restrictions compared with earlier work. 
To test the evidence of contagion, the Wald test was used. Their research used weekly 
stock data from the eight markets under study, covering the period from the first week 
of August 1990 to the last week of July 1998. They chose the end date of July to avoid 
an overlap with the Russian crisis, which started in August 1998. As mentioned earlier, 
breakpoints that denoted the period of contagion were selected. To achieve this, the 
researchers considered various specifications for the step dummy, such as allowing for 
the start date of contagion ranging from January 1997 to June 1998. The period that had 
the largest Wald statistic was then selected. If the Wald statistic is significant, as well as 
the coefficients associated with the step dummy being positive and significant, 
contagion is said to have occurred. 
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They found evidence of contagion between the major lenders to the emerging markets, 
which they attributed to the reduction in bank lending from the major international 
lenders. For instance, developed countries reduced their exposure to the emerging 
markets between 1997 and 1998. Lending from Germany to Korea fell from US$10,968 
billion in 1997 to US$8,678 billion in 1998, while France to Korea fell from US$11,349 
billion to US$8,440 billion in 1998. In a similar fashion, other developed countries in 
the sample also reduced their lending to emerging markets over the years. The 
contagion test specifically revealed that even though lending from France to Malaysia 
fell from US$2,885 billion in 1997 to US$2,391 billion in 1998, Malaysia provided no 
contagion with France but provided support for contagion with Germany, Japan and the 
UK. Contagion was also evident between South Korea and France, and South Korea and 
Japan, but absent between South Korea and Germany, and South Korea and the UK. 
Thailand and Germany gave no evidence of contagion but, evidence of contagion is 
found from Thailand to the three remaining major lenders. 
Strikingly, they found that Japan was the only country that had a contagious effect with 
each of the emerging markets under study. Arestis et al. (2005) reported that there was 
contagion from Indonesia to the UK and from Korea and Thailand to France. They 
indicated that the UK was largely exposed to Indonesia while the largest exposure from 
an international lender country to emerging economies was from France to Korea and 
Thailand. 
In conclusion, Arestis et al. (2005) reported that the impact of the East Asian crisis on 
developed financial markets was minimal because of the diversification of risk through 
the reallocation of bank loans, drastic reduction of exposure on the part of Western and 
Japanese banks to emerging markets and prudential supervision and regulatory policies. 
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The reduction in exposure of the major international lenders had a serious contagious 
effect to the East Asian economies. The findings of this research were inconsistent with 
those of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) because the authors reported evidence of contagion 
during the Asian crisis. This study however, failed to extend the research to any African 
market. 
 
5. Wang and Thi (2006) 
Using DCC-bivariate GARCH, Wang and Thi (2006) investigated the existence of 
contagion effects between the stock markets of Thailand and the Chinese Economic 
Area (CEA). The sample included the indices of China (Shang Hai B-shares), Hong 
Kong (Hang Sheng index), Thailand (Bangkok index), and Taiwan (Taiwan Weighted) 
over the period 21 February 1992 to 15 November 2000. The contagion test of Wang 
and Thi (2006) was carried out in three stages; 
First, they detected structural breaks by employing the iterated cumulative sum of 
squares (ICSS) proposed by Inclán and Tiao (1994). This was to determine if the 
samples included financial crisis and also because it had been raised earlier by 
Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) that ignoring structural breaks could lead to the 
overestimation of heteroscedasticity and affect the reliability of applications. Also, in 
the opinion of Hansen (2001), structural breaks are endogenous and determined by the 
data, which could lead to the model being set up wrongly. 
The second step was the application of the DCC-bivariate GARCH of Engle (2002) to 
estimate the correlation coefficients between stock returns in accordance with the pre-
crisis and crisis periods, as identified by the ICSS in step one. An estimation of Engle’s 
(2002) DCC model itself requires two stages: a) the first stage is to estimate the 
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univariate GARCH model, and b) the second stage is to estimate the correlation 
coefficient. It was reported that GARCH (1, 1) captures the characteristics of 
heteroscedasticity of stock and financial variables (Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner 1992, 
Morales and Andreosso-O’Callaghan 2010). Wang and Thi (2006:24) provided this 
viewpoint: “The correlation coefficients between stocks returns estimated by the DCC-
bivariate GARCH model, in the progress of time, varies with market variances. 
Therefore, the conventional contagion effect test that ignores the adjustment of 
heteroscedasticity can be improved”. 
In the third step, the 𝑡-test was used to check the existence of contagion, based on the 
means of the correlation coefficients of the pre-crisis and crisis periods identified by the 
ICSS estimated through the DCC model. 
Their finding suggested positive conditional correlation coefficients and an increase in 
co-movement among the Thai and CEA markets. They explained that the Asian 
meltdown, which began in Thailand, transmitted to other countries in the region through 
various channels, of which the stock market was a very important one. “Consequently, 
rapid economic integration within the CEA, consisting of China, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, has caused these markets to be badly hurt by the crisis. However, the economic 
integration is stronger and needed for the globalisation process. Therefore, we must 
learn how to live with contagion”. (Wang and Thi 2006:34) 
The research concluded that evidence of contagion effects were found during the Asian 
crisis in the region. This occurred during a period of exceptional economic growth. This 
meant that investors needed to pay close attention to what was happening in 
neighbouring markets and that financial exogenous shock, would increase if economic, 
financial and market information was ignored. 
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6. Khalid and Rajaguru (2006) 
On the Asian crises, Khalid and Rajaguru (2006) used daily data on the exchange rate of 
each country’s domestic currency against the US dollar to study the interlinkages 
between currency markets among ten Asian countries (India, Indonesia, Japan, South 
Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand) covering 
the period 5 January 1994 to 31 December 1999. 
The sample period was divided into four (full period, pre-crisis period, crisis period and 
post-crisis period) in order to find out whether contagion was supported strongly during 
the crisis period. The full period was from 1994 to 1999, the pre-crisis period covered 5 
January 1994 to 1 July 1997, the crisis period span from 2 July 1997 to 30 June 1998 
and the post-crisis period was from 1 July 1998 to 31 December 1999. 
The countries were divided into crisis-hit Asia and non-crisis-hit Asia. They constructed 
a multivariate GARCH model and applied Granger causality to identify the 
interlinkages among exchange rate markets in the Asian countries. They found strong 
evidence of inter-market linkages within the Asian currency markets in the full sample 
and during the crisis and post-crisis periods. The pre-crisis period did not provide very 
strong evidence. The results from the Granger causality tests provided weak support for 
contagion. Their results indicated an increase in currency market links during and after 
the crisis. 
They also reported that the Indian rupee had become more vulnerable to regional 
currency markets following India’s recent development of investment zones to attract 
foreign investment and its receipt of substantial foreign direct investment (FDI). Also, 
they found no strong currency linkages within non-crisis-hit Asia, but the non-crisis-hit 
Asian countries were linked to currency markets in the crisis-hit Asian countries. 
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Their results supported evidence of contagion by means of a common creditor – in this 
case Japan. They explained that a shock in the crisis-hit East Asian market that changed 
the Japanese yen could be transmitted to a non-crisis-hit Asian country such as Pakistan, 
because of Japan’s position as a common creditor. This finding was in line with 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), who investigated the role of a common-banker-lender 
channel as a main determinant of international propagation of shocks; they found that 
this channel played a major role in emerging countries. 
 
7. Beirne et al. (2009) 
Beirne et al. (2009) estimated the tri-variate GARCH-BEKK models of returns in 
mature, regional emerging and local emerging markets. The research was aimed at 
examining volatility spill-over from mature to emerging stock markets; tests for changes 
in the transmission mechanism for contagion when mature markets are in crisis and; the 
implications for conditional correlations between mature and emerging market returns. 
They adopted Forbes and Rigobon’s (2002) concept of shift contagion and defined 
volatility contagion as the shift in volatility transmission from mature to emerging 
markets during turbulence in the mature markets. 
A dummy variable was included in the model to capture the parameter shifts during 
turbulence. The sample markets consisted of 41 emerging market economies from Asia, 
emerging Europe and South Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA). Weekly stock returns were used. The time frame for the Asian crisis 
ran from September 1993 to March 2008 while that of emerging Europe and South 
Africa, Latin America and MENA started from 1996 and also ended in March 1998. 
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The authors also carried out likelihood ratio tests to examine a number of hypotheses 
regarding the transmission of volatility from mature to regional and local emerging 
markets and also from regional to local markets. The likelihood ratio tests suggested 
that conditional variances in many of the emerging markets were influenced by mature 
markets as the spill-over parameter changed during the turbulent period. However, they 
reported limited evidence of shifts in conditional correlations between mature and 
emerging markets although the conditional variances of most of the emerging market 
economies increased during the crisis episodes studied. They concluded that the 
increase in conditional correlations was very much limited to emerging Europe.  
 
8. Lee, Wu and Wang (2007) and Asongu (2011a) 
Every now and then irregular events take place in different parts of the world, such as 
the London Tube bombings, the 9/11 attack on the US and natural disasters around the 
globe. These events are not expected and are therefore not planned for. When they 
occur, the financial market of the affected country usually suffers heavy damage, which 
may spill over to other countries. Contagion research has been extended to investigate 
some of these irregularities. 
In one research on these kinds of events, Lee, Wu and Wang (2007) investigated 
whether contagion had occurred across 26 international stock indices and exchange 
rates after the South East Asian earthquake of 26 December 2004. The sample size 
covered 26 December 2003 to 25 March 2005, divided into the non-crisis period (26 
December 2003 to 25 December 2004) and the crisis period (26 December 2004 to 25 
March 2005). The Indonesian equity and foreign exchange markets were the base 
criteria. The study employed the correlation coefficient method. They found no 
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evidence of contagion effect in any of the stock markets but some evidence in the 
foreign exchange market after the 2004 South East Asian tsunami. The researchers 
concluded that the earthquake primarily affected countries in the Asian region because 
of the tsunami in East Asia; they referred to the contagion effect as geographical. 
Another recent work that studied an irregular event was Asongu (2011a). Asongu’s 
study focused on the Kenyan crisis and risk of contagion effect to other markets from 
27/12/2007 to 28/02/2008. Asongu investigated eight African markets (Botswana, 
Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia). In addition, 
Lebanon was also part of the sample countries. Asongu (2011a) adopted the Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) approach in the context of Collins and Biekpe (2003). The sample 
period was divided into a two-month pre-crisis (stable) period and a one-month crisis 
(turmoil) period. The stable period covered 01/11/2007 to 24/12/2007 and the crisis 
period was from 04/01/2008 to 29/01/2008. This viewpoint is provided in the research: 
“We assume here that any substantial price sensitive political implication should have 
occurred after the announcement of the election results (30/12/2007). More so, the full 
crisis period (27/12/2007 to 28/02/2008) is not assumed as the turmoil period because a 
stock market shock was not experienced during the entire period”. (Asongu 2011a:6) 
Asongu’s (2011a) study found that Lebanon, Mauritius and Nigeria were contaminated. 
The author concluded that political instability in Africa does not have isolated within-
country financial effects. The findings support the hypothesis of growing integration of 






9. Malik and Ewing (2009) 
Using the bivariate GARCH model, Malik and Ewing (2009) studied the volatility 
transmission between oil prices and five different US sector indices (financial, 
industrials, consumer services, healthcare and technology). The research used weekly 
returns, which were calculated from daily data over the period 1 January 1992 to 30 
April 2008. 
The study showed that the volatility of oil returns was significantly affected by its own 
news and past volatility, and that news from the financial sector indirectly affected the 
volatility of oil return. As such, a positive shock in the financial market was associated 
with a decline in the volatility of oil returns. Also, volatility of returns from the financial 
sector was affected by its own news and volatility. No direct or indirect evidence on the 
impact of oil return volatility was found. These findings indicated that financial market 
stability measured by conditional variance of returns would not be affected by oil 
market shocks. As for the technology sector, the results gave evidence that the volatility 
of technology returns was directly affected by its news and volatility and indirectly 
affected by shocks and volatility in oil returns. Thus changes in oil returns would 
increase volatility in the technology sector. In terms of the consumer sector, it was 
found that the volatility of oil returns was affected by its news and volatility and also by 
the return volatility from the consumer sector. On the other hand, the consumer return 
volatility was affected by volatility in the oil sector. Healthcare returns volatility was 
found to be directly and indirectly affected by volatility in oil returns, while the 
volatility from the oil returns was indirectly affected by the healthcare sector and 
affected directly by its news and volatility. The indirect impact from the healthcare to 
the oil sector was compatible with the fact that healthcare has been relatively steady 
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over time. Finally, for the industrial sector, they found oil returns volatility to be 
indirectly affected by the volatility of returns from the industrial sector and affected 
directly by its news and volatility. However, the volatility of returns in the industrial 
sector was only affected by its news and volatility. This indicated that the industrial 
sector was not affected by shocks and volatility from the oil sector. 
The general conclusion from the research was that significant interaction between the 
volatility of returns especially in the oil and equity markets was attributed to cross-
market hedging and sharing of common information by investors. This means that 
investors should keep a close watch on different markets because news in one sector 
may have an impact on other markets through various interdependencies. 
 
10. Morales and Andreosso-O’Callaghan (2010) 
A new empirical advancement to contagion literature is the work of Morales and 
Andreosso-O’Callaghan (2010). It first adopted the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
approach. In line with Billio and Pelizzon’s (2003) argument on the Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) approach (that it is highly affected by the size of the windows used and 
omitted variables); the authors proposed a second approach that entailed testing for 
contagion using the residuals from GARCH (1, 1).  
Morales and Andreosso-O’Callaghan’s (2010) research was inspired by the recent 
financial crisis (2007-2009), which started in the US and made the debate on contagion 
more popular than ever. The researchers found it necessary to study and analyse the 
crisis before concluding the existence of contagion. They explained that although the 
US is interconnected with many economies around the globe, what appears to be 
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contagion might just be spill-over effect arising from interlinkages across markets. The 
researchers argued that if it were contagion, it would take the world a long time to 
recover, but at the time of their research some countries were beginning to recover. 
They also pointed out that other countries did not present the same problems that were 
affecting the US economy; therefore, the conclusion that the financial crisis was 
contagious had to be drawn with care. 
The research studied the recent financial crisis from a world market perspective and also 
from a regional perspective. A total of 58 world economies were analysed, which were 
grouped regionally: America, Europe, Asia and Africa. The stock markets were further 
divided into six sub-regions as African markets, American markets, Asian markets, 
Eastern European markets, European markets and Middle East markets. The intuition 
behind grouping the countries was to identify behavioural patterns among the regions. 
The research covered the period January 2003 to May 2009, using daily adjusted stock 
price data for all the countries under analysis. The sample was divided into crisis and 
non-crisis periods and the US was identified as the origin of crisis. The turmoil period 
was identified as the period covering October 2007 to May 2009 while the period of 
tranquillity covered January 2003 to September 2007. The definition of contagion given 
by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) was adopted in this research. Three different models 
were used to conduct the contagion analysis: 
The research first adopted the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) model based on correlation 
where asset returns are first scaled before testing for contagion in a regression 
framework. 
The second procedure adopted by the researchers was motivated by Billio and Pelizzon 
(2003), who criticised Forbes and Rigobon’s (2002) contagion model as being affected 
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by the size of the windows. Morales and Andreosso-O’Callaghan proposed using the 
GARCH (1, 1) model to counter problems of omitted variables. Dummy variables for 
the pre-crisis and crisis periods were also included in the model. Considering that the 
GARCH (1, 1) gives a good description on financial asset returns, Morales and 
Andreosso-O’Callaghan (2010) concluded that the AR (1)-GARCH (1, 1) was most 
appropriate to test for contagion. 
The last model extended the second model by incorporating GARCH errors per regional 
market to adjust for shocks originating in the regional market. This was to check 
whether market volatility was greatly affected by shocks from the regions rather than 
the initial event in the US stock markets. 
Using the two American indices (Dow Jones and S&P500) to test for contagion to the 
African markets (Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa) within the three 
models provided an interesting result for the authors. Egypt was the only African 
market that had a significant 𝑝-value indicating the presence of contagion within all 
frameworks. Kenya was also significant with both indices but only within the first 
model. Nigeria had no contagion with either of the indices within all three frameworks. 
South Africa and Morocco had contagion with only S&P500 within the first model. 
The Asian markets in the study comprised of Australia, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong 
Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. With the exception of Australia, Hong 
Kong, India, the Philippines and Thailand, the rest of the markets in this group showed 
evidence of contagion from Dow Jones within the first model. As regards to S&P500 
within the first model, no contagion was found in Australia, Hong Kong and Japan. 
Contagion was only present in Thailand and India for the S&P500 within all three 
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frameworks. More surprising to the authors is the absence of contagion in all facets 
from Australia and Hong Kong, especially that of Hong Kong considering the 
catastrophic Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s.  
Within the Middle Eastern region, which comprised Israel, Jordan, Oman and Qatar, 
only Israel showed the presence of contagion within all models from the two US 
indices, while the rest of the markets detected no contagion in all aspects. 
The fourth sub-region was the American markets, which included Canada, Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. No contagion was detected in 
Venezuela for both indices within the three models. Argentina, Chile and Columbia had 
the same result of no contagion with both indices within the first model, but had 
contagion with both indices within the second and third model. Mexico was the only 
market exhibiting contagion effect from S&P500 within the three models, while from 
Dow Jones contagion was detected in the second and third model but not in the first 
model. It is also worth mentioning that contagion was found in all countries with Dow 
Jones except Venezuela within the second model. 
In the Eastern European sub-region made up of nine markets (Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine), there was 
consistency from both indices within the first and third models. The results showed that 
there was contagion in Croatia, Hungary and Romania within all models with both 
indices.  
The largest sub-region comprised of the European stock markets (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. The general finding in 
this group was the lack of contagion, with an exception in the case of Ireland, which 
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provided evidence of contagion in all three models with both indices. The UK, Italy and 
Iceland, on the other hand, provided not a single case of contagion with both indices. 
 
2.7.2 Further empirical evidence on contagion and cross-market transmission of 
crisis: alternative methodological approaches 
Masih and Masih (1997) tested the relationship among six stock markets of developed 
nations, the Dow Jones (US), Nikkei (Japan), CAC (France), Canada, DAX (Germany) 
and FTSE (UK), before and after the stock market crash of 1987. They used the co-
integration technique on end-month closing share price indices. They found that despite 
the crash, Dow Jones which was the leading market still remained top among the 
sampled markets while the FTSE and DAX indices showed more dependency on their 
indices. They concluded that the crash brought about a greater interaction among 
markets, but they did not explicitly test for contagion. However, they found a single co-
integration vector over each of the pre-crash and post-crash samples. 
Baig and Goldfajn (1999) used daily data from 1995 to 1998 from a set of Asian 
countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia and Korea) to test for contagion 
during the Asian crisis of the 1990s. They studied the correlations between countries of 
their respective equity, foreign exchange, interest rate and sovereign debt markets. They 
then applied a VAR methodology to estimate the impulse responses to shocks in each of 
the currency and stock markets. Finally, they tested whether the correlations had 
significantly increased after the crisis compared to the tranquil period correlations. In 
the event that they found there to be no significant increase in correlations after the 
shock, then they would attribute the pressure felt by the market to some common cause 
or spill-over effects. They found a significant increase in correlation in the currency and 
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sovereign spreads indicating contagion, but the equity market correlations provided 
mixed evidence. The authors explained that the Asian crises suggested that market 
participants moved together across a range of countries during financial instability as 
such a shock from one market is readily transmitted to other markets causing substantial 
instability. 
To investigate contagion across six developed and emerging Asian markets and also the 
US during the time of the Asian currency crisis of 1997, Thanyalakpark and Filson 
(2001) extended the GARCH model by using a stationary multivariate asymmetric 
GARCH specification of international capital assets pricing model. The developed 
markets included in their samples were Hong Kong, Japan and the US, while the 
emerging markets were Korea, Thailand and Malaysia. They referred to contagion as 
herd behaviour resulting from investors pulling out of a market because of a change in 
their expectations as a result of a shock in another market. Their theory was that if herd 
behaviour was a factor in the crisis, correlations between the affected stock markets 
should rise even after controlling for the important aspects of own-country risk. The 
approach they took to investigate if herd behaviour was a factor was to test whether 
correlations between stock markets returns increased after the crisis started. They 
reported contagion effect only from Thailand to Korea, while other markets showed 
interdependence. 
Mathur et al. (2002) investigated contagion effects in the Chilean market and the 
Chilean American Depository Receipts (ADRs) trading in the US from the 1994 
Mexican peso crisis using four approaches: event study, regression analysis, multifactor 
regression model and variance decompositions. Their results supported contagion. For 
the event study test, they found that the Chilean stock market reacted negatively to the 
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devaluation news of the Mexican peso. The result from the multiple regressions 
suggested that during the event, changes in the Chilean peso IGPA index affected the 
pricing of the ADRs and that spill-over contagion effects from the Mexican market were 
transmitted through the Chilean market to the Chilean ADRSs. The multifactor 
regressions found that during the peso crisis, the Chilean peso returns on IGPA were the 
determinants of returns on the Chilean ADR portfolio and that the Chilean index 
expressed in local currency had more significant influence on the pricing of the Chilean 
ADRs than when expressed in US dollars. Finally, the variance decomposition results 
indicated that returns on the Chilean index were influenced by returns on the Mexican 
index, US index and the ADR portfolio. The Chilean index explained nearly half of the 
variance in the ADR portfolio returns and that exchange rate innovations had no 
significant contribution to the pricing of the Chilean ADRs. The results from their 
findings indicated that during the crisis, investors did not pay attention to exchange rate-
based asset pricing. As such, they priced the Chilean ADRs with regard to the Chilean 
index without considering changes in the exchange rate in the market. Instead, they 
applied the home country Chilean index unadjusted for exchange-rate fluctuations to 
price Chilean ADRs denominated in US dollars. 
Moussalli (2007) analysed the extent to which the Asian currency crisis affected 32 
nations. The sample countries were divided into three regions: Asia (China, Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand 
and Vietnam), Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) and Eastern Europe (Russia, Hungary, Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Romania and Slovenia). In 
order to measure the severity of the crisis the study employed a cross-country regression 
analysis to test the relationship between the dependant variables and the independent 
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variables. The dependant variables were depreciation and stock prices, while capital 
controls, law and order, corruption and fixed exchange rate were among the independent 
variables. The regression framework also included dummy variables. Moussalli (2007) 
found that countries with weak institutions were associated with a more severe crisis, as 
were countries with more capital controls and weak institutions, while countries with 
flexible exchange rates, weak institutions and low capital controls were less associated 
with the severity of the crisis. The study concluded that weak institutions, high capital 
controls and fixed exchange rate combined increased the panic effect, which in turn led 
to contagion and the severity of financial crises. More importantly, Moussalli (2007) 
found that belonging to a region was a better explanation for the severity of the crisis 
than any of the macroeconomic variables in the study.  
Essaadi, Jouini, Khallouli (2009) investigated contagion in seven East Asian markets 
during the Asian financial crisis, which began in July 1997. The research adopted the 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Rigobon (2003) terminology of shift contagion as the 
increase in cross-market interdependencies estimated with correlation among assets’ 
returns during crisis. They found that after the devaluation of the Thai baht on 2 July 
1997, structural changes occurred in the links among the markets. An increase in 
correlation between Thailand and each of the other Asian markets was recorded in a 
pair-wise relationship. They also demonstrated the existence of shift contagion in the 
East Asian region as a result of the Thai baht devaluation, which led to a surge in the 
market. They concluded that the increase in interdependencies is linked with a structural 
break that shows the generation of new transmission mechanisms among countries that 
does not exist during the period of tranquillity. The identified new transmission 




2.8 CONCLUSIONS: IDENTIFYING GAPS IN THE LITERATURE, 
IDENTIFYING THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND IDENTIFYING 
NOVELTY IN THE THESIS 
From an African perspective, the 2007-09 crisis was unique as it was the first time that a 
major financial crisis in another part of the world represented a potential contagion 
event on the continent. This possibly was a reflection of increasing globalisation and 
increases in the integration of Africa’s expanding financial markets with the rest of the 
world. Previous contagion events cited in the literature affected countries with similar 
features (for example, the Asian financial crisis). The 2007-09 crisis, however, appeared 
unique as it was truly global. 
From a literature perspective it can be argued that there are a considerable number of 
gaps in our current body of knowledge. These range from methodological issues in 
terms of how we should measure contagion from an econometric perspective (see 
Section 2.7 and discussed in detail in subsequent chapters) to explaining the process by 
which a contagion event unfolds. For example, from the literature it can be identified 
that there are a number of possible channels that a contagion event can follow (see 
Section 2.3). The chapter also cites some evidence from the literature that suggests that 
the strength of financial linkages/integration will influence how contagion will manifest 
itself. From my analysis the following research gaps are identified. 
1. Methodology: to identify which of the constant correlation and the dynamic 
conditional correlations methodologies are most appropriate for the 




• A number of studies focused on adopting, extending or developing further the 
work of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) in the light of criticism of their original 
methodology. A number of researchers adopt more than one methodological 
approach in their studies on robustness grounds (for example, Mathur et al. 
2002, Morales and Andreosso-O’Callaghan 2010, Bekaert, Harvey and Ng 
2005). An important caveat is that the econometric approaches employed in 
investigating contagion can reflect differences in the definition of contagion (for 
example, Collins and Biekpe 2003, Forbes 2012). 
• This thesis will make a novel contribution to the literature by making 
adjustments to the statistical framework in the light of criticism of the Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002) methodology. These include (i) using separate VAR systems 
to compare the crisis period against the pre-crisis period and (ii) applying a 
DCC-GARCH approach (Engle 2002). 
2. The application of contagion testing to a cross-section of both emerging and 
frontier African markets. 
• Current contagion studies cited in the literature focused on emerging markets in 
Asia and Latin America. From an African perspective, studies focus on a single 
larger African emerging market (mainly South Africa: see Forbes and Rigobon 
2002, Arestis et al. 2005). Morales and Andreosso-O’Callaghan (2010), Asongu 
(2011a and 2011b) and Collins and Biekpe (2003) do consider a number of 
African countries but no studies examine the broad cross-section of emerging 
and frontier markets I consider in my thesis. In doing this I will make a novel 
contribution to the literature. 
• The level of correlations found before the crisis will identify which African 
market is the most integrated with the US. In addition, all markets studied will 
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either be classed as a highly integrated market or a low-integrated market. If this 
distinction holds true, this thesis submits that it will be possible to characterise 
different forms of contagion in respect to the value of correlations before and 
during crisis. 
3. Identifying the channels through which contagion events develop 
within the context of appropriate theory (behavioural and/or non-
behavioural models). 
• Existing literature can be cited that describe contagion events in terms of 
herding. However, none, to my knowledge, attempts to use a number of 
behavioural bias-related concepts to describe the process by which a contagion 
event develops across different regions of the global financial market. Economic 
literature identifies many cases of theories being adapted by synthesis to reflect 
new economic environments. For example, the Phillips curve was adjusted by 
Friedman to produce the expectations-augmented Phillips curve. Another 
example is the synthesis of Keynesian economics with classical economics to 
produce neoclassical economics. In respect to the contagion literature, I believe 
that a similar synthesis of academic ideas can be made through the application of 
behavioural finance to explain the contagion process. In doing this I believe that 
I am making a novel contribution to the literature. 
• The research will attempt to provide behavioural explanations to econometric 
analysis of data. It will go beyond ascertaining that unexplained high 
correlations results from investors’ behaviour or herding. It will attempt to 
identify likely biases resulting from heuristic simplification, social effect, self-
deception or emotions and mood that might have played a part during the crisis. 
I found support for this approach in the work of Hovde (2014:73), who states 
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that: “Behavioural finance is gaining wider acceptance in the financial planning 
field, especially in light of the recent credit crisis. Everything cannot be 
quantified and reduced to formulas and numbers-the markets are created and 
used by humans, who are not perfect. We all have various emotions, and we do 
not always behave rationally. Our behaviour as investors, whether rational or 
not, has an impact on the market”. 
4. Identifying how differences in the extent of market integration influence the 
ways that contagion events unfold in developed markets and emerging/frontier 
African markets. 
• Many authors argue that the degree of financial market linkage/integration 
determines how vulnerable countries are to financial crisis (Collins and Biekpe 
2003, Schmukler 2004, Sinha and Pachori 2014). While others submit that most 
African markets except South Africa are largely segmented from world market 
(Hatemi-J and Morgan 2007, Bekaert et al. 2011, Berger, Pukthuanthong and 
Yang 2011), African markets have a variety of institutional features that 
differentiate them from developed country markets and other emerging markets. 
As such, it is useful to examine the effect of the crisis on developed markets to 
provide a means of comparison between developed and African markets. Other 
high-growth emerging markets (China and India) are also included in the sample 
for comparative purposes. Assessment of correlations of the markets will answer 
how differently the crisis affected the markets. In this thesis I will make a novel 
contribution by examining whether different behavioural factors (biases) can 
account for differences in the ways in which contagion events develop between 








This chapter starts by providing information on the data used and sources of the data. 
The research periods are identified in Sections 3.2.1.1 and 3.2.1.2. The primary case 
study of the thesis examines the relationships between the US and African stock 
markets and covers the period January 2007 to October 2009. There are a total of 10 
African countries. The relationship between US and developed markets is also explored 
to provide a basis for differentiating between the impact of the crisis on 
emerging/frontier markets and developed markets. For further comparative purposes, 
additional non-African emerging markets from Asia are incorporated into the analysis. 
This chapter then discusses (and justifies) the developed hypotheses of the thesis in 
Section 3.3. The section also produces a preliminary model of how the financial crisis 
develops. This model will be tested in subsequent chapters. It also identifies 
expectations in respect to results. 
Section 3.4 identifies the two main methodologies I use for testing contagion effect. 
These are firstly, Constant Correlation Coefficient Analysis and secondly, Dynamic 





3.2 DATA DESCRIPTION 
3.2.1 Identifying the crisis period 
Identifying a starting point as well as an end point of a crisis is not clear cut and is 
subject to argument. The crisis developed slowly at first. Its genesis was in the US sub-
prime mortgage market and was associated with high default rates among mortgagees. 
Although commentators such as Nouriel Roubini warned about the impending crisis in 
20066 it was not until 2007 that stock prices in the US started to fall significantly and 
major casualties were observed. For example, on 17 July 2007, Bear Stearns (an 
investment bank) announced that investors would get little or no money from their 
investments in its two hedge funds, which were on the verge of collapsing. 
Subsequently, other big institutions around the globe such as PNB PARIBAS and 
Northern Rock also announced they had problems and might need help. 
Most of the contagion studies found in the literature have not faced major issues in 
identifying the contagion event as these events have been relatively short-lived (see, for 
example, Table 3.4 below). The 2007-09 crisis was unique among post-1945 financial 
shocks in that it developed over a relatively long period. This makes identifying the 
event window potentially problematical. However, since the crisis originated from the 
US we have the VIX at our disposal to identify which events in the crisis produced the 
greatest “shock” to investors. I use this as my tool to identify contagion events in my 
analysis. The index is popularly known as the “fear index” or “fear gauge”7 given that it 
has forward-looking properties. It measures the S&P 500 index options and it reflects 
market volatility expectations over the next 30 days. The index has been incorporated 
                                                 
6 See, for example: http://www.economicpredictions.org/who-predicted-the-financial-crisis.htm. Access date: 6/06/2014  
7 See, for example, the popular investor web-site: http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article42579.html. Access date: 6/06/2014. 
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into other credible research (See Becker, Clements and McClelland 2009, Ciarlone and 
Piselli 2009, and Duan and Yeh 2008). 
 
3.2.1.1 Long crisis period (15/09/2008 – 15/10/2009) 
The index covering the period 2006-2012 is presented in Figure 3.1 below. It can be 
noted that the index showed a marginal upward trend between the start of 2006 and the 
third quarter of 2008 as the crisis began to develop. The sudden increase in the last 
quarter of 2008 can be identified as being associated with the lead up to the Lehman 
bankruptcy (15 September) and similar events surrounding it, such as the Federal 
takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (7 September), the emergency US$85 billion 
loan to insurer AIG (17 September) and the crisis-induced sale of Merrill Lynch to 
Bank of America (14 September). The Lehman bankruptcy was the defining event of 
this period and was associated with a sharp spike in the VIX (see Figure 3.1). I therefore 
use 15 September 2008 to identify the start of what I define as the long crisis period. 
Figure 3.1 shows that volatility in the US market increased drastically in September. 
This period also corresponds with the downturn of major African markets. Figures 3.2, 
3.3 and 3.4 are graphical presentations of how some large African markets (Egypt, 
South Africa and Nigeria) behaved from late 2008 to 2009. 
The VIX remained high well into 2009, which is an indication that this particular crisis 
was not the type of short sharp shock modelled previously in the contagion literature by 
the likes of Forbes and Rigobon (2002), among others. October 2008 saw further crisis 
measures such as the introduction of the US$700 billion TARP programme in the US to 
stave off collapse in the banking system and we saw further emergency mergers in this 
sector (for example, Wells Fargo taking over Wachovia). On 27 November the US 
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government had to rescue Citigroup after speculators drove its share price down 60%. 
Further afield, in the UK, RBS was rescued by the UK government on 13 October and 
around the same time HBOS was forced to merge with Lloyds TSB, which ultimately 
led to the partial collapse and bailout of this bank. 
Although the number of new events associated with the crisis diminished somewhat 
during 2009, it continued to have reverberations well into the year. As can be seen in 
Figure 3.1 market volatility did not return to close to “normal” until well into the third 
quarter. Defining the end point of the financial crisis is also open to interpretation but I 
also used the VIX as a guide. Using the mean index value over a 12-year period from 
the start of 2000 as a guide, the index is seen to revert back to its average by early 
October 2009. This gives an indication that market expectations were that the crisis was 
drawing to a close. Based on this I identify the end period of the long period contagion 
event as 15 October 2009.8 
                                                 
8 The mean daily closing value of the VIX over the period 03/01/2000-11/05/2012 was 21.72. The index began to show a significant 
increase above this level from the middle of 2007, peaking at 79.13 on 20/10/2008. It began to revert to the mean value during 2009 
and by 15/10/2009 was at 21.72. 
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Figure 3.1:9S&P 500 VIX 2006-2012
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Figure 3.3: Johannesburg Stock Exchange
 
Source: Reuters 
Daily EGYPT CMA GN IDX 31/07/2007 - 30/11/2009 (CAI)
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3.2.1.2 Short crisis periods 
 
Another noticeable characteristic of the selected crisis period above (the long period) 
are the individual spikes observed in the VIX in Figure 3.1 presented above. This 
suggests that it may be more appropriate to treat the crisis as accumulation of events 
rather than a single event. 
This has implications for the study of contagion from the US to other markets from a 
behavioural finance perspective. I speculate that we may possibly find evidence of two 
possible forms of behaviour. First, I speculate that behaviour may reflect a “decision 
fatigue” effect given that the crisis developed over such a long period. Specifically, I 
argue that shocks subsequent to the initial Lehman bankruptcy-based shock of 15 
September 2008 may possibly result in smaller contagion effects than the initial shock, 
as investors in overseas markets have become better able to interpret the potential 
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consequences of such events. An alternative second argument is that investor behaviour 
may show evidence of representativeness bias (see Harman 2009). The argument here 
is that investors would respond to each of the sub-crises in the same way as they see the 
impact of the previous sub-crisis as representative. 
After the Lehman initial shock there was a whole series of further fallout events and a 
whole series of emergency interventions into the financial markets by regulatory 
authorities. These are well documented in the historical studies of the crisis.10 It is, 
however, difficult to identify the impact of individual events on the market given that 
many of these were in close proximity. We can, on the other hand, possibly identify the 
sub-periods in the market when fear within the market spiked by referencing the “gauge 
of fear”, i.e. the VIX. 
A number of volatility spikes occurred between October 2008 and November 2008. The 
first spike was on 10/10/2008 and this was followed about a week later on 17/10/2008 
as the market continued to try to understand and accurately price in the potential impact 
of the crisis. I also identify two further spikes on 27/10/2008 and 20/11/2008. 
I test for short-period contagion by comparing the pre-crisis correlation against the first 
sub-period and against subsequent cumulative sub-periods. I will attempt to interpret the 
reasons for any contagion found from a behavioural perspective. For example, investor 
decision-making may arguably reflect factors such as decision fatigue or 
representativeness bias and this may manifest itself in the ways that the correlation 
adjusts from the pre-crisis period to each successive spike. 
 
                                                 
10 See for example: http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/. Access date: 5/01/2014. 
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The sub-periods identified are: 
a. Sub-period 1 (15/09/2008-10/10/2008) 
b. Sub-period 2 (15/09/2008-17/10/2008) 
c. Sub-period 3 (15/09/2008-27/10/2008) 
d. Sub-period 4 (15/09/2008-20/11/2008) 
The periods highlighted above can be related reasonably closely to the following 
specific events:11 
1. “10 October 2008: A global rout starts in Asia as recession fears deepen, with 
Japan’s Nikkei index falling almost 10%, its biggest drop in 20 years. Singapore 
officially slides into recession. The FTSE 100 plunges more than 10% to 3,932.1 
points, falling under the 4,000 mark for the first time in five years. This fall 
represents the worst daily fall since the crash of 1987 and wipes more than £100 
billion off the value of Britain’s biggest companies. Oil prices fall US$5 a barrel 
to a one-year low. The Dow crashes almost 700 points to 7,882 in the first few 
minutes of trading, a fall of 8%”. 
2. “17 October 2008: French savings bank Caisse d’Epargne announces a loss of 
€600 million in a “trading incident”, which the bank says was triggered by what 
it called “extreme market volatility” amid the market crash in the previous two 
weeks”. 
3. “24 October 2008: Shares and the pound slump as official government figures 
confirm that the UK economy is shrinking, with the biggest drop in GDP since 
1990. The Ukraine and Hungary seek US$16.5 and US$10 billion rescue 
packages, respectively, from the IMF. In Denmark, the Central Bank raises its 
key interest rate by 0.5 percentage points to 5.5%. Stock markets around the 
world plummet. Investors fear that governments, central banks and finance 
                                                 
11 Various sources: http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/. Mauro F. Guillén, Access date: 08/06/2014. 
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ministers will not be able to stop the deepening of a global recession. The Dow 
Jones opens with a drop of almost 490 points (a 5% drop). Before opening Dow 
futures drop 550 points, triggering a temporary trading halt in stock futures 
contracts in an effort to slow the decline”. 
4. “20 November 2008: The Dow Jones Industrial Average plunges another 445 
points in the last minutes of the trading session, closing at 7,552. This is its 
lowest point in six years. Shares in Citigroup plummet another 26%, with drops 
of more than 10% in the shares of other major US financial institutions”. 
Note that in testing the short period affects the same starting point is used (the 
Lehman’s crisis). Although individual sub-periods are identified above, the focus of this 
thesis is to examine the cumulative impact of the crisis in terms of changes in 
correlations as the crisis period lengthens. I believe this approach will help in the 
process of exploring the potential importance that behavioural biases may have played 
in the decisions made by African investors during this period. 
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3.2.2 Countries chosen for study and their market returns January 2007- 
October 2009 
 
The principle goal of the thesis is to identify any contagion effects between the US and 
African markets. While the US is a developed market, African markets are a mixture of 
emerging/frontier markets12 and non-classified “other markets”. The 2007-09 crisis was 
a global event with repercussions across all market types. It is therefore important for 
comparative purposes to examine if the contagion events played out in different ways in 
respect to a representative sample of (i) developed markets and (ii) non-African 
emerging/frontier markets. 
Previous crises examined in the contagion literature have focused on the impact on 
countries in the same region or markets of the same economic structures and 
fundamentals. For example, crises such as the US market crash of 1987, the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism of 1992, the Mexican economic crisis in 1994, the Asian 
financial crisis (1997), the Russian financial crisis (1998) and the Brazilian crisis of 
1999, which began as spill-over of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 then later 
engulfed other Latin American countries. My work differs from these studies as the 
global and highly protracted nature of the 2007-09 crisis enables me to examine these 




                                                 
12 I use the MSCI classifications in respect to market types. MSCI describes the equity universe in terms of its “global investable 
market index methodology”. This uses a number of criteria to classify different market types.  For example, in respect to MSCI 
Frontier Markets Indices minimum size and liquidity criteria are used. See: 
http://www.mscibarra.com/eqb/methodology/meth_docs/MSCI_May13_GIMIMethod.pdf. Access date:  09/09/2013. 
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3.2.2.1 Crisis market index used in this study 
 
The S&P 500 index is selected as the American index; this index is selected on the basis 
that it is an index that is reflective of a general cross-section of US stocks (unlike, for 
example, the NASDAQ and DJIA, which consist of technology stocks and the top 30 
industrial stocks, respectively). 
 
3.2.2.2 African markets 
 
This work aims to test for contagion during the 2007-09 financial crisis from the US 
market to 10 African markets: Botswana*, Cote d’Ivoire***, Egypt**, Mauritius*, 
Morocco*, Namibia***, Nigeria*, South Africa**, Tunisia* and Zambia***. The 
African countries chosen for this research are a mixture of emerging (**), frontier (*) 
and “other markets” (***). It can be noted that a number of markets are omitted from 
this list, for example Zimbabwe and Tanzania. Markets have been omitted where 
trading is relatively illiquid and where markets are relatively small and undeveloped (by 
African standards) in order to maintain robustness in the analysis. The markets chosen 
can be considered as being relatively risky from a US investor’s perspective as they 
carry additional political, economic and currency risks. They are also (as identified 
below) a lot less integrated with the US than developed markets. A consequence of this 
is that there are generally much lower correlations with the US market than we find in 
respect to developed markets. It might therefore be expected that any contagion effects 
would be related predominantly to investor herding rather than financial integration. 
Another interesting feature of the markets chosen is that they are high-growth markets. 
This is significant from a contagion perspective as previous literature suggests that 
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financial crisis can have a disproportionate impact on high-growth markets. This, in 
part, is a reflection of the tendency of large developed market investors (such as mutual 
funds) to rapidly liquidate their emerging/frontier market investments in periods of 
crisis.13 
It can be noted that the 1997 Asian crises took place during a phase of rapid growth in 
South East Asia. These countries were experiencing low debt ratios, rapid growth and 
stability of exchange rates. Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2000) reported that 
aggregate capital flows into five crisis-affected countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, the Philippines and the Republic of Korea) in the mid-1990s averaged more 
than US$40 billion annually, reaching a high of about US$70 billion in 1996. As 
currencies and stock markets in these countries collapsed, in the second half of 1997, 
more than US$100 billion was repatriated. 
The 2007-09 global financial crisis took place when Africa was growing rapidly. United 
Nations (2009) reported a rise in net private capital flows to Africa from US$17.1 
billion in 2002 to US$81 billion in 2007. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why African 
markets behaved adversely during the crisis and this may possibly be reflected in 
contagion-related events. 
The number of African stock exchanges increased from eight in 1989 to 23 in 2007 
(Massa 2009) and the continent has one of the first regional stock exchanges in the 
world: the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières (BRVM). Established in 1998 and 
located in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, the bourse links the eight West African French-
speaking countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, 
                                                 
13 See Graciela L. Kaminsky, Richard K. Lyons and Sergio L. Schmukler,(2001) Mutual Fund Investment in Emerging Markets: An 
Overview, World Bank Economic Review 2, 315 – 339.   
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Senegal and Togo. It is also referred to as the West African Regional Bourse. Another 
regional market opened in 2003 for the countries of Central Africa with headquarters at 
Libreville, Gabon. Its member countries include Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. 
Most African stock exchanges are members of the African Securities Exchanges 
Association (ASEA). ASEA is composed of 22 exchanges (Bolsa de Valores de Cabo 
Verde, Bolsa de Valores de Moçambique, Botswana Stock Exchange, Bourse de 
Casablanca, Bourse de Tunis, Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières de l’Afrique de 
l’Ouest, Dar-Es-Salaam Stock Exchange, Douala Stock Exchange, Egyptian Exchange, 
Ghana Stock Exchange, JSE Ltd, Khartoum Stock Exchange, Libyan Stock Market, 
Lusaka Stock Exchange, Namibian Stock Exchange, Nairobi Stock Exchange, Nigerian 
Stock Exchange, Malawi Stock Exchange, Uganda Securities Exchange, Stock 
Exchange of Mauritius, Stock Exchange of Swaziland and Zimbabwe Stock Exchange) 
in 27 countries (Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe). 
Table 3.1 below lists the selected active stock exchanges. All the exchanges in the table 
are members of the ASEA. The listed exchanges are quoted as the most active stock 




Table 3.1: African Stock Markets under study 
Countries Name of stock market Index Opened/established 
 
Reuters index code 
Botswana Botswana Stock Exchange  BSE Domestic 1989 .DCIBT 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 





(BRVM)  1998 .BRVMCI 
Egypt The Egyptian Exchange EGX 1883 .CCSI 
Mauritius  
Stock Exchange of 
Mauritius SEMDEX 1989 .MDEX 
Morocco 
Casablanca Stock 
Exchange CSE 1929 .MASI 
Namibia Namibian Stock Exchange NSX  1992 .OVRLNM 
Nigeria 
The Nigerian Stock 




Exchange JSE  1887 .JALSH 
Tunisia  Tunis Stock Exchange TSE 1998 .TUNINDEX 
Zambia  Lusaka Stock Exchange  LuSE  1993 .ALSLZ 
Source: UNDP handbook 2003, ASEA year book 2009:2008:2007 and Reuters 
Daily returns of all the African markets under study are provided in Figures 3.6 to 3.8. 
The shaded elements of the charts reflect the crisis period. The data sources are 
identified in Section 3.2.3 below. 
It is immediately evident that several patterns exist among these markets. Morocco, 
Nigeria and South Africa exhibit high volatility throughout the period with significant 
increases during the crisis period. Botswana, however, appears more volatile before the 
crisis period while Mauritius and Egypt show relatively low pre-crisis volatility, which 
increases significantly in volatility during the crisis. Cote d’Ivoire shows an important 
example of why researchers need to be very careful when modelling with this type of 
data. The almost straight line with a sudden increase and drop during the crisis period 
reflects a long period of missing data that my subsequent analysis has to adjust for. 
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3.2.2.3  Developed markets  
Financial institutions in developed country markets suffered greatly due to exposure to 
the US sub-prime mortgages and its knock-on effects. Investment banks and banks with 
large investment arms (Bear Sterns; Lehman Brothers, RBS, BNP Paribas, IKB 
Industriebank) across the US and European countries were bailed out, while some were 
subsequently taken over (for example, Merrill Lynch). In such circumstances it might 
be expected that any contagion event would be related predominantly to the integration 
between institutions in these markets rather than herding. 
The developed markets sample countries used in my study consist of Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain and the United Kingdom. Table 3.2 gives information on 
the sample markets and their Reuter’s index code at the time of the research. 
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 provide a graphical presentation of the daily returns of the 
developed markets. It is clear from the figures that volatility in the markets increased 
during the crisis period (shaded portion). France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Spain 
demonstrated some large negative returns at the beginning of 2008 with Germany 
(Figure 3.9) producing the largest negative return. The charts also illustrates decline in 
volatility towards the end of 2009 especially in the UK. Also, the graphical 
presentations in Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show that Canada and the UK are more stable than 
other developed markets before the crisis period. The data sources are identified in 







Table 3.2: Developed stock markets under study 




Canada Toronto Stock Exchange 300 Composite TSX 1861 .GSPTSE 
France Euronext Paris CAC 40 Index 1987 .FCHI 
Germany GER Deutsche Boerse DAX Index 1988 .GDAXI 
Italy Milan Stock Exchange BCI General Index 1808 .BCII 








UK London Stock Exchange FTSE 350 1801 .FTLCS 
Source: Reuters and various indices websites
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Figure 3.9: Daily returns on developed stock markets (shaded portion is the crisis period; 15/09/08-15/10/09) 
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3.2.2.4 Comparative (other) markets 
China and India are included in the sample for comparative purposes as they represent 
two of the fastest-growing emerging markets. India, for instance, has enjoyed an 
impressive growth rate of 9% per annum. This is reported as the fastest in history along 
with China (Sharma 2014). 
Table 3.3 below provides a profile of the comparative markets and the Reuter’s index 
code of the respective indices as at time of research. 
Graphical presentation of the daily returns of these markets is provided in Figure 3.11 
below. While China shows greater volatility before 2009, India’s volatility is higher 
after 2009. As identified in the developed markets above, the comparative markets also 
showed high negative returns in the beginning of 2008. China demonstrates higher 
volatility than India in the stable period (non- shaded portion). China’s volatility during 
crisis did not show much difference from what is observed in the market during stability 
except in a relatively short period before the onset of the crisis period. India on the other 
hand shows more volatility during crisis as compared to its stable period. However, 
China seems to be the more volatile of the comparative markets. The data sources are 
identified in Section 3.2.3 below. 
 
Table 3.3: Other stock markets under study 
Countries Name of stock market Index Opened/established 
 
Reuters index code 
China Shanghai Stock Exchange A Share Index SSEASI 1990 
.SSEA 








3.2.3 Data set 
 
The data used is the daily closing values of stock markets obtained from the Thompson-
Reuters Eikon Financial Database shown in local currencies. The indices used are the 
principal indices from the respective countries (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2 for details in 
respect to their RIC codes). 
Eikon did not have a full data set on all major African countries and although another 
major source was available (MSCI) this data set posed a number of reliability issues14 
and was eventually discounted as a potential source. 
The Eikon financial database only guarantees two years of daily data. Although most 
indices can go back significantly longer periods, the full data required for two major 
African markets (Kenya and Ghana) was not available from Eikon or other sources 
available from the university. These countries are therefore omitted from the study. 
Other countries omitted from the study include Tanzania (a very illiquid market with 
only 19 stocks traded), Zimbabwe (limited period of data available), Malawi (limited 
period of data available), Mozambique (no available data), Swaziland (no available 
data) and Uganda (not enough data). 
 
Data cleaning issues 
Market holidays were the biggest data issue faced in this thesis. National holidays that 
differ from country to country mean that when US markets are open and trading it is 
possible for country B markets to be closed. This results in a series of non-
                                                 
14 MSCI data is converted into US dollars, which means that the value of the index will change in dollar terms on non-trading days 
when the respective stock markets were not open. This made it difficult to identify and eliminate non-trading days from the data set, 
which meant that this was discounted as a source. 
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corresponding dates across the raw market data. A lot of time was taken in data cleaning 
going through each data set and deleting the non-corresponding dates manually. 
 
3.3 HYPOTHESIS AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 
As identified in Section 3.2, the financial crisis was long, drawn out and contained a 
series of sub-events. The 2007-09 crisis can be contrasted with previous events 
examined in the contagion literature. These can be characterised as being more in terms 
of one-off short period events that rarely have an impact on the markets for more than 
three months. Examples of short crises papers are presented in Table 3.5 below. 
Table 3.4: Examples of short-term contagion studies 
Authors Duration of crisis period studied 
 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
1) 1997 East Asian Crisis: 1 month 
2) 1994 Mexican Peso Crisis: less than a month 
3) 1987 US Stock Market Crash: 1 to 2 months 
Asongu (2011) 04/01/2008-29/01/2008: less than a month 
Collins and Biekpe (2003) 20/10/1997-28/11/1997: just over a month 
  
The 2007-09 crisis was not a single short, sharp shock but a series of sub-events that 
unfolded in the US over a period of more than a year (see Section 3.2 above). I therefore 
test for contagion from two main perspectives: 
 (i) Characterising the crisis as a single event (Hypothesis 1) 
(ii) Characterising the crisis as a series of sub-crisis events (Hypothesis 2) 
The two groups of markets in this research (developed and African) differ markedly in 
their financial infrastructures as well as their level of financial integration with the US. 
This is self-evident from constant correlations estimates over the stable period (01 
January, 2007 to 14 September 2008). Correlations between the US and most African 
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markets (see Table 3.5) are very low and sometimes negative (the case in Nigeria and 
Zambia). South Africa is the only African market with a high correlation with the US, 
providing up to 42% (0.42468). All the developed markets in the table provided high 
correlation values with the US. 
Table 3.5: Demonstrating the degree of relationship by means of raw correlations 
African markets Correlation between the US and each country over the period 01 January, 2007 to 14 September, 2008 
Botswana -0.01398 





















I cite this evidence as the justification for expecting that there may be differences in the 
degree (and possibly form) of contagion between the two groups. On this basis I split 
the principle hypotheses below into two sub-categories, namely, developed and African 






The principle hypothesis is that contagion occurred during the full period of the 
2007-09 financial crisis. This is formally tested as: 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a statistically significant increase in correlations between US 
and developed markets over the period 15/09/2008-15/10/2009. 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a statistically significant increase in correlations between US 
and African markets over the period 15/09/2008-15/10/2009. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
The secondary hypothesis is that the crisis developed as a series of sub-crises (see 
Section 3.2.1.2 above) and that contagion events occurred in each of these sub-
periods. This is formally tested as: 
Hypothesis 2a: There is a statistically significant increase in correlations between US 
and developed markets over the sub-periods 15/09/2008-10/10/2008, 15/09/2008-
17/10/2008, 15/09/2008-27/10/2008 and 15/09/2008-20/11/2008. 
Hypothesis 2b: There is a statistically significant increase in correlations between US 
and African markets over the sub-periods 15/09/2008-10/10/2008, 15/09/2008-
17/10/2008, 15/09/2008-27/10/2008 and 15/09/2008-20/11/2008. 
As stated in the last paragraph of Section 3.2.1.2, the impact of the crisis will be tested 
as a cumulative effect. For example, I did not test the stable period against sub-period 3 








The spread of financial crisis: a hypothesised framework model 
The examination of the data in Section 3.2 and correlations estimated in Table 3.5 
indicate to me that contagion events from a developed market to another developed 
market are likely to be very different from a contagion event from a developed to an 
emerging/frontier market. Using this finding and also existing theoretical literature on 
contagion discussed in Chapter 2 to provide insights regarding the model in explaining 
contagion in the two groups of markets in this thesis, I now present a hypothesised 
provisional model of contagion (shown in Figure 3.12). 
There are a number of hypotheses that could explain the spread of shocks across 
countries (Chapter 2). The low correlations with Africa (shown in Table 3.5 above) 
suggest that the linkages between US and African markets are relatively weak. 
The higher correlations with developed markets probably reflect the stronger linkages 
between their financial institutions. For example, we see that global investment banks’ 
financial intermediaries have major presence in most of the world’s financial centres. 
We only need to look at the international nature of banks and institutions in London to 
see this.15 From this I would argue that any contagion effect would be predominantly 
financial market integration-based.16 A caveat that can be added is that I am not 
excluding the possibility that some herding behaviour might have also occurred during 
this period. This could, for example, reflect anchoring type behaviour of investors in 
times of extreme uncertainty. 
The principle mechanisms by which a financial crisis is transmitted between markets are 
shown in Figure 3.12 below as contagion, interdependence and spill-over. Forbes and 
                                                 
15 See for example: http://www.cass.city.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/124930/CBR-WP01-12.pdf  
16 This does not mean of course that any herding effect can be entirely discounted. 
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Rigobon (2002) argue that both contagion and interdependence result in increases on 
correlation but that a contagion event results in a relatively bigger increase. They are 
differentiated in terms of statistical significance. An increase that is statistically 
significant at 5% identifies contagion. If it is not significant at 5% it identifies 
interdependence. In effect the distinction is based on the extent to which the correlation 
increases. 
As stressed by Massacci (2007:2): “The distinction between interdependence and 
contagion is of interest to policy makers (either in international financial institutions, 
such as the IMF, or at central banks) and to profit maximisers investors. In the former 
case, if a random jump from a good to a bad equilibrium (that is contagion) occurs, then 
a policy intervention could be effective; conversely, in the case of interdependence a 
similar action is unlikely to have any significant effect. In the case of investors, the 
exposition to market risk can be generally reduced by portfolio diversification; however, 
if contagion occurs then the degree of dependence between markets increases, and 
portfolio diversification may not be an effective strategy to follow. Therefore, because 
of the different effects they have on economic agents’ decision process, the 




Figure 3.12: Forms of financial crisis: A preliminary model of contagion based on the expected relationships between (i) US-developed 
































Financial crisis can also have a spill-over effect. It essentially implies a lagged impact 
of other country-specific effects that arises as a result of economic linkages between 
countries, for example, through trading arrangements (Dungey and Martin 2000:3). In 
my thesis, spill-over is defined as a situation whereby one market within a region is 
affected by the crisis of a developed market and then subsequently transmits the crisis to 
other markets within the region (e.g. from the US to South Africa and then from South 
Africa to “other” African markets.  
I argue that the existence of sub-crisis periods in the 2007-09 crisis may be important in 
the spread of the crisis and that behavioural finance theory is likely to play an important 
role in explaining this transmission process. This is because as investors get used to a 
series of events their reactions may change in response to each subsequent event. 
Behavioural finance theory would suggest to us that uncertainty is the key driver of 
behaviour during crisis situations. The question arises from a behavioural perspective of 
how will market participants in the markets of other countries respond? Will they treat 
each sub-event as separate and unrelated and anchor their decisions on the US market in 
each instance? Will they become used to crisis in the US and stop responding to events 
in the US altogether? Or will each sub-crisis in the US have a diminishing impact on 




Given the dominant position that the US holds in world financial markets, a crisis that 
originates in this market can easily affect other nations through either financial 
integration or herding behaviour on the part of investors. 
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US and African markets have few similarities in terms of size or structure. However, 
major falls in some African markets during the financial crisis led us to ask if growing 
market integration played a role. Nellor (2008) reported the steady integration of 
African markets with the global financial systems, in particular Sub-Saharan Africa – 
the rapid inflow of foreign capital saw foreign trading in African (excluding South 
Africa) debt markets more than triple in 2007 compared with 2005. 
The US has strong financial links with other developed countries, as was evidenced by 
the fact that rescue plans for financial institutions were needed not just in the US but in 
many developed countries. Therefore it is highly plausible that financial integration 
played a part in the transmission relationships. The importance of integration in the 
spread of financial crisis is a major theme in the academic literature (see Wongswan 
2003, Gilmore and McManus 2002, Patev and Kanaryan 2003, and Bekaert, Harvey and 
Ng 2005). 
My expectations are summarised as follows: 
1. Evidence of contagion is expected during the 2007-09 financial crisis in African 
markets both in long and short sub-crisis periods, 
2. Evidence of contagion or interdependence is expected during the 2007-09 
financial crisis in developed markets during both long and short sub-crisis 
periods, 
3. There will be substantial differences between emerging and developed markets 
respond to the financial crisis because of market linkage differences. 
Expectations are that integration effects will explain any US/developed market 
contagion while herding behaviour might explain any contagion found in 




3.4 METHODOLOGICAL NOTES 
 
Having identified issues associated with the data and having identified the hypotheses to 
be tested, in this section I now examine how these issues will influence the statistical 
methodology applied in the thesis. This section is divided into two: 
1. Identifying the major statistical approaches available to test for contagion, 
2. Justifying the selected approaches used in this thesis. 
 
3.4.1 Statistical approaches of contagion 
The different approaches of contagion testing were identified by Rigobon (2001) and 
then further classified by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) into four principle methodologies. 
These are identified in Table 3.6 below along with examples found in the academic 
literature. 
Table 3.6: Contagion testing frameworks 
METHODOLOGY MAJOR PAPERS 
1) Correlation Coefficient Analysis 
King And Wadhwani (1990) 
Lee and Kim (1993) 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
Caporale, Cipollini and Spagnolo (2005) 
2) DCC-ARCH/GARCH  
Engle (2002) 
Chiang, Jeon, and Li (2007) 
3) Cointegration Technique 
Longin and Solnik (1995) 
Kanas (1998) 
4) Transmission Mechanism Approach 
  
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) 
Forbes (2004) 




Cross-market correlation analysis 
The most popular contagion methodology found in the contagion literatures is based 
around this approach. This forms the basis of the contagion model based on correlation 
coefficients modelled by King and Wadhwani (1990), further developed by Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) and more recently by Caporale et al. (2005). This test is based on 
changes in correlation coefficients between markets before and after a shock. If the 
correlation coefficients increase by a statistically significantly amount after crisis, 
contagion is said to have occurred. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) can be considered as a 
seminal article in the early contagion literature. It employs a vector autoregressive 
(VAR) methodology that controls for non-contagion-related factors by correlating the 
residuals from two VAR equations. This approach requires an adjustment to be made to 
the estimated correlation coefficient to take into consideration differences in the 
volatility in the crisis and non-crisis periods. The impact that the adjustment made on 
the robustness of the analysis is an issue that is widely discussed in the literature and 
that will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
 
Dynamic conditional correlation analysis 
An additional disadvantage of the cross-market correlation model is that estimates are 
based on single constant correlation estimates. This does not allow the researcher to 
explore the impact of the crisis on a dynamic basis. The dynamic conditional correlation 
(DCC) model in contrast estimates individual estimates of correlation at each point in 
time. The generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) approach 
has been used widely to analyse volatility properties of time series data. The variance-
covariance transmission mechanisms between countries are estimated using the 
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conditional covariance and the conditional variance at each point in time. This 
framework was popularised by Engle (2002), who proposed the DCC multivariate 
GARCH model. It has been popularised, and developed further in a contagion context, 
by a number of researchers including Chiang, Jeon and Li (2007) who studied the Asian 
markets from 1996 to 2003. 
 
Cointegration testing 
Cointegration testing predates the introduction of DCC. This test has been widely used 
to examine market interdependencies or the international integration of financial 
markets. The procedure entails checking for changes in the cointegrating vector between 
markets in the long run, instead of short run changes after a shock. There are two 
principle approaches to cointegration; the Engle-Granger two-step approach and the 
Johansen17 procedure. There are issues in respect of the statistical power of the test 
statistics associated with these tests. Another issue is that these tests focus on the long-
run relationships between series, which may be problematic if the contagion event is 
short-lived. It has been argued by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) that the long time frame 
might miss periods of contagion when correlations increase briefly after a crisis. Longin 
and Solnik (1995) used this procedure to measure the correlations of monthly excess 
returns from seven countries over the period 1960 to 1990. They found an increase in 
correlation between the markets and that the correlation rises in periods of high 
volatility. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argue that this technique does not explicitly test 
for evidence of contagion and as a consequence rejected it. 
 
 
                                                 
17 Johansen, Søren (1991). Estimation and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration Vectors in Gaussian Vector Autoregressive Models. 
Econometrica 59(6): 1551–1580.  
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Transmission mechanism identification 
Rather than focusing on the impact of the contagion event on the strength of the linkage 
between markets, this methodology attempts to identify the ways in which shocks are 
transmitted across countries. This is based on the assumption that the crisis is 
transmitted through the integration linkage between countries. These transmission 
pathways can take a series of forms: for example, through financial market links or 
through trade relations. This approach employs a variety of statistical techniques to 
model these relationships. These use a variety of techniques including limited 
dependant variable type analysis (logit and probit regression), OLS and principal 
component analysis (Rigobon 2001, Dungey et al. 2005b, Wang 2004, Yang and Lim 
2004 and Billio and Pelizzon 2003). Researchers investigating contagion to identify the 
transmission mechanism look at the size of the estimation parameters to evaluate 
channels of contagion. Eichengreen et al. (1996) applied the binary probit model on 
quarterly panel data from 20 industrialised countries to check whether the probability of 
crisis occurring in a country at a particular time is correlated with crises in other 
countries at the same time. They reported evidence of contagion (their model controlled 
for political and economic fundamentals). The tests they implemented suggested that 
the probability of crisis occurring in one country is correlated with concurrent 
speculative attacks occurring in other countries. It is also suggested that contagion is 
more easily transmitted between countries that have strong international trade linkages 
than to countries with similar macroeconomic circumstances. 
A further example of this approach is provided by Forbes (2004). In an extensive study 
of how the Asian and Russian crises affected different firms around the world. Forbes 
(2004) used firm-level data set of financial statistics, industry information, geographic 
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data and stock returns for more than 10,000 companies from 46 countries. The study 
adopted the event-study methodology to investigate if the firms’ vulnerability to the two 
crises studied were affected by factors such as industry, international exposure, debt 
ratios, trading liquidity and geographic location. Forbes (2004) found that trade linkages 
(product competitiveness and income effects) were the main predictors in the 
international transmission of the crises. 
 
3.4.2 Selecting thesis statistical methods 
It can be noted from Section 3.3 that my hypotheses focuses on examining differences 
in the impact of the crisis on the strength of the linkages from the US to Africa and from 
the US to developed markets. Although I attempt to distinguish between herding and 
financial market integration effects, I am not attempting to identify the specific 
integration-related transmission pathways used in the transmission mechanism 
methodology approach. I therefore discount this methodology. 
The following observations can be made: 
• First, I note that there is an extensive body of work using a considerable number 
of different approaches on financial contagion. This suggests that there is no 
clear-cut best approach. 
• Second, as can be recalled in Chapter 2, although there are a number of different 
definitions of contagion, Forbes’ and Rigobon’s (2002:2250) concept of shift-
contagion appears to have broad acceptance in the literature (defined as “a 
significant increase in cross-market linkages resulting from a shock hitting one 
country or group of countries”). 
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• Third, there are a number of critiques in the literature of Forbes’ and Rigobon’ 
(2002) VAR-based methodology. 
• Fourth, the 2007-09 crisis was quite unlike previous crises examined in the 
literature given its long duration. 
In my work I will use Forbes’ and Rigobon’s (2002) narrow definition as it has two 
important advantages: 
1. It provides a direct test for contagion by comparing cross-market correlation 
coefficient between two countries during a period of stability and after a 
crisis/shock. 
2. The second advantage of the narrow definition is that it provides a direct 
approach of distinguishing between contagion theories, such as those predicting 
a change after a crisis or those based on the continuation of the existing 
relationship between markets after a shock (recall the theories of contagion 
given in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2).  
A correlation of 40% and above during a period of tranquillity would be interpreted 
as a strong positive correlation. This will serve as a guideline for the interpretation of 
the relationships between markets before the onset of the crisis. Goetzmann, Li and 
Rouwenhorst 2004 carried out a long term correlation study which covered the years 
1850- 2000 in respect to US markets. They identified that between 1972-2000 
correlation between US and what they described as core markets (UK, Germany and 
France) rarely fell below an average of 40%. This is therefore what I use to define 
high correlation levels. 
After noting that the VAR approach of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) has a number of 
criticisms in the literature, I have decided that for robustness purposes I will employ 
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both the cross-market correlation analysis approach and also the DCC-based approach. 
This will enable me to make a full comparison of the two methodologies. I also note 
that contagion testing over a long crisis period has not been extensively examined in the 
literature. By applying two different methodologies I will have greater flexibility if any 
modelling issues arise. I also believe that it is important to examine the dynamic impact 
on correlation of the crisis event. This is particularly important in respect to the 2007-09 
crisis because of its length and its sub-phases. It is often commented that the use of 
averages can obscure a lot of significant information. Estimating the correlation on a 
dynamic day-by-day basis will enable me to more fully explore changes in the impact of 
the crisis on correlation linkages over time. 
 
3.5 FOLLOWING CHAPTERS 
 
In Chapter 4, I will test the hypotheses identified using the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
constant correlation analysis along with variations and extensions of it. This analysis 
will then be repeated for comparative purposes in Chapter 5 using the dynamic 
correlation methodology before the results are discussed and conclusion drawn about 















This chapter applies non-time-varying correlation coefficient analysis using 
methodologies based on the work of Forbes and Rigobon (2002). This is used to test for 
the occurrence of contagion from (i) the US to emerging/frontier African markets and 
(ii) from the US to developed markets during the 2007-09 financial crisis. 
The two hypotheses tested, as justified and identified in Chapter 3, identify potential 
“long period” and “short period” contagion events. The hypotheses tested are: 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a statistically significant increase in correlations between US 
and developed markets over the period 15 September 2008-15 October 2009. 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a statistically significant increase in correlations between US 
and African markets over the period 15 September 2008-15 October 2009. 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2a: There is a statistically significant increase in correlations between US 
and developed markets over the sub-periods 15/09/2008-10/10/2008, 15/09/2008-
17/10/2008, 15/09/2008-27/10/2008 and 15/09/2008-20/11/2008. 
Hypothesis 2b: There is a statistically significant increase in correlations between US 
and African markets over the sub-periods 15/09/2008-10/10/2008, 15/09/2008-
17/10/2008, 15/09/2008-27/10/2008 and 15/09/2008-20/11/2008. 
In this chapter, I test three versions of the constant correlation contagion model. This is 
done for two principle reasons. First, the extended length of the crisis means that the 
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standard Forbes and Rigobon (2002) methodology can be adjusted in a way that 
addresses a key criticism of their methodology; namely, in respect to the adjustment 
they made to the estimated correlation coefficient. The second reason is for robustness. I 
believe that the combination of these two factors means that my work in this chapter can 
be considered as being a “novel” contribution to the academic literature in this area. 
The three versions of the constant correlation contagion model tested are: 
•  The base case of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) based on a single VAR system 
methodology; 
• An adjusted Forbes and Rigobon model that uses raw log returns data rather than 
the residuals from a VAR system; 
• A two-VAR system methodology (which therefore does not require an 
adjustment to the measurement of correlation). 
In Section 4.2 the different methodologies applied are discussed. This is followed in 
Sections 4.3 by a presentation of correlation estimation results and in Section 4.4 by a 
presentation of contagion test results. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes the chapter with 
some thoughts about the relative merits of the different methodologies examined. 
 
4.2 DISCUSSION OF METHODOLOGIES 
 
The three methodologies identified above are now considered in more detail. 
4.2.1 The single VAR approach 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) developed a restricted single-system vector autoregressive 
(VAR) based methodology that estimated the correlation between the residuals of a 
two-equation VAR system. In this system the dependent variables are the adjusted daily 
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returns of the two markets being considered. By basing the correlation on the residuals 
this methodology controls for the lead-lag relationship. This is the impact of previous 
market returns in the two markets on the returns in the current period. Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) used interest rates as an additional explanatory variable in their VAR 
system but found that omitting the interest rates did not weaken their findings.  
They also found the optimal lag structure in the VAR to be five relatively short periods. 
This is probably a reflection of two factors: (i) that new information tends to be 
incorporated into financial market processes relatively quickly; and (ii) that the differing 
opening times of financial markets meant they had to estimate daily returns on the basis 
of a two-day rolling average. 
I have attempted to follow the Forbes and Rigobon (FR) methodology as closely as 
possible in my work. This has meant basing my VAR system on a five-period lag 
structure and omitting interest rates as a potential explanatory variable. Tests I 
undertook in respect to my data identified that these assumptions were credible in 
respect to my data.18 I also made use of a two-day rolling average when estimating 
returns. This was essential given the wide variety of opening times in the markets I am 
working with. These are shown in Table 4.1 below. The opening times are shown in 
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC)/Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). As illustrated in 
Table 4.1, the UK, Spain and Italy begin trading at 08:00AM, UTC. Canada and the US 
begin at 14:30 UTC. The table shows that there is an overlap of trading hours in 
Namibia and Morocco. There are also instances where markets’ opening times do not 
overlap at all, such as Japan and the UK or Japan and the US. 
 
                                                 
18 It can be noted that in respect to the data used in this thesis, interest rate data were unavailable in relation to a number of African 
markets, which meant that a full series of tests could not be undertaken. 
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Table 4.1: Stock markets under view and their opening times 
African countries Index UTC opening time UTC/GMT closing time 
Botswana BSE Domestic 07:30 08:30  
Côte d’Ivoire  BRVM  09:00 15:00  
Egypt EGX 07:45 13:15 
Mauritius SEMDEX 05:00 09:30 
Morocco CSE 08:00 13:00 
Namibia NSX  08:00 16:00 
Nigeria NSE 09:30  14:30  
South Africa JSE  07:00 15:00 
Tunisia TSE 10:30 12:30  
Zambia LuSE 08:00 10:00 
Developed countries 
Canada TSX 14:30 21:00 
France CAC 40 Index 08:00 16:30 
Germany DAX Index 07:00 21:00 
Italy BCI General Index 08:00 16:25 
Japan NIKKEI 500 Index 00:00 06:00 
Spain Madrid General Index 08:00  16:30 
United Kingdom FTSE 350 08:00 16:30 
United States S&P 500 Index 14:30 21:00 
Comparative countries 
China SSEASI 01:30 07:00 
India BSE 03:45 10:00 
 
Based on the assumptions identified above I now illustrate the single VAR system 
approach. This is based on the assumption of there being two markets in the system and 
that contagion is to be tested from Market 1 to Market 2. In this thesis, Market 1 is the 
US, identified as the origin of the crisis, while Market 2 would represent any of the 
remaining markets identified in Table 4.1. 
Let 𝑥 represent stock market returns of the US and 𝑦 the returns of a second country19 in 
the following regression: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝑥𝑡  + 𝜀𝑡 ,       (4.1) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐸[𝜀𝑡] = 0;       (4.2)   
𝐸�𝜀𝑡²� = 𝑐 ˂ ∞,       (4.3) 
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑐 𝑖𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸[𝑥𝑡𝜀𝑡] = 0     (4.4) 
                                                 
19 Where returns are estimated on a continually compounding basis and estimated by ln (xt /xt-1). 
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The sample period is divided into two, which FR (Forbes and Rigobon 2002) describes 
as the low volatility and high volatility (crisis) periods respectively. They note that the 
variance will be higher in the crisis period and therefore in their single VAR model the 
measurement of the correlation will need to be adjusted to reflect this. 
The VAR system is estimated using the optimal number of lags (identified by FR as 
five) and containing no exogenous variables (such as interest rates). This is given by: 
𝑅𝑡  = 𝑐 + 𝜙(L)𝑅𝑡  +  𝜂𝑡             (4.5)  
𝑅𝑡 = �𝑟𝑥𝑡 , 𝑟𝑦𝑡�
′                            (4.6)  
  
Where 𝑅𝑡 represent the vector of returns, such that 𝑟𝑥𝑡  is the stock market return in the 
crisis country (US), and 𝑟𝑦𝑡 is the stock market return in another country 𝑦 (an African 
or alternative developed market), 𝜙L is the vector of lag and 𝜂𝑡 is the vector of reduced 
form disturbance terms. Given that I am dealing with a two-equation system, the returns 
equations can, alternatively, be shown in non-matrix format as: 






𝑟𝑦𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜀𝑥𝑡                  (4.7𝑎) 






𝑟𝑥𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜀𝑦𝑡                  (4.7𝑏) 
 
The residuals, as identified from the variance-covariance matrix, are then used to 
estimate the cross-market correlation coefficients for each pair of countries. 
The correlation given by the standard definition of correlation is: 
𝜌 = 𝜎𝑥𝑦
𝜎𝑥𝜎𝑦




𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑥 is the base criterion (in this case US) and 𝑦 is another market (African or 
developed). 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argue that the estimated correlation during the crisis period 
is generally biased upwards due to the problem of heteroscedasticity (volatility changes 
in asset returns) in high frequency data. They argue that even if the underlying 
relationship between 𝑥 and 𝑦 does not change, it is possible for 𝜌 to increase whenever 
the variance of 𝑥 increases. 
Consider the correlations between the returns of two stock markets, to be presented by 
𝜌1 during the crisis (high volatility) period and 𝜌2 during low volatility period. If there 
is an increase in the volatility of asset return in market 1, the variance in the market will 
increase, such that 𝜎𝑥,12 >  𝜎𝑥,22 . If there is no change to the fundamental relationship 
between the assets returns in the two markets, then the estimated correlations will be 
larger during a crisis period than a tranquil period, such that  𝜌1 > 𝜌2. This can 
therefore give a false indication of contagion given that the increase in correlation is 
conditional on market volatility. In such cases the estimate of correlation will be biased 
upward. 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) suggested an adjustment for the heteroscedasticity bias that 
takes into account the increase in variance during the crisis period. The adjusted 






          (4.9) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 
 𝜌𝑎 = adjusted (unconditional) correlation 
𝜌ᵁ = unadjusted (conditional) correlation, as in 𝜌 in Equation 4.8 above 
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𝛿 = increase in the variance of 𝑥, which measures the change in the period of high 




− 1,        (4.10)   
𝜎𝑥𝑥ℎ = variance during high volatility (crisis period) 
𝜎𝑥𝑥𝑙 = variance during low volatility 
The unconditional correlation is denoted by 𝜌𝑎 in Equation 4.9 above. This is the 
conditional correlation scaled by a non-linear function of the percentage change in the 
volatility of returns from the country where the crisis started (in this case the US), over 
the high and low volatility periods. 
If there is no change in the underlying relationship between two markets, then the 
adjustment allows for a levels shift in the volatility of Market 1, whereby 𝜌𝑎 = 𝜌2. 
Contagion from Market 1 to Market 2 is identified in terms of a significant increase in 
the unconditional correlation. We therefore are required to undertake a one-tailed 
statistical test20. 
The null of market interdependence is tested against the alternative of contagion 
through the following hypothesis test: 
𝐻0 ∶  𝜌𝑎ℎ ≤  𝜌𝑙       (4.11𝑎) 
𝐻𝐴 ∶  𝜌𝑎ℎ > 𝜌𝑙         (4.11𝑏)   
 
 
                                                 
20 It was not necessary to adjust the 𝑡-test for over lapping periods because the thesis is not looking for significant 
changes in correlation between the individual short sub-periods. It is instead looking at how correlation changes and 
testing for contagion between cumulative sub-periods and the stable period. For example, I did not test the stable 
period against sub-period 2; I tested the stable period against the cumulative impact of sub periods 1 and 2. 
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𝜌𝑎ℎ is the adjusted correlation during the crisis period (high volatility). 
𝜌𝑙 is the correlation during the low volatility period. This period is the full period that 
consists of the full dataset in the VAR system. 
The test statistic that FR developed is identified as following the 𝑡-distribution and is 






 + 1𝑁𝑙 − 3
      (4.12)  
Where 𝑁ℎ and 𝑁𝑙 are corresponding samples sizes of crisis (high volatility) and low 
volatility periods, 𝐹ℎ and 𝐹𝑙 are Fisher’s transformations for the high and low volatility 
period to improve the properties of the test statistics. The Fisher transformation is 
important because the standard test requires that the coefficients are normally 
distributed. Fisher’s Z transformation provides a solution by converting standard 







�      (4.13)  






�      (4.14)  
















 + 1𝑁𝑙 − 3
     (4.15) 
If the calculated value of the test statistics is higher than the critical value of the one-
tailed test at 5% significance, we reject the null hypothesis of interdependence in favour 
of the alternative hypothesis of contagion.21 
                                                 
21 This thesis applies the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) definition of contagion. They define an increase in correlation that is not 
statistically significant at the 5% level as market interdependence. They define an increase in correlation that is statistically 
significant at the 5% level as contagion. A fall in correlation is not considered. 
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The model described above is applied in this chapter to test for contagion from the US 
to (i) the selected African markets, (ii) the selected developed country markets and (iii) 
selected other emerging markets. 
 
4.2.2 Raw log returns approach 
The contagion testing methodology identified in Section 4.2.1 above was repeated using 
the log returns data rather than the residuals from the VAR. This was undertaken for 
robustness purposes in order to identify whether or not the control variables used in the 
VAR (the five-period lagged returns) had a significant impact on the estimated 
correlation coefficients. The same adjustment is made for heteroscedasticity on the 
crisis period as in above and the hypothesis is also measured in the same manner. 
The aim of this method is to check if the final result will complement the results from a 
single VAR approach described above. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argued that 
variation in the nature of the VAR equation used did not change their final conclusion. 
By undertaking this test I will be able to identify whether in fact it is also necessary to 
control for lagged own-market and lagged cross-market affects. 
 
4.2.3 Separate VAR approach 
Given that the financial crisis ran over a full year (see Chapter 3 for details), an 
alternative approach that can be considered is to base the analysis on two separate VAR 
systems. The advantage of such an approach is that there will be no need to use the 
adjustment to the correlation measure used by FR. This is because the variances should 
be relatively homogeneous in the respective VAR systems; there is unlikely to be the 
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step-change in the variance as found in FR low volatility and high volatility periods. I 
would expect high variance in the throughout-the-crisis VAR systems and also low 
variance in the tranquil period VAR system. 
It can be noted that the adjustment that FR used has had some criticism in the literature 
(Billio and Pelizzon 2003) and therefore it can be argued that the results from the 
separate VAR model will show greater robustness. 
This approach22 splits the full sample data into tranquil and crisis periods and then runs 
two separate VAR systems. The residuals from these are then used to estimate the 
correlations. Hypothesis testing for this variant differs from the method outlined above 
in that there is no adjustment made to the estimated correlation coefficient. The tranquil 
or stable period is defined as the period before the crisis and the hypothesis is given as; 
𝐻0 ∶ 𝜌𝑐  ≤  𝜌𝑠       (4.16) 
𝐻𝐴 ∶ 𝜌𝑐 > 𝜌𝑠       (4.17) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜌𝑐  and 𝜌𝑠 are correlations of crisis and stable periods. The null of 





                                                 
22 Separate VAR tests will only be applied to sub-period 4 and the long crisis period. This is because other sub-crisis periods have 
relatively small crisis sample sizes to be run through a VAR system separately.  
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4.3 RESULTS PART 1: CORRELATION ESTIMATION 
 
Section 4.3.1 presents the results of correlations tests undertaken using the three 
methodologies identified above. The principal features of these results are then 
described in summary form as stylised facts with the focus being on the differences 
between the US-African market correlations and the US-developed market correlations.  
Section 4.3.2 then presents the results of tests for contagion with the principal features 
of these results again being described in summary form as stylised facts. Discussion of 
the results is not undertaken until Chapter 6, given the need to compare them with the 
time-varying correlation-based contagion tests undertaken in Chapter 5. 
 
4.3.1 Tests undertaken 
Correlation estimates are presented below on the basis of three separate methods 
identified above. These are (i) the base case of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) based on a 
single VAR system methodology, (ii) the adjusted Forbes and Rigobon (2002) model 
that uses raw log returns data rather than the residuals from a VAR system and (iii) the 
two-VAR system. 
For each of these three methods, the pre-crisis, stable or low-volatility period and the 
crisis period or high-volatility period correlations are identified. These relate to models 
based on the following crisis definitions: (i) long crisis: 15/09/2008- 15/10/2009, (ii) 
sub-period 1: 15/09/2008-10/10/2008, (iii) sub- period 2: 15/09/2008-17/10/2008, (iv) 
sub- period 3: 15/09/2008-27/10/2008 and (v) sub- period 4: 15/09/2008-20/11/2008.  
It should be noted that different VAR systems are estimated in respect to methods (i) 
and (iii) for the long period and also for each sub-period. It can also be noted that a 
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consequence of this is that the estimated correlation can differ in respect to the stable 
period. This can be seen, for example, in Figure A4.1 in this chapter’s appendix 
(Section 4.6). 
 
4.3.1.1 Correlations using the base case method 
23Figure 4.1 below show the full period correlation (low volatility period) estimates 
based on the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) methodology for all sampled countries across 
all testing periods.  
The pre-crisis stable period, the crisis period using the adjusted correlation (see 
equation 4.9 for the adjustment) and, for comparative purposes, the unadjusted crisis 
period correlations are presented in Figures A4.1 through to A4.3 in this chapter’s 
appendix. 
                                                 
23 Figures preceded by “A” are found in chapter appendices.  
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Figure 4.1: Full period correlations with US market (base case methodology covering various periods) 
 
BWA CIV  EGY MUS MAR NAM NGA SA TUN ZMB CAN FRA GER ITA JPN SPN U K CHN IND 
Long Period 0.024 0.034 0.248 0.077 0.067 0.220 0.025 0.499 0.089 -0.008 0.824 0.727 0.744 0.559 0.341 0.678 0.712 0.083 0.437 
Short 1 -0.034 0.032 0.220 0.050 0.061 0.302 0.017 0.389 0.146 0.017 0.751 0.690 0.657 0.480 0.312 0.608 0.666 0.050 0.312 
Short 2 -0.012 0.031 0.223 0.173 0.120 0.307 0.030 0.436 0.150 0.011 0.775 0.720 0.707 0.547 0.360 0.642 0.678 0.075 0.388 
Short 3 -0.002 0.053 0.266 0.199 0.148 0.330 0.026 0.475 0.123 0.023 0.804 0.724 0.720 0.588 0.425 0.681 0.691 0.108 0.434 






















Full period correlations for the long and four sub-crisis periods 
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4.3.1.1.1 Stylised facts 
 
It is clear from Figure 4.1 that across the full period each model runs, correlations with the US 
were a lot lower in respect to African markets than they were in respect to developed markets. 
Some differences in correlations can be observed in respect to the sub-periods over which the 
models were run. These were considerably smaller over the stable period, as shown in Figure 
A4.1, but more pronounced during the crisis period (unadjusted), as shown in Figure A4.3. 
 
The long period model 
During the stable period (Figure A4.1), Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Morocco, Nigeria and China 
have negative correlations with the US before the crisis. The result is surprising for Nigeria as 
it is considered one of Africa’s most liquid markets. The smallest correlation value (−0.042) 
observed during the stable period is between Botswana and the US. While most African 
markets have correlations of less than 10%, South Africa’s correlation is 35% (0.354). 
With the exception of Japan, all the developed markets (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain and UK) have correlations with the US higher than the African markets. All the 
developed markets, excluding Japan, have above 40% correlation with the US. South Africa is 
the only African market with correlation (0.354) higher than a developed market (Japan 
−0.276). 
The adjusted crisis period correlations are shown in Figure A4.2. It can be observed that with 
the exception of Egypt, Namibia, Zambia, France and Japan, correlations are higher than their 
respective stable period correlations. Nigeria’s adjusted correlation of 0.030 (3.0%) is the 
second smallest after Côte d’Ivoire’s at 0.027 (2.7%) but they are higher than their respective 
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stable period correlations of −0.017 and −0.042. This indicates that these markets in one way 
or the other have reacted to the financial crisis. 
For comparative purposes, the unadjusted crisis period correlations are shown in Figure A4.3. 
It can be noted here that the introduction of a correction factor had the effect of reducing the 
estimated correlation values. The likely impact of this is that the correction factor reduces the 
likelihood of contagion being identified using the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) definition. 
In summary, it can be noted that in the long period model: 
• Botswana, Morocco and Nigeria are the only African countries with adjusted crisis 
period correlations higher than their full period correlations in the long crisis period; 
• No developed country market have an adjusted crisis period correlation higher than 
their full period correlation in the long crisis sample; 
• Unlike the majority of African markets examined, China (another emerging market) 
shows a significant increase in correlation in the crisis period. 
 
Short period models 
An examination of Figure A4.1 indicates that although the stable period correlations show 
some variations in respect to the different crisis time frame definitions, these differences are 
not pronounced. Greater differences are seen, however, in respect to the adjusted crisis period 
correlations in Figure A4.2. 
Compared with the full period correlations (Figure 4.1 above), the crisis correlation in sub- 
period 1 is higher in Botswana, Morocco and Nigeria. Côte d’Ivoire provided no change while 
Egypt, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia and Zambia had their full period 
correlations higher than their adjusted correlations in sub-period 1. China and India also have 
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adjusted crisis correlations higher than the full period correlations. All developed markets’ 
adjusted correlations of sub-period 1 are found to be smaller than the adjusted long crisis 
period correlations and also smaller than their respective full period correlations. 
The result is very different for the cumulative impact of sub-period 1- 2. In fact, in Botswana, 
Morocco and Nigeria the adjusted crisis correlations went negative. Apart from Zambia, the 
sample period found no adjusted correlation higher than the full period correlation across all 
countries including the comparative markets (China and India). 
For the cumulative effect of sub-period 1-3 (sub-period 3), Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritius, Morocco 
and Nigeria have their adjusted crisis period correlations higher than the full period. Again, no 
developed country market adjusted correlation is higher than the full period correlation in 
sub-period 1-3. 
The cumulative effect of sub-period 1-4 produced a very different result from that of sub-
period 1-3. This time, Nigeria’s adjusted crisis correlation went negative from 0.055 in sub-
period 1-3 to −0.041 in sub-period 1-4. China is the only market to have its adjusted crisis 
correlations higher than its full period correlation in the cumulative sub-period 1-4. 
 
 
4.3.1.2 Correlations of the log returns based method 
Using log returns from the daily closing values, raw correlations are calculated between the 
US and each comparator market. The results are provided in Figures A4.4 to A4.7 in the 
chapter appendix (Section 4.6). 
Unlike with the VAR-system based models, correlation computation in this section does not 
require any regression estimation; therefore, the stable period correlations (see Figure A4.5 in 
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appendix) remain constant in respect to the long period and sub-period models. Changes in 
correlation figures are, however, observed in the crisis and full periods given that these differ 
in length in the various sub-period models. 
 
4.3.1.2.1 Stylised facts 
The log returns model was undertaken for robustness and comparison purposes. If Figure 
A4.4 (full period correlations from log returns) is considered, it can be seen that correlations 
are generally a little higher than the base case model in Figure 4.1 above. However, the 
between-country differences are broadly similar. For example, African country correlations 
are generally much lower than those found in respect to developed markets. This preliminary 
examination of the data would suggest there is unlikely to be much difference in respect to 
contagion between the two models. 
 
The long period model 
Figure A4.5 indicates that in respect to the stable period, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Morocco, 
Nigeria and Zambia have negative correlations. In terms of the developed markets, all 
correlations with the exception of Japan’s are higher than African markets’ correlations. This 
time, the UK has the highest correlation of 0.663 (66.3%) with the US, contrary to Figure 
A4.1 where the correlation in respect to Canada was marginally higher. Overall, however, 




The adjusted correlations in respect to the crisis period, shown in Figure A4.6, are higher than 
the stable period correlations in all African markets. In the developed markets, the adjusted 
crisis correlations are also higher in most countries except in Italy and the UK. 
Botswana, Morocco and China have adjusted crisis period correlations higher than their full 
period correlations (Figures A4.4 and A4.6). Although Zambia produced a negative 
correlation (−0.004) in the adjusted crisis period, it is found to be higher than the full period 
correlation (−0.007). 
The highest full period correlation is observed in Canada (0.803). France, Germany, Spain 
and the UK also have relatively huge correlations with the US during the full period (Figure 
A4.4). However, when compared to the adjusted crisis correlations, no developed market 
produced an adjusted correlation higher than the full period correlation. For the comparative 
markets, China’s adjusted correlation of 0.188 is higher than its full period correlation of 
0.155. Relative to the stable period, all full period correlations are higher in all countries 
except Namibia. 
If the values found in Figure A4.6 are compared with those in Figure A4.2, it can be identified 
that there is a similar pattern as found in respect to the full period data. Specifically, that 
although the correlation in the log returns data are higher, there is a very similar pattern in 
terms of the relative correlations of African and developed markets. 
 
Short period models 
If sub-period 1 and all the cumulative sub-period models are considered in Figure A4.5, 
essentially the same patterns are observed. Negative correlations are observed in Botswana 
(−0.014), Côte d’Ivoire (−0.054), Morocco (−0.027), Nigeria (−0.040) and Zambia (−0.015) 
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throughout the four sub-crisis and the long crisis periods. The highest correlation for the 
African market is observed in South Africa (0.425). 
France provided the highest stable period correlation with the US at a value of 0.660, while 
Japan gave the lowest developed market correlation during the stable period. For the 
comparative markets, China’s correlation is 0.036 while India’s is 0.266. Overall minimum 
correlation is observed in Morocco. 
If the unadjusted crisis period model (Figure A4.7) is compared with the adjusted crisis period 
model (Figure A4.6), it can be identified that after adjusting for heteroscedasticity in line with 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002), all the crisis period correlations across all countries decreased. 
The highest adjusted correlation observed in the African market for sub-period 1 is between 
the US and Egypt at a value of 0.241 while the lowest is 0.017, found between the US and 
Nigeria. South Africa produced the highest adjusted correlation for the cumulative sub-
periods 1- 2 (0.265), 1-3 (0.272) and 1-4 (0.325), while Zambia’s correlations of −0.043 and 
0.0015 are the lowest in cumulative sub-periods 1-2, and 1-3. The lowest correlation observed 
in the African markets for sub-period 1-4 is between the US and Nigeria at a value of −0.059. 
For the developed market, the highest adjusted correlation is observed in Germany for sub-
period 1 (0.565) and sub-period 1-4 (0.583) and in Canada for sub-period 1-2 (0.506) and 1-3 
(0.548). Japan produced the lowest correlation in sub-periods 1 and 1-4, while Italy’s 
correlations are the lowest in sub-periods 1-2 and 1-3. The overall highest sub-crisis 
correlation is observed in Canada (0.575) in sub-period 1-4. For the comparative markets, 




When compared to the full period correlations, the adjusted crisis correlations for Botswana, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Mauritius and Morocco are higher in sub-period 1. The remaining African 
markets’ full correlations are higher than the adjusted correlation with South Africa producing 
the highest full period correlation value (0.474). For the cumulative impact of sub-periods 1-
2, and 1-3, adjusted correlations are higher than the full period correlations in Botswana, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Morocco and Nigeria. The lowest full period correlations observed in sub-periods 1-
2, and 1-3 are between Zambia and the US. The adjusted correlation of Côte d’Ivoire of 
−0.024 for the sub-period 1-4 decreased significantly below its full period correlation. 
Morocco’s adjusted correlation for sub-period 1-4 is the only African correlation value higher 
than its full period correlation. 
For the developed markets, all the full period correlations are higher than the adjusted 
correlations across all sub-periods. The highest full period correlation is found in Canada 
across all sub-periods. Japan provided the lowest full period correlations from sub-period 1 
through to 4. 
To summarise, it can be identified that: 
1. Reduction in unadjusted correlations after the first crisis period is consistent in 
Botswana, Tunisia and India throughout the sub-periods; 
2.  Adjusted correlations in Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire and Morocco are higher than their 
full period correlations in sub period 1, sub-periods 1-2 and 1-3. Mauritius, Namibia 
and Zambia’s adjusted correlations are higher than their full period correlations in sub-
period 1, while the adjusted correlations in Nigeria are higher than the full period 
correlations in sub-periods 1-2 and 1-3; 
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3. Egypt, Namibia, South Africa and Tunisia’s adjusted correlations are lower than their 
full period correlations across all sub-periods; 
4. All the developed markets’ full period correlations are higher than their respective 
adjusted correlations across all sub-periods; 
5. China and India’s adjusted correlations are higher than their full period correlations in 
sub-period 1. China’s adjusted correlations also remain higher than the full period 
correlations in the remaining periods. 
 
4.3.1.3 Correlations of the two separate VAR systems method 
 
Figures A4.8-A4.10 in the chapter appendix show correlation estimates based on two separate 
VAR systems in respect to the cumulative impact of sub-period 1-4 and the long crisis period. 
Sub-periods 1, 1-2 and 1-3 cannot be tested because of their relatively small sample sizes. The 
figures show, respectively, the full period, the stable period and the crisis period. 
4.3.1.3.1 Stylised facts 
If the full period correlations of the separate VAR model (Figure A4.8), are compared with 
the base case model in Figure 4.1 above we see that the results are identical. This reflects the 
fact that the full period model is based on a single VAR system in both cases. 
From Figure A4.9 it can be identified that Botswana, Morocco, Nigeria and China have 
negative correlations in the stable period before the crisis. Canada produced the highest 
correlation with the US while South Africa (0.382) is the only African market to have 
correlation higher than a developed market – Japan (0.276). It can also be noted that the 
values are identical for the long period and for the cumulative impact of sub-period 1-4, 
which reflects the fact that the same stable period VAR system is used for both. 
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The long period model 
In the long crisis period (Figure A4.10), Botswana’s correlation increased to 0.051, 
Morocco’s increased to 0.083, Nigeria’s increased to 0.044 and China’s increased to 0.142. 
These markets produced negative correlations in the stable period. The changes found in them 
are set to be substantial due to the low level of correlations that existed before the crisis. 
While most correlations increased during crisis, some reductions are observed in Namibia and 
Zambia during the long crisis period. South Africa is the only African market with high 
correlation with the US, at a value of 0.577. All the developed country markets correlations 
increased during the crisis. Canada produced the highest correlation value with the US at 
0.863. Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK have correlations above 50%. Japan is the only 
developed market with a less than 40% correlation with the US, producing a value of 37% 
(0.374) during the crisis period. The major findings of the separate VAR long period 
correlations can be summarised as: 
• Except for Namibia and Zambia, all the crisis period correlations are higher than the 
stable period correlations in African markets; 
• All developed country markets’ correlations are also higher during the crisis period 
when compared with the stable period correlations; 
• The highest correlation during the crisis period is found in Canada for the developed 
markets and South Africa for the African markets, but Canada has the overall highest 
correlation. 
If these values are compared with the adjusted single VAR model results in Figure A4.2, 
correlations are generally higher, for example, for Egypt 0.297 compared with 0.210, and for 
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Canada 0.864 compared with 0.776. This gives an indication that contagion is more likely to 
be found given that the stable period correlation values are identical for both models. 
 
Short period model 
The correlation results obtained from the separate VAR analysis for the cumulative impact of 
sub-period 1-4 are depicted in appendix Figure A4.10 for the crisis period. The results show 
that correlations are higher during the crisis when compared with the stable period or the long 
crisis period. For instance, the correlation in Botswana is −0.038 during the stable period, 
which increased to 0.104 during the crisis. Morocco’s correlation also increased from −0.043 
during stability to 0.486 during the crisis. Namibia’s correlation is higher during the crisis 
period when compared with the stable period and even the long crisis period. 
Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria did particularly badly during the crisis. Côte d’Ivoire’s correlation 
with the US during the crisis period stands at −0.094, while Nigeria’s stands at −0.281. The 
highest African market correlation during the crisis is produced between South Africa and the 
US at a value of 0.716. For the developed markets, all correlations during the crisis are found 
to be higher than the correlations during stability. Not only that, they are also higher than the 
crisis correlations of the long period. China’s crisis correlation also shows a substantial 
increase from the stable period correlation. The correlation increased from −0.001 during 
stability to 0.311 during the crisis. If these values are compared with the sub-periods adjusted 
single VAR model results in Figure A4.2, correlations are generally higher. For example, for 
Egypt 0.645 compared with 0.227 and for Canada 0.910 compared with 0.609. This also gives 
an indication that contagion is more likely to be found given that the stable period correlation 
values are identical for both models. 
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The tests for contagion will now be presented in the next section to identify whether or not 
this is in fact the case. 
 
4.4 RESULTS PART 2: CONTAGION TESTING 
 
The following hypotheses are tested in respect to each of the three correlation contagion 
models identified in Section 4.1: 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a statistically significant increase in correlations between US and 
developed markets over the period 15 September 2008-15 October 2009. 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a statistically significant increase in correlations between US and 
African markets over the period 15 September 2008-15 October 2009. 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2a: There is a statistically significant increase in correlations between US and 
developed markets over the sub-periods 15/09/2008-10/10/2008, 15/09/2008-17/10/2008, 
15/09/2008-27/10/2008 and 15/09/2008-20/11/2008. 
Hypothesis 2b: There is a statistically significant increase in correlations between US and 
African markets over the sub-periods 15/09/2008-10/10/2008, 15/09/2008-17/10/2008, 
15/09/2008-27/10/2008 and 15/09/2008-20/11/2008. 
These hypotheses are tested by means of testing the significance of a test statistic (see 
equation 4.12). The null of market interdependence is tested against the alternative of 




𝐻0 ∶  𝜌𝑎ℎ ≤  𝜌𝑙        (4.18) 
𝐻𝐴 ∶  𝜌𝑎ℎ > 𝜌𝑙        (4.19) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜌𝑎ℎ, is the correlation during the high volatility period, and 𝜌𝑙, is the correlation during 
the low volatility period. The hypothesis above is applied to the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
base case method and the raw log returns model. 
For the separate VARs model, the hypothesis is estimated as: 
𝐻0 ∶ 𝜌𝑐  ≤  𝜌𝑠      (4.20) 
𝐻𝐴 ∶ 𝜌𝑐 > 𝜌𝑠       (4.21) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜌𝑐  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜌𝑠 are correlations of crisis and stable periods.  
 
4.4.1 Single VAR system contagion test results 
The following provides a summary of the correlation in the stable, crisis (high volatility 
period) and full (low volatility period) periods along with their respective standard deviations. 
The test is undertaken in respect to the difference between the low volatility period and high 
period correlations. The test statistic follows a 𝑡-distribution, with contagion identified as 
occurring if the null hypothesis has a one-tail 5% or less probability value. In large samples, 







Long period contagion tests 
Tables 4.2A and 4.2B present the result for the long period models.  
 
Table 4.2A: Hypothesis 1 (single VAR long period unadjusted correlation contagion test) 
African markets 
Stable period Crisis period Full period Test 
statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.042 0.003 0.091 0.002 0.024 0.003 0.913 NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  -0.009 0.009 0.038 0.164 0.034 0.103 0.063 NO 
Egypt 0.248 0.008 0.294 0.015 0.248 0.011 0.594 NO 
Mauritius 0.045 0.005 0.095 0.008 0.077 0.006 0.251 NO 
Morocco -0.020 0.005 0.118 0.006 0.067 0.005 0.701 NO 
Namibia 0.259 0.010 0.209 0.022 0.220 0.016 -0.163 NO 
Nigeria -0.017 0.004 0.042 0.007 0.025 0.005 0.233 NO 
South Africa 0.354 0.007 0.573 0.011 0.499 0.009 1.431* NO 
Tunisia 0.063 0.003 0.106 0.004 0.089 0.003 0.246 NO 
Zambia 0.003 0.006 -0.016 0.007 -0.008 0.007 -0.111 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.689 0.006 0.864 0.013 0.824 0.010 1.934** YES 
France 0.649 0.007 0.761 0.012 0.727 0.009 1.081 NO 
Germany 0.583 0.006 0.800 0.013 0.744 0.010 1.916** YES 
Italy 0.442 0.004 0.599 0.009 0.559 0.007 0.827 NO 
Japan 0.276 0.011 0.374 0.007 0.341 0.009 0.513 NO 
Spain 0.561 0.007 0.730 0.012 0.678 0.009 1.436* NO 
United Kingdom 0.628 0.006 0.753 0.011 0.712 0.008 1.214 NO 
Other markets 
China -0.002 0.013 0.165 0.012 0.083 0.013 1.112 NO 
India 0.189 0.010 0.559 0.015 0.437 0.012 2.215** YES 










Table 4.2B: Hypothesis 1 (single VAR long period adjusted correlation contagion test) 
African markets 
Stable period Crisis period Full period Test 
statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion24 ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.042 0.003 0.066 0.002 0.024 0.003 0.562 NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  -0.009 0.009 0.027 0.164 0.034 0.103 -0.088 NO 
Egypt 0.248 0.008 0.210 0.015 0.248 0.011 -0.468 NO 
Mauritius 0.045 0.005 0.069 0.008 0.077 0.006 -0.111 NO 
Morocco -0.020 0.005 0.084 0.006 0.067 0.005 0.237 NO 
Namibia 0.259 0.010 0.151 0.022 0.220 0.016 -0.984 NO 
Nigeria -0.017 0.004 0.030 0.007 0.025 0.005 0.075 NO 
South Africa 0.354 0.007 0.449 0.011 0.499 0.009 -0.885 NO 
Tunisia 0.063 0.003 0.078 0.004 0.089 0.003 -0.152 NO 
Zambia 0.003 0.006 -0.011 0.007 -0.008 0.007 -0.048 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.689 0.006 0.776 0.013 0.824 0.010 -1.871 NO 
France 0.649 0.007 0.646 0.012 0.727 0.009 -2.132 NO 
Germany 0.583 0.006 0.690 0.013 0.744 0.010 -1.550 NO 
Italy 0.442 0.004 0.473 0.009 0.559 0.007 -1.194 NO 
Japan 0.276 0.011 0.275 0.007 0.341 0.009 -0.973 NO 
Spain 0.561 0.007 0.610 0.012 0.678 0.009 -1.602 NO 
United Kingdom 0.628 0.006 0.636 0.011 0.712 0.008 -1.947 NO 
Other markets 
China -0.002 0.013 0.119 0.012 0.083 0.013 0.478 NO 
India 0.189 0.010 0.431 0.015 0.437 0.012 -0.094 NO 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
 
Stylised facts in respect to long period tests 
In respect to the Hypothesis 1 based results, the first thing to note is that while none of the 
tests undertaken in respect to the adjusted correlation coefficient (Table 4.2B) show 
contagion, a number of the tests do for the unadjusted correlations. This is constant with the 
findings of Forbes and Rigobon (2002), who found no contagion in emerging markets after 
adjusting for heteroscedasticity during the 1987 stock market crash, 1994 Mexican peso crisis 
and the 1997 Asian crisis. 
 
                                                 
24 The tables report the unadjusted (conditional) and adjusted (unconditional) correlations tests. The test statistics is for one-sided 𝑡-test at a 




If we want to compare African and developed markets it is necessary to focus on the 
unadjusted correlation-based tests. It can be noted that while there is no contagion in African 
markets in the unadjusted test, South Africa has a high test statistic of 1.431. Contagion 
effects were found in respect to the developed markets Canada and Germany, and the 
emerging market of India. The remaining developed markets and China indicated no 
contagion effect. 
It can be noted that there is evidence of what Forbes and Rigobon (2002) define as 
interdependence. They identify this as crisis period increases in correlation that occur between 
countries that show high stable period correlations (defined as 40% or more in this thesis). 
This is evident in the correlations levels between the US and France, Italy, Spain and the UK 
before the crisis. 
Other interesting features can be identified in the data. For example, Japan produced the 
lowest test statistic of 0.513 for the developed markets while Namibia has the lowest test 
statistics (−0.163) across all markets. While the result of no contagion in South Africa is 
surprising, the higher level of correlation in comparison with the remaining African markets 
obtained is expected, as the South African stock market is the largest in Africa. Also, if the 
restriction on the significance level was relaxed to, say, 10%, South Africa’s and Spain’s test 
statistics (1.431 and 1.436, respectively) could have provided evidence of contagion. 
Lack of contagion in all African markets and most developed markets is shocking by the fact 
that the crisis tested is considered by experts as the worst financial crash since the Great 





Short sub-period contagion tests 
The short sub-period tests presented below relate to Hypothesis 2 and cover the respective 
sub-periods; 15/09/2008-10/10/2008, 15/09/2008-17/10/2008, 15/09/2008-27/10/2008 and 
15/09/2008-20/11/2008. The findings are presented in the chapter appendix (Section 4.6) in 
Tables A4.1a, A4.2a, A4.3a and A4.4a for the unadjusted tests. The adjusted tests are 
presented in Tables A4.1b, A4.2b, A4.3b and A4.4b also in the chapter appendix. 
 
Stylised facts in respect to short sub-period tests 
The pattern in respect to the differences found using the adjusted and unadjusted (conditional) 
correlation measures is very similar to the findings in respect to Hypothesis 1. Specifically, 
while no evidence of contagion is found in relation to the adjusted measure, contagion is 
found using the unadjusted measure. From the unadjusted (conditional) tests, the results show 
evidence of contagion in: 
1. Germany, China and India in sub-period 1 (Table A4.1a); 
2. Canada, Germany, China and India in respect to the cumulative impact of sub-period 
1-2 (Table A4.2a); 
3. Mauritius, Canada, Germany, Spain, China and India in respect to the cumulative 
impact of sub-period 1-3 (Table A4.3a ); 
4. Morocco, South Africa, Canada, Germany and India in respect to the cumulative 
impact of sub-period 1-4 (Table A4.4a). 
The findings tend to be consistent among African markets in sub-periods 1 and 2 where no 
contagion is found in respect to the conditional measure. Mauritius became contaminated in 
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sub-period 1-3. And for the cumulative impact of sub-period 1-4, Morocco and South Africa 
are the only contaminated African markets. 
If you look at the linkages between African and US markets across the four sub-periods, it is 
evident that these markets are not highly connected. Given that stable period correlations are 
low, it can be concluded that neither contagion nor interdependence effects are present in 
Africa. It can be speculated that any impact on African markets could be a spill-over effect 
derived from linkages that exist across the region. South Africa can be considered the 
potential channel of such effects because it has the highest correlation with the US among the 
African markets. 
As regards the developed markets, there is consistent evidence of Germany being 
contaminated throughout the four sub-crisis periods. Canada is found to be contaminated in 
sub-periods 1-2, 1-3 and 1- 4. Spain became contaminated in sub-period 1-3. However, it is 
worth noting that high correlation between the developed markets and the US where 
contagion is not found is very evident. It is possible to speculate that these countries could be 
affected by interdependence effects at different sub-crisis stages, or spill-over derived from, 
say, Germany which is contaminated. These effects are obviously not being detected here, as I 
did not test for spill-over effect.  
 
4.4.2 Log returns contagion test results 
 
The testing of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 is repeated in this section using the correlation 
estimates derived from the log returns based methodology. This model is implemented in 
order to obtain results that allow direct comparison with the single VAR approach before and 
after adjusting for heteroscedasticity. In line with Forbes and Rigobon (2002), I am more 
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concern with the results obtained after adjusting the crisis correlation for heteroscedasticity. If 
the results derived from using the two different methodologies are similar, I will be able to 
conclude that the results are relatively robust using both approaches. 
 
Long period contagion tests 
Table 4.3A: Hypothesis 1 (log returns long period unadjusted correlation contagion test) 
African markets 
Stable period Crisis period Full period Test 
statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion? ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.014 0.005 0.102 0.004 0.046 0.004 0.757 NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  -0.054 0.006 0.018 0.201 0.015 0.126 0.041 NO 
Egypt 0.131 0.011 0.383 0.021 0.316 0.016 0.910 NO 
Mauritius 0.009 0.008 0.163 0.013 0.117 0.010 0.655 NO 
Morocco -0.027 0.007 0.168 0.010 0.102 0.008 0.917 NO 
Namibia 0.341 0.013 0.274 0.029 0.289 0.021 -0.222 NO 
Nigeria -0.040 0.009 -0.007 0.016 -0.015 0.012 0.102 NO 
South Africa 0.425 0.010 0.624 0.017 0.562 0.013 1.327* NO 
Tunisia 0.126 0.005 0.223 0.005 0.178 0.005 0.645 NO 
Zambia -0.015 0.008 -0.006 0.009 -0.007 0.008 0.022 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.653 0.007 0.846 0.018 0.803 0.012 1.850** YES 
France 0.660 0.009 0.793 0.018 0.758 0.013 1.246 NO 
Germany 0.594 0.009 0.827 0.018 0.770 0.013 2.200** YES 
Italy 0.484 0.007 0.596 0.016 0.571 0.012 0.533 NO 
Japan 0.378 0.010 0.515 0.017 0.470 0.013 0.805 NO 
Spain 0.578 0.009 0.750 0.017 0.704 0.013 1.373* NO 
United Kingdom 0.663 0.008 0.780 0.016 0.746 0.012 1.118 NO 
Other markets 
China 0.036 0.018 0.265 0.017 0.155 0.017 1.551* NO 
India 0.266 0.014 0.587 0.021 0.476 0.017 2.095** YES 








Table 4.3B: Hypothesis 1 (log returns long period adjusted correlation contagion test) 
African 
markets 
Stable period Crisis period Full period Test 
statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion? ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.014 0.005 0.099 0.004 0.046 0.004 0.712 NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  -0.054 0.006 0.013 0.201 0.015 0.126 -0.030 NO 
Egypt 0.131 0.011 0.277 0.021 0.316 0.016 -0.513 NO 
Mauritius 0.009 0.008 0.116 0.013 0.117 0.010 -0.007 NO 
Morocco -0.027 0.007 0.119 0.010 0.102 0.008 0.231 NO 
Namibia 0.341 0.013 0.197 0.029 0.289 0.021 -1.345 NO 
Nigeria -0.040 0.009 -0.005 0.016 -0.015 0.012 0.130 NO 
South Africa 0.425 0.010 0.491 0.017 0.562 0.013 -1.340 NO 
Tunisia 0.126 0.005 0.160 0.005 0.178 0.005 -0.248 NO 
Zambia -0.015 0.008 -0.004 0.009 -0.007 0.008 0.045 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.653 0.007 0.748 0.018 0.803 0.012 -1.931 NO 
France 0.660 0.009 0.678 0.018 0.758 0.013 -2.315 NO 
Germany 0.594 0.009 0.725 0.018 0.770 0.013 -1.415 NO 
Italy 0.484 0.007 0.464 0.016 0.571 0.012 -2.022 NO 
Japan 0.378 0.010 0.391 0.017 0.470 0.013 -1.313 NO 
Spain 0.578 0.009 0.625 0.017 0.704 0.013 -1.963 NO 
United 
Kingdom 0.663 0.008 0.661 0.016 0.746 0.012 -2.348 NO 
Other markets 
China 0.036 0.018 0.188 0.017 0.155 0.017 0.462 NO 
India 0.266 0.014 0.453 0.021 0.476 0.017 -0.396 NO 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
 
Stylised facts in respect to long period tests 
In respect to the Hypothesis 1 based results, the first thing to note is that while none of the 
tests undertaken in respect to the adjusted correlation coefficient (Table 4.3B) show 
contagion, a number of the tests in respect to the unadjusted correlations did (Table 4.3A). 
This is constant with the findings in respect to the single VAR system approach. 
The unadjusted correlation tests presented in Table 4.3A also give similar results, in terms of 
the evidence of contagion, with the unadjusted single VAR test in Table 4.2A above. In 




Test statistics of 1.850, 2.200 and 2.095 indicate contagion effects in Canada, Germany and 
India. The highest overall statistic is from Germany, while −0.222 produced by Namibia is the 
lowest across all markets.  
The result also indicates that China has high test statistics of 1.551, which is insignificant at 
the 5% significant level. If I relax the significance restriction, this market would have been 
significant at, say, 10%. 
The analysis of correlations from this approach reflects that with the exception of Japan, the 
rest of the developed markets are highly correlated with the US. This suggests that an 
interdependence effect has occurred in these markets during the crisis. This is found where 
high correlations increased during the crisis as evident across all the developed markets 
(Table 4.3A). 
 
Short period contagion tests 
The short sub-period tests presented in Tables A4.5a to A4.8b in the chapter appendix relate 
to Hypothesis 2 and cover the respective sub-periods 15/09/2008-10/10/2008, 15/09/2008-
17/10/2008, 15/09/2008-27/10/2008 and 15/09/2008-20/11/2008. Tables A4.5a, A4.6a, A4.7a 
and A4.8a are for the unadjusted tests. The adjusted tests are presented in Tables A4.5b, 
A4.6b, A4.7b and A4.8b. 
 
Stylised facts in respect to short sub-period tests 
The Hypothesis 2 results obtained for sub-period 1 in this section are similar to the results 
obtained in sub-period 1 based on a single VAR in Table A4.1a. Differences are observed in 
the value of the test statistics obtained. But for the cumulative impact sub-periods 1-2, 1-3 and 
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1-4, there are differences in the countries contaminated during the crisis compared with the 
ones observed in Section 4.4.1. The unadjusted log returns tests show contagion in: 
• Germany, China and India (Table A4.5a) as in the single VAR test for sub-period 1 
(Table A4.1a ); 
• Morocco and India in respect to the cumulative impact of  sub-period 1-2 (Table 
A4.6a); 
• Morocco and China in respect to the cumulative impact of sub-period 1- 3 (Table 
A4.7a); 
• Morocco, Germany and India in respect to the cumulative impact of sub-period 1-4 
(Table A4.8a). 
Surprisingly, Germany is only contaminated in sub periods 1 and 1-4, unlike the single VAR 
model where contagion consistency is found in Germany throughout all sub-periods. Another 
difference that is worth noting is that Morocco was contaminated from the cumulative impact 
of sub-periods 1-2, 1-3 and 1-4 while, in the single VAR approach, Morocco’s contamination 
is only evident on the impact of sub-period 1-4. It is also found that India is not contaminated 
from the cumulative impact of sub period 1-3 in this section, unlike the single VAR approach 
where India is contaminated in sub-period 1 and all the cumulative sub-periods. 
It can also be noted that there are a number of t-test values marginally below the contagion 
threshold of 1.645. For example, the 𝑡 values of 1.621 and 1.494 were found in Botswana and 
France in sub-period 1 (Table A4.5a). The result is surprising for Botswana as sub-period 1 
had very low correlations during the stable and full periods (−0.014 and −0.011) although this 
increased to 0.392 during crisis. This finding may be indicative of herding behaviour. 
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For the cumulative impact of sub-period 1-2 (Table A4.6a), Mauritius, Germany and China 
also produced high but insignificant statistics of 1.488, 1.481 and 1.577. Mauritius and 
Germany subsequently produced insignificant 𝑡-statistics on the cumulative impact of sub-
period 1-3 (Table A4.7a) at 1.630 and 1.543. Another high 𝑡-statistic is observed in India at 
1.422 in sub-period 1-3 and increased further in sub-period 1-4 to 2.076 to suggest evidence 
of contagion. 
When the adjusted correlation data is considered it can be noted that all evidence of contagion 
found in both African and developed country markets disappeared across all four sub-crisis 
periods. 
The findings of the adjusted contagion test based on raw log returns across all samples are in 
line with Forbes and Rigobon (2002:2236), who reported: “Changing the model specification 
has no significant impact on results. For example, using daily or weekly returns, local 
currency returns, greater or fewer lags, and/or varying the interest rate controls, does not 
change our central findings. Moreover, the sensitivity analysis also shows that focusing only 
on the cross-market correlation coefficient with daily returns, no lags, and no interest rate 
controls actually strengthens our central results”. 
 
4.4.3 Separate VAR systems contagion test results 
The testing of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 is repeated in this section using the correlation 
estimates derived from two separate VAR systems. This model is implemented in order to 
obtain results that allow direct comparison with the results from the alternative approaches 




Long period and sub-period 1-4 contagion tests 
Table 4.4: Hypothesis 1 (separate VAR systems long period contagion test) 
African markets 
Stable period Crisis period Full period Test 
statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion? ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.038 0.003 0.051 0.002 0.024 0.003 1.096 NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  0.024 0.005 0.039 0.173 0.034 0.103 0.191 NO 
Egypt 0.100 0.008 0.297 0.014 0.248 0.011 2.232** YES 
Mauritius 0.035 0.005 0.096 0.008 0.077 0.006 0.768 NO 
Morocco -0.043 0.005 0.083 0.006 0.067 0.005 1.566* NO 
Namibia 0.298 0.009 0.211 0.023 0.220 0.016 -1.171 NO 
Nigeria -0.015 0.004 0.044 0.007 0.025 0.005 0.727 NO 
South Africa 0.382 0.007 0.577 0.011 0.499 0.009 3.203*** YES 
Tunisia 0.077 0.003 0.121 0.004 0.089 0.003 0.550 NO 
Zambia 0.007 0.006 -0.012 0.007 -0.008 0.007 -0.236 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.680 0.006 0.863 0.013 0.824 0.010 5.959*** YES 
France 0.653 0.006 0.763 0.012 0.727 0.009 2.804*** YES 
Germany 0.587 0.006 0.799 0.013 0.744 0.010 5.354*** YES 
Italy 0.457 0.004 0.597 0.009 0.559 0.007 2.464*** YES 
Japan 0.276 0.007 0.374 0.011 0.341 0.009 1.343* NO 
Spain 0.563 0.007 0.728 0.011 0.678 0.009 3.628*** YES 
United Kingdom 0.630 0.006 0.756 0.010 0.712 0.008 3.085*** YES 
Other markets 
China -0.001 0.013 0.142 0.012 0.083 0.013 1.755** YES 
India 0.210 0.010 0.555 0.015 0.437 0.012 5.095*** YES 













Table 4.5: Hypothesis 2 (Cumulative separate VAR systems contagion test on sub-period 1-4 
African markets Stable period Crisis period Full period Test statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion? 
ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.038 0.003 0.104 0.002 0.033 0.003 0.821 NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  0.024 0.005 -0.094 0.004 0.040 0.005 -0.682 NO 
Egypt 0.100 0.008 0.645 0.015 0.340 0.009 3.211*** YES 
Mauritius 0.035 0.005 0.288 0.009 0.161 0.006 1.525* NO 
Morocco -0.043 0.005 0.486 0.006 0.217 0.005 3.258*** YES 
Namibia 0.298 0.009 0.320 0.014 0.299 0.010 0.140 NO 
Nigeria -0.015 0.004 -0.281 0.004 -0.010 0.004 -1.530 NO 
South Africa 0.382 0.007 0.716 0.016 0.505 0.009 2.937*** YES 
Tunisia 0.077 0.003 0.206 0.007 0.101 0.004 0.756 NO 
Zambia 0.007 0.006 0.153 0.004 0.035 0.006 0.835 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.680 0.006 0.910 0.021 0.828 0.009 4.123*** YES 
France 0.653 0.006 0.772 0.014 0.721 0.008 1.459* NO 
Germany 0.587 0.006 0.887 0.020 0.757 0.009 4.372*** YES 
Italy 0.457 0.004 0.697 0.013 0.576 0.006 2.196** YES 
Japan 0.276 0.007 0.555 0.021 0.417 0.009 1.940** YES 
Spain 0.563 0.007 0.756 0.015 0.652 0.008 2.091** YES 
United Kingdom 0.630 0.006 0.789 0.014 0.702 0.008 1.945** YES 
Other markets 
China -0.001 0.013 0.311 0.013 0.089 0.012 1.776** YES 
India 0.210 0.010 0.717 0.022 0.473 0.011 3.902*** YES 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
Stylised facts in respect to long period and cumulative sub-period 1-4 
The estimated results for the Hypothesis 1 contagion effects using separate VARs are 
depicted in Table 4.4 above for the long crisis period. The nearest comparators are the results 
for the single VAR system based on adjusted results in Table 4.2B above.25 There are 
considerable differences in the results in these two tables. Table 4.4 shows that contagion 
occurred frequently. The adjusted tests from the single VAR and log returns models above 
show no contagion. In African markets, Egypt and South Africa show contagion with 𝑡-test 
statistics of 2.232 and 3.203, respectively. There was also a high, but insignificant, 𝑡-statistic 
value of 1.566 in Morocco. All the developed markets except Japan showed evidence of 
                                                 
25 Where adjustments to correlation estimates were made to control for higher volatility in the crisis period. Such adjustments are not 
required in a two VAR system to ensure comparability between correlation estimates. 
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contagion effect. Although Japan appears uncontaminated, it has a relative high statistics of 
1.343. The two comparative emerging markets, China and India, also show evidence of 
contagion. 
Data limitations meant that the short period contagion tests could only be undertaken for the 
cumulative impact of sub-period 1-4. Table 4.5 identifies that contagion is found in Egypt, 
Morocco and South Africa and all the developed country markets except France in this period 
(although high, but insignificant, statistics were produced: France-1.459 and Mauritius-
1.525). The two emerging markets included for comparative purposes also showed evidence 
of contagion. The strongest contagion effect is found in Germany across all markets with a 𝑡-
statistics value of 4.372. For the African markets, Morocco produced the strongest contagion 
effect at a 𝑡-value of 3.258. 
 
4.5 MODEL COMPARISONS: SOME THOUGHTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
While there is no much difference in respect to results between the single VAR and the log 
returns methodologies, the separate VAR system results suggest that evidence of contagion is 
significantly greater. Why is this? And which methodology is the more credible? 
Comparisons can be made between the stable period and crisis period correlation estimates 
using the adjusted single VAR system (Table 4.2A) and the separate VAR system (Table 4.4). 
It can be noted that the stable period estimates are marginally lower and this may reflect an 
element of bias in the estimation procedure given that the low volatility (stable) period values 
are estimated for the VAR parameters obtained from the full period data: data that also 
incorporate the impact of the crisis on the estimated model. It is possible that the use of a 
single model in the estimation procedure, along with the adjustment made to control for 
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heteroscedasticity bias in the variance, may mean that there are flaws in the Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) model. 
A number of peer-reviewed journal articles also identified issues with the Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002) approach. For instance, Dungey and Zhumabekova (2001) argue that the Forbes and 
Rigobon (1999, now 2002) results consistently over-reject the hypothesis of contagion largely 
because they compare a large sample of non-crisis period data with a small sample of crisis 
period data. Dungey and Zhumabekova (2001) also argued that the Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002) tests have very low power given that the ability to reject the null hypothesis can be 
affected by the sample size (2000: 1 and 4). 
I would argue that of the three methodologies tested in this chapter, the separate VAR system 
approach produces the most credible estimates of contagion. It is not, however, without 
drawbacks. The principal ones being (i) it cannot be applied unless the crisis extends over a 
relative long period and (ii) it is based on a single point measure of correlation and therefore 
tells us nothing about how correlation (and therefore contagion) develops over time. It may 
very well be that in order to extend our understanding of contagion we need to incorporate 
time-varying correlation estimates into our analysis and this is what I will do in the next 
chapter, where I explore the issues identified in this chapter by using a multivariate DCC-
GARCH based analysis. 
The results from this chapter indicate that there was strong evidence that the 2007-09 
financial crisis resulted in contagion from the US to most Western developed markets, but 
that the spread of contagion to African markets was limited to a few countries. I will examine 
whether or not this conclusion is supported using a multivariate DCC-GARCH based 
approach in the next chapter. 
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4.6 CHAPTER APPENDICES 
Figure A4.1: Stable period correlations with US market from 01/01/2007-14/09/2008 (base case method) 
BWA CIV  EGY MUS MAR NAM NGA SA TUN ZMB CAN FRA GER ITA JPN SPN U K CHN IND 
Long Period -0.042 -0.009 0.248 0.045 -0.020 0.259 -0.017 0.354 0.063 0.003 0.689 0.649 0.583 0.442 0.276 0.561 0.628 -0.002 0.189 
Short 1 -0.047 0.022 0.091 0.043 -0.035 0.287 -0.008 0.359 0.079 0.017 0.688 0.655 0.593 0.452 0.276 0.571 0.636 -0.004 0.213 
Short 2 -0.046 0.022 0.096 0.036 -0.015 0.298 -0.008 0.366 0.062 0.014 0.684 0.664 0.596 0.448 0.278 0.580 0.644 0.004 0.222 
Short 3 -0.049 0.021 0.105 0.040 -0.013 0.292 -0.005 0.360 0.054 0.014 0.681 0.673 0.593 0.448 0.292 0.573 0.648 0.004 0.218 





















Stable period correlations for the long and four subcrisis periods 
Short 1= Sub-period 1 
Short 2= Cumulative effect of sub-period 1-2 
Short 3= Cumulative effect of sub-period 1-3 
Short 4 = Cumutative effect of sub-period 1-4 
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BWA CIV  EGY MUS MAR NAM NGA SA TUN ZMB CAN FRA GER ITA JPN SPN U K CHN IND 
Long Period 0.066 0.027 0.210 0.069 0.084 0.151 0.030 0.449 0.078 -0.011 0.776 0.646 0.690 0.473 0.275 0.610 0.636 0.119 0.431 
Short 1 0.034 0.032 0.197 0.005 0.130 0.179 0.067 0.217 0.106 -0.059 0.535 0.500 0.568 0.258 0.241 0.446 0.416 0.184 0.417 
Short 2 -0.046 0.022 0.096 0.036 -0.015 0.298 -0.008 0.366 0.062 0.014 0.684 0.664 0.596 0.448 0.278 0.580 0.644 0.004 0.222 
Short 3 0.060 0.076 0.215 0.225 0.172 0.203 0.055 0.306 0.078 -0.001 0.634 0.509 0.594 0.411 0.277 0.516 0.430 0.198 0.387 























Adjusted crisis period correlations for the long and four sub-crisis periods 
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Figure A4 3: Unadjusted crisis period correlations with US market (base case methodology) 
 
BWA CIV  EGY MUS MAR NAM NGA SA TUN ZMB CAN FRA GER ITA JPN SPN U K CHN IND 
Long Period 0.091 0.038 0.294 0.095 0.118 0.209 0.042 0.573 0.106 -0.016 0.864 0.761 0.800 0.599 0.374 0.730 0.753 0.165 0.559 
Short 1 0.080 0.088 0.519 0.012 0.326 0.408 0.173 0.470 0.266 -0.151 0.853 0.815 0.872 0.562 0.530 0.770 0.740 0.508 0.786 
Short 2 0.131 0.073 0.478 0.490 0.415 0.389 0.276 0.579 0.277 -0.134 0.890 0.827 0.890 0.700 0.552 0.800 0.733 0.471 0.741 
Short 3 0.150 0.202 0.510 0.514 0.421 0.470 0.144 0.648 0.190 -0.002 0.909 0.822 0.888 0.750 0.591 0.829 0.749 0.506 0.754 



















Unadjusted crisis period correlations for the long and four sub-crisis periods 
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Figure A4.4: Full period correlations with US market (for log returns method covering various periods) 
 
 
BWA CIV  EGY MUS MAR NAM NGA SA TUN ZMB CAN FRA GER ITA JPN SPN U K CHN IND 
Long Period 0.046 0.015 0.316 0.117 0.102 0.289 -0.015 0.562 0.178 -0.007 0.803 0.758 0.770 0.571 0.470 0.704 0.746 0.155 0.476 
Short 1 -0.011 0.010 0.340 0.173 0.147 0.398 0.026 0.474 0.278 0.024 0.743 0.736 0.690 0.574 0.470 0.647 0.730 0.149 0.395 
Short 2 0.010 0.010 0.312 0.216 0.208 0.345 0.026 0.495 0.262 0.007 0.747 0.739 0.706 0.539 0.466 0.651 0.714 0.154 0.411 
Short 3 0.029 0.050 0.366 0.240 0.241 0.352 0.035 0.513 0.255 0.028 0.766 0.749 0.718 0.562 0.504 0.680 0.726 0.182 0.422 






















Full period correlations for the long and four sub-crisis periods 
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Figure A4.5: Stable period correlations with US market from 01/01/2007-14/09/2008 (log returns method) 
 
 
BWA CIV  EGY MUS MAR NAM NGA SA TUN ZMB CAN FRA GER ITA JPN SPN U K CHN IND 
Long Period -0.014 -0.054 0.131 0.009 -0.027 0.341 -0.040 0.425 0.126 -0.015 0.653 0.660 0.594 0.484 0.378 0.578 0.663 0.036 0.266 
Short 1 -0.014 -0.054 0.131 0.009 -0.027 0.341 -0.040 0.425 0.126 -0.015 0.653 0.660 0.594 0.484 0.378 0.578 0.663 0.036 0.266 
Short 2 -0.014 -0.054 0.131 0.009 -0.027 0.341 -0.040 0.425 0.126 -0.015 0.653 0.660 0.594 0.484 0.378 0.578 0.663 0.036 0.266 
Short 3 -0.014 -0.054 0.131 0.009 -0.027 0.341 -0.040 0.425 0.126 -0.015 0.653 0.660 0.594 0.484 0.378 0.578 0.663 0.036 0.266 




















Stable period correlations for the long and four sub-crisis periods 
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Figure A4.6: Adjusted crisis Period correlations with US market (log returns methodology) 
 
BWA CIV  EGY MUS MAR NAM NGA SA TUN ZMB CAN FRA GER ITA JPN SPN U K CHN IND 
Long Period 0.099 0.013 0.277 0.116 0.119 0.197 -0.005 0.491 0.160 -0.004 0.748 0.678 0.725 0.464 0.391 0.625 0.661 0.188 0.453 
Short 1 0.166 0.128 0.241 0.192 0.191 0.201 0.017 0.238 0.233 0.107 0.507 0.561 0.565 0.302 0.287 0.456 0.486 0.236 0.526 
Short 2 0.091 0.027 0.184 0.198 0.240 0.110 0.059 0.265 0.165 -0.043 0.506 0.445 0.466 0.219 0.240 0.368 0.367 0.168 0.403 
Short 3 0.097 0.085 0.215 0.220 0.259 0.117 0.051 0.272 0.139 0.015 0.548 0.487 0.501 0.258 0.271 0.406 0.411 0.207 0.294 





















Adjusted crisis correlations for the long and four sub-crisis periods 
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Figure A4.7: Unadjusted crisis period correlations with US market (log returns methodology) 
 
BWA CIV  EGY MUS MAR NAM NGA SA TUN ZMB CAN FRA GER ITA JPN SPN U K CHN IND 
Long Period 0.102 0.018 0.383 0.163 0.168 0.274 -0.007 0.624 0.223 -0.006 0.846 0.793 0.827 0.596 0.515 0.750 0.780 0.265 0.587 
Short 1 0.392 0.308 0.595 0.435 0.446 0.460 0.048 0.529 0.521 0.259 0.823 0.865 0.866 0.627 0.614 0.792 0.815 0.630 0.857 
Short 2 0.256 0.074 0.504 0.502 0.587 0.302 0.181 0.624 0.440 -0.120 0.839 0.820 0.835 0.542 0.562 0.751 0.749 0.506 0.780 
Short 3 0.251 0.212 0.525 0.514 0.585 0.294 0.140 0.603 0.353 0.040 0.851 0.825 0.835 0.573 0.582 0.759 0.762 0.541 0.627 


















Unadjusted crisis correlations for the long and four sub-crisis periods 
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Figure A4.8: Full period correlations with US market separate VAR method (covering various periods) 
 
 
BWA CIV  EGY MUS MAR NAM NGA SA TUN ZMB CAN FRA GER ITA JPN SPN U K CHN IND 
Long Period 0.024 0.034 0.248 0.077 0.067 0.220 0.025 0.499 0.089 -0.008 0.824 0.727 0.744 0.559 0.341 0.678 0.712 0.083 0.437 






















Full period correlations 
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Figure A4.9: Stable period correlations with US market from 01/01/2007-14/09/2008 (separate VAR method) 
 
BWA CIV  EGY MUS MAR NAM NGA SA TUN ZMB CAN FRA GER ITA JPN SPN U K CHN IND 
Long Period -0.038 0.024 0.100 0.035 -0.043 0.298 -0.015 0.382 0.077 0.007 0.680 0.653 0.587 0.457 0.276 0.563 0.630 -0.001 0.210 





















Stable period correlations 
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Figure A4.10: Crisis period correlations with US market (separate VAR methodology) 
 
BWA CIV  EGY MUS MAR NAM NGA SA TUN ZMB CAN FRA GER ITA JPN SPN U K CHN IND 
Long Period 0.051 0.039 0.297 0.096 0.083 0.211 0.044 0.577 0.121 -0.012 0.863 0.763 0.799 0.597 0.374 0.728 0.756 0.142 0.555 



















Crisis period correlations 
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Table A4.1a: Hypothesis 2 (unadjusted sub-period 1 test from a single VAR) 
African markets 
Stable period Crisis period Full period Test 
statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion? ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.047 0.003 0.080 0.005 -0.034 0.003 0.434 NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  0.022 0.005 0.088 0.003 0.032 0.005 0.216 NO 
Egypt 0.092 0.008 0.519 0.018 0.220 0.008 1.093 NO 
Mauritius 0.043 0.006 0.012 0.009 0.050 0.006 -0.150 NO 
Morocco -0.035 0.005 0.326 0.010 0.061 0.005 1.056 NO 
Namibia 0.287 0.009 0.408 0.013 0.302 0.009 0.489 NO 
Nigeria -0.008 0.004 0.173 0.002 0.017 0.004 0.560 NO 
South Africa 0.359 0.007 0.470 0.017 0.389 0.008 0.389 NO 
Tunisia 0.079 0.003 0.266 0.008 0.146 0.004 0.476 NO 
Zambia 0.017 0.006 -0.151 0.003 0.017 0.006 -0.685 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.688 0.006 0.853 0.019 0.751 0.007 1.182 NO 
France 0.655 0.007 0.815 0.017 0.691 0.007 1.189 NO 
Germany 0.593 0.006 0.872 0.014 0.657 0.007 2.236** YES 
Italy 0.452 0.005 0.562 0.010 0.480 0.005 0.455 NO 
Japan 0.277 0.007 0.530 0.011 0.312 0.007 1.013 NO 
Spain 0.571 0.007 0.770 0.017 0.608 0.007 1.271 NO 
United Kingdom 0.636 0.006 0.740 0.016 0.667 0.007 0.587 NO 
Other markets 
China -0.004 0.013 0.509 0.019 0.050 0.014 1.673** YES 
India 0.213 0.010 0.786 0.016 0.312 0.010 2.806*** YES 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
Table A4.1b: Hypothesis 2 (adjusted sub-period 1 test from a single VAR) 
African markets 
Stable period Crisis period Full period Test 
statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion? ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.047 0.003 0.034 0.005 -0.034 0.003 0.258 NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  0.022 0.005 0.032 0.003 0.032 0.005 0.002 NO 
Egypt 0.091 0.008 0.197 0.018 0.220 0.008 -0.074 NO 
Mauritius 0.043 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.050 0.006 -0.180 NO 
Morocco -0.035 0.005 0.130 0.010 0.061 0.005 0.265 NO 
Namibia 0.287 0.009 0.179 0.013 0.302 0.009 -0.529 NO 
Nigeria -0.008 0.004 0.067 0.002 0.017 0.004 0.179 NO 
South Africa 0.359 0.007 0.217 0.017 0.389 0.008 -0.746 NO 
Tunisia 0.079 0.003 0.106 0.008 0.146 0.003 -0.156 NO 
Zambia 0.017 0.006 -0.059 0.003 0.017 0.006 -0.306 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.688 0.006 0.535 0.019 0.751 0.007 -1.532 NO 
France 0.655 0.006 0.500 0.017 0.690 0.007 -1.211 NO 
Germany 0.593 0.006 0.568 0.014 0.657 0.007 -0.580 NO 
Italy 0.452 0.005 0.258 0.010 0.480 0.005 -1.049 NO 
Japan 0.277 0.007 0.241 0.011 0.312 0.007 -0.294 NO 
Spain 0.571 0.007 0.446 0.017 0.608 0.007 -0.913 NO 
United Kingdom 0.636 0.006 0.416 0.016 0.666 0.007 -1.463 NO 
Other markets 
China -0.004 0.013 0.184 0.019 0.050 0.014 0.446 NO 
India 0.213 0.010 0.417 0.016 0.312 0.010 0.464 NO 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
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Table A4.2a: Hypothesis 2 (Cumulative unadjusted test on sub-period 1-2 from a single VAR) 
African markets 
Stable period Crisis period Full period Test 
statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.046 0.003 0.131 0.005 -0.012 0.003 0.613 NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  0.022 0.005 0.073 0.003 0.031 0.005 0.182 NO 
Egypt 0.096 0.008 0.478 0.017 0.223 0.009 1.076 NO 
Mauritius 0.036 0.006 0.490 0.011 0.173 0.006 1.616* NO 
Morocco -0.015 0.005 0.415 0.010 0.120 0.005 1.403* NO 
Namibia 0.298 0.009 0.389 0.014 0.307 0.009 0.430 NO 
Nigeria -0.008 0.004 0.276 0.003 0.030 0.004 1.024 NO 
South Africa 0.366 0.007 0.579 0.017 0.436 0.008 0.866 NO 
Tunisia 0.062 0.003 0.277 0.009 0.150 0.004 0.580 NO 
Zambia 0.014 0.006 -0.134 0.003 0.011 0.006 -0.668 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.684 0.006 0.890 0.021 0.775 0.008 1.738** YES 
France 0.664 0.007 0.827 0.019 0.720 0.008 1.244 NO 
Germany 0.596 0.006 0.890 0.019 0.707 0.008 2.470*** YES 
Italy 0.448 0.004 0.700 0.014 0.547 0.005 1.153 NO 
Japan 0.278 0.007 0.552 0.018 0.360 0.008 1.042 NO 
Spain 0.580 0.007 0.800 0.018 0.642 0.008 1.543* NO 
United Kingdom 0.644 0.006 0.733 0.017 0.678 0.007 0.497 NO 
Other markets 
China 0.004 0.013 0.471 0.018 0.075 0.014 1.709** YES 
India 0.222 0.010 0.741 0.023 0.388 0.011 2.374*** YES 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
Table A4.2b: Hypothesis 2 (Cumulative adjusted test on sub-period 1-2 from a single VAR)  
African markets 
Stable period Crisis period Full period Test 
statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion? ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.046 0.003 0.048 0.005 -0.012 0.003 0.257 NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  0.022 0.005 0.025 0.003 0.031 0.005 -0.027 NO 
Egypt 0.096 0.008 0.181 0.017 0.223 0.009 -0.161 NO 
Mauritius 0.036 0.006 0.194 0.011 0.173 0.006 0.100 NO 
Morocco -0.015 0.005 0.160 0.010 0.120 0.005 0.180 NO 
Namibia 0.298 0.009 0.151 0.014 0.307 0.009 -0.752 NO 
Nigeria -0.008 0.004 0.095 0.003 0.030 0.004 0.265 NO 
South Africa 0.366 0.007 0.260 0.017 0.436 0.008 -0.902 NO 
Tunisia 0.062 0.003 0.107 0.009 0.150 0.004 -0.192 NO 
Zambia 0.014 0.006 -0.048 0.003 0.011 0.006 -0.269 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.684 0.006 0.577 0.021 0.775 0.008 -1.681 NO 
France 0.664 0.007 0.488 0.019 0.720 0.008 -1.711 NO 
Germany 0.596 0.006 0.574 0.019 0.707 0.008 -1.039 NO 
Italy 0.448 0.004 0.343 0.014 0.547 0.005 -1.174 NO 
Japan 0.278 0.007 0.233 0.018 0.360 0.008 -0.593 NO 
Spain 0.580 0.007 0.461 0.018 0.642 0.008 -1.198 NO 
United Kingdom 0.644 0.006 0.380 0.017 0.678 0.007 -1.950 NO 
Other markets 
China 0.004 0.013 0.173 0.018 0.075 0.014 0.387 NO 
India 0.222 0.010 0.356 0.023 0.388 0.011 -0.163 NO 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
190 
 
Table A4.3a: Hypothesis 2 (Cumulative unadjusted test on sub-period 1-3 from a single VAR) 
African markets 
Stable period Crisis period Full period Test 
statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion? ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.049 0.003 0.150 0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.747 NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  0.021 0.005 0.202 0.003 0.053 0.005 0.748 NO 
Egypt 0.105 0.008 0.510 0.017 0.266 0.009 1.200 NO 
Mauritius 0.040 0.006 0.514 0.010 0.199 0.006 1.851** YES 
Morocco -0.013 0.005 0.421 0.010 0.148 0.005 1.488* NO 
Namibia 0.292 0.009 0.470 0.014 0.330 0.010 0.860 NO 
Nigeria -0.005 0.004 0.144 0.002 0.026 0.004 0.556 NO 
South Africa 0.360 0.007 0.648 0.017 0.475 0.008 1.287* NO 
Tunisia 0.054 0.003 0.190 0.008 0.123 0.004 0.340 NO 
Zambia 0.014 0.006 -0.002 0.003 0.023 0.006 -0.124 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.681 0.006 0.909 0.022 0.804 0.008 2.072** YES 
France 0.673 0.007 0.822 0.018 0.724 0.008 1.263 NO 
Germany 0.593 0.006 0.888 0.018 0.720 0.008 2.584*** YES 
Italy 0.448 0.004 0.750 0.014 0.588 0.006 1.526 NO 
Japan 0.292 0.007 0.591 0.020 0.425 0.008 1.090 NO 
Spain 0.573 0.007 0.829 0.019 0.681 0.008 1.813** YES 
United Kingdom 0.648 0.006 0.749 0.016 0.691 0.008 0.625 NO 
Other markets 
China 0.004 0.014 0.506 0.018 0.108 0.014 2.050** YES 
India 0.218 0.010 0.754 0.024 0.434 0.011 2.564*** YES 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
Table A4.3b: Hypothesis 2 (Cumulative adjusted test on sub-period 1- 3 from a single VAR) 
African markets 
Stable period Crisis period Full period Test 
statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion? ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.049 0.003 0.060 0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.303 NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  0.021 0.005 0.076 0.003 0.053 0.005 0.111 NO 
Egypt 0.105 0.008 0.215 0.017 0.266 0.009 -0.224 NO 
Mauritius 0.040 0.006 0.225 0.010 0.199 0.006 0.136 NO 
Morocco -0.013 0.005 0.172 0.010 0.148 0.005 0.123 NO 
Namibia 0.292 0.009 0.203 0.014 0.330 0.010 -0.700 NO 
Nigeria -0.005 0.004 0.055 0.002 0.026 0.004 0.135 NO 
South Africa 0.360 0.007 0.306 0.017 0.475 0.008 -1.009 NO 
Tunisia 0.054 0.003 0.078 0.008 0.123 0.004 -0.223 NO 
Zambia 0.014 0.006 -0.001 0.003 0.023 0.006 -0.118 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.681 0.006 0.634 0.022 0.804 0.008 -1.823 NO 
France 0.673 0.007 0.509 0.018 0.724 0.008 -1.827 NO 
Germany 0.593 0.006 0.594 0.018 0.720 0.008 -1.146 NO 
Italy 0.448 0.004 0.411 0.014 0.588 0.006 -1.221 NO 
Japan 0.292 0.007 0.277 0.020 0.425 0.008 -0.823 NO 
Spain 0.573 0.007 0.516 0.019 0.681 0.008 -1.336 NO 
United Kingdom 0.648 0.006 0.430 0.016 0.691 0.008 -1.995 NO 
Other markets 
China 0.004 0.014 0.198 0.018 0.108 0.014 0.420 NO 
India 0.218 0.010 0.387 0.024 0.434 0.011 -0.281 NO 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
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Table A4.4a: Hypothesis 2 (Cumulative unadjusted test on sub-period 1-4 from a single VAR) 
African 
markets 
Stable period Crisis period Full period Test 
statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion? ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.047 0.003 0.197 0.004 0.033 0.003 1.041 NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  0.028 0.005 0.042 0.004 0.040 0.005 0.012 NO 
Egypt 0.119 0.008 0.562 0.017 0.340 0.009 1.520* NO 
Mauritius 0.054 0.005 0.308 0.009 0.161 0.006 0.990 NO 
Morocco -0.011 0.005 0.519 0.009 0.217 0.005 2.193** YES 
Namibia 0.286 0.009 0.371 0.015 0.299 0.010 0.522 NO 
Nigeria -0.008 0.004 -0.098 0.005 -0.010 0.004 -0.546 NO 
South Africa 0.350 0.007 0.673 0.017 0.505 0.009 1.660** YES 
Tunisia 0.051 0.003 0.136 0.007 0.101 0.004 0.225 NO 
Zambia 0.002 0.006 0.110 0.004 0.035 0.006 0.466 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.690 0.006 0.908 0.022 0.828 0.009 2.141** YES 
France 0.679 0.007 0.800 0.016 0.721 0.008 1.222 NO 
Germany 0.598 0.006 0.884 0.020 0.757 0.009 2.623*** YES 
Italy 0.455 0.004 0.702 0.013 0.576 0.006 1.390* NO 
Japan 0.288 0.007 0.552 0.020 0.417 0.009 1.096 NO 
Spain 0.573 0.007 0.753 0.017 0.652 0.008 1.301* NO 
United Kingdom 0.647 0.006 0.784 0.016 0.702 0.008 1.184 NO 
Other markets 
China -0.002 0.013 0.337 0.017 0.089 0.014 1.581* NO 
India 0.221 0.010 0.741 0.023 0.473 0.012 2.722*** YES 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
Table A4.4b: Hypothesis 2 (Cumulative adjusted test on sub-period 1-4 from a single VAR) 
African markets 
Stable period Crisis period Full period Test 
statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion? ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.047 0.003 0.085 0.004 0.033 0.003 0.326 NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  0.028 0.005 0.017 0.004 0.040 0.005 -0.144 NO 
Egypt 0.119 0.008 0.274 0.017 0.340 0.009 -0.396 NO 
Mauritius 0.054 0.005 0.137 0.009 0.161 0.006 -0.152 NO 
Morocco -0.011 0.005 0.243 0.009 0.217 0.005 0.168 NO 
Namibia 0.286 0.009 0.167 0.015 0.299 0.010 -0.906 NO 
Nigeria -0.008 0.004 -0.041 0.005 -0.010 0.004 -0.192 NO 
South Africa 0.350 0.007 0.360 0.017 0.505 0.009 -1.149 NO 
Tunisia 0.051 0.003 0.061 0.007 0.101 0.004 -0.250 NO 
Zambia 0.002 0.006 0.045 0.004 0.035 0.006 0.059 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.690 0.006 0.669 0.022 0.828 0.009 -2.387 NO 
France 0.679 0.007 0.518 0.016 0.721 0.008 -2.180 NO 
Germany 0.598 0.006 0.625 0.020 0.757 0.009 -1.645 NO 
Italy 0.455 0.004 0.402 0.013 0.576 0.006 -1.485 NO 
Japan 0.288 0.007 0.273 0.020 0.417 0.009 -1.016 NO 
Spain 0.573 0.007 0.462 0.017 0.652 0.008 -1.809 NO 
United Kingdom 0.647 0.006 0.495 0.016 0.702 0.008 -2.134 NO 
Other markets 
China -0.002 0.013 0.143 0.017 0.089 0.014 0.330 NO 
India 0.221 0.010 0.414 0.023 0.473 0.012 -0.454 NO 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
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Table A4.5a: Hypothesis 2 (unadjusted sub-period 1 test using log returns) 
African markets 
Stable period Crisis period Full period Test 
statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion? ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.014 0.005 0.392 0.007 -0.011 0.005 1.621* NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  -0.054 0.006 0.308 0.002 0.010 0.006 1.174 NO 
Egypt 0.131 0.011 0.595 0.026 0.340 0.013 1.029 NO 
Mauritius 0.009 0.008 0.435 0.015 0.173 0.009 1.147 NO 
Morocco -0.027 0.007 0.446 0.019 0.147 0.008 1.262 NO 
Namibia 0.341 0.013 0.460 0.024 0.398 0.014 0.304 NO 
Nigeria -0.040 0.009 0.048 0.002 0.026 0.009 0.076 NO 
South Africa 0.425 0.010 0.529 0.019 0.474 0.011 0.287 NO 
Tunisia 0.126 0.005 0.521 0.010 0.278 0.005 1.114 NO 
Zambia -0.015 0.008 0.259 0.003 0.024 0.008 0.976 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.653 0.007 0.823 0.024 0.743 0.009 0.853 NO 
France 0.660 0.009 0.865 0.024 0.736 0.010 1.494* NO 
Germany 0.594 0.000 0.866 0.000 0.690 0.010 1.900** YES 
Italy 0.484 0.007 0.627 0.019 0.574 0.009 0.336 NO 
Japan 0.378 0.010 0.614 0.019 0.470 0.011 0.780 NO 
Spain 0.578 0.009 0.792 0.024 0.647 0.010 1.243 NO 
United Kingdom 0.663 0.008 0.815 0.024 0.730 0.010 0.855 NO 
Other markets 
China 0.036 0.018 0.630 0.034 0.149 0.018 1.934** YES 
India 0.266 0.014 0.857 0.023 0.395 0.015 3.296*** YES 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
Table A4.5b: Hypothesis 2 (adjusted sub-period 1 test using log returns) 
African markets 
Stable period Crisis period Full period Test 
statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion? ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.014 0.005 0.166 0.007 -0.011 0.005 0.681 NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  -0.054 0.006 0.128 0.002 0.010 0.006 0.451 NO 
Egypt 0.131 0.011 0.241 0.026 0.340 0.013 -0.339 NO 
Mauritius 0.009 0.008 0.192 0.015 0.173 0.009 0.078 NO 
Morocco -0.027 0.007 0.191 0.019 0.147 0.008 0.173 NO 
Namibia 0.341 0.013 0.201 0.024 0.398 0.014 -0.881 NO 
Nigeria -0.040 0.009 0.017 0.002 0.026 0.009 -0.033 NO 
South Africa 0.425 0.010 0.238 0.019 0.474 0.011 -1.070 NO 
Tunisia 0.126 0.005 0.233 0.010 0.278 0.005 -0.182 NO 
Zambia -0.015 0.008 0.107 0.003 0.024 0.008 0.339 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.653 0.007 0.507 0.024 0.743 0.009 -1.610 NO 
France 0.660 0.009 0.561 0.024 0.736 0.010 -1.245 NO 
Germany 0.594 0.000 0.565 0.000 0.690 0.010 -0.846 NO 
Italy 0.484 0.007 0.302 0.019 0.574 0.009 -1.379 NO 
Japan 0.378 0.010 0.287 0.019 0.470 0.011 -0.815 NO 
Spain 0.578 0.009 0.456 0.024 0.647 0.010 -1.127 NO 
United Kingdom 0.663 0.008 0.486 0.024 0.730 0.010 -1.612 NO 
Other markets 
China 0.036 0.018 0.236 0.034 0.149 0.018 0.298 NO 
India 0.266 0.014 0.526 0.023 0.395 0.015 0.635 NO 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
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Table 4A.6a: Hypothesis 2 (Cumulative unadjusted test on sub-period 1-2 using log returns) 
African markets 
Stable period Crisis period Full period Test 
statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.014 0.005 0.256 0.007 0.010 0.005 1.073 NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  -0.054 0.006 0.074 0.003 0.010 0.006 0.282 NO 
Egypt 0.131 0.011 0.504 0.026 0.312 0.013 0.848 NO 
Mauritius 0.009 0.008 0.502 0.020 0.216 0.009 1.488* NO 
Morocco -0.027 0.007 0.587 0.019 0.208 0.008 2.023** YES 
Namibia 0.341 0.013 0.302 0.025 0.345 0.014 -0.218 NO 
Nigeria -0.040 0.009 0.181 0.003 0.026 0.009 0.633 NO 
South Africa 0.425 0.010 0.624 0.021 0.495 0.011 0.844 NO 
Tunisia 0.126 0.005 0.440 0.011 0.262 0.005 0.890 NO 
Zambia -0.015 0.008 -0.120 0.003 0.007 0.008 -0.584 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.653 0.007 0.839 0.025 0.747 0.010 1.127 NO 
France 0.660 0.009 0.820 0.030 0.739 0.011 0.952 NO 
Germany 0.594 0.009 0.835 0.027 0.706 0.011 1.481* NO 
Italy 0.484 0.007 0.542 0.027 0.539 0.010 0.021 NO 
Japan 0.378 0.010 0.562 0.027 0.466 0.012 0.556 NO 
Spain 0.578 0.009 0.751 0.027 0.651 0.011 0.906 NO 
United Kingdom 0.663 0.008 0.749 0.027 0.714 0.011 0.345 NO 
Other markets 
China 0.036 0.018 0.506 0.030 0.154 0.018 1.577* NO 
India 0.266 0.014 0.780 0.025 0.411 0.015 2.657*** YES 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
Table A4.6b: Hypothesis 2 (Cumulative adjusted test on sub-period 1-2 using log returns) 
African markets 
Stable period Crisis period Full period Test 
statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion? ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.014 0.005 0.091 0.007 0.010 0.005 0.344 NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  -0.054 0.006 0.027 0.003 0.010 0.006 0.076 NO 
Egypt 0.131 0.011 0.184 0.026 0.312 0.013 -0.501 NO 
Mauritius 0.009 0.008 0.198 0.020 0.216 0.009 -0.085 NO 
Morocco -0.027 0.007 0.240 0.019 0.208 0.008 0.148 NO 
Namibia 0.341 0.013 0.110 0.025 0.345 0.014 -1.140 NO 
Nigeria -0.040 0.009 0.059 0.003 0.026 0.009 0.134 NO 
South Africa 0.425 0.010 0.265 0.021 0.495 0.011 -1.213 NO 
Tunisia 0.126 0.005 0.165 0.011 0.262 0.005 -0.445 NO 
Zambia -0.015 0.008 -0.043 0.003 0.007 0.008 -0.227 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.653 0.007 0.506 0.025 0.747 0.010 -1.829 NO 
France 0.660 0.009 0.445 0.030 0.739 0.011 -2.152 NO 
Germany 0.594 0.009 0.466 0.027 0.706 0.011 -1.716 NO 
Italy 0.484 0.007 0.219 0.027 0.539 0.010 -1.740 NO 
Japan 0.378 0.010 0.240 0.027 0.466 0.012 -1.109 NO 
Spain 0.578 0.009 0.368 0.027 0.651 0.011 -1.794 NO 
United Kingdom 0.663 0.008 0.367 0.027 0.714 0.011 -2.337 NO 
Other markets 
China 0.036 0.018 0.168 0.030 0.154 0.018 0.058 NO 
India 0.266 0.014 0.403 0.025 0.411 0.015 -0.044 NO 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
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Table A4.7a: Hypothesis 2 (Cumulative unadjusted test on sub-period 1-3 using log returns) 
African markets 
Stable period Crisis period Full period Test 
statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion? ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.014 0.005 0.251 0.006 0.029 0.005 1.109 NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  -0.054 0.006 0.212 0.004 0.050 0.006 0.821 NO 
Egypt 0.131 0.011 0.525 0.027 0.366 0.013 0.824 NO 
Mauritius 0.009 0.008 0.514 0.019 0.240 0.009 1.630* NO 
Morocco -0.027 0.007 0.585 0.018 0.241 0.008 2.105** YES 
Namibia 0.341 0.013 0.294 0.025 0.352 0.014 -0.335 NO 
Nigeria -0.040 0.009 0.140 0.002 0.035 0.009 0.494 NO 
South Africa 0.425 0.010 0.603 0.023 0.513 0.012 0.662 NO 
Tunisia 0.126 0.005 0.353 0.010 0.255 0.005 0.536 NO 
Zambia -0.015 0.008 0.040 0.004 0.028 0.008 0.059 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.653 0.007 0.851 0.028 0.766 0.010 1.252 NO 
France 0.660 0.009 0.825 0.029 0.749 0.012 1.043 NO 
Germany 0.594 0.009 0.835 0.025 0.718 0.011 1.543* NO 
Italy 0.484 0.007 0.573 0.026 0.562 0.010 0.081 NO 
Japan 0.378 0.010 0.582 0.031 0.504 0.013 0.543 NO 
Spain 0.578 0.009 0.759 0.029 0.680 0.012 0.846 NO 
United Kingdom 0.663 0.008 0.762 0.027 0.726 0.011 0.410 NO 
Other markets 
China 0.036 0.018 0.541 0.028 0.182 0.018 1.929** YES 
India 0.266 0.014 0.627 0.029 0.422 0.016 1.422* NO 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
Table A4.7b: Hypothesis 2 (Cumulative adjusted test on sub-period 1-3 using log returns) 
African markets 
Stable period Crisis period Full period Test 
statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion? ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.014 0.005 0.097 0.006 0.029 0.005 0.333 NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  -0.054 0.006 0.085 0.004 0.050 0.006 0.176 NO 
Egypt 0.131 0.011 0.215 0.027 0.366 0.013 -0.686 NO 
Mauritius 0.009 0.008 0.221 0.019 0.240 0.009 -0.106 NO 
Morocco -0.027 0.007 0.259 0.018 0.241 0.008 0.095 NO 
Namibia 0.341 0.013 0.117 0.025 0.352 0.014 -1.283 NO 
Nigeria -0.040 0.009 0.051 0.002 0.035 0.009 0.071 NO 
South Africa 0.425 0.010 0.272 0.023 0.513 0.012 -1.449 NO 
Tunisia 0.126 0.005 0.139 0.010 0.255 0.005 -0.599 NO 
Zambia -0.015 0.008 0.015 0.004 0.028 0.008 -0.068 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.653 0.007 0.548 0.028 0.766 0.010 -1.994 NO 
France 0.660 0.009 0.487 0.029 0.749 0.012 -2.251 NO 
Germany 0.594 0.009 0.501 0.025 0.718 0.011 -1.811 NO 
Italy 0.484 0.007 0.258 0.026 0.562 0.010 -1.909 NO 
Japan 0.378 0.010 0.271 0.031 0.504 0.013 -1.342 NO 
Spain 0.578 0.009 0.406 0.029 0.680 0.012 -2.039 NO 
United Kingdom 0.663 0.008 0.411 0.027 0.726 0.011 -2.483 NO 
Other markets 
China 0.036 0.018 0.207 0.028 0.182 0.018 0.118 NO 
India 0.266 0.014 0.294 0.029 0.422 0.016 -0.727 NO 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
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Table A4.8a: Hypothesis 2 (Cumulative unadjusted test on sub-period 1-4 using log returns) 
African markets 
Stable period Crisis period Full period Test 
statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion? ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.014 0.005 0.176 0.006 0.058 0.005 0.751 NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  -0.054 0.006 -0.055 0.005 0.038 0.007 -0.587 NO 
Egypt 0.131 0.011 0.561 0.028 0.412 0.014 1.068 NO 
Mauritius 0.009 0.008 0.400 0.015 0.217 0.009 1.287* NO 
Morocco -0.027 0.007 0.575 0.015 0.267 0.008 2.365*** YES 
Namibia 0.341 0.013 0.248 0.027 0.311 0.015 -0.445 NO 
Nigeria -0.040 0.009 -0.142 0.014 -0.010 0.010 -0.815 NO 
South Africa 0.425 0.010 0.633 0.024 0.538 0.012 0.926 NO 
Tunisia 0.126 0.005 0.339 0.009 0.243 0.005 0.658 NO 
Zambia -0.015 0.008 0.096 0.005 0.050 0.008 0.290 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.653 0.007 0.852 0.027 0.786 0.012 1.296* NO 
France 0.660 0.009 0.813 0.028 0.753 0.013 1.001 NO 
Germany 0.594 0.009 0.863 0.027 0.758 0.012 2.030** YES 
Italy 0.484 0.007 0.573 0.025 0.555 0.011 0.172 NO 
Japan 0.378 0.010 0.533 0.033 0.479 0.014 0.443 NO 
Spain 0.578 0.009 0.722 0.029 0.670 0.013 0.657 NO 
United Kingdom 0.663 0.008 0.785 0.027 0.739 0.012 0.704 NO 
Other markets 
China 0.036 0.018 0.357 0.025 0.137 0.019 1.427* NO 
India 0.266 0.014 0.696 0.032 0.481 0.017 2.076** YES 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
Table A4.8b: Hypothesis 2 (Cumulative adjusted test on sub- period 1-4 using log returns) 
African markets 
Stable period Crisis period Full period Test 
statistics  
Evidence of 
contagion? ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ 
Botswana -0.014 0.005 0.075 0.006 0.058 0.005 0.108 NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  -0.054 0.006 -0.024 0.005 0.038 0.007 -0.389 NO 
Egypt 0.131 0.011 0.269 0.028 0.412 0.014 -0.880 NO 
Mauritius 0.009 0.008 0.179 0.015 0.217 0.009 -0.248 NO 
Morocco -0.027 0.007 0.280 0.015 0.267 0.008 0.085 NO 
Namibia 0.341 0.013 0.107 0.027 0.311 0.015 -1.383 NO 
Nigeria -0.040 0.009 -0.059 0.014 -0.010 0.010 -0.300 NO 
South Africa 0.425 0.010 0.325 0.024 0.538 0.012 -1.692 NO 
Tunisia 0.126 0.005 0.149 0.009 0.243 0.005 -0.616 NO 
Zambia -0.015 0.008 0.040 0.005 0.050 0.008 -0.058 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.653 0.007 0.575 0.027 0.786 0.012 -2.609 NO 
France 0.660 0.009 0.506 0.028 0.753 0.013 -2.741 NO 
Germany 0.594 0.009 0.583 0.027 0.758 0.012 -2.091 NO 
Italy 0.484 0.007 0.283 0.025 0.555 0.011 -2.169 NO 
Japan 0.378 0.010 0.259 0.033 0.479 0.014 -1.590 NO 
Spain 0.578 0.009 0.402 0.029 0.670 0.013 -2.485 NO 
United Kingdom 0.663 0.008 0.471 0.027 0.739 0.012 -2.825 NO 
Other markets 
China 0.036 0.018 0.149 0.025 0.137 0.019 0.075 NO 
India 0.266 0.014 0.377 0.032 0.481 0.017 -0.791 NO 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
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It was identified in Chapter 2 that researchers have identified potential problems in 
respect to applying the static correlation model to contagion analysis. These arguments 
have been supported by my findings from Chapter 4. The issues raised relate to the 
adjustments to the standard error made by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) in order to 
control for the excess volatility during crisis periods and also relate to their use of a 
single-system VAR. 
Another issue that researchers face is that the static correlation models fail to take into 
consideration fluctuations in correlation over time. I believe that this is a particularly 
important issue in respect to the 2007-09 financial crisis, given that it ran over a 
relatively long period, and therefore considerable changes in correlation might be 
expected. 
 
In this chapter, I attempt to address both of these issues by testing for contagion using a 
time-varying correlations measure using the DCC-MGARCH framework of Engle 
(2002). The results of these tests are presented in summary or stylised fact form in this 
chapter. They will be discussed from a behavioural perspective and compared (and 







5.2 CHAPTER AIMS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
This chapter explores the same hypotheses as were tested in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.1). 
The primary objective is to identify if the use of a more sophisticated methodology will 
produce appreciably different findings. This is important given the criticisms and issues 
associated with the static-correlation-based approach. The rationales for the hypotheses 
tested are detailed in Chapter 3. The hypotheses tested are: 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a statistically significant increase in correlations between US 
and developed markets over the period 15 September 2008-15 October 2009. 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a statistically significant increase in correlations between US 
and African markets over the period 15 September 2008-15 October 2009. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2a: There is a statistically significant increase in correlations between US 
and developed markets over the sub-periods 15/09/2008-10/10/2008, 15/09/2008-
17/10/2008, 15/09/2008-27/10/2008 and 15/09/2008-20/11/2008. 
Hypothesis 2b: There is a statistically significant increase in correlations between US 
and African markets over the sub-periods 15/09/2008-10/10/2008, 15/09/2008-








5.3 TIME-VARYING CORRELATION METHODOLOGY 
 
The time-varying methodology adopted in this section is the DCC-MGARCH model. 
Unlike the static model, this methodology enables us to estimate correlations at each 
point in time. This is done through estimating conditional covariance and conditional 








   (5.1) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 = US and 𝑗 = a second country. 
The covariance and variance terms are estimated from the covariance matrix 𝑄𝑡, where 
𝑄𝑡 = [qij,t] 
 
5.3.1 Estimating conditional correlations using the multivariate DCC model 
The model applied is based on a variant of the original dynamic conditional correlation 
multivariate GARCH model proposed by Engle (2002). This methodology can be run 
on the basis of either a system of equations or on the basis of a series of equation pairs, 
where the equation pairs are the US market and “a second country”. I run the model on 
the basis of 19 equation pairs, given the objective is to identify contagion between the 
US and individual countries. These countries are grouped into African markets, 
developed markets and “others”, as shown in Table 5.1 below. 
The first step in this pairs-based modelling procedure is to estimate the residual returns 
mean equations. These equations, which are in a VAR format (the mean equation form 
is discussed below), are as follows: 
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𝑟𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 +  �𝛼𝑖𝑘
𝑚
𝑘=1
𝑟𝑖𝑡−𝑘 +  �𝛽𝑖𝑘
𝑚
𝑘=1
𝑟𝑗𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                        (5.2) 
𝑟𝑗𝑡 =  𝜇𝑗 +  �𝛼𝑗𝑘
𝑚
𝑘=1
𝑟𝑗𝑡−𝑘 +  �𝛽𝑗𝑘
𝑚
𝑘=1
𝑟𝑖𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡                        (5.3) 
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 represent the US and 𝑗 a second country. 
The methodology assumes that residuals are conditionally multivariate-normal. 
The residuals from the mean equation pairs are then used to derive the variance 
equations. These are in a GARCH (1, 1) format (discussed below). They are as follows: 
 
𝜎𝑖𝑡2 =  𝛼𝑖0 +  𝛼𝑖1 𝜀𝑖𝑡−12 +  𝛽𝑖1𝜎𝑖𝑡−12                 (5.4) 
 
𝜎𝑗𝑡2 =  𝛼𝑗0 +  𝛼𝑗1 𝜀𝑗𝑡−12 +  𝛽𝑗1𝜎𝑗𝑡−12                 (5.5) 
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝜎𝑡2 is the conditional variance, 𝛼0 the intercept, 𝜀 the standardised residuals, 
𝛼1 represents the ARCH parameter and 𝛽1 the GARCH parameter. 
The correlation coefficients are estimated from the DCC equation: 
 
Qt = (1 − α − β)Q� + ανt−1νt−1′ + βQt−1            (5.6) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑄𝑡 represents the covariance matrix, 𝑄𝑡 = �qij,t�, and νt represents the residuals 
standardised by their conditional standard deviation. The model is mean reverting as 
long as the non-negative scalars satisfy the constraint 𝛼 + 𝛽 < 1 
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A significant alpha coefficient value in the DCC equation is an indication that 
correlations will vary appreciably over time. It can be noted in Appendix Tables A5.2b, 
A5.2d and A5.2f that the alpha parameter is significant in all cases except Mauritius, 
Nigeria, Tunisia and Zambia. This is indicative that there is a likelihood that evidence 
of contagion could be found within the data. This is because it indicates significant 
changes in the conditional correlation over time in most of the sample countries. The 
beta parameter is an estimate of the persistence26 within the series. If 𝛼 + 𝛽 = 1, the 
model will not mean revert, which would effectively mean the series would be 
integrated to the order 1: i.e. I (1). In the case of our models presented in Appendix 
Table A5.2, this does not present major issues. 
 
5.3.2 Development of the VAR-based mean equations  
The mean equations developed are presented in Appendix Tables A5.1a to A5.1f. 
Unlike standard mean equations, which contain a single constant, these are based on 
VAR equations. This approach is taken for two reasons. First, following Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002), in order to identify contagion between two series, the residuals used to 
estimate the correlation must control for (eliminate) all other (non-contagion-based) 
factors that can influence returns. As Forbes and Rigobon (2002) show us, these are in 
effect the lagged returns in the two markets concerned. 
Although Forbes and Rigobon (2002) concluded that a five-lag VAR structure was 
sufficient to control for non-contagion factors, there is also an additional issue that 
needs to be considered in respect to the MGARCH-DCC model. Tsay (2005) showed 
that evidence of autocorrelation in the residuals of either the mean or variance equations 
                                                 
26 Persistence is measured as the half-life of shock computed as ln(0.5)/ln(α+β) as suggested in Engle and Sheppard (2001). The 
half-life is defined as the time at which a shock to correlation is expected to be halfway dissipated. 
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would compromise the integrity of the methodology. On this basis I had to identify an 
optimal lag structure of the VAR that was subject to the condition that there was an 
absence of autocorrelation in these two series of equations. This process of testing for 
autocorrelation is described in Section 5.3.3 below. 
The optimal lag-length selection was undertaken using information criteria. Three 
selection criteria are used for this purpose, namely AIC,27 BIC28 and HQC.29 Liew 
(2004) argues that where the sample is relatively large, such as 120 and above 
observations, HQC produces the most efficient results. I found, however, that use of this 
criterion resulted in cases of autocorrelation in some of the mean and variance equation 
residuals. As there were no such issues found when the AIC was used (see Appendix 










                                                 
27 Akaike information criterion. See Burnham and Anderson (2004). 
28 Bayesian information criterion.  See Burnham and Anderson (2004). 
29 Hannan Quinn Criterion. See Sin and White (1996). 
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Table 5.1: Optimal lags identified by HQC and AIC lag selection criteria 
Countries HQC AIC 
Botswana 11 17 
Côte d’Ivoire  10 16 
Egypt 16 20 
Mauritius 9 14 
Morocco 9 13 
Namibia 10 14 
Nigeria 11 16 
South Africa 11 15 
Tunisia 9 19 
Zambia 11 15 
Developed markets 
Canada 10 16 
France 11 17 
Germany 12 20 
Italy 11 20 
Japan 9 19 
Spain 11 17 
United Kingdom 11 18 
Other markets 
China 11 20 
India 9 20 
 
It can be noted in Table 5.1 above that the AIC-based optimal lags were considerably 
longer than the HQC-based lags across all 19 countries. They are also considerably 
longer than the five lags used by Forbes and Rigobon (2002). This is possibly to be 
expected given that the static-correlation-based contagion tests do not need to take into 
consideration the issue of autocorrelation in mean and variance equations. The mean 
equations are presented in Appendix Tables A5.1. 1f identify that that the lagged values 
showed considerable statistical significance. For example, it can be noted that in respect 
to the pair of US and France, the US returns equation showed significance (at 1% and 




5.3.3 Development of the variance equations  
 
The variance equations developed are presented in Tables A5.2a, A5.2c and A5.2e. For 
all 19 equation pairs modelled, they take the form of GARCH (1, 1). 
Different GARCH specifications can be considered in respect to possible asymmetry in 
the data set associated with the tendency for bear phases of the market cycle to show a 
quicker pace of price adjustment than that found in bull phases. 
It is possible to test for the most efficient functional form using information criteria in 
the same way in which the mean equations were tested.30 Models can be tested as part 
of the set of GARCH models identified by Hentschel (1995) and subsequently described 
by Ghalanos (2013) as the family GARCH (fGARCH) model. Potential alternative 
specifications include: 
• GJRGARCH model (Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle 1993); 
• Threshold GARCH (TGARCH) model (Zakoian 1994); 
• Nonlinear ARCH (NGARCH) model (Higgins and Bera 1992); 
• Nonlinear Asymmetric GARCH (NAGARCH) model (Engle and Ng 1993); 
Despite the range of alternative asymmetric GARCH models available to us, it was 
found that none of the alternatives tested proved to be significantly superior to the 
standard GARCH (1, 1) specification. These alternative models were tested using 
information criteria; specifically, none of the alternatives were found to show superior 
performance to the standard GARCH (1, 1) model. I therefore applied the standard 
model for all of the 19 model pairs run. This conclusion is drawn from the information 
criteria test carried out on all the sampled markets. The results can be seen in Appendix 
                                                 
30 It can be noted that in this case information criteria are estimated in relation to the likelihood function as estimation used 
Maximum Likelihood estimation as opposed to the Ordinary Least Squares used in the mean equations. 
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Tables A5.1 andA5.2. It can be noted from the tables that all three parameters of these 
models (α0, α1, β1) were statistically significant in respect to the US at the 10% level 
(with most being significant at 5% or lower). The statistical significance across all three 
parameters was also high in respect to most of the developed markets, although the 
picture was a little more mixed in respect to the African markets (there were still 
considerable levels of significance found in respect to a number of the African 
countries).  
Attempts were made towards other GARCH models on the African markets (Nigeria, 
Zambia, Tunisia and Mauritius) which showed insignificant alpha in there DCC 
equation using GARCH (1, 1) but the models returned lack of convergence across the 
different alternative GARCH models.   
 
5.3.4 Autocorrelation testing in the mean and variance equations 
As noted above, Tsay (2005) identified that where the mean and variance equations 
contain autocorrelations the robustness of the modelling process has to be called into 
question. We therefore performed a series of tests to check for autocorrelation in the 
models identified in the appendix. These are presented in Table A5.3. We perform the 
series of tests for robustness purposes given that the results from individual tests can 
sometime contradict each other; this is because they control for the influence of a 
specific lag-length in slightly different ways. 
The tests employed are the Q-Statistic (Ljung and Box 1978) for the standardised 
residuals and standardised squared residuals. These are on the mean and variance 
equations, respectively, and are undertaken with lags of 5, 10, 20 and 50. The tests are 
joint tests with the null hypothesis stating that the parameter values on respective lags 
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are simultaneously zero. Rejection of the null indicates the presence of misspecification 
errors (i.e. autocorrelation). 
The Q-Statistic test on the squared standardised residuals was used to examine for the 
presence of ARCH effects in the variance equation also undertaken with the same 
number of lags. Hosking’s (1980) multivariate portmanteau test statistics are also 
employed, along with the Li and McLeod (1981) multivariate tests. These are testing for 
simultaneous zero values across the respective mean and variance equations for both 
countries in the pair being tested at the time. The test results, presented in Appendices 
A5.3a to A5.5c, indicate that, with a few potential exceptions, the models I selected did 
not suffer from any autocorrelation issue (there were no cases where the null was 
rejected for a given pair across all the different test sets undertaken). 
 
5.3.5 Test for financial crisis contagion: the equality of means test 
Given that the conditional correlation is estimated across each point in time of the 
sample, the impact of financial crisis on the conditional correlation is examined using 
comparison-of-means tests. The test identifies the extent of the statistical significance of 
any differences in the mean daily conditional correlation in the pre-crisis period against 
the mean daily conditional correlation in the crisis period (multiple tests are undertaken 
using a fixed pre-crisis period of 01/01/2007–14/09/2008 and tested against a series of 
short sub-crisis periods). 
The test undertaken is an independent samples t-test. Given that market volatility is 
normally expected to be greater during crisis periods it is expected that the variance of 
the pre-crisis and crisis period observations may differ. Differing forms of the 𝑡-test can 
be run on the basis of (i) equal variance samples and (ii) unequal variance samples. A 
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Levine test for variance equality (where the null hypothesis is variance equality) is 
therefore run to determine which test to apply. The effective difference between the two 
tests is that if unequal variances are identified the test becomes marginally stricter. 
The null hypothesis is that mean daily correlations during the crisis is less than or equal 
to the pre-crisis period. If the null is rejected contagion is deemed to have been found. 
𝐻𝑂 :𝑦2 ≤ 𝑦1 (absence of financial contagion) 
𝐻1:𝑦2 >  𝑦1 (financial contagion) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑦2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦1 are the mean daily correlation values between countries 𝑖 and 𝑗 
during the crisis and pre-crisis periods respectively. 








~𝑡(𝑛1 + 𝑛2 − 2)                                      (5.7) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙2 =  
∑(𝑦1𝑖 − 𝑦�1)2 + ∑�𝑦2𝑗 − 𝑦�2�
2
𝑛1 + 𝑛2 − 2
=  
(𝑛1 − 1)𝑠12 +  (𝑛2 − 1)𝑠22 
𝑛1 + 𝑛2 − 2
 
n1 – pre-crisis sample size 
n2 – during crisis sample size 







~𝑡( 𝑑𝑓𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑒 )                                (5.8) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑓𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑒 =  
(𝑛1 − 1)(𝑛2 − 1) 
(𝑛1 − 1)(1 − 𝑐)2 +  (𝑛2 − 1)𝑐2






and s2 is the variance. The Satterthwaite approximation was introduced by Satterthwaite 
(1946). 
 
5.3.6 Financial contagion robustness test 
To add to the robustness of the analysis, an alternative regression-based test is also 
undertaken to act as a confirmatory test. This takes the form of a test of significance in 
respect to a regression dummy variable representing the crisis periods. 
 
𝐶𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑗 + 𝛿𝑗𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡                                     (5.9) 
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 Cij,t is the conditional correlation at time t, between the US (i) and the second 
country (j). Crisis DUMMYt is a dummy variable taking on a value of 1 over the 
respective crisis period being tested. A positive AND statistically significant parameter 
value in respect to Crisis DUMMY is an indication that financial contagion has 
occurred. The hypothesis tested is: 
𝐻𝑂 : 𝛿𝑗 ≤ 0 (absence of financial contagion) 
𝐻1: 𝛿𝑗 >  0 (financial contagion) 
It may be noted that a statistically significant negative parameter on the dummy variable 
would indicate a significant fall in correlation during the crisis period and does not 









This section will start with a graphical presentation of the daily time-varying 
conditional correlations before using the comparison-of-means tests to identify financial 
contagion. This is done because the use of mean values can often obscure considerable 
spikes in conditional correlation over time. As well as presenting the correlations, the 
graphical analysis also shows the conditional covariance along with the conditional 
variances. This is done to examine why correlations change (see Equation 5.1 in respect 
to how correlations are estimated). 
 
5.4.1 Time-varying conditional correlations: a stylised fact-based graphical 
descriptive analysis 
Graphical presentations of the conditional correlation, conditional variances, ratio of 
conditional variances and covariance for each pair of country with the US are presented 
in this chapter’s appendix (Section 5.7). Figures A5.1 to A5.10 are in respect to the 
African markets and Figures A5.11 to A5.19 are in respect to the developed markets 
and other markets (China and India). Each figure contains four sub-elements: the 
conditional correlation (top left); the conditional variances (top right); the conditional 
covariance (bottom right) and the ratio of the conditional variances (US/second country, 
bottom left). 
The conditional correlation charts show that the US stock market is generally more 
highly correlated with the developed markets than African emerging and frontier 
markets. For example, in respect to Botswana the correlation with the US ranged 
between −0.11 and 0.12 over the period 2007-2009. For Canada, the correlation with the 
US ranged between 0.48 and 0.93 over this period, although it is clear that there were 
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considerable spikes in the correlations associated with the onset of the crisis in the 
developed markets. The impact of the crisis on African markets was, however, mixed. 
The reaction of the conditional correlation to the financial crisis of some African 
countries shows negative values before the onset of the crisis. For instance, the 
correlations in Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Morocco were largely negative. These 
values increased immediately after 15/09/2008 (Lehman’s crisis) and fell back 
sometime in early 2009. This, in essence, supports my hypothesis of a short-term 
contagion effect. 
For some developed markets, there was an initial fall in correlation in September 2008 
after Lehman’s. For example, conditional correlation charts of Canada, the UK, France 
and Italy showed a decline at the onset of the crisis (Lehman’s announcement).This 
indicates that these markets responded relatively slowly to the initial falls in the US 
market or they are studying the US market closely and tried avoiding the effect of the 
crisis. 
Changes in the conditional correlation are driven by changes in the ratio of the 
covariance to the product of the two market variances (see Equation 5.1). The 
covariance spiked around the period of the crisis in the developed markets and also in a 
number of the African markets. For example, in Canada it increased by more than four 
times the size. The correlation is only going to increase if the covariance increases 
proportionally more than does the product of the two variances. What my analysis 
shows is that changes in correlations were affected to a considerable degree by changes 
in the relative variances of the US and the second country. 
Generally, changes in correlation tend to be driven by changes in the covariance. If 
markets in two countries move in the same direction then this will increase (i.e. it is 
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positive). In times of financial crisis any contagion effect will result in considerable 
increases in this covariance. The covariance chart in Figure A5.1 (bottom right 
quadrant) shows an initial negative relationship between Botswana and the US. 
However, this suddenly shoots upward towards the end of 2008 and stays positive for 
some time in 2009 before dropping down. This gives a clear indication that the US 
crisis had a considerable negative impact on the Botswana market. Similar behaviour is 
exhibited in Morocco, Egypt, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia; 
their covariances with the US are initially quite low but mostly moved in a positive 
direction (some shooting up drastically) during the crisis. These increases provide 
expectation of correlation increases during crisis. A cursory inspection of the developed 
markets also identifies that the covariance with the US increased significantly during 
the crisis. 
The variances of the respective countries are shown in the top right quadrants of each 
figure, with the US in red and the second country in blue. It is immediately evident from 
these charts that the US is more volatile than Botswana, Morocco, Namibia, South 
Africa and Tunisia during the crisis period (towards the end of 2008). This suggests that 
the impact on African markets was considerably smaller over this period. As the crisis 
began in the US, the increase in US variance is expected. Although the change in 
African markets was generally smaller there were some considerable spikes. Mauritius, 
for instance, shows many spikes throughout the sample period and it is especially higher 
than the US at some point after the onset of the crisis. South Africa’s variances, even 
though lower than the US, show appreciable reaction during the crisis period. It can be 
noted that these spikes could also possibly reflect African issues rather than being 
related to the US crisis. Africa is a continent where there are considerable political 
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upheavals. African markets may have been responding to local and regional issues over 
what was a considerable period of time. 
The situation is different for developed markets – there is also clear evidence of high 
volatility in the conditional variance of this group. Canada in particular displayed what 
could be seen as an almost identical movement in conditional variances with the US 
throughout the sample period. The remaining developed markets, including Japan, 
shows the crisis affected their conditional variance; there was clear upward movement 
during the crisis period. The story is different for the non-African emerging markets 
sampled: China and India. Here the conditional variance of China is higher than that of 
the US till around late 2008 (the crisis period), when it begins to fall. This suggests that 
the initial phase of the crisis had very little impact on China. 
As noted in the introduction to this section, the ratio of the conditional variances (ratio 
of US/second country, bottom left quadrant of the figures) showed considerable 
differences over the crisis period. In most of the African markets this ratio rose around 
the period of the financial crisis. This indicates that, in general, African markets 
responded to a lesser degree than their US counterpart. In respect to developed markets 
there was some evidence to suggest that the ratio was relatively stable. This suggests 
that other developed markets experienced similar levels of volatility as their US 
counterpart. Interestingly, the ratio seems to fall in some cases, for example, the UK, 
Italy, Spain and China, indicating that the impact was considerably more than it was on 
the US even though the crisis had US origins. The UK is interesting; an initial spike in 
the ratio when the crisis began, indicating an initially higher impact on the US, was 
replaced by a considerable fall, indicating that the crisis had a much larger medium-term 
impact on UK markets than US markets. 
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In conclusion to this section, I would say that considerable care needs to be taken when 
interpreting correlations data as the impact of the crisis on the covariance can be in part, 
masked (or even increased) by the impact of changes in relative market volatilities over 
the period. This appears to be especially important in respect to developed markets 
where, in some cases, higher relative levels of US volatility at the start of the crisis gave 
way to lower relative levels of US volatility as the crisis developed. 
 
5.4.2 Time-varying mean correlations: a stylised fact-based descriptive analysis 
As has been discussed above, there were considerable variations in the conditional 
correlations over time. It also appears from the charts that the correlations were higher 
during the crisis period than the pre-crisis period. However, in order to undertake formal 
hypothesis tests for contagion I undertake statistical comparison-of-mean tests between 
the two periods. Before I undertake a statistical test for contagion in Section 5.4.3, I will 
undertake a descriptive analysis of the means. This section will attempt to identify the 
changes in mean correlations during the crisis using the identified periods under study. 
As a reminder, the periods under consideration are: 
1. Long crisis period (15/09/2008-15/10/2009) 
2. Sub-period 1 (15/09/2008-10/10/2008) 
3. Sub-period 2 (15/09/2008-17/10/2008) 
4. Sub-period 3 (15/09/2008-27/10/2008) 
5. Sub-period 4 (15/09/2008-20/11/2008) 
Correlations of all countries with the US during the pre-crisis and crisis periods are used 
to plots charts in order to adequately visualise the differences in the relationship of the 
countries with the US before and during crisis. Figure 5.1 below gives the correlations 
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of all sample countries with the US during the period of tranquillity. As the stable 
period remains constant throughout my analysis, only one chart is used to present this 
period. It is immediately evident from Figure 5.1 that all the African markets have a less 
than 50% correlation with the US. The most correlated market with the US in this 
region is South Africa with 41%. Namibia has about 30% correlation with the US while 
Botswana and Zambia produced negative correlation values of −0.028 and −0.016 
during the tranquil period. The smallest correlation value is produced between the US 
and Botswana (US and Botswana is also the smallest correlation in the previous 
chapter). The negative correlations indicate movement in opposite directions; therefore, 
a sudden increase in correlation during the crisis could lead to a contagion effect. 
 
Figure 5.1: Showing stable period correlations 
 
But, more interestingly, if we look at the connections of South Africa to the US, it is 
evident that this market is more connected with the US than other African markets. 




















Stable period correlations of all countries with the US 
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any shock originating in the US stock market could hit instantly the South African stock 
market, either as contagion or interdependence that would act as a transmitter to the rest 
of the African markets.  
For the developed markets, Canada provided the highest correlation value with the US 
at 76%. France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK all had above 50% correlation with 
the US before the crisis. Japan is the only developed market in the sample to have a less 
than 50% correlation (25%) during tranquillity. The comparative markets (China and 
India) provided positive correlation but India did better at 31% whereas China had only 
0.589%. As stated in the methodology section, the crisis period had sub-elements in 
which peaks are identified using the VIX. Therefore, correlations for the long crisis and 




Figure 5.2: Showing crisis period correlations 
 
BWA CIV  EGY MUS MAR NAM NGA SA TUN ZMB CAN FRA GER ITA JPN SPN U K CHN IND 
long .0108817 .0358839 .1944376 .0433226 .0168558 .3180376 .0426777 .5468666 .0660145 -.016285 .8283888 .7449817 .7694720 .5674647 .2455765 .7038020 .7198560 .0907693 .4175565 
short 1 .0116971 .1025270 .2427418 .0433225 .1308204 .3671186 .0426777 .4963532 .0668851 -.016285 .7170734 .6664872 .7082006 .4769963 .2573353 .6166037 .6649986 .0479118 .0524466 
short 2 .0136816 .1127702 .2554831 .0433226 .1386932 .3659704 .0426777 .5035673 .0668608 -.016285 .7298377 .6718843 .7163823 .4844658 .2727989 .6171340 .6685909 .1747277 .4033911 
short 3 .0201280 .1192317 .2632762 .0433226 .1435071 .3674708 .0426777 .5144670 .0664243 -.016285 .7444916 .6776201 .7236939 .4942101 .2895384 .6218099 .6728302 .1696668 .4234136 




















All Crisis Period Correlations 
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As indicated in the chart above, the highest correlation during the long crisis period in 
Africa is produced in South Africa at about 55%. Zambia is the only African country 
with negative correlation throughout the different crisis periods. Also, the correlations 
of Zambia, Nigeria and Mauritius remained unchanged throughout the crisis periods. 
While that of Tunisia showed negligible variation, it could also be referred to as 
unchanged. This could be resulting from the insignificant alpha in the DCC equation. 
Botswana, Egypt, Morocco and Namibia have their highest correlation from the 
cumulative impact of sub-period 1-4. Only South Africa has the highest correlation 
during the long crisis period in the African markets under study. India’s highest 
correlation is also from the cumulative impact of periods 1 to 4 (sub-period 4), as with 
most African markets. 
All developed markets excluding Japan have their highest correlation during the long 
crisis period. The highest correlation (83%) of the sampled markets is produced in the 
long crisis period in Canada. 
In order to appreciate the change in correlation during the crisis, I plotted a bar chart of 
the stable period with all crisis periods presented in Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3: Showing stable period (pre-crisis period) correlations against all crisis period correlations 
BWA CIV  EGY MUS MAR NAM NGA SA TUN ZMB CAN FRA GER ITA JPN SPN U K CHN IND 
Pre-crisis -0.02798 0.02770 0.15486 0.04332 0.01117 0.34212 0.04268 0.41595 0.06589 -0.01629 0.76258 0.71270 0.66360 0.53063 0.24638 0.60220 0.66537 0.05887 0.31418 
Long .0108817 .0358839 .1944376 .0433226 .0168558 .3180376 .0426777 .5468666 .0660145 -.016285 .8283888 .7449817 .7694720 .5674647 .2455765 .7038020 .7198560 .0907693 .4175565 
Short 1 .0116971 .1025270 .2427418 .0433225 .1308204 .3671186 .0426777 .4963532 .0668851 -.016285 .7170734 .6664872 .7082006 .4769963 .2573353 .6166037 .6649986 .0479118 .0524466 
Short 2 .0136816 .1127702 .2554831 .0433226 .1386932 .3659704 .0426777 .5035673 .0668608 -.016285 .7298377 .6718843 .7163823 .4844658 .2727989 .6171340 .6685909 .1747277 .4033911 
Short 3 .0201280 .1192317 .2632762 .0433226 .1435071 .3674708 .0426777 .5144670 .0664243 -.016285 .7444916 .6776201 .7236939 .4942101 .2895384 .6218099 .6728302 .1696668 .4234136 























Correlation of pre-crisis period against the identified crisis periods of all countries with the US 
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It is immediately evident from the figure above that the long crisis period correlations 
surpasses all other crisis correlations, including the stable period correlations in South 
Africa, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. This leads to the expectation 
of a contagion effect if the long crisis period is measured against the stable period. The 
only negative correlation found in Botswana is during the stable period. Zambia has 
negative correlation in all periods, including the stable period. 
The most striking changes in correlation are evident in India. Here, the correlation of the 
long crisis period is also higher than the stable period, but when the stable period is 
compared to sub-period 1, the correlation reduced from 0.314 to 0.0524 and increased 
sharply from the cumulative impact of sub-period 1-2 to 0.4033. India’s correlation with 
the US further increased in sub-periods 1-3 (0.4234) and 1- 4 (0.4522). When compared 
to the crisis periods in African markets, the stable period correlation is lower than all the 
crisis periods in Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Morocco and South Africa, as 
expected. This, however, does not signify that a contagion effect will be found in these 
countries. Even in the developed markets where correlations are high (above 70%), one 
needs to take into account whether the presence of a high degree of correlations is 
sufficient proof of contagion. If markets are historically cross-correlated (e.g. most 
developed markets in this research with the US), then a sharp change in one market will 
have an expected change in given magnitude in the other markets. If there is no 
significant increase in correlations during the crisis period, then the markets are simply 
reacting (interdependencies) to each other, as dictated by their traditional relationship. 
The scenario is quite different if the correlations change substantially subsequent to the 
onset of the crises, in which case one can indeed make the case for contagion (such as 
the situation seen in India). The significance or otherwise of the increased correlations 
discussed in this section are discussed in the following section. 
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5.4.3 Time-varying mean correlations: a comparison-of-means statistical test for 
contagion 
This section answers the principal hypothesis set out in this thesis that contagion 
occurred from the US to developed and African markets during the 2007-09 financial 
crisis. 
Estimates are based on different observations for every combination of country with the 
US. A contagion test is carried out on the long period (Hypothesis 1) and the four sub-
periods (Hypothesis 2), as was undertaken in respect to the constant correlation analysis 
(Chapter 4). Tables 5.2 to 5.6 present the results for the tests of contagion. The test 
undertaken is a one-tail comparison-of-means test of the form indicated in Section 5.3.5 
above. 
The 𝑡- tests for the presence of contagion are based on one-tail tests at 5%. A ‘Yes’ in 
the last column indicates evidence of contagion, while a ‘No’ indicates no contagion. 
Where markets exhibit high correlations in their traditional relationship and do not 
reject the null of no contagion, we interpret this as interdependence (increase in 
correlation that is not statistically significant at 5%). In this thesis, a correlation of 40% 
and above before the crisis period must be found in the markets to support the theory of 





5.4.3.1 Hypothesis 1: Long crisis period contagion effects 
Table 5.2 below presents a contagion test on the long crisis period. Evidence of 
contagion (defined as a statistically significant increase in correlation at 5%) in African 
markets is found in Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Mauritius and South Africa. 
Increases in correlation that were not statistically significant at 5% were found in 
respect to Morocco, Nigeria and Tunisia. This is not termed as interdependence due to 
initial low correlations during period of tranquillity. Reductions in correlation are found 
in Namibia and Zambia. 
Evidence of contagion is found in all developed markets and “other” emerging markets, 
with the exception of Japan. In the case of Japan, the mean correlation was marginally 












Table 5.2: Comparison-of-means tests for the long period 
African 
markets 




contagion4 Mean Standard deviation Mean 
Standard 
deviation F Sig 
Botswana -0.028 0.035 0.011 0.043 30.776 0.000 12.060*** YES 
Côte d’Ivoire 0.028 0.035 0.036 0.074 187.983 0.000 1.659** YES 
Egypt 0.155 0.066 0.194 0.076 14.616 0.000 5.991*** YES 
Mauritius 0.043 0.000 0.043 0.000 24.590 0.000 1.881** YES 
Morocco 0.011 0.036 0.017 0.081 159.192 0.000 1.060 NO 
Namibia 0.342 0.217 0.318 0.093 164.047 0.000 -1.965 NO 
Nigeria 0.043 0.000 0.043 0.000 4.982 0.026 0.904 NO 
South Africa 0.416 0.144 0.547 0.043 214.195 0.000 17.040*** YES 
Tunisia 0.066 0.002 0.066 0.002 1.811 0.179 0.935 NO 
Zambia -0.016 0.000 -0.016 0.000 8.478 0.004 -1.269 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.763 0.112 0.828 0.046 121.101 0.000 10.486*** YES 
France 0.713 0.053 0.745 0.053 4.051 0.045 7.795*** YES 
Germany 0.664 0.059 0.769 0.030 67.056 0.000 30.620*** YES 
Italy 0.531 0.101 0.567 0.052 123.984 0.000 6.169*** YES 
Japan 0.246 0.050 0.246 0.067 24.805 0.000 -0.164 NO 
Spain 0.602 0.065 0.704 0.046 34.937 0.000 23.574*** YES 
United 
Kingdom 0.665 0.033 0.720 0.028 3.672 0.056 22.150*** YES 
Other markets 
China 0.059 0.048 0.091 0.057 9.078 0.003 7.340*** YES 
India 0.314 0.052 0.418 0.054 0.020 0.887 24.200*** YES 
1 Levine’s test of variance equality; where rejection of the null hypothesis indicates inequality. 2 The 𝑡-
value reported is the form appropriate for the variance identified. 3 *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 
5%, ***Significant at 1%. 4 Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
 
5.4.3.2 Hypothesis 2: Short crisis periods contagion effects 
The first sub-period (15/09/2008-10/10/2008), from Lehman’s announcement to the 
first spike identified by the VIX, presented contagion in Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Egypt, Morocco, Namibia and South Africa. Evidence of contagion was not found in 
Mauritius, Nigeria, Tunisia and Zambia at the onset of the crisis. The four African 
markets that showed no contagion effect are those that had an insignificant alpha in the 




It is noticeable from Table 5.3 that the highly correlated market with the US actually 
had a reduction in correlation at the onset of the crisis. This includes Canada, France, 
Italy and the UK. Germany and Spain are the only developed markets to exhibit 
contagion effect in sub-period 1. The comparative markets, China and India, both 
showed evidence of contagion with China being the most affected of all markets. The 
result for China is not surprising due to the high business relationship between China 
and the US. 
Table 5.3: Comparison-of-means test for sub-period 1 
African 
markets 








deviation F Sig 
Botswana -0.028 0.035 0.012 0.045 1.873 0.172 4.697*** YES 
Côte d’Ivoire 0.028 0.035 0.103 0.013 14.658 0.000 21.56*** YES 
Egypt 0.155 0.066 0.243 0.059 0.801 0.371 4.71***  YES 
Mauritius 0.043 0.000 0.043 0.000 1.068 0.302 0.229 NO 
Morocco 0.011 0.036 0.131 0.030 1.037 0.309 13.85*** YES 
Namibia 0.342 0.217 0.367 0.037 29.933 0.000 1.839** YES 
Nigeria 0.043 0.000 0.043 0.000 4.516 0.034 1.312* NO 
South Africa 0.416 0.144 0.496 0.058 9.357 0.002 5.342*** YES 
Tunisia 0.066 0.002 0.067 0.004 45.408 0.000 1.017 NO 
Zambia -0.016 0.000 -0.016 0.000 0.204 0.652 0.225 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.763 0.112 0.717 0.049 7.150 0.008 -3.676 NO 
France 0.713 0.053 0.666 0.015 19.087 0.000 -10.962 NO 
Germany 0.664 0.059 0.708 0.020 11.163 0.001 8.195*** YES 
Italy 0.531 0.101 0.477 0.026 28.042 0.000 -6.935 NO 
Japan 0.246 0.050 0.257 0.029 5.618 0.018 1.52* NO 
Spain 0.602 0.065 0.617 0.020 22.139 0.000 2.622*** YES 
United 
Kingdom 0.665 0.033 0.665 0.013 9.615 0.002 -0.111 NO 
Other markets 
China 0.059 0.048 0.176 0.049 0.023 0.880 8.978*** YES 
India 0.314 0.052 0.378 0.058 0.007 0.934 5.004*** YES 
1 Levine’s test of variance equality; where rejection of the null hypothesis indicates inequality. 2 The t-
value reported is the form appropriate for the variance identified. 3 *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 
5%, ***Significant at 1%. 4 Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
 
Table 5.4 below showed that the cumulative impact of sub-period 1-2 provided higher 
correlations than the stable period correlations in Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Morocco, Namibia and South Africa. As such, contagion is expected. The contagion 
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tests follow suit, showing contamination in these countries. Tunisia and Zambia remain 
uncontaminated in sub-period 1-2. 
Germany appears to be the most affected developed market with a 𝑡-statistic of 9.10***. 
Japan and Spain also showed evidence of contagion while Canada, France, Italy and the 
UK had no evidence of contagion. Interdependence (defined as an increase in 
correlation that is not statistically significant at 5%) is evident in the UK alone. China 
and India are also contaminated but the most affected of all countries is, surprisingly, 
Morocco with a 𝑡-statistic of 16.55***. 
Table 5.4: Cumulative Comparison-of-means test on sub-period 1-2 
African 
markets 
Stable period Crisis period 
Test for equality of 








deviation F Sig 
Botswana -0.028 0.035 0.014 0.041 0.365 0.546 5.449*** YES 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 0.028 0.035 0.113 0.026 4.116 0.043 15.02*** YES 
Egypt 0.155 0.066 0.255 0.057 0.853 0.356 6.147*** YES 
Mauritius 0.043 0.000 0.043 0.000 27.534 0.000 1.994** YES 
Morocco 0.011 0.036 0.139 0.033 0.335 0.563 16.55*** YES 
Namibia 0.342 0.217 0.366 0.034 38.920 0.000 1.863** YES 
Nigeria 0.043 0.000 0.043 0.000 2.792 0.096 2.198** YES 
South 
Africa 0.416 0.144 0.504 0.053 13.851 0.000 6.722*** YES 
Tunisia 0.066 0.002 0.067 0.004 32.951 0.000 1.212 NO 
Zambia -0.016 0.000 -0.016 0.000 0.255 0.614 0.252 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.763 0.112 0.730 0.054 6.810 0.009 -2.655 NO 
France 0.713 0.053 0.672 0.018 19.076 0.000 -9.231 NO 
Germany 0.664 0.059 0.716 0.025 10.625 0.001 9.107*** YES 
Italy 0.531 0.101 0.484 0.029 30.755 0.000 -5.991 NO 
Japan 0.246 0.050 0.273 0.044 0.202 0.653 2.427*** YES 
Spain 0.602 0.065 0.617 0.019 29.097 0.000 3.008*** YES 
United 
Kingdom 0.665 0.033 0.669 0.014 10.529 0.001 1.001 NO 
Other markets 
China 0.059 0.048 0.175 0.042 0.694 0.405 10.34*** YES 
India 0.314 0.052 0.403 0.072 3.840 0.051 7.75*** YES 
1 Levine’s test of variance equality; where rejection of the null hypothesis indicates inequality. 2 The t-
value reported is the form appropriate for the variance identified. 3 *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 
5%, ***Significant at 1%. 4 Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
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For the cumulative impact of sub-period 1-3, Tunisia and Zambia are the only African 
markets not affected. The most affected market is, once again, Morocco with a test 
statistic of 19.220***. This result is presented in Table 5.5 below. 
Again, Canada, France and Italy show no evidence of contagion in sub-period 1-3. This 
time, the UK is affected along with Germany, Japan and Spain. China and India also 
show evidence of contagion effect. 
Table 5.5: Cumulative comparison-of-means test on sub-period 1-3 
African 
markets 









deviation F Sig 
Botswana -0.028 0.035 0.020 0.038 0.135 0.713 7.067*** YES 
Côte d’Ivoire 0.028 0.035 0.119 0.026 2.664 0.103 13.610*** YES 
Egypt 0.155 0.066 0.263 0.054 1.856 0.174 7.346*** YES 
Mauritius 0.043 0.000 0.043 0.000 28.178 0.000 2.806*** YES 
Morocco 0.011 0.036 0.144 0.031 0.796 0.373 19.220*** YES 
Namibia 0.342 0.217 0.367 0.031 50.724 0.000 2.083** YES 
Nigeria 0.043 0.000 0.043 0.000 1.774 0.184 1.719** YES 
South Africa 0.416 0.144 0.514 0.052 18.530 0.000 8.221*** YES 
Tunisia 0.066 0.002 0.066 0.003 24.734 0.000 0.849 NO 
Zambia -0.016 0.000 -0.016 0.000 0.305 0.581 0.276 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.763 0.112 0.744 0.056 7.863 0.005 -1.541 NO 
France 0.713 0.053 0.678 0.020 18.902 0.000 -7.912 NO 
Germany 0.664 0.059 0.724 0.027 10.755 0.001 10.600*** YES 
Italy 0.531 0.101 0.494 0.033 32.402 0.000 -4.670 NO 
Japan 0.246 0.050 0.290 0.050 1.019 0.313 4.409*** YES 
Spain 0.602 0.065 0.622 0.020 35.855 0.000 4.080*** YES 
United 
Kingdom 0.665 0.033 0.673 0.015 11.480 0.001 2.338*** YES 
Other markets 
China 0.059 0.048 0.170 0.038 2.369 0.125 11.330*** YES 
India 0.314 0.052 0.423 0.075 8.539 0.004 7.712*** YES 
1 Levine’s test of variance equality; where rejection of the null hypothesis indicates inequality. 2 The t-
value reported is the form appropriate for the variance identified. 3 *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 




Again, the evidence from the cumulative impact of sub-period 1-4 (presented in Table 
5.6 below) is showing that contagion has occurred in most African countries except 
Nigeria, Tunisia and Zambia. 
For the developed markets, Italy is not affected while Germany, Japan, Spain and the 
UK show contagion effect. China and India show evidence of contagion, as they did in 
all crisis periods.  
Interdependence is found in Canada and France, where mean correlations increased 
from 0.763 and 0.664 during tranquillity to 0.770 and 0.724 during the crisis. The most 
affected developed market is Germany with a 𝑡-value of 14.88*** while Morocco has 













Table 5.6: Cumulative comparison-of-means test on sub-period 1-4 
African 
markets 









deviation F Sig 
Botswana -0.028 0.035 0.045 0.043 3.639 0.057 13.139*** YES 
Côte d’Ivoire 0.028 0.035 0.110 0.025 6.383 0.012 19.900*** YES 
Egypt 0.155 0.066 0.284 0.049 7.510 0.006 14.160*** YES 
Mauritius 0.043 0.000 0.043 0.000 25.163 0.000 3.813*** YES 
Morocco 0.011 0.036 0.152 0.028 3.361 0.067 25.290*** YES 
Namibia 0.342 0.217 0.369 0.026 83.328 0.000 2.3170** YES 
Nigeria 0.043 0.000 0.043 0.000 7.327 0.007 0.354 NO 
South Africa 0.416 0.144 0.539 0.053 32.720 0.000 11.780*** YES 
Tunisia 0.066 0.002 0.066 0.003 17.047 0.000 0.798 NO 
Zambia -0.016 0.000 -0.016 0.000 0.458 0.499 0.338 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.763 0.112 0.770 0.056 15.058 0.000 0.719 NO 
France 0.664 0.059 0.724 0.027 29.705 0.000 -6.478 NO 
Germany 0.664 0.059 0.737 0.028 13.773 0.000 14.88*** YES 
Italy 0.531 0.101 0.516 0.039 41.251 0.000 -1.939 NO 
Japan 0.246 0.050 0.309 0.047 0.247 0.619 7.955*** YES 
Spain 0.602 0.065 0.630 0.019 60.084 0.000 6.469*** YES 
United 
Kingdom 0.665 0.033 0.681 0.017 15.570 0.000 5.547*** YES 
Other markets 
China 0.059 0.048 0.149 0.056 0.826 0.364 11.550*** YES 
India 0.314 0.052 0.452 0.072 11.799 0.001 12.500*** YES 
1 Levine’s test of variance equality; where rejection of the null hypothesis indicates inequality. 2 The t-
value reported is the form appropriate for the variance identified. 3 *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 
5%, ***Significant at 1%. 4 Contagion is defined as statistical significance at 5% level. 
 
5.4.4 Summary of findings 
The findings of comparison-of-means tests are presented in Tables 5.2 to 5.6 above. The 
summarised results based on the long crisis period and the four sub-periods are 
presented in Table 5.6.1 below. This shows more contagion effect in Africa than found 





Table 5.6.1: Evidence of contagion of the comparison-of–means Test 
Countries Contagion? 
African 
markets Long period Sub-period 1 Sub-period 1-2 Sub-period 1-3 Sub-period 1-4 
Botswana YES YES YES YES YES 
Côte d’Ivoire YES YES YES YES YES 
Egypt YES YES YES YES YES 
Mauritius YES NO YES YES YES 
Morocco NO YES YES YES YES 
Namibia NO YES YES YES YES 
Nigeria NO NO YES YES NO 
South Africa YES YES YES YES YES 
Tunisia NO NO NO NO NO 
Zambia NO NO NO NO NO 
Developed markets 
Canada YES NO NO NO NO 
France YES NO NO NO NO 
Germany YES YES YES YES YES 
Italy YES NO NO NO NO 
Japan NO NO YES YES YES 
Spain YES YES YES YES YES 
United 
Kingdom YES NO NO YES YES 
Other markets 
China YES YES YES YES YES 
India YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Evidences to support the existence of interdependencies in the markets under study are 
found in: 
• The UK from the cumulative impact of sub-period 1-2; 
• Canada and France from the cumulative impact of sub-period 1-4. 
These are the only markets that satisfied the notion of interdependence laid out in 
Section 5.4.3 above. An increase in correlation that is not statistically significant at 5% 
is found in respect to Morocco, Nigeria and Tunisia in the long crisis period. However, 
since their correlations with the US were low before the crisis, this result is simply 
identified as no contagion. 
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In conclusion to the comparison-of-means results, the findings of this section are 
inconsistent with those of the constant correlation analysis in Chapter 4. However the 
test applied in this chapter differs markedly: 1) I used a time-varying correlation 
analysis; 2) the crisis period is measured against the stable period (instead of full period 
against crisis period as in Forbes and Rigobon, 2002); and 3) the numbers of lags 
applied are also considerably longer than those of the constant correlation analysis. 
 
5.5 CONTAGION ROBUSTNESS TESTING 
 
I undertake a second set of tests for contagion using a regression-base dummy variable 
analysis. The details of the tests undertaken are described in Section 5.3.6 above. They 
are in the form of a one-tail test on a regression between the conditional correlation and 
a dummy variable that represents the crisis period. A statistically significant positive 
value for the dummy variable is an indication of financial contagion. 
I repeat the contagion tests undertaken in Tables 5.2-5.6 above in respect to the long 
period and the various sub-periods using this dummy variable-based methodology. The 
results are shown below. 
 
Long period 
For the results to be considered robust, the conclusions drawn in Table 5.7 below should 
be the same as those in Table 5.2. This is what is found and therefore it can be 





Table 5.7: Dummy test for the long period 
African markets R squared 
Coefficients 
Evidence of contagion2  
Unstandardised coefficient 
t β 
Constant Dummy Dummy1 
Botswana 0.199 -0.028 0.039 12.642*** YES 
Côte d’Ivoire 0.005 0.028 0.008 1.874** YES 
Egypt 0.071 0.155 0.040 6.169*** YES 
Mauritius 0.006 0.043 0.000 2.001** YES 
Morocco 0.002 0.011 0.006 1.221 NO 
Namibia 0.004 0.342 -0.024 -1.710 NO 
Nigeria 0.001 0.043 0.000 0.967 NO 
South Africa 0.239 0.416 0.131 14.392*** YES 
Tunisia 0.001 0.066 0.000 0.935 NO 
Zambia 0.003 -0.016 0.000 -1.449 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.110 0.763 0.066 9.090*** YES 
France 0.083 0.713 0.032 7.795*** YES 
Germany 0.528 0.664 0.106 27.332*** YES 
Italy 0.044 0.531 0.037 5.523*** YES 
Japan 0.000 0.246 -0.001 -0.174 NO 
Spain 0.421 0.602 0.102 22.071*** YES 
United Kingdom 0.424 0.665 0.054 22.154*** YES 
Other markets 
China 0.084 0.059 0.032 7.601*** YES 
India 0.477 0.314 0.103 24.200*** YES 
1*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. 2 Contagion is defined as statistical 
significance at 5% level. 
 
Short periods 
There are some differences in respect to sub-period 1 between the comparison-of-means 
results and the dummy variable results. In respect to the African markets, the dummy 
variable tests in Table 5.8 below indicate contagion in respect to Nigeria and Tunisia 
(not found in Table 5.3 above). While the comparison-of-means test shows evidence of 
contagion in Namibia, the dummy test indicates no contagion. 
There is also a difference in respect to the developed markets. For example, Spain31 
indicates contagion in Table 5.3 but not in Table 5.8. 
 
                                                 
31 There are financial reports that Spain escaped the initial crisis. 
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Table 5.8: Dummy test for sub-period 1 
African markets R squared 
Coefficients 
Evidence of contagion2 
Unstandardised coefficient 
t β 
Constant Dummy Dummy1 
Botswana 0.051 -0.028 0.040 4.697*** YES 
Côte d’Ivoire 0.165 0.028 0.075 8.912*** YES  
Egypt 0.066 0.155 0.088 4.710*** YES 
Mauritius 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.229 NO  
Morocco 0.318 0.011 0.120 13.846*** YES 
Namibia 0.001 0.342 0.025 0.513 NO 
Nigeria 0.012 0.043 0.000 2.190** YES 
South Africa 0.014 0.416 0.080 2.426*** YES 
Tunisia 0.013 0.066 0.001 2.332*** YES 
Zambia 0.000 -0.016 0.000 0.225 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.008 0.763 -0.046 -1.802 NO 
France 0.035 0.713 -0.046 -3.906 NO 
Germany 0.027 0.664 0.045 3.387*** YES 
Italy 0.013 0.531 -0.054 -2.372 NO 
Japan 0.002 0.246 0.011 0.922 NO 
Spain 0.002 0.602 0.014 0.981 NO 
United Kingdom 0.000 0.665 0.000 -0.050 NO 
Other markets 
China 0.170 0.059 0.117 8.978*** YES 
India 0.058 0.314 0.064 5.004*** YES 
1*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. 2 Contagion is defined as statistical 
significance at 5% level 
 
Namibia and Tunisia did not show robustness in respect to the cumulative impact of 
sub-period 1-2 (in the comparison-of-mean test results). However, Nigeria and the 
remaining African markets appear robust. 
With the exception of Spain, results are robust in all developed markets. For Spain, 
contagion is found in Table 5.4 but not in Table 5.9. Other markets are also robust in the 







Table 5.9: Cumulative dummy test on sub-period 1-2 
African markets R squared 
Coefficients 
 Evidence of contagion2 
Unstandardised coefficient 
t β 
Constant Dummy Dummy1 
Botswana 0.067 -0.028 0.042 5.449*** YES 
Côte d’Ivoire 0.239 0.028 0.085 11.316*** YES 
Egypt 0.106 0.155 0.101 6.147*** YES 
Mauritius 0.033 0.043 0.000 3.746*** YES 
Morocco 0.397 0.011 0.128 16.553*** YES 
Namibia 0.001 0.342 0.024 0.548 NO 
Nigeria 0.012 0.043 0.000 2.198** YES 
South Africa 0.021 0.416 0.088 2.971*** YES 
Tunisia 0.015 0.066 0.001 2.514*** YES 
Zambia 0.000 -0.016 0.000 0.252 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.005 0.763 -0.033 -1.418 NO 
France 0.034 0.713 -0.041 -3.851 NO 
Germany 0.045 0.664 0.053 4.470*** YES 
Italy 0.012 0.531 -0.046 -2.281 NO 
Japan 0.014 0.246 0.026 2.427*** YES 
Spain 0.003 0.602 0.015 1.136 NO 
United Kingdom 0.001 0.665 0.003 0.486 NO 
Other markets 
China 0.212 0.059 0.116 10.340*** YES 
India 0.128 0.314 0.089 7.750*** YES 
1*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. 2Contagion is defined as statistical 
significance at 5% level 
 
Only Namibia shows an absence of robustness from the cumulative impact of sub-
period 1-3 for the African markets. For the developed markets, UK is the only market 
where this is also the case. Contagion at 5% is found in the UK in Table 5.5 but not in 
Table 5.10. 
Sub-period 1-4 provided the same result as in sub-period 1-3 for the African markets, 
whereas full robustness is found in the developed markets and other markets from the 
dummy test on the cumulative impact of sub-period 1-4. 
This section can therefore be concluded by reporting; 
• Full robustness across all markets in the long period; 
• No robustness in Nigeria, Namibia, Tunisia and Spain in sub-period 1; 
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• No robustness in Namibia, Tunisia and Spain from the cumulative test on sub-
period 1-2; 
• No robustness in Namibia and UK in respect to the cumulative impact of sub-
period 1-3; 
• No robustness in Namibia in respect to the cumulative impact of sub-period 1-4. 
All other markets show robustness. 
Table 5.10: Cumulative dummy test on sub-period 1-3 
African markets R squared 
Coefficients 
Evidence of contagion2  
Unstandardised coefficient 
t β 
Constant Dummy Dummy1 
Botswana 0.107 -0.028 0.048 7.067*** YES 
Côte d’Ivoire 0.309 0.028 0.092 13.609*** YES 
Egypt 0.144 53.960 0.108 7.346*** YES 
Mauritius 0.053 0.043 0.000 4.861*** YES 
Morocco 0.466 0.011 0.132 19.224*** YES 
Namibia 0.001 0.342 0.025 0.648 NO 
Nigeria 0.007 0.043 0.000 1.719** YES 
South Africa 0.032 0.416 0.099 3.731*** YES 
Tunisia 0.006 0.066 0.001 1.576 NO 
Zambia 0.000 -0.016 0.000 0.276 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.002 0.763 -0.018 -0.873 NO 
France 0.030 0.713 -0.035 -3.679 NO 
Germany 0.069 0.664 0.060 5.653*** YES 
Italy 0.009 0.531 -0.036 -2.001 NO 
Japan 0.045 0.246 0.043 4.409*** YES 
Spain 0.006 0.602 0.020 1.660** YES 
United Kingdom 0.004 0.665 0.007 1.249 NO 
Other markets 
China 0.241 0.059 0.111 11.329*** YES 
India 0.208 0.314 0.109 10.460*** YES 
1 *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. 2 Contagion is defined as statistical 









Table 5.11: Cumulative dummy test on sub-period 1-4 
African markets R squared 
Coefficients 
Evidence of contagion2  
Unstandardised coefficient 
t β 
Constant Dummy Dummy1 
Botswana 0.284 -0.028 0.073 13.139*** YES 
Côte d’Ivoire 0.354 0.028 0.082 15.377*** YES 
Egypt 0.273 0.155 0.130 11.229*** YES 
Mauritius 0.069 0.043 0.000 5.699*** YES 
Morocco 0.593 0.011 0.141 25.291*** YES 
Namibia 0.002 0.342 0.027 0.856 NO 
Nigeria 0.001 0.043 0.000 0.560 NO 
South Africa 0.073 0.416 0.123 5.896*** YES 
Tunisia 0.004 0.066 0.000 1.243 NO 
Zambia 0.000 -0.016 0.000 0.338 NO 
Developed markets 
Canada 0.000 0.763 0.007 0.427 NO 
France 0.024 0.713 -0.025 -3.345 NO 
Germany 0.143 0.664 0.073 8.628*** YES 
Italy 0.002 0.531 -0.015 -1.004 NO 
Japan 0.129 0.246 0.062 7.955*** YES 
Spain 0.019 0.602 0.027 2.919*** YES 
United Kingdom 0.025 0.665 0.016 3.350*** YES 
Other markets 
China 0.240 0.059 0.091 11.547*** YES 
India 0.373 0.314 0.138 16.022*** YES 
1 *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. 2 Contagion is defined as statistical 
significance at 5% level 
 
5.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to check the evidence of contagion using a time-
varying correlation. This chapter controls for the heteroscedasticity bias by using a 
GARCH process for the conditional variance system. The results illustrate that there is 
more contagion than the constant correlation coefficient analysis applied in Chapter 4 
shows. This is evident in both the African and developed markets as well as the two 
comparative markets. The statistical method and correlation coefficient estimation are 
mainly different from the perception of Forbes and Rigobon (2002), which might be the 
reason that led to the difference in the empirical results. 
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The primary hypothesis that tests for evidence of contagion during the long crisis period 
found considerable evidences. The spikes in the VIX that made up the four short crisis 
sub-periods in this research also appear to be related to contagion effects. Evidence of 
contagion is found in: 
1. African markets (Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Mauritius and South Africa) 
and developed markets (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) in 
the long crisis period; 
2. African markets (Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Morocco, Namibia, South 
Africa) and developed markets (Germany and Spain) during sub-period 1 
timeframe; 
3. African markets (Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Namibia, Nigeria and South Africa) and developed markets (Germany, Japan 
and Spain) from the cumulative impact of sub-period 1-2; 
4.  African markets (Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Namibia, Nigeria and South Africa) and developed markets (Germany, Japan, 
Spain and the UK) in respect to sub-period 1-3; 
5. African markets (Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia 
and South Africa) and developed markets (Germany, Japan, Spain and the UK) 
in sub-period 1-4; 
6. The two comparative markets China and India in all crisis periods including the 
long period; 
7. Strong evidence of interdependence is found in the UK from the cumulative 
impact of sub-period 1-2 and, in Canada and France from the cumulative impact 
of sub-period 1-4.  
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An initial fall in correlation is found in Canada, France, Italy and the UK immediately 
after the onset of the crisis (sub-period 1). Correlations reduced from 76.3%, 71.3% and 
53.1% to 71.7%, 66.6% and 47.7% in Canada, France and Italy, respectively, in sub-
period 1. The reduction in correlation observed in the UK is very small. The value 
reduced from 66.54% to 66.49% after Lehman’s announcement. This can be interpreted 
that stock markets in some developed markets responded relatively slowly to the initial 
falls in the US market. However, as the crisis period lengthens, some of the developed 
markets that appeared insulated during the first short sub-period became contaminated. 
Attempts to understand such behaviour can be best described from a behavioural 
finance perspective, to be discussed in Chapter 6. 
It is generally believed that during crisis, variances and covariances of financial returns 
increase dramatically. Inspection of the pre-crisis and crisis variance and covariance 
charts shows that the crisis period is characterised by substantial increases in volatility. 
Associated with increases in both variances and covariances during the crisis periods are 
increases in correlations in most cases. This can be attributed to an increase in the 
volatility of either the economic and financial factors that jointly underlie financial 
returns (integration), or factors that cannot be measured (such as herding behaviour). 
This forms the bases of my model of interpretation and will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
The next chapter of this thesis focuses on exploring the mechanism by which contagion 
occurs from a behavioural finance perspective. The focus will be the use of the 
preliminary model framework developed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.4, Figure 3.12) as a 
means of explaining the findings of Chapters 4 and 5. Behavioural finance theories of 
decision bias relating to features such as herding, anchoring, familiarity bias and 
information cascades will be discussed.  
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5.7 CHAPTER APPENDICES 
Table A5.1a: VAR-based mean equations of US-African market pairs 
Parameter US Botswana Parameter US Côte d’Ivoire Parameter US Egypt 
Constant -0.000247981 0.0000225875 Constant -0.000267597 0.00103884 Constant -0.000294488 -0.0000250047 
US_1 0.848141*** -0.000911955 US_1 0.761054*** -0.114429 US_1 0.843851*** 0.297883*** 
US_2 -0.906656*** -0.0102567 US_2 -0.798348*** 0.316544 US_2 -0.827995*** -0.207069*** 
US_3 0.935474*** 0.00377809 US_3 0.812013*** -0.232892 US_3 0.769903*** 0.265367*** 
US_4 -0.898679*** 0.00477794 US_4 -0.811138*** 0.344552 US_4 -0.728195*** -0.196444** 
US_5 0.777385*** 0.0039999 US_5 0.760569*** -0.244667 US_5 0.715006*** 0.302231*** 
US_6 -0.728634*** -0.00300836 US_6 -0.711443*** 0.83366 US_6 -0.663666*** -0.240377*** 
US_7 0.740223*** -0.00510448 US_7 0.696819*** -0.650823 US_7 0.615036*** 0.236593*** 
US_8 -0.748871*** 0.0050247 US_8 -0.641278*** 1.0268 US_8 -0.511027*** -0.112259 
US_9 0.701012*** 0.00113004 US_9 0.550134*** -1.15228 US_9 0.616576*** 0.167681* 
US_10 -0.472433*** -0.0249244 US_10 -0.381801*** 0.958529 US_10 -0.757136*** -0.0681195 
US_11 0.397712*** 0.0250776 US_11 0.324758*** -1.22132 US_11 0.756519*** 0.139035* 
US_12 -0.358976*** -0.0215059 US_12 -0.257215*** 0.55467 US_12 -0.738285*** -0.143365* 
US_13 0.258597*** 0.0156413 US_13 0.165687** -0.855885 US_13 0.648702*** 0.163821* 
US_14 -0.18331** -0.0153177 US_14 -0.141222** 0.132525 US_14 -0.611757*** -0.110264 
US_15 0.206445*** 0.0266707 US_15 0.150902*** -0.121769 US_15 0.525872*** 0.143165 
US_16 -0.18519*** -0.0164465 US_16 -0.141264*** 0.0283379 US_16 -0.472964*** -0.190681** 
US_17 0.0198845 0.0243765** Côte d’Ivoire_1 0.00124261 0.00912045 US_17 0.337654*** 0.101647 
***Significant at 1%; Significant at 5%;* Significant at 10%
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Table A5.1a: Continued 
Parameter US Botswana Parameter US Côte d’Ivoire Parameter US Egypt 
Botswana_1 0.20972 1.03281*** Côte d’Ivoire_2 0.00127434 -0.884578*** US_18 -0.285662*** -0.0644767 
Botswana_2 -0.268635 -0.857985*** Côte d’Ivoire_3 -0.000412793 0.0226949 US_19 0.259176*** -0.0224867 
Botswana_3 0.200823 0.871026*** Côte d’Ivoire_4 -0.000136584 -0.753358*** US_20 -0.107683** 0.110207** 
Botswana_4 -0.162829 -0.778722*** Côte d’Ivoire_5 0.000907592 0.0421973 Egypt_1 0.014615 0.853817*** 
Botswana_5 0.188631 0.817571*** Côte d’Ivoire_6 0.000763215 -0.629418*** Egypt_2 0.0195467 -0.693679*** 
Botswana_6 -0.159374 -0.728922*** Côte d’Ivoire_7 0.0029472 0.0446737 Egypt_3 -0.118122* 0.583215*** 
Botswana_7 0.127376 0.729751*** Côte d’Ivoire_8 0.001967 -0.514396*** Egypt_4 0.0103543 -0.679963*** 
Botswana_8 0.13808 -0.593282*** Côte d’Ivoire_9 0.00222004 0.0417214 Egypt_5 0.0103543 -0.679963*** 
Botswana_9 -0.217799 0.570905*** Côte d’Ivoire_10 0.000876898 -0.408744*** Egypt_6 -0.111934 -0.560265*** 
Botswana_10 0.103613 -0.523839*** Côte d’Ivoire_11 0.00392616 0.0327717 Egypt_7 0.0737436 0.428475*** 
Botswana_11 -0.36725 0.489133*** Côte d’Ivoire_12 -0.000484143 -0.30523*** Egypt_8 0.0137626 -0.415015*** 
Botswana_12 0.228481 -0.405144*** Côte d’Ivoire_13 0.00468088 0.0211711 Egypt_9 0.104837 0.437439*** 
Botswana_13 -0.257718 0.364453*** Côte d’Ivoire_14 0.0025789 -0.197152*** Egypt_10 -0.109836 -0.439738*** 
Botswana_14 0.180406 -0.339406*** Côte d’Ivoire_15 0.00132724 0.0109721 Egypt_11 0.144707 0.418121*** 
Botswana_15 0.0349362 0.249835*** Côte d’Ivoire_16 -0.00241105 -0.0977763** Egypt_12 -0.0941357 -0.373146*** 
Botswana_16 -0.0469268 -0.126257** 
   
Egypt_13 0.147015* 0.321175*** 
Botswana_17 0.0390386 0.105834*** 
   
Egypt_14 -0.0845706 -0.285059*** 
      
Egypt_15 0.114242 0.28451*** 
      
Egypt_16 -0.0693059 -0.177189** 
      
Egypt_17 -0.0116121 0.149648** 
      
Egypt_18 -0.0419551 -0.148157** 
      
Egypt_19 0.0472126 0.123812** 
      
Egypt_20 -0.0339205 -0.111248** 
***Significant at 1%; Significant at 5%;* Significant at 10%
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Table A5.1b: VAR-based mean equations of US-African market pairs (continued) 
Parameter US Mauritius Parameter US Morocco Parameter US Namibia 
Constant -0.000336995 0.000335372 Constant -0.000222834 0.0000765058 Constant -0.000507353 0.000120359 
US_1 0.793082*** 0.160765*** US_1 0.801334*** 0.0566649*** US_1 0.827268*** 0.314683*** 
US_2 -0.811698*** -0.128103*** US_2 -0.82402*** -0.0534966** US_2 -0.932044*** -0.0693791* 
US_3 0.81459*** 0.186136*** US_3 0.823764*** 0.0447786 US_3 0.961072*** 0.251248*** 
US_4 -0.765578*** -0.112582*** US_4 -0.795755*** -0.0540609 US_4 -0.970677*** -0.194469*** 
US_5 0.613725*** 0.135185*** US_5 0.708166*** -0.0342074 US_5 0.866808*** 0.261528*** 
US_6 -0.527911*** -0.0469241 US_6 -0.652535*** 0.0253673 US_6 -0.817644*** -0.198052*** 
US_7 0.467789*** 0.0109326 US_7 0.581901*** -0.0216948 US_7 0.721089*** 0.244634*** 
US_8 -0.395332*** 0.0586797 US_8 -0.483823*** 0.0444187 US_8 -0.597428*** -0.163445** 
US_9 0.330434*** -0.0071419 US_9 0.341167*** -0.00601887 US_9 0.5222*** 0.231997*** 
US_10 -0.237206*** 0.0208079 US_10 -0.270492*** 0.0312336 US_10 -0.442199*** -0.12971** 
US_11 0.221815*** 0.0394843 US_11 0.280707*** -0.00603177 US_11 0.331528*** 0.126137** 
US_12 -0.189021*** 0.0239741 US_12 -0.196925*** -0.0101705 US_12 -0.185343*** -0.0827061 
US_13 0.0826628 -0.0367668 US_13 0.123277*** 0.0194279 US_13 0.136196*** 0.105102** 
US_14 -0.0814977** 0.00120518 Morocco_1 0.0086715 1.2481*** US_14 -0.138554*** -0.0308701 












Table A5.1b: Continued 
Parameter US Mauritius Parameter US Morocco Parameter US Namibia 
Mauritius_1 -0.0494249 1.12215*** Morocco_2 -0.207467* -1.2398*** Namibia_1 -0.0102732 0.491311*** 
Mauritius_2 -0.0389908 -1.10707*** Morocco_3 0.135234 1.11434*** Namibia_2 0.0587336 -0.719279*** 
Mauritius_3 0.0698953 1.03961*** Morocco_4 -0.067774 -0.968949*** Namibia_3 -0.0658213 0.436048*** 
Mauritius_4 0.130196 -0.945278*** Morocco_5 0.110584 0.866743*** Namibia_4 0.125745* -0.540391*** 
Mauritius_5 -0.0858987 0.788075*** Morocco_6 -0.114826 -0.820202*** Namibia_5 -0.0816216 0.385139*** 
Mauritius_6 -0.0444995 -0.635612*** Morocco_7 0.0714969 0.700267*** Namibia_6 0.115611 -0.460951*** 
Mauritius_7 0.188438 0.573427*** Morocco_8 -0.145116 -0.616111*** Namibia_7 -0.115696 0.331112*** 
Mauritius_8 -0.348661** -0.514064*** Morocco_9 0.120761 0.480514*** Namibia_8 0.157687** -0.364285*** 
Mauritius_9 0.313608** 0.423662*** Morocco_10 -0.120542 -0.359611*** Namibia_9 -0.142098* 0.202549*** 
Mauritius_10 -0.271121* -0.303561*** Morocco_11 0.208572 0.256254*** Namibia_10 0.136824* -0.22584*** 
Mauritius_11 0.341392*** 0.25415*** Morocco_12 -0.186589 -0.181428*** Namibia_11 -0.150038** 0.109785** 
Mauritius_12 -0.208294* -0.187529** Morocco_13 0.151759* 0.0678412* Namibia_12 0.136153** -0.143383*** 
Mauritius_13 0.109002 0.136598** 
   
Namibia_13 -0.0370755 0.0690935 
Mauritius_14 0.0382463 -0.072475* 
   
Namibia_14 0.0874145* -0.0513732 
***Significant at 1%; Significant at 5%;* Significant at 10% 
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Table A5.1c: VAR-based mean equations of US-African market pairs (continued) 
Parameter US Nigeria Parameter US South Africa Parameter US Tunisia Parameter US Zambia 
Constant -0.000273479 -0.000111508 Constant -0.000247763 0.000228094 Constant -0.000265673 0.000348529** Constant -0.000230671 0.000129546 
US_1 0.868783*** -0.00573771 US_1 0.820951*** 0.414607*** US_1 0.832808*** 0.0462129*** US_1 0.806533*** 0.00430791 
US_2 -0.955158*** 0.014587 US_2 -0.900704*** -0.314894*** US_2 -0.890044*** -0.0569201*** US_2 -0.838544*** 0.0102298 
US_3 0.989056*** -0.0225446 US_3 0.917167*** 0.376997*** US_3 0.904874*** 0.0798249*** US_3 0.814658*** -0.0379404 
US_4 -0.942205*** 0.0345189 US_4 -0.922254*** -0.308*** US_4 -0.875279*** -0.0714654*** US_4 -0.838672*** 0.00909525 
US_5 0.841968*** -0.0294286 US_5 0.815594*** 0.388466*** US_5 0.772647*** 0.0930839*** US_5 0.756979*** 0.00553529 
US_6 -0.815471*** 0.0797036* US_6 -0.770753*** -0.338073*** US_6 -0.666283*** -0.0602069** US_6 -0.65027*** -0.0194253 
US_7 0.7865*** -0.0248666 US_7 0.706319*** 0.364245*** US_7 0.628686*** 0.066961** US_7 0.593104*** 0.0197087 
US_8 -0.708016*** 0.0981366* US_8 -0.580579*** -0.324841*** US_8 -0.555322*** -0.0614581** US_8 -0.487055*** 0.0125946 
US_9 0.640623*** -0.0700756 US_9 0.544617*** 0.333221*** US_9 0.445642*** 0.0155004 US_9 0.497933*** 0.0308036 
US_10 -0.439688*** 0.0686891 US_10 -0.480801*** -0.307887*** US_10 -0.338009*** 0.0173539 US_10 -0.509175*** 0.0410773 
US_11 0.327271*** -0.0564575 US_11 0.410843*** 0.300383*** US_11 0.33087*** 0.00450211 US_11 0.383432*** -0.00841824 
US_12 -0.147964* 0.0816598* US_12 -0.246259*** -0.142778** US_12 -0.272785*** 0.0195184 US_12 -0.253213*** 0.0467861 
US_13 0.108923 -0.0538371 US_13 0.188491*** 0.106111* US_13 0.196052** -0.00921278 US_13 0.247184*** -0.0396192 
US_14 -0.0970658 0.0543996 US_14 -0.253409*** -0.150572*** US_14 -0.148699* -0.000121465 US_14 -0.205204*** 0.0440577 
US_15 0.0227911 -0.0194923 US_15 0.130612*** 0.0699395 US_15 0.146924* 0.0134535 US_15 0.10456*** -0.0223351 
US_16 -0.10382** 0.0281899 South Africa_1 0.0234243 0.774558*** US_16 -0.14846** 0.00387222 Zambia_1 -0.0206265 0.742146*** 
***Significant at 1%; Significant at 5%;* Significant at 10%
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Table A5.1c: Continued 
Parameter US Nigeria Parameter US South Africa Parameter US Tunisia Parameter US Zambia 
Nigeria_1 -0.0183255 1.63305*** South Africa_2 0.000428992 -0.765244*** US_17 0.0519112 0.0137635 Zambia_2 -0.0299841 -0.679274*** 
Nigeria_2 -0.101161 -1.51421*** South Africa_3 -0.00319 0.578608*** US_18 -0.0412556 -0.0336315** Zambia_3 -0.0736832 0.637717*** 
Nigeria_3 0.0893297 1.25744*** South Africa_4 0.0577121 -0.648874*** US_19 0.0727986* 0.030339** Zambia_4 0.0590814 -0.569851*** 
Nigeria_4 0.0576313 -1.21468*** South Africa_5 -0.108148 0.47963*** Tunisia_1 0.23468* 1.10024*** Zambia_5 0.00780087 0.647647*** 
Nigeria_5 -0.266158 1.23272*** South Africa_6 0.227092** -0.418026*** Tunisia_2 -0.213732 -0.984914*** Zambia_6 -0.00245961 -0.472082*** 
Nigeria_6 0.25691 -1.17173*** South Africa_7 -0.288825*** 0.344736*** Tunisia_3 0.159957 0.922717*** Zambia_7 -0.0220571 0.544742*** 
Nigeria_7 -0.021964 0.99261*** South Africa_8 0.261744*** -0.318328*** Tunisia_4 0.153129 -0.923656*** Zambia_8 0.179635 -0.442323*** 
Nigeria_8 -0.00323142 -0.847925*** South Africa_9 -0.23823** 0.242352*** Tunisia_5 -0.425503 0.865238*** Zambia_9 -0.188277* 0.443386*** 
Nigeria_9 0.0276819 0.716375*** South Africa_10 0.244042*** -0.198074** Tunisia_6 -0.000203391 -0.871164*** Zambia_10 0.179277 -0.29849*** 
Nigeria_10 -0.107406 -0.604591*** South Africa_11 -0.283841*** 0.0441514 Tunisia_7 0.071113 0.783551*** Zambia_11 -0.189944* 0.289139*** 
Nigeria_11 0.21685 0.572715*** South Africa_12 0.25041*** -0.0249422 Tunisia_8 -0.26309 -0.657747*** Zambia_12 0.165977* -0.195265*** 
Nigeria_12 -0.200983 -0.491803*** South Africa_13 -0.209826*** 0.00571371 Tunisia_9 0.440326 0.720553*** Zambia_13 -0.151574* 0.165433*** 
Nigeria_13 0.147527 0.441201*** South Africa_14 0.258137*** 0.0997327* Tunisia_10 -0.318168 -0.69737*** Zambia_14 0.131675 -0.0463812 
Nigeria_14 -0.11134 -0.390253*** South Africa_15 -0.126603*** -0.0322299 Tunisia_11 0.0702937 0.693834*** Zambia_15 -0.0508292 0.00631918 
Nigeria_15 0.128754 0.251533*** 
   
Tunisia_12 0.180435 -0.63024*** 
   Nigeria_16 -0.103783 -0.094948** 
   
Tunisia_13 -0.0899513 0.594993*** 
   
      
Tunisia_14 -0.114423 -0.532215*** 
   
      
Tunisia_15 0.370268 0.405029*** 
   
      
Tunisia_16 -0.222677 -0.329488*** 
   
      
Tunisia_17 -0.0302346 0.302493*** 
   
      
Tunisia_18 0.113803 -0.260468*** 
   
      
Tunisia_19 -0.0778145 0.088047** 
   ***Significant at 1%; Significant at 5%;* Significant at 10%
242 
 
Table A5.1d: VAR-based mean equations of US-developed market pairs 
Parameter US Canada Parameter US France Parameter US Germany 
Constant -0.000195771 0.0000355367 Constant -0.000256432 -0.000320425 Constant -0.000277106 0.0000610939 
US_1 1.00414*** 0.226922*** US_1 0.904377*** 0.629592*** US_1 0.786129*** 0.436425*** 
US_2 -0.962072*** -0.0634683 US_2 -0.887017*** -0.310371*** US_2 -0.930259*** -0.306612*** 
US_3 0.926242*** 0.200274** US_3 1.06187*** 0.613502*** US_3 0.933405*** 0.461279*** 
US_4 -0.854219*** -0.113407 US_4 -1.03913*** -0.472128*** US_4 -1.04089*** -0.510349*** 
US_5 0.778151*** 0.09243 US_5 0.998738*** 0.593467*** US_5 0.88548*** 0.484283*** 
US_6 -0.863449*** -0.131286 US_6 -0.881777*** -0.491825*** US_6 -0.874118*** -0.442188*** 
US_7 0.783429*** 0.0373304 US_7 0.789728*** 0.407107*** US_7 0.837228*** 0.460668*** 
US_8 -0.691579*** -0.0027005 US_8 -0.625448*** -0.343831*** US_8 -0.60101*** -0.236842** 
US_9 0.695532*** 0.133484 US_9 0.599372*** 0.317042*** US_9 0.641321*** 0.3066*** 
US_10 -0.481513*** -0.0189567 US_10 -0.401035*** -0.0695224 US_10 -0.508739*** -0.0544521 
US_11 0.497388*** 0.086383 US_11 0.378523*** 0.100501 US_11 0.433159*** 0.164889 
US_12 -0.43985*** -0.0523765 US_12 -0.0939691 0.155712 US_12 -0.262959** 0.0779099 
US_13 0.44564*** 0.151787 US_13 0.0853071 -0.103099 US_13 0.187805 -0.0383002 
US_14 -0.496073*** -0.209882** US_14 -0.104749 0.117024 US_14 -0.216753* 0.0596571 
US_15 0.34835*** 0.191689** US_15 -0.0280194 -0.159758** US_15 0.118741 -0.107536 
US_16 -0.130755* -0.0544921 US_16 0.0941707 0.198175*** US_16 -0.0259287 0.172371* 
***Significant at 1%; Significant at 5%;* Significant at 10%
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Table A5.1d: Continued 
Parameter US Canada Parameter US France Parameter US Germany 
Canada_1 -0.280473*** 0.664384*** US_17 -0.204948*** -0.195817*** US_17 0.0685791 -0.083511 
Canada_2 0.264202*** -0.811329*** France_1 -0.092844 0.426305*** US_18 -0.160082* -0.0154566 
Canada_3 -0.177271 0.758813*** France_2 -0.0310254 -0.713457*** US_19 0.134531* 0.0913538 
Canada_4 0.123378 -0.775095*** France_3 -0.136796* 0.380039*** US_20 -0.140549** -0.0699313 
Canada_5 -0.112342 0.658208*** France_4 0.180354** -0.381336*** Germany_1 0.0826006 0.639939*** 
Canada_6 0.227337 -0.614014*** France_5 -0.23688** 0.217826*** Germany_2 -0.0283822 -0.751446*** 
Canada_7 -0.200494 0.650085*** France_6 0.212777** -0.206566** Germany_3 0.0213759 0.552011*** 
Canada_8 0.190834 -0.592385*** France_7 -0.182619* 0.232566*** Germany_4 0.129782 -0.405505*** 
Canada_9 -0.240412 0.406687** France_8 0.104531 -0.216718** Germany_5 -0.0474096 0.367681*** 
Canada_10 0.151743 -0.387598** France_9 -0.150727 0.132698 Germany_6 0.085271 -0.325902*** 
Canada_11 -0.237747 0.214295 France_10 0.0601822 -0.295603*** Germany_7 -0.139518 0.214633** 
Canada_12 0.208333 -0.171551 France_11 -0.170316* 0.115233 Germany_8 -0.008676 -0.360042*** 
Canada_13 -0.219971 0.0883683 France_12 0.00719748 -0.237158*** Germany_9 -0.0615429 0.228572** 
Canada_14 0.261073** 0.00600416 France_13 0.0098315 0.150639* Germany_10 0.0464379 -0.341157*** 
Canada_15 -0.186754* -0.0490015 France_14 0.0318665 -0.0992538 Germany_11 -0.08002 0.194075** 
Canada_16 0.0354112 -0.0258985 France_15 0.0345486 0.105752 Germany_12 0.0114898 -0.305009*** 
   
France_16 0.0042495 -0.0372738 Germany_13 0.0926674 0.236201** 
   
France_17 0.129214** 0.112855** Germany_14 -0.106581 -0.264697*** 
      
Germany_15 0.130348 0.232748*** 
      
Germany_16 -0.157729* -0.25078*** 
      
Germany_17 0.069041 0.19291** 
      
Germany_18 0.00610674 -0.19253** 
      
Germany_19 0.0301795 0.125271* 
      
Germany_20 0.0415113 -0.0589505 
***Significant at 1%; Significant at 5%;* Significant at 10%
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Table A5.1e: VAR-based mean equations of US-developed market pairs (continued) 
Parameter US Italy Parameter US Japan Parameter US Spain Parameter US UK 
Constant  -0.000262278 -0.00035872 Constant  -0.000276026 -0.000520024 Constant  -0.000200571 -0.0000610761 Constant  -0.000202129 0.0000221085 
US_1 0.900798*** 0.598985*** US_1 0.784581*** 0.592296*** US_1 0.872202*** 0.465405*** US_1 0.844048*** 0.503093*** 
US_2 -0.854961*** -0.313975*** US_2 -0.777398*** -0.396919*** US_2 -0.887305*** -0.329917*** US_2 -0.869365*** -0.265746*** 
US_3 0.969339*** 0.451877*** US_3 0.811821*** 0.565569*** US_3 0.999776*** 0.466521*** US_3 0.974925*** 0.489304*** 
US_4 -0.964102*** -0.329203*** US_4 -0.730536*** -0.444069*** US_4 -0.94137*** -0.395758*** US_4 -0.977741*** -0.385433*** 
US_5 0.939348*** 0.407231*** US_5 0.719937*** 0.47998*** US_5 1.02071*** 0.537608*** US_5 0.935698*** 0.499625*** 
US_6 -0.77195*** -0.298354*** US_6 -0.576135*** -0.37376*** US_6 -0.777184*** -0.421387*** US_6 -0.79638*** -0.342514*** 
US_7 0.799299*** 0.29378*** US_7 0.620603*** 0.440001*** US_7 0.77326*** 0.361743*** US_7 0.739077*** 0.367749*** 
US_8 -0.583637*** -0.251941*** US_8 -0.483349*** -0.330056*** US_8 -0.59188*** -0.293654*** US_8 -0.615012*** -0.319837*** 
US_9 0.654546*** 0.310363*** US_9 0.473337*** 0.379254*** US_9 0.52149*** 0.282857*** US_9 0.595504*** 0.292533*** 
US_10 -0.486606*** -0.14652** US_10 -0.4162*** -0.212051*** US_10 -0.404847*** -0.16063* US_10 -0.435645*** -0.145876 
US_11 0.484481*** 0.201103*** US_11 0.410199*** 0.230324*** US_11 0.26648** 0.0915207 US_11 0.482362*** 0.172698* 
US_12 -0.295791*** -0.0218614 US_12 -0.343098*** -0.228769*** US_12 -0.067716 0.0905559 US_12 -0.20794* 0.0142124 
US_13 0.222793** 0.0535993 US_13 0.24082*** 0.195635** US_13 0.0140936 -0.0461816 US_13 0.243477** 0.106557 
US_14 -0.328432*** -0.0715174 US_14 -0.232381*** -0.167328** US_14 -0.00837936 0.130325* US_14 -0.238911** -0.0235326 
US_15 0.19418** -0.045128 US_15 0.203972** 0.175821** US_15 -0.032001 -0.101793 US_15 0.200834** 0.0482281 
US_16 -0.192928** -0.0118995 US_16 -0.256573*** -0.137555** US_16 0.113157* 0.193821*** US_16 -0.0593052 0.0803737 
US_17 0.0970382 -0.00935662 US_17 0.0340156 0.0436672 US_17 -0.21577*** -0.147255*** US_17 -0.0594943 -0.113298** 
US_18 -0.198827*** -0.0377585 US_18 -0.118024** -0.0241479 Spain_1 -0.0852669 0.640516*** US_18 -0.137423** -0.0703351 
US_19 0.126442* 0.033788 US_19 0.122449** 0.0490808 Spain_2 -0.0193417 -0.725631*** UK_1 -0.0566351 0.488109*** 
US_20 -0.0247446 -0.013433 Japan_1 -0.00728858 0.692504*** Spain_3 -0.104305 0.558259*** UK_2 -0.00987198 -0.708869*** 
***Significant at 1%; Significant at 5%;* Significant at 10%
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Table A5.1e: Continued 
Parameter US Italy Parameter US Japan Parameter US Spain Parameter US UK 
Italy_1 -0.153334** 0.616477*** Japan_2 -0.0292745 -0.78964*** Spain_4 0.0486452 -0.52446*** UK_3 -0.106692 0.386382*** 
Italy_2 -0.0168999 -0.691368*** Japan_3 -0.0639319 0.57803*** Spain_5 -0.260964*** 0.316537*** UK_4 0.175631* -0.371437*** 
Italy_3 -0.0201834 0.542332*** Japan_4 -0.00672457 -0.600706*** Spain_6 0.11887 -0.352959*** UK_5 -0.271419*** 0.186892** 
Italy_4 0.069732 -0.507647*** Japan_5 -0.134119 0.493116*** Spain_7 -0.156941 0.299663*** UK_6 0.211945** -0.293937*** 
Italy_5 -0.214714* 0.458338*** Japan_6 0.0653828 -0.55448*** Spain_8 0.122715 -0.319696*** UK_7 -0.169526 0.283149*** 
Italy_6 0.161111 -0.468407*** Japan_7 -0.0379752 0.474034*** Spain_9 -0.094281 0.284517*** UK_8 0.143358 -0.251707*** 
Italy_7 -0.232918* 0.481669*** Japan_8 -0.0729821 -0.520701*** Spain_10 0.105786 -0.290467*** UK_9 -0.167732 0.233042*** 
Italy_8 0.0978354 -0.475916*** Japan_9 0.146115 0.380468*** Spain_11 -0.0745795 0.246171*** UK_10 0.0628509 -0.292945*** 
Italy_9 -0.179358 0.334532*** Japan_10 -0.0887781 -0.427003*** Spain_12 -0.0417629 -0.260952*** UK_11 -0.254252** 0.14296* 
Italy_10 0.165715 -0.354923*** Japan_11 -0.00568646 0.435107*** Spain_13 0.12211 0.231525*** UK_12 0.049615 -0.24485*** 
Italy_11 -0.261358* 0.212961** Japan_12 0.0272969 -0.343675*** Spain_14 -0.122393 -0.258313*** UK_13 -0.0523745 0.0872175 
Italy_12 0.233428* -0.18742** Japan_13 0.011152 0.313397*** Spain_15 0.0943798 0.179508** UK_14 0.0348015 -0.111527 
Italy_13 0.0141931 0.248476*** Japan_14 0.0591678 -0.234492*** Spain_16 -0.0133688 -0.123341** UK_15 -0.0736691 0.0286635 
Italy_14 0.0116419 -0.124082 Japan_15 -0.0187322 0.204972*** Spain_17 0.166484*** 0.151438*** UK_16 0.070546 -0.0498886 
Italy_15 0.112648 0.238756*** Japan_16 0.114078 -0.160092**       UK_17 0.072636 0.118885** 
Italy_16 0.0134826 -0.11046 Japan_17 0.0998907 0.119406**       UK_18 0.115283* 0.00264039 
Italy_17 -0.0644874 0.0729602 Japan_18 0.0198499 -0.106474**             
Italy_18 0.219488** -0.0561886 Japan_19 -0.126224*** 0.0162089             
Italy_19 -0.25373*** -0.0295603                   
Italy_20 0.121108** -0.0577682*                   
***Significant at 1%; Significant at 5%;* Significant at 10%
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Table A5.1f: VAR-based mean equations of US-other market pairs 
Parameter US China Parameter US India 
Constant -0.0002845 0.000214255 Constant -0.000331978 0.000484172 
US_1 0.855067*** 0.234565*** US_1 0.788999*** 0.400645*** 
US_2 -0.947673*** -0.194429*** US_2 -0.801605*** -0.127473** 
US_3 0.974339*** 0.137539* US_3 0.82306*** 0.323879*** 
US_4 -0.976634*** -0.0882915 US_4 -0.717489*** -0.177862** 
US_5 0.902781*** 0.123536 US_5 0.66775*** 0.182972** 
US_6 -0.822611*** 0.028695 US_6 -0.637725*** -0.0413718 
US_7 0.790014*** -0.0185929 US_7 0.66351*** 0.16629* 
US_8 -0.718996*** 0.113568 US_8 -0.632983*** -0.0736567 
US_9 0.658358*** -0.0702651 US_9 0.557766*** 0.0194671 
US_10 -0.552596*** 0.0471972 US_10 -0.463129*** 0.0975065 
US_11 0.565593*** -0.0786015 US_11 0.436824*** 0.00091758 
US_12 -0.45266*** 0.10337 US_12 -0.44908*** 0.0329237 
US_13 0.409778*** -0.0988853 US_13 0.353821*** 0.0340768 
US_14 -0.415922*** 0.0303365 US_14 -0.331367*** -0.0248387 
US_15 0.372502*** 0.0197155 US_15 0.346681*** 0.0318759 
US_16 -0.30352*** 0.0251568 US_16 -0.456104*** -0.123647 
US_17 0.212871*** 0.00220752 US_17 0.30743*** 0.142238* 
US_18 -0.22801*** -0.076174 US_18 -0.277668*** -0.198573*** 
US_19 0.2194*** 0.0445372 US_19 0.247714*** 0.138598** 
US_20 -0.132354*** -0.040195 US_20 -0.134884*** -0.143056*** 
***Significant at 1%; Significant at 5%;* Significant at 10%
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Table A5.1f: Continued 
Parameter US China Parameter US India 
China_1 0.0116064 0.885313*** India_1 -0.00875436 0.814384*** 
China_2 -0.0338925 -0.808613*** India_2 -0.0242854 -0.901714*** 
China_3 0.0186294 0.812302*** India_3 -0.018499 0.759776*** 
China_4 -0.0749971 -0.711835*** India_4 -0.0447736 -0.796144*** 
China_5 -0.0102389 0.607508*** India_5 0.0656823 0.670258*** 
China_6 -0.0191037 -0.574031*** India_6 -0.0805467 -0.73329*** 
China_7 -0.015415 0.545016*** India_7 0.0598169 0.679363*** 
China_8 -0.00606105 -0.560961*** India_8 -0.0413573 -0.52658*** 
China_9 0.0275321 0.516315*** India_9 0.0636303 0.458464*** 
China_10 -0.00422666 -0.427957*** India_10 -0.0894861 -0.431151*** 
China_11 0.0694359 0.4179*** India_11 0.158014* 0.375968*** 
China_12 -0.037427 -0.343613*** India_12 -0.123062 -0.327857*** 
China_13 0.0148077 0.393854*** India_13 0.127526 0.321321*** 
China_14 -0.0205044 -0.320494*** India_14 -0.073253 -0.195856** 
China_15 0.101011 0.266597*** India_15 0.143348* 0.195339** 
China_16 -0.06024 -0.258514*** India_16 -0.0707471 -0.1148 
China_17 0.0682894 0.207617*** India_17 0.155524** 0.125246 
China_18 -0.0317032 -0.122728* India_18 -0.13477** -0.128944* 
China_19 0.00713942 0.06624 India_19 0.0433392 0.0790449 
China_20 0.037641 -0.0455147 India_20 -0.0419083 -0.026195 
***Significant at 1%; Significant at 5%;* Significant at 10%
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Table A5.2a: Variance equations (GARCH 1, 1) for US and African markets 
     US        African markets  
 
  
US Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood Botswana Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Constant 0.6306 1.4290 0.1535 
2200.9730 
Constant 2.2478 2.3660 0.0183 
2956.7230 
Alpha 0.0841 4.4690 0.0000 Alpha 0.1544 1.8740 0.0614 
Beta 0.9108 48.1200 0.0000 Beta 0.5038 3.7580 0.0002 
US Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood Côte d’Ivoire Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Constant 0.8179 1.8020 0.0720 
2216.0790 
Constant 0.1608 0.9621 0.3364 
1229.7560 
Alpha 0.0973 4.0430 0.0001 Alpha 9.0580 1.0050 0.3152 
Beta 0.8951 38.3200 0.0000 Beta 0.0792 0.6159 0.5382 
US Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood Egypt Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Constant 1.4463 1.5810 0.1145 
1668.6840 
Constant 0.0286 1.4440 0.1495 
1649.5190 
Alpha 0.1066 4.1370 0.0000 Alpha 0.1893 2.5560 0.0109 
Beta 0.8793 33.2400 0.0000 Beta 0.8129 15.2600 0.0000 
US Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood Mauritius Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Constant 1.2186 1.8910 0.0591 
2239.6190 
Constant 6.4849 2.0110 0.0448 
2519.3130 
Alpha 0.0940 3.9160 0.0001 Alpha 0.5486 2.9080 0.0038 
Beta 0.8919 34.9000 0.0000 Beta 0.3942 2.3580 0.0187 
US Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood Morocco Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Constant 1.2005 1.7450 0.0815 
2215.0860 
Constant 2.2877 1.8670 0.0624 
2604.5450 
Alpha 0.0886 3.4310 0.0006 Alpha 0.1843 3.1480 0.0017 
Beta 0.8980 31.7700 0.0000 Beta 0.7270 7.6780 0.0000 
US Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood Namibia Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Constant 0.0312 1.8220 0.0690 
1819.2160 
Constant 0.3527 1.3550 0.1760 
1872.5470 
Alpha 0.0842 3.9240 0.0001 Alpha 0.0347 1.1410 0.2543 
Beta 0.9066 40.8900 0.0000 Beta 0.8104 22.1800 0.0000 
249 
 
Table A5.2a: Continued 
     US        African markets       
US Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood Nigeria Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Constant 0.9358 1.7320 0.0837 
2205.7120 
Constant 0.7165 1.8380 0.0666 
2569.2440 
Alpha 0.0771 3.9410 0.0001 Alpha 0.0846 2.6000 0.0095 
Beta 0.9110 41.7400 0.0000 Beta 0.8840 21.5100 0.0000 
US Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood South Africa Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Constant 0.6161 1.6250 0.1047 
2274.7260 
Constant 0.8757 1.7270 0.0847 
2293.7550 
Alpha 0.0821 3.9690 0.0001 Alpha 0.0858 4.6520 0.0000 
Beta 0.9114 44.5200 0.0000 Beta 0.9029 46.9000 0.0000 
US Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood Tunisia Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Constant 0.6848 1.6300 0.1035 
2212.2770 
Constant 1.3111 1.1930 0.2335 
2897.2830 
Alpha 0.0957 5.3520 0.0000 Alpha 0.2084 2.1460 0.0323 
Beta 0.8971 51.5000 0.0000 Beta 0.6471 3.1450 0.0017 
US Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood Zambia Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Constant 0.7813 0.9071 0.0782 
2238.6260 
Constant 4.1858 1.4280 0.1538 
2414.0480 
Alpha 0.0833 4.4750 0.0000 Alpha 0.0682 1.9470 0.0520 
Beta 0.9071 48.3100 0.0000 Beta 0.8235 12.0500 0.0000 
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Table A5.2b: DCC equations for correlation estimates between US and African markets 
Botswana Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Rho -0.0242 -0.4290 0.6681 
5283.4600 
Alpha 0.0093 1.2040 0.2292 
Beta 0.9787 45.7200 0.0000 
Cote d’Ivoire Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Rho 0.0229 0.4620 0.6442 
3712.0520 
Alpha 0.0193 1.4590 0.1450 
Beta 0.9519 20.1600 0.0000 
Egypt Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Rho 0.1669 2.3970 0.0169 
3355.1590 
Alpha 0.0192 1.5420 0.1236 
Beta 0.9473 48.7400 0.0000 
Mauritius Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Rho 0.0433 1.1110 0.2669 
4804.4620 
Alpha 0.0000 0.0145 0.9885 
Beta 0.7698 1.8690 0.0621 
Morocco Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Rho 0.0121 0.2334 0.8155 
4856.2860 
Alpha 0.0144 1.5530 0.1210 
Beta 0.9472 50.2800 0.0000 
Namibia Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Rho 0.7665 4.7670 0.0000 
3879.3450 
Alpha 0.0181 0.9819 0.0291 
Beta 0.9819 118.2000 0.0000 
Nigeria Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Rho 0.0427 1.0430 0.2972 
4785.2420 
Alpha 0.0000 0.0002 0.9998 
Beta 0.0030 0.0037 0.9971 
South Africa Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Rho 0.6850 3.8750 0.0001 
4654.1010 
Alpha 0.0185 1.6040 0.1091 
Beta 0.9810 91.8500 0.0000 
Tunisia Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Rho 0.0659 1.7490 0.0807 
5118.8220 
Alpha 0.0018 0.0249 0.9801 
Beta 0.2860 0.0040 0.9968 
Zambia Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Rho -0.0163 -0.4619 0.6443 
4716.6350 
Alpha 0.0000 0.0000 0.9999 
Beta 0.8418 5.5090 0.0000 




Table A5.2c: Variance equations (GARCH 1, 1) for US and developed markets 
US Developed markets 
US Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood Canada Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Constant 0.6181 1.7560 0.0795 
2307.8230 
Constant 0.4668 1.5990 0.1102 
2345.5570 
Alpha 0.0792 4.8390 0.0000 Alpha 0.0825 4.8320 0.0000 
Beta 0.9140 59.2300 0.0000 Beta 0.9126 54.9800 0.0000 
US Parameter  T-value   Log likelihood France Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Constant 0.7351 1.5430 0.1234 
2305.6760 
Constant 0.7245 1.4470 0.1483 
2345.1040 
Alpha 0.0791 4.0290 0.0001 Alpha 0.0720 3.2110 0.0014 
Beta 0.9126 43.6400 0.0000 Beta 0.9185 36.6400 0.0000 
US Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood Germany Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Constant 0.7165 1.6390 0.1016 
2287.5780 
Constant 0.9929 1.5740 0.1160 
2300.4770 
Alpha 0.0819 4.5110 0.0000 Alpha 0.0761 3.7270 0.0002 
Beta 0.9099 4.5110 0.0000 Beta 0.9122 43.4800 0.0000 
US Parameter  T-value   Log likelihood Italy Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Constant 0.6491 1.5340 0.1256 
2277.4360 
Constant 0.4681 1.2360 0.2167 
2552.1730 
Alpha 0.0814 4.5630 0.0000 Alpha 0.1064 2.2730 0.0234 
Beta 0.0814 50.0700 0.0000 Beta 0.8860 19.0100 0.0000 
US Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood Japan Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Constant 0.5068 1.5240 0.1279 
2182.7010 
Constant 1.4812 1.5400 0.1240 
2275.5900 
Alpha 0.0925 5.8760 0.0000 Alpha 0.1323 2.4020 0.0166 
Beta 0.9041 63.8500 0.0000 Beta 0.8470 15.4400 0.0000 
US Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood Spain Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Constant 0.6973 1.5510 0.1213 
2284.8630 
Constant 1.0526 1.3710 0.1710 
2325.8070 
Alpha 0.0734 4.0800 0.0001 Alpha 0.0702 2.6790 0.0076 
Beta 0.9188 48.2400 0.0000 Beta 0.9150 28.0800 0.0000 
US Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood UK Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Constant 0.6715 1.5190 0.1292 
2274.8890 
Constant 0.4358 1.2920 0.1967 
2366.0840 
Alpha 0.0850 4.5180 0.0000 Alpha 0.0770 4.5260 0.0000 
Beta 0.9087 47.7200 0.0000 Beta 0.9177 55.2400 0.0000 
Rho is the correlation targeting parameter 
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Table A5.2d: DCC equations for correlations estimates between US and developed markets 
 Canada Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Rho 0.9407 45.0500 0.0000 
5000.9420 
Alpha 0.0330 4.6770 0.0000 
Beta 0.9670 131.8000 0.0000 
France Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Rho 0.8343 13.0900 0.0000 
4914.3670 
Alpha 0.0150 3.1370 0.0018 
Beta 0.9838 218.8000 0.0000 
Germany Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Rho 0.7840 8.0600 0.0000 
4845.0780 
Alpha 0.0148 0.9824 0.1441 
Beta 0.9824 91.2800 0.0000 
Italy Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Rho 0.7364 3.6700 0.0003 
4957.2370 
Alpha 0.0164 0.9751 0.3299 
Beta 0.9836 61.7200 0.0000 
Japan Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Rho 0.2450 4.3390 0.0000 
4486.1520 
Alpha 0.0146 1.3220 0.1866 
Beta 0.9528 35.4700 0.0000 
Spain Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Rho 0.7352 6.0540 0.0000 
4805.4930 
Alpha 0.0139 2.1980 0.0283 
Beta 0.9853 167.7000 0.0000 
UK Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Rho 0.7493 8.5060 0.0000 
4862.5810 
Alpha 0.0105 2.5010 0.0126 
Beta 0.9894 216.3000 0.0000 
 
Table A5.2e: Variance equations (GARCH 1, 1) for US and other markets 
US Other markets 
US Parameter T-value T-probability Log likelihood China Parameter T-value T-probability 
Log 
likelihood 
Constant 0.8393 1.5440 0.1231 
2157.0030 
Constant 0.0521 0.9866 0.3242 
1904.2710 
Alpha 0.0994 3.3680 0.0008 Alpha 0.0338 1.5410 0.1238 
Beta 0.8950 35.1300 0.0000 Beta 0.9312 19.9600 0.0000 
US Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood India Parameter  T-value T-probability 
Log 
likelihood 
Constant 0.7828 1.5000 0.1340 
2198.4630 
Constant 0.0186 1.1700 0.2425 
2032.3160 
Alpha 0.0987 4.7110 0.0000 Alpha 0.1715 2.2550 0.0245 






Table A5.2f: DCC correlation estimation equations between US and other markets 
US and China Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Rho 0.0683 1.3880 0.1655 
4088.907 
Alpha 0.0237 1.2320 0.2185 
Beta 0.8678 11.5200 0.0000 
US and India Parameter  T-value T-probability Log likelihood 
Rho 0.3520 5.4920 0.0000   
Alpha 0.0230 0.5822 0.5606 4299.0600 







Table A5.3a: Autocorrelation tests for means equations. Q-statistics on standardised residuals of 
African market and the US 
US Botswana 
 Q( 5) = 5.26080 [0.3848883]  Q( 5) = 0.520881 [0.9913387] 
 Q( 10) = 11.4290 [0.3250827]  Q( 10) = 2.20375 [0.9945265] 
 Q( 20) = 27.3974 [0.1244494]  Q( 20) = 12.7004 [0.8898673] 
 Q( 50) = 67.1397 [0.0531693]  Q( 50) = 41.6148 [0.7947121] 
US Côte d’Ivoire 
 Q( 5) = 4.57916 [0.4693623]  Q( 5) = 17.3491 [0.0038832] 
 Q( 10) = 12.5002 [0.2529710]  Q( 10) = 18.5153 [0.0468682] 
 Q( 20) = 34.3065 [0.0241244]  Q( 20) = 35.7862 [0.0162951] 
 Q( 50) = 53.5348 [0.3402328]  Q( 50) = 77.1545 [0.0081550] 
US Egypt 
 Q( 5) = 2.89877 [0.7155884]  Q( 5) = 8.58164 [0.1269602] 
 Q( 10) = 6.84502 [0.7399904]  Q( 10) = 9.93570 [0.4461529] 
 Q( 20) = 18.0078 [0.5868919]  Q( 20) = 14.2949 [0.8152334] 
 Q( 50) = 49.4262 [0.4963313]  Q( 50) = 45.2579 [0.6637883] 
 US  Mauritius 
 Q( 5) = 3.91346 [0.5619417]  Q( 5) = 15.3601 [0.0089296] 
 Q( 10) = 12.8151 [0.2341942]  Q( 10) = 21.8891 [0.0156796] 
 Q( 20) = 29.9492 [0.0706815]  Q( 20) = 37.0563 [0.0115213] 
 Q( 50) = 91.2341 [0.0003317]  Q( 50) = 70.0596 [0.0320297] 
US  Morocco 
 Q( 5) = 2.55929 [0.7675405]  Q( 5) = 3.31089 [0.6521741] 
 Q( 10) = 17.9268 [0.0562108]  Q( 10) = 8.89133 [0.5424473] 
 Q( 20) = 35.3134 [0.0184972]  Q( 20) = 14.3984 [0.8097340] 
 Q( 50) = 66.8350 [0.0559435]  Q( 50) = 52.6462 [0.3720098] 
US  Namibia 
 Q( 5) = 8.44126 [0.1335353]  Q( 5) = 12.5289 [0.0282171] 
 Q( 10) = 17.6569 [0.0610336]  Q( 10) = 14.2019 [0.1639782] 
 Q( 20) = 35.3212 [0.0184589]  Q( 20) = 20.4811 [0.4282181] 
 Q( 50) = 70.8457 [0.0277818]  Q( 50) = 35.2728 [0.9429700] 
 US  Nigeria 
 Q( 5) = 10.8252 [0.0549587]  Q( 5) = 1.16644 [0.9480560] 
 Q( 10) = 17.8252 [0.0579850]  Q( 10) = 6.60610 [0.7620339] 
 Q( 20) = 33.7736 [0.0276974]  Q( 20) = 15.7113 [0.7343684] 








Table A5.3a: Continued 
 US  South Africa 
 Q( 5) = 5.25194 [0.3859136]  Q( 5) = 1.02278 [0.9607072] 
 Q( 10) = 13.4045 [0.2019282]  Q( 10) = 2.09706 [0.9955407] 
 Q( 20) = 31.4739 [0.0492364]  Q( 20) = 19.0184 [0.5206294] 
 Q( 50) = 76.6870 [0.0089741]  Q( 50) = 41.8406 [0.7873964] 
 US  Tunisia 
 Q( 5) = 3.97539 [0.5529643]  Q( 5) = 2.80520 [0.7299871] 
 Q( 10) = 9.04335 [0.5279950]  Q( 10) = 7.32283 [0.6946566] 
 Q( 20) = 15.9177 [0.7217177]  Q( 20) = 10.3743 [0.9608662] 
 Q( 50) = 52.7812 [0.3670968]  Q( 50) = 43.9660 [0.7129802] 
 US  Zambia 
 Q( 5) = 2.51123 [0.7748034]  Q( 5) = 0.222119 [0.9988572] 
 Q( 10) = 5.58799 [0.8486098]  Q( 10) = 3.10448 [0.9788571] 
 Q( 20) = 25.3053 [0.1899989]  Q( 20) = 20.2871 [0.4401065] 

















Table A5.3b: Autocorrelation tests for variance equations. Q-statistics on squared standardised 
residuals of African market and the US 
 US  Botswana 
 Q( 5) = 2.40764 [0.7903359]  Q( 5) = 3.37602 [0.6422254] 
 Q( 10) = 10.1767 [0.4251262]  Q( 10) = 3.87894 [0.9526429] 
 Q( 20) = 17.7886 [0.6013336]  Q( 20) = 6.67469 [0.9976235] 
 Q( 50) = 38.4139 [0.8838511]  Q( 50) = 25.5383 [0.9984199] 
US Côte d’Ivoire 
 Q( 5) = 4.90710 [0.4273231]  Q( 5) = 0.0202776 [0.9999969] 
 Q( 10) = 15.3285 [0.1205371]  Q( 10) = 0.0267572 [1.0000000] 
 Q( 20) = 21.9265 [0.3445130]  Q( 20) = 0.0659225 [1.0000000] 
 Q( 50) = 54.5032 [0.3072301]  Q( 50) = 0.233225 [1.0000000] 
US Egypt  
 Q( 5) = 2.84593 [0.7237248]  Q( 5) = 2.53422 [0.7713322] 
 Q( 10) = 7.10729 [0.7152790]  Q( 10) = 4.93576 [0.8954281] 
 Q( 20) = 16.4673 [0.6872433]  Q( 20) = 8.84869 [0.9845945] 
 Q( 50) = 38.1741 [0.8893589]  Q( 50) = 24.4731 [0.9991046] 
US Mauritius  
 Q( 5) = 6.73748 [0.2409078]  Q( 5) = 7.14116 [0.2103522] 
 Q( 10) = 14.3275 [0.1585696]  Q( 10) = 9.60947 [0.4753969] 
 Q( 20) = 23.3689 [0.2710454]  Q( 20) = 21.6651 [0.3589560] 
 Q( 50) = 52.5205 [0.3766136]  Q( 50) = 57.2934 [0.2228583] 
US Morocco 
 Q( 5) = 3.60748 [0.6071901]  Q( 5) = 4.64257 [0.4610373] 
 Q( 10) = 13.2357 [0.2107896]  Q( 10) = 11.5027 [0.3197192] 
 Q( 20) = 23.6448 [0.2582540]  Q( 20) = 19.8432 [0.4677788] 

























Table A5.3b: Continued 
US Nigeria 
 Q( 5) = 6.38283 [0.2707295]  Q( 5) = 5.42069 [0.3667206] 
 Q( 10) = 12.1907 [0.2724940]  Q( 10) = 7.36426 [0.6906670] 
 Q( 20) = 25.5816 [0.1800790]  Q( 20) = 19.4497 [0.4927937] 
 Q( 50) = 49.9628 [0.4748773]  Q( 50) = 45.0706 [0.6710632] 
US South Africa 
 Q( 5) = 5.04171 [0.4108105]  Q( 5) = 0.985591 [0.9637196] 
 Q( 10) = 12.3202 [0.2641969]  Q( 10) = 3.18107 [0.9768358] 
 Q( 20) = 19.5393 [0.4870568]  Q( 20) = 11.6620 [0.9272182] 
 Q( 50) = 40.5193 [0.8283843]  Q( 50) = 31.3861 [0.9817675] 
US Tunisia 
 Q( 5) = 3.95023 [0.5566038]  Q( 5) = 6.17467 [0.2895916] 
 Q( 10) = 8.34486 [0.5951906]  Q( 10) = 9.25366 [0.5082120] 
 Q( 20) = 15.0080 [0.7759516]  Q( 20) = 20.5269 [0.4254359] 
 Q( 50) = 52.0350 [0.3946163]  Q( 50) = 77.3824 [0.0077811] 
US Zambia 
 Q( 5) = 8.22446 [0.1442913]  Q( 5) = 1.75765 [0.8815583] 
 Q( 10) = 14.3669 [0.1569046]  Q( 10) = 3.58018 [0.9643056] 
 Q( 20) = 24.1889 [0.2342382]  Q( 20) = 5.76323 [0.9991815] 






Table A5.3c: Autocorrelation tests for means equations. Q-statistics on standardised residuals of 
developed market and the US 
US Canada 
 Q( 5) = 0.915652 [0.9690782]  Q( 5) = 15.4686 [0.0085369] 
 Q( 10) = 7.93783 [0.6349096]  Q( 10) = 18.5531 [0.0463208] 
 Q( 20) = 15.4668 [0.7491046]  Q( 20) = 29.1675 [0.0845138] 
 Q( 50) = 30.8346 [0.9849125]  Q( 50) = 58.3329 [0.1957538] 
US  France 
 Q( 5) = 10.9619 [0.0521397]  Q( 5) = 1.62664 [0.8980094] 
 Q( 10) = 21.6589 [0.0169397]  Q( 10) = 2.49436 [0.9909577] 
 Q( 20) = 41.1486 [0.0035649]  Q( 20) = 11.1333 [0.9426925] 
 Q( 50) = 102.423 [0.0000179]  Q( 50) = 46.1088 [0.6302537] 
US Germany 
 Q( 5) = 5.11381 [0.4021492]  Q( 5) = 2.27257 [0.8102870] 
 Q( 10) = 13.7920 [0.1826907]  Q( 10) = 5.00609 [0.8907709] 
 Q( 20) = 23.2437 [0.2769870]  Q( 20) = 10.9039 [0.9486770] 
 Q( 50) = 55.8375 [0.2648162]  Q( 50) = 28.7384 [0.9931656] 
US  Italy 
 Q( 5) = 3.48560 [0.6255672]  Q( 5) = 3.21065 [0.6675468] 
 Q( 10) = 8.79093 [0.5520535]  Q( 10) = 6.24303 [0.7944483] 
 Q( 20) = 21.1916 [0.3859355]  Q( 20) = 13.7615 [0.8423775] 
 Q( 50) = 59.2531 [0.1737483]  Q( 50) = 39.1537 [0.8658006] 
US Japan 
 Q( 5) = 5.94535 [0.3115732]  Q( 5) = 7.53027 [0.1840943] 
 Q( 10) = 12.2185 [0.2707013]  Q( 10) = 11.9616 [0.2876363] 
 Q( 20) = 24.4809 [0.2220158]  Q( 20) = 28.3466 [0.1014458] 
 Q( 50) = 41.9590 [0.7835081]  Q( 50) = 55.3758 [0.2790737] 
US  Spain 
 Q( 5) = 8.58043 [0.1270158]  Q( 5) = 0.729688 [0.9812997] 
 Q( 10) = 24.3025 [0.0068366]  Q( 10) = 4.67519 [0.9117934] 
 Q( 20) = 49.3268 [0.0002763]  Q( 20) = 17.0465 [0.6499551] 
 Q( 50) = 98.9853 [0.0000453]  Q( 50) = 51.9477 [0.3978900] 
 US  UK 
 Q( 5) = 8.60988 [0.1256737]  Q( 5) = 0.926784 [0.9682524] 
 Q( 10) = 17.4110 [0.0657502]  Q( 10) = 2.25366 [0.9940004] 
 Q( 20) = 38.5984 [0.0074768]  Q( 20) = 18.4902 [0.5551526] 
 Q( 50) = 94.1615 [0.0001591]  Q( 50) = 41.0870 [0.8113236] 
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Table A5.3d: Autocorrelation tests for variance equations. Q-statistics on squared standardised 
residuals of developed market and the US 
US Canada 
 Q( 5) = 7.45330 [0.1890509]  Q( 5) = 2.70258 [0.7457233] 
 Q( 10) = 10.6254 [0.3874386]  Q( 10) = 5.86004 [0.8268816] 
 Q( 20) = 13.6688 [0.8468842]  Q( 20) = 14.4113 [0.8090443] 
 Q( 50) = 34.3051 [0.9557893]  Q( 50) = 40.1648 [0.8385969] 
US  France 
 Q( 5) = 5.16117 [0.3965290]  Q( 5) = 8.49440 [0.1310114] 
 Q( 10) = 9.35252 [0.4990065]  Q( 10) = 11.3745 [0.3290954] 
 Q( 20) = 14.8640 [0.7841341]  Q( 20) = 20.4503 [0.4300937] 
 Q( 50) = 61.6599 [0.1247609]  Q( 50) = 39.2824 [0.8625002] 
US Germany 
 Q( 5) = 5.02590 [0.4127269]  Q( 5) = 13.3569 [0.0202544] 
 Q( 10) = 9.58778 [0.4773715]  Q( 10) = 13.8064 [0.1820078] 
 Q( 20) = 17.1976 [0.6401074]  Q( 20) = 16.3288 [0.6960262] 
 Q( 50) = 58.5049 [0.1914984]  Q( 50) = 26.9606 [0.9968408] 
US Italy 
 Q( 5) = 5.73410 [0.3329575]  Q( 5) = 3.54180 [0.6170720] 
 Q( 10) = 11.1430 [0.3464888]  Q( 10) = 6.19362 [0.7987418] 
 Q( 20) = 15.1207 [0.7694590]  Q( 20) = 12.3010 [0.9053260] 
 Q( 50) = 46.0860 [0.6311602]  Q( 50) = 42.6730 [0.7593846] 
US  Japan 
 Q( 5) = 2.26591 [0.8112602]  Q( 5) = 8.26937 [0.1420016] 
 Q( 10) = 10.1458 [0.4277986]  Q( 10) = 15.4515 [0.1164484] 
 Q( 20) = 24.4623 [0.2227827]  Q( 20) = 18.2395 [0.5716316] 
 Q( 50) = 49.8337 [0.4800205]  Q( 50) = 30.2194 [0.9878943] 
US  Spain 
 Q( 5) = 5.47041 [0.3612011]  Q( 5) = 4.73851 [0.4486184] 
 Q( 10) = 10.2578 [0.4181768]  Q( 10) = 14.1572 [0.1659432] 
 Q( 20) = 20.9266 [0.4014619]  Q( 20) = 19.2096 [0.5082449] 
 Q( 50) = 47.5400 [0.5726605]  Q( 50) = 41.2525 [0.8061907] 
US  UK 
 Q( 5) = 5.13944 [0.3991010]  Q( 5) = 4.75686 [0.4462680] 
 Q( 10) = 8.06734 [0.6222591]  Q( 10) = 10.0516 [0.4359779] 
 Q( 20) = 14.9690 [0.7781790]  Q( 20) = 19.3961 [0.4962317] 
 Q( 50) = 49.1985 [0.5054920]  Q( 50) = 40.1796 [0.8381789] 
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Table A5.3e: Autocorrelation tests for means equations. Q-statistics on standardised residuals of 
other markets and the US 
 US China 
 Q( 5) = 9.83559 [0.0800301]  Q( 5) = 0.948898 [0.9665813] 
 Q( 10) = 19.8350 [0.0308526]  Q( 10) = 1.92671 [0.9968716] 
 Q( 20) = 32.4469 [0.0387634]  Q( 20) = 9.22055 [0.9802091] 
 Q( 50) = 59.6496 [0.1648364]  Q( 50) = 31.6082 [0.9803648] 
US India 
 Q( 5) = 1.86501 [0.8674900]  Q( 5) = 6.31611 [0.2766639] 
 Q( 10) = 4.96216 [0.8936914]  Q( 10) = 7.60988 [0.6668833] 
 Q( 20) = 18.1800 [0.5755539]  Q( 20) = 18.6893 [0.5420959] 
 Q( 50) = 50.3844 [0.4581756]  Q( 50) = 48.1118 [0.5494663] 
 
 
Table A5.3f: Autocorrelation tests for variance equations. Q-statistics on squared standardised 
residuals of other markets and the US 
 US  China 
 Q( 5) = 1.43493 [0.9204540]  Q( 5) = 1.84445 [0.8702217] 
 Q( 10) = 24.2375 [0.0069944]  Q( 10) = 2.84079 [0.9849263] 
 Q( 20) = 27.5678 [0.1200311]  Q( 20) = 6.33046 [0.9983713] 
 Q( 50) = 44.1838 [0.7048642]  Q( 50) = 31.2628 [0.9825121] 
US India 
 Q( 5) = 3.85390 [0.5706374]  Q( 5) = 4.67241 [0.4571518] 
 Q( 10) = 7.57587 [0.6701881]  Q( 10) = 6.56112 [0.7661264] 
 Q( 20) = 21.7843 [0.3523267]  Q( 20) = 12.3466 [0.9036301] 












Table A5.4a: Autocorrelation tests for means and variance equations. Hosking’s tests on African 
markets 
Hosking’s multivariate portmanteau statistics on standardised 
residuals 
Hosking’s multivariate portmanteau statistics on squared 
standardised residuals 
 US and Botswana US and Botswana 
 Hosking( 5) = 7.73049 [0.9935059]  Hosking( 5) = 20.0936 [0.3275740] 
 Hosking( 10) = 22.2261 [0.9897213]  Hosking( 10) = 43.0618 [0.2635508] 
 Hosking( 20) = 64.3302 [0.8991563]   Hosking( 20) = 71.2510 [0.6925084] 
 Hosking( 50) = 222.485 [0.1318461]   Hosking( 50) = 168.204 [0.9389269] 
 US and Côte d’Ivoire  US and Côte d’Ivoire 
 Hosking( 5) = 30.9454 [0.0559158]   Hosking( 5) = 7.51286 [0.9850415] 
 Hosking( 10) = 61.3593 [0.0165030]   Hosking( 10) = 29.8633 [0.8242656] 
 Hosking( 20) = 122.389 [0.0016165]   Hosking( 20) = 58.6087 [0.9504512] 
 Hosking( 50) = 239.606 [0.0290002]   Hosking( 50) = 145.645 [0.9979641] 
 US and Egypt  US and Egypt 
 Hosking( 5) = 15.7874 [0.7297200]   Hosking( 5) = 13.0079 [0.7911027] 
 Hosking( 10) = 24.4498 [0.9748463]   Hosking( 10) = 34.4234 [0.6355947] 
 Hosking( 20) = 53.6290 [0.9897515]   Hosking( 20) = 72.2722 [0.6615090] 
 Hosking( 50) = 178.807 [0.8567689]   Hosking( 50) = 186.516 [0.7105477] 
US and Mauritius  US and Mauritius 
 Hosking( 5) = 29.8764 [0.0718814]  Hosking( 5) = 25.7104 [0.1065669] 
 Hosking( 10) = 55.8860 [0.0488321]   Hosking( 10) = 44.0118 [0.2321253] 
 Hosking( 20) = 99.7156 [0.0670549]   Hosking( 20) = 88.9666 [0.1859902] 
 Hosking( 50) = 250.602 [0.0087451]   Hosking( 50) = 207.364 [0.3096960] 
 US and Morocco US and Morocco 
 Hosking( 5) = 12.8661 [0.8830552]   Hosking( 5) = 13.4916 [0.7615792] 
 Hosking( 10) = 35.8023 [0.6596584]   Hosking( 10) = 50.0211 [0.0917083] 
 Hosking( 20) = 79.7731 [0.4861219]  Hosking( 20) = 94.9168 [0.0934516] 
 Hosking( 50) = 222.341 [0.1332821]   Hosking( 50) = 213.249 [0.2174682] 
US and Namibia   US and Namibia 
 Hosking( 5) = 22.4132 [0.3185174]  Hosking( 5) = 9.24651 [0.9537558] 
 Hosking( 10) = 35.9088 [0.6549536]   Hosking( 10) = 20.2936 [0.9917099] 
 Hosking( 20) = 69.4172 [0.7948410]   Hosking( 20) = 37.3238 [0.9999738] 
 Hosking( 50) = 180.851 [0.8305238]   Hosking( 50) = 80.3169 [1.0000000] 
US and Nigeria  US and Nigeria 
 Hosking( 5) = 13.3428 [0.8621956]   Hosking( 5) = 23.7234 [0.1643005] 
 Hosking( 10) = 29.6061 [0.8859086]   Hosking( 10) = 37.0385 [0.5137650] 
 Hosking( 20) = 63.2919 [0.9150104]   Hosking( 20) = 81.8285 [0.3613549] 







Table A5.4a: Continued 
Hosking’s multivariate portmanteau statistics on standardised 
residuals 
Hosking’s multivariate portmanteau statistics on squared 
standardised residuals 
 US and South Africa  US and South Africa  
 Hosking( 5) = 9.95895 [0.9689102]   Hosking( 5) = 31.1844 [0.0274049] 
 Hosking( 10) = 24.4466 [0.9748756]   Hosking( 10) = 52.5274 [0.0586731] 
 Hosking( 20) = 72.7590 [0.7045566]   Hosking( 20) = 93.4213 [0.1123429] 
 Hosking( 50) = 195.169 [0.5832074]   Hosking( 50) = 212.912 [0.2222485] 
 US and Tunisia US and Tunisia  
 Hosking( 5) = 17.1693 [0.6419539]   Hosking( 5) = 32.4955 [0.0191949] 
 Hosking( 10) = 36.8482 [0.6129298]   Hosking( 10) = 58.8652 [0.0165351] 
 Hosking( 20) = 53.6082 [0.9898103]   Hosking( 20) = 103.345 [0.0290059] 
 Hosking( 50) = 206.450 [0.3622852]   Hosking( 50) = 264.546 [0.0011000] 
US and Zambia  US and Zambia  
 Hosking( 5) = 6.52454 [0.9979777]  Hosking( 5) = 24.9917 [0.1251456] 
 Hosking( 10) = 15.1584 [0.9998731]   Hosking( 10) = 41.3778 [0.3254329] 
 Hosking( 20) = 59.7450 [0.9560727]   Hosking( 20) = 89.2904 [0.1797064] 






























Table A5.4b: Autocorrelation tests for means and variance equations. Hosking’s tests on developed 
markets 
Hosking’s multivariate portmanteau statistics on 
standardised residuals 
Hosking’s multivariate portmanteau statistics on squared 
standardised residuals 
US and Canada  US and Canada 
 Hosking( 5) = 29.1976 [0.0839413]  Hosking( 5) = 24.3528 [0.1438067] 
 Hosking( 10) = 43.6117 [0.3204884]  Hosking( 10) = 44.6457 [0.2125989] 
 Hosking( 20) = 73.4057 [0.6855484]  Hosking( 20) = 77.1736 [0.5051641] 
 Hosking( 50) = 177.655 [0.8703658]  Hosking( 50) = 183.023 [0.7699787] 
 US and France US and France  
 Hosking( 5) = 26.8318 [0.1400640]  Hosking( 5) = 45.9707 [0.0002996] 
 Hosking( 10) = 45.2604 [0.2617344]  Hosking( 10) = 60.7260 [0.0110202] 
 Hosking( 20) = 88.0636 [0.2515724]  Hosking( 20) = 101.032 [0.0408658] 
 Hosking( 50) = 245.362 [0.0158168]  Hosking( 50) = 229.919 [0.0595943] 
 US and Germany  US and Germany  
 Hosking( 5) = 15.9070 [0.7223750]   Hosking( 5) = 58.1189 [0.0000041] 
 Hosking( 10) = 34.6204 [0.7106449]   Hosking( 10) = 68.0836 [0.0019422] 
 Hosking( 20) = 65.6003 [0.8772478]   Hosking( 20) = 95.2541 [0.0895597] 
 Hosking( 50) = 197.491 [0.5368946]   Hosking( 50) = 248.028 [0.0090955] 
 US and Italy  US and Italy 
 Hosking( 5) = 14.2040 [0.8200020]   Hosking( 5) = 31.6765 [0.0240067] 
 Hosking( 10) = 31.5126 [0.8288881]   Hosking( 10) = 44.8493 [0.2065754] 
 Hosking( 20) = 70.9330 [0.7557149]   Hosking( 20) = 80.0478 [0.4145586] 
 Hosking( 50) = 182.466 [0.8078792]   Hosking( 50) = 210.117 [0.2642587] 
 US and Japan US and Japan 
 Hosking( 5) = 21.0035 [0.3969285]  Hosking( 5) = 22.5876 [0.2069378] 
 Hosking( 10) = 45.5692 [0.2515251]  Hosking( 10) = 67.7870 [0.0020908] 
 Hosking( 20) = 100.450 [0.0607912]  Hosking( 20) = 102.084 [0.0350333] 
 Hosking( 50) = 225.357 [0.1054795]  Hosking( 50) = 192.185 [0.6031601] 
US and Spain US and Spain 
 Hosking( 5) = 19.6028 [0.4830069]   Hosking( 5) = 40.0789 [0.0020362] 
 Hosking( 10) = 45.2087 [0.2634711]   Hosking( 10) = 64.8909 [0.0042272] 
 Hosking( 20) = 103.443 [0.0400915]  Hosking( 20) = 111.076 [0.0082547] 
 Hosking( 50) = 252.234 [0.0072144]   Hosking( 50) = 221.752 [0.1185761] 
US and UK US and UK 
 Hosking( 5) = 17.9636 [0.5898058]   Hosking( 5) = 46.2037 [0.0002770] 
 Hosking( 10) = 32.7907 [0.7836206]   Hosking( 10) = 62.3220 [0.0076943] 
 Hosking( 20) = 88.4120 [0.2434202]   Hosking( 20) = 95.8471 [0.0830321] 







Table A5.4c: Autocorrelation tests for means and variance equations. Hosking’s tests on other 
markets 
Hosking’s multivariate portmanteau statistics on 
standardised residuals 
Hosking’s multivariate portmanteau statistics on squared 
standardised residuals 
 US and China  US and China 
 Hosking( 5) = 13.7185 [0.8444763]   Hosking( 5) = 28.2733 [0.0580167] 
 Hosking( 10) = 28.4267 [0.9144461]   Hosking( 10) = 65.2399 [0.0038895] 
 Hosking( 20) = 58.6097 [0.9653731]   Hosking( 20) = 85.8073 [0.2551585] 
 Hosking( 50) = 172.703 [0.9190412]   Hosking( 50) = 186.855 [0.7044612] 
US and India US and India  
 Hosking( 5) = 16.9293 [0.6575623]   Hosking( 5) = 14.5173 [0.6948009] 
 Hosking( 10) = 26.1611 [0.9551018]   Hosking( 10) = 27.1301 [0.9052544] 
 Hosking( 20) = 72.4443 [0.7136517]   Hosking( 20) = 56.5791 [0.9677380] 



































Table A5.5a: Autocorrelation tests for means and variance equations. LM tests on African markets 
Li and McLeod’s multivariate portmanteau statistics on 
standardised residuals 
Li and McLeod’s multivariate portmanteau statistics on squared 
standardised residuals 
US and Botswana US and Botswana 
 Li-McLeod( 5) = 7.78578 [0.9931928]  Li-McLeod( 5) = 20.1218 [0.3260058] 
 Li-McLeod( 10) = 22.3406 [0.9891896]  Li-McLeod( 10) = 43.0705 [0.2632515] 
 Li-McLeod( 20) = 64.3630 [0.8986263]  Li-McLeod( 20) = 71.5448 [0.6836873] 
 Li-McLeod( 50) = 220.747 [0.1499667]  Li-McLeod( 50) = 170.014 [0.9257347] 
US and Côte d’Ivoire US and Côte d’Ivoire 
 Li-McLeod( 5) = 30.9242 [0.0561995]  Li-McLeod( 5) = 7.57278 [0.9843413] 
 Li-McLeod( 10) = 61.2090 [0.0170315]  Li-McLeod( 10) = 29.9278 [0.8220122] 
 Li-McLeod( 20) = 121.703 [0.0018448]  Li-McLeod( 20) = 58.8344 [0.9481705] 
 Li-McLeod( 50) = 239.079 [0.0305820]  Li-McLeod( 50) = 147.786 [0.9969361] 
US and Egypt US and Egypt 
 Li-McLeod( 5) = 15.8466 [0.7260955]  Li-McLeod( 5) = 13.0580 [0.7881153] 
 Li-McLeod( 10) = 24.6809 [0.9726588]  Li-McLeod( 10) = 34.4203 [0.6357370] 
 Li-McLeod( 20) = 54.1312 [0.9882517]  Li-McLeod( 20) = 72.3644 [0.6586661] 
 Li-McLeod( 50) = 179.256 [0.8512341]  Li-McLeod( 50) = 186.177 [0.7165755] 
US and Mauritius Mauritius 
 Li-McLeod( 5) = 29.8601 [0.0721517]  Li-McLeod( 5) = 25.6815 [0.1072660] 
 Li-McLeod( 10) = 55.7938 [0.0496737]  Li-McLeod( 10) = 43.9861 [0.2329389] 
 Li-McLeod( 20) = 99.6172 [0.0679324]  Li-McLeod( 20) = 88.8009 [0.1892645] 
 Li-McLeod( 50) = 248.257 [0.0114548]  Li-McLeod( 50) = 207.310 [0.3106251] 
US and Morocco US and Morocco 
 Li-McLeod( 5) = 12.8956 [0.8818169]  Li-McLeod( 5) = 13.5321 [0.7590469] 
 Li-McLeod( 10) = 35.7962 [0.6599233]  Li-McLeod( 10) = 49.8621 [0.0942388] 
 Li-McLeod( 20) = 79.6846 [0.4889152]  Li-McLeod( 20) = 94.6392 [0.0967541] 
 Li-McLeod( 50) = 221.436 [0.1425811]  Li-McLeod( 50) = 212.743 [0.2246552] 
US and Namibia US and Namibia 
 Li-McLeod( 5) = 22.4414 [0.3170490]  Li-McLeod( 5) = 9.30245 [0.9523192] 
 Li-McLeod( 10) = 36.0230 [0.6498947]  Li-McLeod( 10) = 20.4393 [0.9911134] 
 Li-McLeod( 20) = 69.6879 [0.7880980]  Li-McLeod( 20) = 38.0276 [0.9999612] 
 Li-McLeod( 50) = 181.450 [0.8223171]  Li-McLeod( 50) = 85.1658 [1.0000000] 
US and Nigeria US and Nigeria 
 Li-McLeod( 5) = 13.3808 [0.8604525]  Li-McLeod( 5) = 23.7290 [0.1641086] 
 Li-McLeod( 10) = 29.6795 [0.8839598]  Li-McLeod( 10) = 37.1347 [0.5092994] 
 Li-McLeod( 20) = 63.5395 [0.9113958]  Li-McLeod( 20) = 81.8123 [0.3618246] 








Table A5.5a: Continued 
Li and McLeod’s multivariate portmanteau statistics on 
standardised residuals 
Li and McLeod’s multivariate portmanteau statistics on 
squared standardised residuals 
US and South Africa US and South Africa 
 Li-McLeod( 5) = 10.0058 [0.9680658]  Li-McLeod( 5) = 31.1710 [0.0275030] 
 Li-McLeod( 10) = 24.5567 [0.9738522]  Li-McLeod( 10) = 52.5106 [0.0588549] 
 Li-McLeod( 20) = 72.6273 [0.7083753]  Li-McLeod( 20) = 93.4676 [0.1117163] 
 Li-McLeod( 50) = 195.112 [0.5843370]  Li-McLeod( 50) = 213.271 [0.2171684] 
US and Tunisia US and Tunisia 
 Li-McLeod( 5) = 17.1893 [0.6406514]  Li-McLeod( 5) = 32.4723 [0.0193179] 
 Li-McLeod( 10) = 36.8741 [0.6117615]  Li-McLeod( 10) = 58.7656 [0.0168913] 
 Li-McLeod( 20) = 54.1925 [0.9880569]  Li-McLeod( 20) = 103.225 [0.0295382] 
 Li-McLeod( 50) = 205.304 [0.3835523]  Li-McLeod( 50) = 261.949 [0.0015700] 
US and Zambia US and Zambia 
 Li-McLeod( 5) = 6.58288 [0.9978455]  Li-McLeod( 5) = 24.9907 [0.1251713] 
 Li-McLeod( 10) = 15.3530 [0.9998504]  Li-McLeod( 10) = 41.4265 [0.3235386] 
 Li-McLeod( 20) = 59.9013 [0.9546575]  Li-McLeod( 20) = 89.1451 [0.1825073] 


















Table A5.5b: Autocorrelation tests for means and variance equations. LM tests on developed 
markets 
Li and McLeod’s multivariate portmanteau statistics on 
standardised residuals 
Li and McLeod’s multivariate portmanteau statistics on 
squared standardised residuals 
US and Canada US and Canada 
 Li-McLeod( 5) = 29.1360 [0.0851162]  Li-McLeod( 5) = 24.3776 [0.1430421] 
 Li-McLeod( 10) = 43.6088 [0.3205996]  Li-McLeod( 10) = 44.6673 [0.2119534] 
 Li-McLeod( 20) = 73.6505 [0.6782515]  Li-McLeod( 20) = 77.4193 [0.4972735] 
 Li-McLeod( 50) = 178.874 [0.8559573]  Li-McLeod( 50) = 183.818 [0.7570192] 
US and France US and France 
 Li-McLeod( 5) = 26.8100 [0.1406956]  Li-McLeod( 5) = 45.8748 [0.0003094] 
 Li-McLeod( 10) = 45.2635 [0.2616321]  Li-McLeod( 10) = 60.6765 [0.0111419] 
 Li-McLeod( 20) = 88.1050 [0.2505960]  Li-McLeod( 20) = 101.048 [0.0407685] 
 Li-McLeod( 50) = 243.086 [0.0202163]  Li-McLeod( 50) = 229.434 [0.0622576] 
US and Germany US and Germany 
 Li-McLeod( 5) = 15.9269 [0.7211507]  Li-McLeod( 5) = 58.0796 [0.0000042] 
 Li-McLeod( 10) = 34.6525 [0.7092917]  Li-McLeod( 10) = 68.1557 [0.0019076] 
 Li-McLeod( 20) = 65.8269 [0.8730461]  Li-McLeod( 20) = 95.6821 [0.0848093] 
 Li-McLeod( 50) = 196.735 [0.5520164]  Li-McLeod( 50) = 246.451 [0.0109157] 
US and Italy US and Italy 
 Li-McLeod( 5) = 14.2377 [0.8182419]  Li-McLeod( 5) = 31.6565 [0.0241366] 
 Li-McLeod( 10) = 31.5857 [0.8264436]  Li-McLeod( 10) = 44.9063 [0.2049104] 
 Li-McLeod( 20) = 71.0590 [0.7523164]  Li-McLeod( 20) = 80.2730 [0.4076766] 
 Li-McLeod( 50) = 183.141 [0.7979475]  Li-McLeod( 50) = 209.757 [0.2699804] 
US and Japan US and Japan 
 Li-McLeod( 5) = 21.0058 [0.3967922]  Li-McLeod( 5) = 22.5782 [0.2073223] 
 Li-McLeod( 10) = 45.5077 [0.2535380]  Li-McLeod( 10) = 67.4077 [0.0022965] 
 Li-McLeod( 20) = 99.9366 [0.0651175]  Li-McLeod( 20) = 101.823 [0.0364086] 
 Li-McLeod( 50) = 224.321 [0.1144923]  Li-McLeod( 50) = 193.487 [0.5772953] 
US and Spain US and Spain 
 Li-McLeod( 5) = 19.6105 [0.4825212]  Li-McLeod( 5) = 40.0142 [0.0020780] 
 Li-McLeod( 10) = 45.1530 [0.2653466]  Li-McLeod( 10) = 64.7683 [0.0043523] 
 Li-McLeod( 20) = 103.089 [0.0421765]  Li-McLeod( 20) = 110.880 [0.0085381] 
 Li-McLeod( 50) = 250.057 [0.0093171]  Li-McLeod( 50) = 222.080 [0.1155762] 
US and UK  US and UK 
 Li-McLeod( 5) = 17.9763 [0.5889711]  Li-McLeod( 5) = 46.0871 [0.0002881] 
 Li-McLeod( 10) = 32.8756 [0.7804300]  Li-McLeod( 10) = 62.2541 [0.0078144] 
 Li-McLeod( 20) = 88.1857 [0.2486970]  Li-McLeod( 20) = 95.9771 [0.0816541] 










Table A5.5c: Autocorrelation tests for means and variance equations. LM tests on other markets 
Li and McLeod’s multivariate portmanteau statistics on 
standardised residuals 
Li and McLeod’s multivariate portmanteau statistics on 
squared standardised residuals 
US and China US and China 
 Li-McLeod( 5) = 13.7467 [0.8431025]  Li-McLeod( 5) = 28.2492 [0.0583627] 
 Li-McLeod( 10) = 28.5272 [0.9122165]  Li-McLeod( 10) = 64.9959 [0.0041229] 
 Li-McLeod( 20) = 58.9036 [0.9631248]  Li-McLeod( 20) = 86.0434 [0.2495009] 
 Li-McLeod( 50) = 173.119 [0.9155490]  Li-McLeod( 50) = 188.106 [0.6815600] 
US and India US and India 
 Li-McLeod( 5) = 16.9570 [0.6557610]  Li-McLeod( 5) = 14.5398 [0.6932844] 
 Li-McLeod( 10) = 26.3272 [0.9527176]  Li-McLeod( 10) = 27.2440 [0.9024650] 
 Li-McLeod( 20) = 72.4721 [0.7128520]  Li-McLeod( 20) = 56.9463 [0.9650169] 


































































































































Figure A5.19: Conditional correlations, conditional variances, ratio of conditional variances and conditional covariance of India and US 
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6 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The objectives of this chapter are threefold. The first objective is to draw some 
conclusion as to which is the preferred econometric methodology. In order to do this a 
comparison of the results obtained by using the separate VARs approach used in 
Chapter 4 and the dynamic conditional correlation approach (using MGARCH) used in 
Chapter 5 are examined in Section 6.2. This comparison, along with some theoretical 
considerations, is then used in Section 6.3 to identify the most preferred contagion 
econometric methodology in the context of this thesis. 
The second objective is to use the preferred methodology identified to describe the 
differences found in respect to contagion in African and developed markets. This is 
done in Section 6.4, which summarises the differences in respect to the “long period” 
and “short periods” contagion events identified in the previous chapters. 
The third objective is to use the findings of the thesis to examine the differences in the 
pathways or channels through which contagion effects develop in African markets and 
developed markets. In Section 6.5, I examine the applicability of the non-behavioural 
explanations first identified in Chapter 2, Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. I then examine the 
results from a behavioural perspective in Section 6.6 in the context of the model 
framework developed in Chapter 3, Figure 3.12. This applies a number of the 
behavioural concepts and ideas first identified in Chapter 2, Section 2.5 to the 
econometric findings of this thesis. This is done as part of the process of identifying the 
reasons for finding differences in contagion effects in African markets and developed 
289 
 
markets. Finally, Section 6.7 draws some conclusions in respect to the differences in the 
channels that contagion effects follow in respect to African and developed markets. 
A preliminary observation that can be made is that it would not be unexpected to find 
significant differences in the channels that contagion takes in African and developed 
markets: this given the large differences in the pre-crisis and crisis-period correlations 
with the US observed in the data. This finding sits comfortably with the distinction I 
made between high-integration markets and low-integration markets. Within the African 
markets, only South Africa can be observed as possibly straddling the high-
integration/low-integration dividing line. 
It is necessary to point out that the behavioural interpretation made of the contagion 
events found in this thesis (Section 6.6) are not formally tested.  
 
6.2 COMPARISON OF THE SEPARATE VARs AND DYNAMIC 
CONDITIONAL CORRELATION RESULTS 
 
This section discusses the results obtained from the implementation of the separate 
VARs (SV) and dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) models applied in Chapters 4 
and 5. Recall that at the end of Chapter 4, the SV model was chosen as the preferred 
model of the static correlation models employed (see Chapter 4, Section 4.5). Therefore, 
only the SV model results will be compared in this section against the respective DCC 
model results. It can be recalled that the findings of Chapters 4 and 5 were discussed in 
terms of the one long and four short sub-crisis periods. In respect to the SV 
methodology, only the cumulative impact of sub-period 1-4 and the long crisis period 
could be used in contagion testing because of the relatively small crisis windows in sub-
periods 1, 1-2 and 1-3 timeframes. The respective correlation and contagion results from 
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the cumulative impact of sub-period 1-4 and the long crisis period presented in Chapters 
4 and 5, respectively, are reproduced in Table 6.132 below. The two approaches show 
clear differences in respect to contagion. It can be noted that: 
• The DCC model found contagion in Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire and Mauritius in 
the two sample periods while the SV model did not. 
• Evidence of contagion is only found from the cumulative impact of sub-period 
1-4 in Morocco and Japan across both methodologies but not in the long period. 
• France provided contagion in the long period across both models but not in sub-
period 1-4. 
• The DCC model finds more evidence of contagion in African markets (seven 
markets from sub-period 1-4 and five markets in the long period) than does the 
SV model (three in African markets from the cumulative impact of sub-period 1- 
4 and two in the long crisis period). 
• For the developed markets, the DCC model found evidence of four contagion 
events in sub-period 1-4 and evidence of six contagion events in the long crisis 
period, while the SV model provided evidence of more contagion in sub-period 








                                                 
32 The DCC estimates are mean values calculated over the period in question. 
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Table 6.1: Correlation and contagion results using the SV and DCC methodologies 
 
Pre-crisis Sub-period 1-4 Long period Sub-period 1-4 Long period 
DCC SV DCC SV DCC SV DCC SV DCC SV 
African markets 
 BWA  -0.028 -0.038 0.045 0.104 0.011 0.051 No Yes No Yes 
 CIV  0.028 0.024 0.110 -0.094 0.036 0.039 No Yes No Yes 
 EGY  0.155 0.100 0.284 0.645 0.194 0.297 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 MUS  0.043 0.035 0.043 0.288 0.043 0.096 No Yes No Yes 
 MAR  0.011 -0.043 0.152 0.486 0.017 0.083 Yes Yes No No 
 NAM  0.342 0.298 0.369 0.320 0.318 0.211 No Yes No No 
 NGA  0.043 -0.015 0.043 -0.281 0.043 0.044 No No No No 
 SA  0.416 0.382 0.539 0.716 0.547 0.577 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 TUN  0.066 0.077 0.066 0.206 0.066 0.121 No No No No 
 ZMB  -0.016 0.007 -0.016 0.153 -0.016 -0.012 No  No  No  No  
Developed markets 
 CAN 0.763 0.680 0.770 0.910 0.828 0.863 Yes No Yes Yes 
 FRA  0.713 0.653 0.687 0.772 0.745 0.763 No No Yes Yes 
 GER  0.664 0.587 0.737 0.887 0.769 0.799 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 ITA  0.531 0.457 0.516 0.697 0.567 0.597 Yes No Yes Yes 
 JPN  0.246 0.276 0.309 0.555 0.246 0.374 Yes Yes No No 
 SPN  0.602 0.563 0.630 0.756 0.704 0.728 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 UK  0.665 0.630 0.681 0.789 0.720 0.756 Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  
Other markets 
 CHN  0.059 -0.001 0.149 0.013 0.091 0.142 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 IND  0.314 0.210 0.452 0.010 0.418 0.555 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Although Table 6.1 shows a substantial number of differences, there are also some 
consistent results. For example, three markets (Nigeria, Tunisia and Zambia) provided 
no contagion in all cases. 
Turning now to an examination of the correlations, it can be seen that although the two 
methodologies produced similar values in many instances there are also some 
significant differences, for example, in respect to Nigeria, Tunisia, Mauritius and 
Zambia. While the DCC shows no change in the correlations of these countries in the 
crisis periods, the SV model shows appreciable changes. For instance, the DCC 
correlation for Nigeria is 0.043 in all periods, but the SV correlations show −0.015 
during the period of stability and −0.281 and 0.044 for the cumulative impact of sub-
period 1-4 and the long crisis period. Similarly, for Tunisia, Mauritius and Zambia, 
which showed no change in the DCC across the two periods, show appreciable change 
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from the cumulative impact of sub-period 1-4 and the long crisis period of the SV 
model. The lack of variation in the DCC coefficients in respect to some countries results 
from a lack of statistical significance in the alpha term in Equation 5.6 (see Chapter 5 
and also Appendix 5.2). 
 
6.3 IDENTIFYING THE PREFERRED ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
 
Identifying the preferred methodology in respect to measuring contagion is potentially 
problematical. Table 6.2 shows that the results of the two methods show significant 
differences. So how is this choice to be made? A number of issues can be identified. 
1. The SV approach is based on a single correlation estimate. Unlike the DCC 
approach, it does not allow for the exploration of the impact of the crisis on a 
time-varying basis (see Figures A5.1 to A5.19 in Chapter 5 appendix in respect 
to examples of time-varying correlations). 
2. The SV approach can only be applied if the crisis period lasts over a sufficiently 
long period to provide adequate data. This can be seen to be a disadvantage in 
respect to this thesis as the first three short sub-periods cannot be modelled. 
3. As identified in Section 6.2 above, in instances where the alpha coefficient in 
Equation 5.6 is not statistically significant, the lack of time variation in 
correlations estimated by the DCC model has to be treated with caution. 
4. The functional form of volatility can potentially change significantly during a 
crisis period. The DCC approach has an advantage here in that volatility that 
takes different functional forms can be modelled. A number of these different 
forms have been identified in Chapter 5, Section 5.5.3 (for example, 
GJRGARCH model; Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle 1993, threshold GARCH 
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model; Zakoian 1994, nonlinear ARCH model; Higgins and Bera 1992, 
nonlinear asymmetric GARCH model; Engle and Ng 1993. 
5. It can also be noted that, although it has not been applied in this thesis, 
asymmetric correlations models are now available in respect to the DCC-type 
methodology (see, for example, Asai 2013). 
On balance, I conclude that although the DCC methodology has some limitations in 
respect to my thesis (principally, in respect to modelling correlation dynamics in respect 
to a number of African countries) it has a number of both practical and theoretical 
advantages over the SV method. On this basis I use the DCC results in my examination 
of contagion in the subsequent section of this chapter. 
 
6.4 CONTAGION DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AFRICAN AND DEVELOPED 
MARKETS 
 
6.4.1 Differences in integration 
The key differences between African and developed markets can be identified in terms 
of the level of integration of the markets with the US. Broadly speaking, African 
markets have relatively low levels of integration (Boamah 2014, Agyei-Ampomah 2011 
and, Bekaert et al. 2011) and developed markets have high levels of integration with the 
US (Bekaert et al. 2011). The degree of integration is normally defined in terms of the 
correlation. 
On this basis, Table 6.2 shows that, of the African countries, only South Africa can be 
described as being highly integrated with the US before the crisis, and this was only to a 
marginal degree. The comparative emerging markets used, China and India, are also 
seen to show low integration during the pre-crisis (or stable period). Of the developed 
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markets, only Japan falls into the low-integration category. The classification of 
countries according to the integration level is shown in Figure 6.1 below. 
Table 6.2: DCC correlations for all countries during all crisis periods 
 
Pre-crisis 
period Sub-period 1 Sub-period 1-2 Sub-period 1- 3 Sub-period 1-4 Long period 
African markets 
 BWA  -0.028 0.012 0.014 0.020 0.045 0.011 
 CIV  0.028 0.103 0.113 0.119 0.11 0.036 
 EGY  0.155 0.243 0.255 0.263 0.284 0.194 
 MUS  0.043 0.043* 0.043* 0.043* 0.043* 0.043* 
 MAR  0.011 0.131 0.139 0.144 0.152 0.017 
 NAM  0.342 0.367 0.366 0.367 0.369 0.318 
 NGA 0.043 0.043* 0.043* 0.043* 0.043* 0.043* 
 SA  0.416 0.496 0.504 0.514 0.539 0.547 
 TUN  0.066 0.067 0.067 0.066* 0.066* 0.066* 
 ZMB -0.016 -0.016* -0.016* -0.016* -0.016* -0.016* 
Developed markets 
 CAN 0.763 0.717 0.730 0.744 0.770 0.828 
 FRA  0.713 0.666 0.672 0.678 0.687 0.745 
 GER  0.664 0.708 0.716 0.724 0.737 0.769 
 ITA  0.531 0.477 0.484 0.494 0.516 0.567 
 JPN  0.246 0.257 0.273 0.290 0.309 0.246 
 SPN  0.602 0.617 0.617 0.622 0.63 0.704 
 UK  0.665 0.665* 0.669 0.673 0.681 0.720 
Other markets 
 CHN  0.059 0.176 0.175 0.170 0.149 0.091 
 IND  0.314 0.378 0.403 0.423 0.452 0.418 
*There is small variation in crisis-period correlations beyond three decimal places when compared with the stable period. 
In respect to African markets, my findings (Table 6.2) are in line with those of Boamah 
(2014), and Agyei-Ampomah (2011). These studies report that, except for South Africa, 
other African markets are segmented from world markets. Morales and Andreosso-
O’Callaghan (2010) also reported that the US has a strong influence on the South 
African market. 
The low pre-crisis correlations for the next largest African markets, Egypt and Nigeria, 
are possibly a little surprising. It can be noted, however, that both of these markets 
experienced internal problems of their own before the crisis. For instance, Egypt was 
experiencing an internal uprising from April 2008, before the final outburst that became 
the Egyptian revolution in 2011. In addition, the country also experienced a food crisis 
between 2007 and 2008. In 2007, Nigeria was also troubled by continued turmoil in the 
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oil-producing Niger Delta and, on the political scene; the new president elected in 2007 
was faced with fraud allegations, which led to political unrest in different parts of the 
country. Six governors elected in 2007 were annulled in 2008 (AfDB/OECD 2008). All 
these problems might have had a great impact on the countries’ stock markets by 
reducing international investment, which would in turn segment the countries from the 
world market, which is dominated by the US. The least-correlated African markets are 
Botswana and Zambia, which produced −0.028 and −0.016 during the stable period. 
High correlations are evident between the US and all developed markets except Japan 
(0.246) during the stable period. The highest correlation is observed in Canada (0.763.) 
This is not surprising because Canada and the US belong to the same region and are 
both very advanced markets. 
It can be speculated that differences in the levels of market integration may reflect a 
number of factors. These are likely to include the strength of trading relationships (see 
Figure 6.3 below) and the strength of linkages between financial markets. The latter 
issue became clearly apparent during the 2007-09 crisis as the spider’s web of 
internationally traded derivative products began to unravel. This was no more apparent 








Figure 6.1: Integration based on pre-crisis DCC correlations 
 
 
6.4.2 Differences in contagion 
As identified in Chapter 2, contagion is commonly referred as occurring when 
correlations increase by a statistically significant amount after a shock. This is 
distinguished from interdependence in high-integration countries where the increase in 
correlation is not found to be significant at the 5% level (Forbes and Rigobon 2002). In 
low-integration countries, an insignificant increase or a decrease in correlation is 
identified as no contagion. 
Using the above basis, Figure 6.2 below identifies instances of contagion and 
interdependence in high and low-integration countries in respect to the various test 
periods identified in this thesis. 
For the highly integrated markets, the figure indicates that: 
1. South Africa, Germany and Spain are the only highly integrated markets to show 
evidence of contagion throughout the sample periods. 
Level of integration 
High integrated 
markets 
South Africa, Canada, France, 




Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Nambia, 
Nigeria, Tunisia, Zambia, Japan, 
China and India 
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2. When compared to the pre-crisis correlations, reductions in correlations are 
observed in Canada, France and Italy in sub-period 1 and from the cumulative 
impact of sub-periods 1 -2, and 1-3. France and Italy also showed reduction in 
correlations in respect to the cumulative impact of sub-period 1-4.  
3. The UK became contaminated when contagion is tested on the impact of sub-
periods 1-3, 1-4 and in the long crisis period. 
4. Interdependence is found in Canada from the cumulative test on sub-period 1-4. 
5. In the long crisis period all highly integrated markets appear affected by the 
crisis in the form of contagion effect. 
For the low-integrated markets; 
1. The crisis took a contagious effect in Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, China and 
India throughout the crisis periods, including the long crisis period. 
2. Japan is contaminated from the cumulative impact of sub-periods 1-2; 1-3 and; 
1-4. 
3. Morocco and Namibia show contagion effect in the four sub-crisis periods. 
4. Tunisia and Zambia show no contagion throughout the sample periods. 
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Figure 6.2: 33Categorisation of market responses to different events during financial crisis 
                                                 





Period 1: SA, GER and SPN  
Period 2: SA, GER and SPN 
Period 3: SA,GER, SPN and UK 
Period 4: SA, GER, SPN and UK 
Long period: SA, CAN, FRA, 
GER,  ITA,SPN and UK 
Interdependence 
effect 
Period 1: NONE (Reduction in 
correlation is observed in CAN, FRA, 
ITA and UK) 
Period 2 UK 
Period 3: NONE (UK became 
contaminated in sub-period 3) 
Period 4: CAN 






Period 1: BWA, CIV, EGY, MAR, NAM, CHN and IND   
Period 2: BWA, CIV,EGY, MAR, NAM,, JPN, CHN and 
IND 
Period 3: BWA, CIV,EGY, MAR, NAM,, JPN, CHN and 
IND 
Period 4: BWA, CIV,EGY, MAR, NAM, JPN, CHN and 
IND 





Period 1: TUN, ZMB and JPN 
Period 2: TUN and ZMB 
Period 3: TUN and ZMB 
Period 4: TUN and ZMB  
Long period: MAR, NAM, 





The strong contagion found in South Africa, over all periods, is not surprising. South 
Africa is the largest market in Africa and the most integrated with the world market. 
Apart from South Africa, the remaining African markets demonstrated low correlation 
before the crisis, but interestingly a number of small markets such as Botswana, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Morocco and Namibia exhibited contagion during the crisis. Although my 
methodology (I am using the DCC results for this analysis) differs from Collins and 
Biekpe (2003), they also found contagion effect in small African markets (Mauritius 
and Namibia) prior to applying the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) heteroscedasticity 
adjustment. 
The next largest markets in Africa after South Africa are Egypt and Nigeria. Although 
Nigeria is omitted from the analysis because of statistical issues, it can be seen that 
Egypt is contaminated in all the crisis periods. 
My findings can be compared most closely to those of Asongu (2011b). Although the 
study adopted the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) approach, it also measured contagion 
across three time periods during the 2007 financial crisis (short-term turmoil period, 
medium-term turmoil period and long-term turmoil period). Asongu (2011b) found 
evidence of contagion in Botswana, Egypt, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa 
and Tunisia in at least in one of the periods tested, even after adjusting for 
heteroscedasticity in accordance with Forbes and Rigobon (2002). They found only 
Morocco and Kenya to show no contagion in all the three periods they tested. 
My findings can also be compared, from a methodological perspective, with the results 
of Morales and Andreosso-O’Callaghan (2010). For robustness they also adopted three 
testing frameworks; Forbes and Rigobon 2002, GARCH (1, 1) and GARCH errors per 
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regional market. Using two different US indices (S&P 500 and the Dow Jones), they 
also found evidence of contagion in African markets. It is interesting to note that 
Nigeria is their only market to show no contagion in all testing frameworks and with 
both indices. 
A further examination of the correlations in Table 6.2 provides support for the argument 
of Kassim (2013:80) that the nature of integration changes during a crisis and that 
markets often move in unison. Similarly, my results are consistent with those of Tuluca 
and Zwick (2001), Cheng and Glascock (2006) and Kang and Yoon (2011), who all 
found increased feedback and integration between markets after crisis. As can be seen 
from Table 6.2, except for Mauritius, Nigeria, Tunisia and Zambia, the remaining six 
African countries demonstrated an increase in correlations during crisis. Botswana 
moved from −0.028 during the stable period to 0.012 in sub-period 1 and continued to 
increase through to sub-period 1-4. A similar pattern is observed in Egypt and Morocco. 
South Africa, however, is the only African market to demonstrate continued increase in 
correlation throughout the four sub-crisis periods through to the long crisis period. 
The table also shows that the African markets had their highest correlations during the 
short crisis samples. These include Botswana, Egypt, Morocco and Namibia from the 
cumulative impact of sub-period 1-4 and Côte d’Ivoire from the cumulative impact of 
sub-period 1-3. The only highly integrated African market, South Africa, had its highest 
correlation in the long crisis period and its lowest correlation in sub-period 1. It can also 
be noted that the lowest correlations for all the lowly integrated African markets were in 
the long crisis period. These findings provide the conclusion that as the crisis period 
lengthened, the low-integrated markets stopped responding to the crisis. This 
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behaviour, I argue, can possibly be explained in terms of behavioural factors 
(addressed in more detail in Section 6.6). 
 
Developed markets 
With the exception of Japan, all the developed markets are classed as highly integrated 
with the US; therefore, it is expected that they will be subject to interdependence or 
contagion effects. OECD (2012:3) gave possible reasons why. They argued: 
“International financial integration is commonly seen as increasing economic efficiency 
and growth, but it may also increase countries’ vulnerability to contagion. Not 
surprisingly, the more banks lend to each other through cross-border loans, the higher 
the risk of contagion. Larger rollover risk due to shorter maturities of cross-border bank 
debt further increases vulnerability”. 
My findings, however, suggest that contagion effects were far from uniform across the 
crisis periods. They show that, apart from Germany and Spain, no other developed 
market was contaminated in sub-period 1. A negative impact on correlation (reduction 
in correlation during crisis) was found in respect to; Canada, France, Italy and the UK in 
sub-period 1 and; Canada, France and Italy from the cumulative impact of sub period 1-
2. The negative effect continued in Canada, France and Italy in sub-period 1-3. 
Correlation between the US and Canada increased when the cumulative impact of sub-
period 1-4 is compared against the stable period in the form of interdependence. UK 
became contaminated sub-periods 1-3 and 1-4 after demonstrating interdependence 
from the cumulative impact of sub-period 1-2.  
The only low-integrated developed market, which is Japan, shows evidence of 
contagion from the cumulative impact of periods 1-2; 1-3 and; 1-4 but not in the long 
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crisis period. All the highly integrated markets showed evidence of contagion in the 
long crisis period. One possible explanation of this finding is that as most of the other 
developed markets in my sample are more strongly integrated with the US than 
Germany and Spain, they showed no significant jump in correlation at the onset of the 
crisis. The high volatility observed in most of these markets during crisis (See Figures 
3.9 and 3.10 in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2.3) may merely reflect a continuation of the 
strong underlying integrated relationship between the markets and the US. 
My findings in respect to developed markets are similar to others found in the literature. 
For instance, Horta, Mendes and Vieira (2008) found significant evidence of contagion 
in Canada, Japan, Italy, France and the UK but not in Germany and Portugal (the 
authors suggest interdependence for Germany and Portugal). They also reported that 
Canada has the highest intensity of contagion observed. More recently, Chenguel (2014) 
also, examining the subprime crisis, detected that the US is a source of contagion to 
France, Germany and the UK. 
My work also suggests evidence of contagion in other emerging markets; specifically 
China and India. This supports the findings of Morales and Andreosso-O’Callaghan 
(2010) who also found evidence of contagion in India during the 2007 financial crisis. It 
can be noted however that Asongu (2011b) found no evidence of contagion in India 
although China provided evidence of contagion for its short-term turmoil period. 
 
6.4.3 Differences between African and developed markets 
Considerable differences between these two groups can be noted from Table 6.2. It can 
be seen that correlations in some developed markets (Canada, France, and Italy) fell 
303 
 
after the onset of crisis in sub-period 1 and did not change appreciably in respect to the 
UK. 
There were also considerable differences within developed markets as the crisis 
developed. For example, while Germany continue to show an increase in correlation 
throughout the sample periods, Spain showed no appreciable change between sub-
periods 1 and  1-2, but increased from cumulative impact of sub-period 1-3 through to 
the long crisis period. The only low-integrated developed market, which is Japan, 
showed continuous increases in correlation from sub-periods 1, 1-2, 1-3 and 1-4 
demonstrating similarities with some African markets. Also observed from the table is 
that only the correlations from the cumulative impact of sub-period 1-4 and the long 
crisis period are higher than the stable period correlation in Canada. In France and Italy, 
only the long crisis period correlations of 0.745 and 0.567 are higher than their stable 
period correlations of 0.713 and 0.531, respectively. 
China and India showed increases in correlation at the onset of crisis. For instance, 
China’s correlation with the US moved from 0.059 before the crisis to 0.176 in sub-
period 1. Although the correlations reduced as the crisis period lengthened, they still 
stood above the stable period correlation, providing the basis for evidence of contagion 
throughout the sample periods. 
The most striking difference between the African market and the developed markets 
correlations is that the African markets, excluding South Africa, produced their highest 
correlations in at least in one, of the short sub-crisis periods. This can be contrasted with 
the highly integrated markets which exhibited their highest correlations in the long 
crisis period (as did South Africa). This finding is very interesting as it provides 
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evidence of strong differences in the financial linkages/integration between markets-
types. 
 
6.5 NON-BEHAVIOURAL EXPLANATIONS FOR DIFFERENCES IN THE 
CONTAGION EFFECTS FOUND 
 
I would argue that my results, as examined in Section 6.4, provide clear evidence that 
contagion effects resulting from the 2007-09 financial crisis differed considerably 
between African and developed markets. In this section and also Section 6.6 I examine 
why this may have been the case. In doing this I will examine the possible channels that 
contagion developed along and also, in Section 6.6, possible differences in the ways in 
which behavioural forces influenced these markets. 
 
6.5.1 Type of banking system in Africa 
One of the potential reasons for the differences found could lie in the differences 
between the banking systems of African and developed-country markets. Unlike 
developed market banking sectors, with their strong focus on investment banking, 
African banking sectors (with the possible exception of South Africa) focus almost 
exclusively on the retail sector. Kasekende et al. (2009:65) reported that, “most banks in 
Africa are engaged in the retail banking business; they deal with the general public 
(households) and businesses by taking in deposits and giving out loans. These banks 
require standard inputs such as deposits, workers (labour) and capital equipment (such 
as computers) in order to produce standard banking products such as consumer loans, 
mortgages, and overdrafts”. Similarly, Allen, Otchere and Senbet (2011) reported that 
the banking systems in Africa consist mainly of central banks and deposit-taking 
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institutions made up of local banks and branches or subsidiaries of foreign banks. 
African banks largely avoid complex derivatives and are less dependent on external 
financing (AfDB, 2009). EIB (2013:17) also states in respect to Sub-Saharan African 
Banks: “Most banking systems in Sub-Saharan Africa are small in absolute and relative 
size. They are characterised by low loan-deposit ratios and, as a corollary, large shares 
of assets held in the form of government securities and liquid assets. Lending is mainly 
short-term in nature, with about 60% of loans having a maturity of less than one year”. 
Unlike their African counterparts, developed-country banks have large investment arms. 
They offer an array of products including currency, commodities and their derivatives. 
The trading of such products tends to be internationally based with large investment 
banks having significant presences in all of the world’s major financial centres, such as 
London, New York, Singapore and Hong Kong. With such strong linkages between 
markets, high correlations between markets are not unexpected. 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) examined bank performance during the 2007 financial crisis 
and found the best-performing banks were those operating in a traditional banking 
system. While their research incorporated only one African country (South Africa), the 
characteristics of the better-performing banks as reported are strongly associated with 
Africa’s banking system. They also noted that better-performing banks in developed 
countries, notably HSBC, rely mostly on deposit rather than investment banking.  
EIB (2013) reported that Sub-Saharan African banking systems were well positioned to 
handle the global financial crisis in 2008. However, EIB (2013:20) also noted: 
“Systemic financial stress was recorded only in Nigeria, where the flight of foreign 
portfolio capital contributed to the collapse of a stock market bubble that had been 
fuelled, in good part, by margin lending by banks to equity investors. The Central Bank 
306 
 
of Nigeria eventually took control of ten banks, collectively accounting for one-third of 
banking system assets, which had suffered large losses on their loan portfolios. Some 
major international banks with a significant African footprint experienced stresses 
during the crisis period, but the spill-over impact on their (largely self-funded) African 
operations was very modest”. 
It is possible to argue that the findings in this thesis of strong long-period contagion 
effects in developed markets may possibly reflect this underperformance of major 
developed-country investment banks during this relatively long crisis period. The few 
long-period contagion effects found in Africa may conversely, reflect the fact that the 
retail-based African banks did not suffer losses to the same extent as their investment 
bank-related, developed-country counterparts. It may well be that the short-period 
contagion effects in Africa are therefore more indicative of short-lived behavioural 
factors such as herding. 
 
6.5.2 Presence of foreign banks in Africa 
It should be noted that there are some major intraregional differences within the African 
banking sector. This may possibly explain why in some notable cases, for example, 
Botswana, long-run contagion was found. Botswana is fairly unique in that it has a 
relatively large foreign bank sector (see Botswana Financial Sector Review 2009/2010). 
The emergence of Africa as a focal point for new investment by foreign banks over the 
last few years has highlighted its relative attractiveness to investors in comparison with 
mature economies. It is a continent with some of the world’s fastest-growing 
economies, such as Nigeria, and offers new opportunities as opposed to the stagnation 
seen in many developed economies. According to the Ernst and Young (2014) Africa 
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Attractiveness Survey, intra-African investment and expansion is growing, with foreign 
direct investment (FDI) into Sub-Saharan Africa at the highest level than it has been in 
years; with this has come a rapid increase in the degree and extent of involvement of 
foreign banks on the continent. Andrew England (Financial Times, 2 January 2012) 
quoted John Coulter of JP Morgan Chase on investment in Africa: “The opportunity we 
see in Africa is really to build out our commercial banking business to deliver treasury 
and corporate banking services to our clients across Africa, at the same time opening up 
the way for investment banking opportunities. If we invest now, then we will reap the 
upturn in Africa, whether it is in five years, ten years or twenty years, but we recognise 
that we need to make that investment now”. 
Pera (2013), argued this involvement in Africa has been paying off as follows: 
• Foreign banks account for 15% of total profits and 19% of total pre-tax profits; 
• Foreign bank profitability exceeds that of banks operating locally and African 
banks operating across the continent; 
• Foreign banks earn a return on assets of 3.75%, well ahead of the average 
3.03%. 
Pera (2013) further noted that the distribution of foreign banks across nations of the 
continent is not uniform. Countries such as Egypt, Algeria and Francophone African 
states have long had a significant presence of foreign banks and that South Africa has 
seen several foreign banks, including Barclays, Credit Suisse and the Chinese ICBC, 
develop a presence in recent times. EIB (2013) reported that there are 12 registered 
branches of foreign banks in South Africa. Nigeria has seen some influx of a few 
foreign banks, notably Standard Chartered Bank (headquartered in London) and 
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Citibank (headquartered in New York, US), but the significance of foreign banks 
remains relatively low at less than 20%. 
Evidence of contagion found in some of the African markets could be attributed to the 
presence of foreign banks in the region. OECD (2012:3) submitted: “Financial 
contagion through international banking occurs, e.g. when banks in a given country 
respond to deteriorations in their balance sheet by reducing cross-border loans, 
including vis-à-vis clients in countries that are not directly exposed to the initial 
financial shock”. Most of the foreign banks in Africa have their headquarters in the UK, 
France and Portugal – these countries suffered huge losses during the financial crisis 
(AfDB, 2009).  
The most vulnerable African countries to be affected through this means include 
Botswana, Cape Verde, Chad, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial 
Guinea, Lesotho and Zambia ( UN/AUC, 2009). Of these African countries, Botswana, 
Côte d’Ivoire and Zambia are investigated for financial contagion in this thesis. 
Contagion is evident in Botswana and Côte d’Ivoire. In addition, the thesis also found 
contagion in Egypt and South Africa, where the presence of foreign banks is 
documented by Pera (2013). 
It has been reported that Africa has continued to draw in more foreign banks even after 
the financial crisis. For instance, Andrew England (2012) of the Financial Times 
reported that, since 2012 not only have Western banks sought to boost their positions in 
Africa, but Chinese industrial and commercial banks are also increasing their presence. 
Andrew England (2012) submit that; “The shift, bankers say, is driven by the stagnation 
of developed economies, coupled with the potential of a resource-rich, but 
underdeveloped continent with one billion people”. 
309 
 
Africa’s attractiveness as a destination for FDI is at an all-time high, and can be 
expected to continue increasing, as long as policies supporting good governance and 
growth are implemented. As such, there is a continued likelihood that the presence of 
foreign players in the banking sector is set to increase in order to take advantage of the 
massive potential Africa has to offer as economies grow and diversify. If this is 
achieved, then Africa is likely to be vulnerable to more contagion effect in the future as 
a result of increased financial integration with the world market. 
 
6.5.3 African stock markets’ illiquidity 
The prevalence of contagion may, in part be linked to the size and the liquidity of stock 
markets. It will be argued in Section 6.6 that social networks may possibly be a key 
behavioural driver of contagion. Relatively small and illiquid markets may reflect the 
fact that markets contain a relatively small number of active traders. In such 
circumstances social networks are likely to be relatively small among the trading 
community, which has been shown to encourage contagion effects (Gai and Kapadia 
2010). 
The fact that there is relatively low capitalisation in many African markets indicates that 
illiquidity may be an issue in African contagion. Table 6.3 shows the market 
capitalisation of listed companies for all countries. Values are provided by the World 
Bank (2014) in US dollars. From the table, we can see that the South African market is 
the most liquid African market. In 2007, the JSE traded stocks worth $833,547,930,000, 
followed by Egypt at $139,289,000,000. Zambia and Tunisia traded stocks worth only 
$2,345,885,000 and $5,355,080,000 in the same year. It is also evident from the table 
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that the 2007-09 crisis impacted upon the African markets as evidenced by the reduction 
in the market capitalisation of all markets in 2008.  
The values for African markets are hugely different from the value of stocks traded on 
developed-country markets. The highest market capitalisation was observed in Japan at 
$4,453,474,908,957 in 2007. For the highly integrated markets, the highest market 
capitalisation in 2007 was in the UK at $3,858,505,426,696. This presents an area of 
concern for the African countries and their stock market development.  
Table 6.3: Market capitalisation of listed companies in US billion dollars 
African 
markets   2006   2007   2008   2009   2010  
 BWA   3.95   5.89   3.56   4.28   4.08  
 CIV   4.16   8.35   7.07   6.14   7.10  
 EGY   93.48   139.29   85.89   89.95   82.49  
 MUS   3.60   5.67   3.44   4.74   7.44  
 MAR   49.36   75.49   65.75   62.91   69.15  
 NAM   0.54   0.70   0.62   0.85   1.18  
 NGA   32.82   86.35   49.80   33.32   50.88  
 SA   715.03   833.55   491.28   704.82   635.35  
 TUN   4.45   5.36   6.37   9.12   10.68  
 ZMB   1.19   2.35    2.80   2.82  
Developed markets 
 CAN  1,700.71   2,186.55   1,002.22   1,680.96   2,160.23  
 FRA   2,428.57   2,771.22   1,492.33   1,972.04   1,926.49  
 GER   1,637.83   2,105.51   1,107.96   1,297.57   1,429.71  
 ITA   1,026.64   1,072.69   520.86   317.32   318.14  
 JPN   4,726.27   4,453.47   3,220.49   3,377.89   4,099.59  
 SPN   1,323.09   1,800.10   946.11   1,297.23   1,171.61  
 UK   3,794.31   3,858.51   1,851.95   2,796.44   3,107.04  
 Other markets  
 CHN   2,426.33   6,226.31   2,793.61   5,007.65   4,762.84  
 IND   818.88   1,819.10   645.48   1,179.24   1,615.86  
Source: World Bank, 2014 
Further evidence of Africa’s illiquidity is provided in Table 6.4. As it was difficult to 
obtain accurate market listings for all countries especially the African markets, we rely 
on domestic listed companies’ data provided by the World Bank (2014). It is evident 
from the table that seven countries out of our total of ten African countries have less 
than 60 domestic listed companies on their exchanges. The smallest numbers come from 
Namibia, Botswana and Zambia. 
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These figures suggest that, apart from South Africa and Egypt, most African stock 
markets are relatively illiquid having minimal trading activities and a small number of 
listed companies. Allen, Otchere and Senbet (2011) attributed some of the problems of 
the Sub-Saharan African stock exchanges to the concentration of trade in a few stocks 
and the dominance of few firms on some stock exchanges. 
Source: World Bank, 2014 
It was also reported by Tafirenyika (2012:20 August, 2014) that: “African stock markets 
are still small and often dominated by a handful of large corporations. For example, the 
conglomerate Dangote Group makes up about 30 per cent of the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange. Trading in shares is less frequent, and when it happens, it is usually limited 
to a few firms. Many do not have access to reliable and up-to-date information 
technology; in some, trading is done manually. Lack of liquidity is a major weakness, 
and in many cases, the general public does not have confidence in the integrity of stock 
exchanges”. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the ten largest companies accounted for 48.9% of 
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the total value traded in aggregate stock markets in 2011, shares are rarely traded and 
turnover ratios are low by international standards (Masetti and Mihr 2013). However, 
according to Masetti and Mihr (2013), although the lack of efficiency in the markets and 
the challenging investment environment are still causes for concern, equity returns have 
been high. 
Returning to the issue of contagion, I argue that there is ample evidence cited above to 
suggest there is an illiquidity problem. This, along with the associated social networking 
issue, may have had a considerable role to play in explaining contagion in Africa. 
 
6.5.4 Trade relationships 
A study by Eichengreen and Rose (1999) argued that the international trade channel is 
the financial transmission mechanism in advanced nations. If this is the case, it can be 
argued that for Canada, Japan, Germany and the UK, trade has paid a role in the 
contagion/interdependency between US and these financial markets. Evidence of trade 
values is provided in Figure 6.3 below. 
The contagion found in respect to China can also be potentially attributed to trade 
linkages. However, as can be noted from the chart, trade linkages between the US and 
most African countries are relatively low (Nigeria is a special case given the oil 
sector).34 Canada has the highest trade relationship with the US among all markets. 
This, as can be noted from Table 6.2, is associated with Canada having the highest 
correlation with US market. 
                                                 




Changes in market correlation (and, by association, contagion) may possibly be 
associated with changes in trading patterns. For example, Xinhua (China.org.cn: 27 
March 2010) quoting Chinese vice-commerce minister Zhong Shan, reported that: 
“Since the outbreak of the international financial crisis, China has been supporting the 
efforts of the American people to tackle the crisis. On the one hand, China has increased 
imports from the US”.35 Similar major changes in other US-emerging market trade 
relationships have been reported to have occurred as a result of the 2007-09 crisis. It 
was reported by the Indian Consulate General36 that, “during the year 2007, the basket 
of US imports to India included exceptionally large imports of aircraft/parts, which 
resulted in a leap in the growth rate of US exports to 54.7%. With this component 
excluded, the growth rates of US exports in 2007 and 2008 were 37.5% and 39.9%, 
respectively”. 
The impact of trade linkages on contagion/interdependence is likely to be difficult to 
establish given that any relationship will be an indirect one. Any changes in trading 
patterns associated with the crisis would have an impact on the share prices of exporting 
companies and on the market as a whole. The fact that the Chinese stock market is 
dominated by export-oriented manufacturing companies suggests that the argument that 
trade relationships can play a role in contagion has strong credibility in respect to 
markets such as China. 
                                                 
35 http://www.piie.com/publications/wp/wp.cfm?ResearchID=162  




Source: U.S Census Bureau, 2014
                                                 
37 Note: All figures are in US million dollars on a nominal basis, not seasonally adjusted 
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6.5.5 Sector impacts 
It can be noted that the 2007-09 financial crisis initially developed in the financial 
sectors of developed-country stock markets before it spread to other sectors and, 
subsequently, internationally in the form of contagion effects. This may possibly 
partially explain the timing of contagion events in Africa. 
In Western markets such as the US and UK, large commodity-based natural resource 
companies such as oil and mining companies, such as RTZ and BHP-Billiton, initially 
rose in response to the crisis as investors saw these as safe-haven stocks given their 
strong links with Chinese economic growth. Given that large parts of the African 
markets are resource-based, especially in South Africa, it is possible that the initially 
slow response of African markets to the crisis may have reflected African investors 
anchoring on the natural resource sectors in the West. It is evident from the returns 
charts in Figures 3.6 to 3.8 (Chapter 3) that declines across all African markets started 
in the last quarter of 2008, which was considerably later than occurred in most 
developed markets. 
Some recent papers, such as Morales and Andreosso-O’Callaghan (2010) (see Section 
2.7.1, no. 10, Chapter 2) defined the starting point of the crisis at an earlier point than I 
do in this thesis. However, it can be noted that during the initial phases of the crisis the 
effects on developing countries were relatively modest. In particular, Africa is said to 
have escaped the initial crisis that engulfed world economies in 2007 and the early part 
of 2008. The timing of contagion events in Africa may well reflect the fact that the 
downturn in the natural resources sector in developed markets occurred significantly 




It is clear from this section that there are a number of plausible explanations that may, in 
part, be able to explain elements of the findings of this thesis. It may very well be that 
they all had some role to play in what was a highly complex process that impacted upon 
the world’s financial markets in many different ways. What this section fails to consider 
in detail, however, is the impact of market psychological factors and behavioural factors 
on market movements. By 2007, communication networks had developed to such an 
extent that information could reach market players across the different markets of the 
world almost instantly. How did the series of “shocks” they faced impact upon their 
behaviour? This is an issue that I will consider in the next section. 
 
6.6 A BEHAVIOURAL INTERPRETATION OF THE DIFFERENCES IN THE 
CONTAGION EFFECTS FOUND 
 
In discussing the nature of the 2007-09 financial crisis in a behavioural finance context, 
it is useful if we can attempt to quantify what was happening to market sentiment 
throughout this period. The most useful tool in this area in respect to US markets is the 
VIX, which is popularly known in the market as the gauge of fear. The VIX of implied 
volatility was developed by Whaley (1993) to gauge market expectations of 30-day 
volatility. Subsequently in the literature, attempts have been made to quantify the level 
of market fear associated with different values. For example, D’Anne (2012:285) 






“5 − 10 =  𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑎𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦 =  𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 
10 − 15 =  𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑎𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦 =  ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 
15 − 20 =  𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑎𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦 =  𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 
20 − 25 = 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦 =  𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 
25 − 30 =  𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑦 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦 
30 − 35 = 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦 
35 − 40 =  𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦 
40 − 45 =  𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑦 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦 
45 − 50 = 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐 
50 − 55 =  𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐 
55 − 60 =  𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐 
60 − 65 =  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐 
65+ =  𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐” 
On this basis, the value of 21.72 on 15/10/2009, which is the date I identify as the end 
of the crisis, is at the lower end of the fear spectrum and the values at the end of each of 
the sub-periods I identify are all at the “extreme panic” end of the spectrum. 
Sub-period 1 (15/09/2008-10/10/2008) VIX value = 69.59 
Sub-period 2 (15/09/2008-17/10/2008) VIX value = 70.33 
Sub-period 3 (15/09/2008-27/10/2008) VIX value = 80.86 
Sub-period 4 (15/09/2008-20/11/2008) VIX value = 80.06 
Before I use behavioural finance-associated concepts to examine my findings in the 
context of behavioural decision biases, it is important to understand that the behavioural 
finance associated concepts adopted in this section are not statistically tested and should 
therefore be regarded as hypotheses.  
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In dealing with the behavioural concepts used in this section, it is useful to introduce 
some of the related concepts and ideas introduced earlier into the literature by market 
analysts who were originally known as chartists, but are now more commonly known as 
technical analysts.  
Dow theorists (see, for example, Kirkpatrick and Dahlquist 2010) focused on 
identifying turning points in markets and one of the key concepts in respect to the 
bottom of a bear market phase is the notion of market capitulation. Dow theorists see 
markets driven by the forces of “fear and greed” and this is seen as introducing cyclical-
based oscillations within the upward bull market trend or, as we see in the case of the 
2007-09 financial crisis, cyclical oscillations around the downward bear market trend. 
An initial market fall will initially be arrested when “bargain hunters” enter the market 
believing that the market fall has been overdone. This is the “greed” that drives the 
market and will see the market recovering from its lows. The top of this short-run cycle 
is reached when “profit-takers” enter the market and sell. This is the “fear” driver 
asserting its dominance over market activity and reflects the fear of losing profits (or, 
alternatively, incurring further losses). 
The Dow-theory-based technical analyst will attempt to identify the point of 
capitulation, which is a final emphatic sell-off that represents the bottom of the bear 
market. This is often seen as occurring where investors are fearful of a systemic 
collapse and, as a consequence, develop a panic-driven “sell at any price” attitude that 
reflects a fear of losing everything. We can possibly see this notion of capitulation 
within the context of behavioural finance theory. 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory suggests that investors show aversion 
to realising losses. Specifically, there is a tendency to keep assets whose prices 
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decreased since they were purchased in the portfolio as they are averse to realising 
losses. Shefrin and Statman (1985) called this the disposition effect. This would explain 
part of the 2007-09 crisis. When the market first began to fall in 2007 this effect meant 
this process was initially slow. There is the tendency to keep assets as they hope the 
sell-off was a market correction and the bull-run will resume. Szyszka (2010) argued 
that during the financial crisis, the disposition effect gave way to a panic-driven sell-out. 
I argue that when there are large falls initiated by significant shock events, such as 
Lehman, investors may panic and we can have capitulation in markets. Investors cannot 
see the bottom of the market and fear a systemic breakdown. 
What was extraordinary about the 2007-09 crisis is that there were a series of sub-period 
shocks where the VIX spiked above the extreme panic level of 65+. Therefore they all 
had the potential to be seen by the market as capitulation-style events from a US 
perspective. From a contagion perspective, it might be expected that shocks in the US 
may initially have had a limited impact on integrated markets due to loss aversion and 
associated disposition effects, leading to no large sell-off. Worldwide contagion is more 
likely to occur if an event was large and perceived as having global implications. In 
effect, if the shock is seen as a capitulation-type event, that leads to a fear of the global 
financial system risking systemic failure. 
However, the correlation analysis in Table 6.2 would appear to indicate that the impact 
of the shock was not uniform worldwide; it was clearly different in respect to Africa and 
developed markets. For example, whereas in African markets the first sub-period shock 
led to a general increase in correlation, in developed markets the picture was more 
mixed with three countries (Canada, France and Italy) showing considerable falls. 
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Figure 6.2, conversely, shows that in the long period there is strong evidence of 
contagion in developed markets but only limited evidence in African markets. 
In the remainder of this section I examine possible behavioural explanations for these 
differences. I would argue that the differences identified below are also a reflection of 
the differences in the extent of integration of African markets and developed markets, as 
identified in Section 6.4.1 above. 
 
6.6.1 Behavioural factors leading to market contagion 
As mentioned in the introductory section of this chapter, none of the behavioural 
concepts in this section is formally tested.  I however find herding to be intuitively 
appealing in explaining the process of contagion found in both developed and African 
markets because;  
• In much of the financial contagion literature, contagion is described as reflecting 
herding behaviour (Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh 2003, Edwards 2000, 
Claessens and Forbes 2004, Dornbusch and Claessens 2000) even in the 
presence of different economic fundamentals. 
• Analyses of correlations show that African markets are not strongly correlated 
with the US before the crisis. My findings show pronounced increase in 
correlation in the African markets during the crisis which resulted in evidence of 
contagion being found. I argue that this indicates a change in the traditional 
relationship between African markets and the US that is consistent with herding 
behaviour. I found some support to this approach in Thanyalakpark and Filson 
(2001) who investigated contagion as herding resulting from an increase in 
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correlation after crisis. Their motivation is also based on the fact that herding is 
widely accepted and documented as cause of contagion.  
• It is also observed from literature review that financial contagion is sometimes 
defined in terms of herding behaviour. For instance one of the definitions of 
contagion given by the World Bank is that; “Contagion is the transmission of 
shocks to other countries or the cross-country correlation, beyond any 
fundamental link among the countries and beyond common shocks. This 
definition is usually referred as excess co-movement, commonly explained by 
herding behaviour”.38 
Although Section 2.5.1.2 has distinguished between intentional and unintentional 
herding behaviour the thesis has recognised the difficulty in identifying which of these 
categorisation is possibly more associated with the crisis under study, particularly in 
African markets. Two reasons are related with this difficulty: (i) anecdotal evidence 
suggests that limited information on market activities in Africa creates room for few 
decision formers and by association, intentional herding (sentiment driven) could occur 
and; (ii) the fact that the crisis under study is the most popular in recent history and 
probably the worst since the 1930’s would suggest that market participants reacted to 
fundamental information from the US market and by association, unintentional herding 
(fundamental driven) could occur. For these reasons, in this section, I argue that 
differences in which the crisis impacted upon the African and developed markets are 
better explained in terms of differences in the speed with which the herding process 
developed. 
It can be noted that Hwang and Salmon (2007) argued that in developed markets the 
herding process can be relatively slow to develop (they were looking in the context of 
                                                 
38 The permanent World Bank URL for contagion definition is http://go.worldbank.org/JIBDRK3YC0. 
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stock market bubbles, which, they argue, can take a number of years to develop). I 
argue in this thesis that the differences found between African and developed markets 
means that herding process is likely to develop more rapidly in Africa. I argue that this 
difference can partially explain the differences in respect to correlation changes and 
contagion identified in this thesis. 
In Chapter 2 (Section 2.5), I identified the types of behavioural biases and other 
behavioural factors that can affect investor behaviour. I will now examine differences in 
the ways in which these may affect African and developed markets. These will focus on 
the following socionomics: 
• Information effects 
• Social networking effect 
• Social mood effects 
In Lintner’s (1998) opinion, behavioural finance is “the study of how humans interpret 
and act on information to make informed investment decisions”. The speed with which 
information is generated and acted upon can to some extent depend on the size and 
extent of the social networks that generate secondary information. 
Primary information from US financial markets (such as stock prices and volumes data) 
is disseminated almost instantly around the world. However, before this information is 
acted upon it has to be interpreted and this secondary information will often depend on 
the advice or influence of friends, colleagues and social influences (Hede 2012). The 
degree of social influence itself is affected by status and expertise. With growing social 
and professional networks such as LinkedIn, Twitter and ResearchGate, social influence 
effects increase. Therefore, it is possible that low quality information, such as rumours 
or noise, is repeated more frequently through the social network than high quality 
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information. As the low quality information gets repeated by multiple sources, it 
achieves credibility overtime (DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel 2003). Investors who do 
not have access to inside information on financial markets can act irrationally, using the 
low quality information that leads to noise trading (Thaler 1993). 
Social effects can also have significant influence on individual judgement as pressures 
to conform can be high. According to Scherer and Cho (2003), people with stronger 
social linkages had more similar perceptions of risk. The manners in which individuals 
perceive risks also become similar with increasing group interaction. Olsen (2004) 
suggested a particular form of social network structure in investment markets that 
significantly affects the speed with which information and influence pass through 
society. The structure, according to Olsen (2004), involves few perceived experts and a 
large number of investors who trust specific experts. This is termed the “aristocratic 
network”, characterised by the rapid spread of influence and the emergence of trends. 
However, the loss of some key experts causes the rapid collapse of the network, leaving 
large numbers of investors isolated from sources of trusted expertise. The consequence 
of this loss is the discrediting of the system; this results in instability and lack of 
direction. This type of social network exhibits a power law distribution that involves 
fat-tail (high kurtosis) outcome distributions. Analysis of stock market returns in 
financial literature suggests that they tend to follow fat-tailed distributions (see Haas 
and Pigorsch 2007; Kittiakarasakun, and Tse (2011); Aparicio and Estrada 1997) 
consistent with power laws and aristocratic social networks. These are especially 
prevalent during financial crises where daily prices swings of 4 and 5 standard deviation 
units are frequently observed. 
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Strongly related to the impact of social effects are social mood effects (Forgas 1995, 
Redhead 2008 and Nofsinger 2005). These are generated through the interactions 
occurring within social networks and reflect the shared experiences of members of the 
network.  
The question arises as to why these combined socionomic factors would lead to this 
secondary data and acted upon more quickly in Africa than in developed markets. The 
answer possibly lies in the small, illiquid nature of African markets (with the exception 
of South Africa). Section 6.5.3 identifies that in comparison to developed markets, 
African exchanges generally have few listed companies and relatively low levels of 
capitalisation. This will also be reflected in the relatively low numbers of active traders 
in African markets and therefore, by implication, relatively small social networks of 
stock market traders. 
This can be contrasted with the vast, and liquid, nature of developed markets with large 
numbers of both active professional and non-professional traders. The social networks 
in these markets are, by implication, going to be much larger than those found in 
African markets. Whereas in African markets there may be a few dominant opinion- 
formers in the social network, in developed-market social networks there are likely to be 
a number of competing high profile opinion-formers. This suggests that the generation 
of consensus in African market social networks is likely to be substantially quicker than 
the generation of consensus in their developed-market counterparts. The implication of 
this for herding behaviour is likely to be highly significant. Specifically, it suggests that 
herding is likely to occur at a faster speed in Africa than in developed markets as 




Although fast herding appears to be the principle behavioural difference between 
African and developed markets, there are other differences that can be observed as well. 
These differences are identified in Figure 6.4 below and are discussed in the following 
two sub-sections. I have developed this framework through an examination of the 
results from my econometric analysis from a behavioural finance point of view.39 
Figure 6.4:  Suggested behavioural biases in sampled markets 
 
 
Before I discussed behavioural concepts further, it is useful to note that contagion effect 
found in African markets could be due to portfolio diversification. For instance, 
Goldstein and Pauzner (2004:152) present a model of financial contagion whereby crisis 
occurs because investment portfolios are diversified across countries which leads to the 
transfer of negative shocks from one part of the world to another. Their findings support 
the hypothesis of contagion events due to diversification and reported that the 
“occurrence of a crisis in one country increases the probability of a crisis in the other 
(Goldstein and Pauzner 2004:175)”. Boyer, Kumagai and Yuan (2006) separated 
emerging market stocks into accessible (eligible for purchase by foreigners) and 
inaccessible (not eligible for purchase by foreigners) categories to examine the degree to 
which the categorised stocks co-move with the crisis country index return during the 
                                                 
39 It can be noted that this differs from the common approach taken in much of the behavioural finance literature. Studies of 
behavioural biases commonly employ the application of primary data such as questionnaires to test evidence of biases among 
private or institutional investors in specific countries, markets or sectors (Suto, Menkhoff and Beckmann 2005, Constantinos 2010, 
Aduda, Oduor and Onwonga 2012, Lowies, Hall and Cloete 2013, Shiller, Konya and Tsutsui 1988).  
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1997 Asian crisis. Using Thailand as the crisis country and a range of emerging and 
developed countries, the authors found that increase in correlation during the crisis 
period was particularly prevalent for accessible returns. Kodres and Pritsker (2002) 
developed a multiple rational expectations model of asset prices to assess financial 
contagion through various channels with emphasis on cross-market rebalancing. They 
found that contagion occurs through cross-market rebalancing where market 
participants in one country are hit by idiosyncratic shock and transfers the shock abroad 
by optimally rebalancing their portfolio’s exposures to macro-economic risks through 
other countries’ markets. The authors submit that cross-market rebalancing could 
explain contagion between Asia and Latin America during the crises of the 1990’s even 
though the macro-economies of the two regions are weakly linked. For the markets 
under study (African markets and the US) evidence of low correlation identified in 
Section 6.4.1, might suggest weak linkages between most African markets and the US. 
For this reason, I suggest the hypothesis that the contagion events found in African 
markets could be a reflection of foreign investors rebalancing their portfolios in African 
markets. This type of behaviour commonly referred to as portfolio rebalancing in 
portfolio diversification literature has been identified by researchers such as Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (2000) as a cause of financial contagion. Moser (2003:161) reported that: 
“Several authors have pointed out that international investors could undertake such 
portfolio rebalancing in response to a crisis in one country, and thereby put other 
emerging economies in trouble by selling their assets or calling loans”.  
Before continuing onto socionomics identified at the beginning of this section, it is 
important to note that examining the hypothesis that foreign investors withdrew their 
investment in African markets or ascertaining the number of foreign investors within 
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each African market is beyond the scope of this thesis but, might present a credible 
future research area.   
 
6.6.2 Behavioural biases in African markets 
 
1. Fast herding 
In terms of the movement of correlations during all crisis periods, I identify that the 
Africa markets reacted more quickly than their developed counterparts during crisis. 
Results show that all African markets had low correlation with the US before the onset 
of the crisis (Table 6.2). These values increased immediately after Lehman’s crisis. This 
behaviour, in essence, supports the hypothesis of fast herding behaviour that leads to the 
short-term contagion effect found in African markets and other low-integrated markets. 
Fast networking effects reflect the relatively few investors trading in markets, leading to 
the fast spread of secondary information and emotions. The findings of this thesis are 
supported by the argument of Prechter (1985, 1999) that increases in correlation as 
markets fall are consistent with herding behaviour when investors are faced with a 
relatively uniform set of stimuli. Although African markets were not faced with a 
subprime problem as in the US, the dominant position that the US holds in the world 
means that the crisis of such a nation can easily be transmitted through herding. In 
effect, the US became the stimulus that all African countries had in common. Prechter’s 
(1985, 1999) arguments fit well with my findings in Table 6.2 that all African markets 
correlations (excluding markets with insignificant alpha in their DCC equations) 
increased in sub-period 1 and continue to increase in subsequent sub-periods. A further 
reason for the fast herding behaviour observed in the African markets could be the 
observation that developed-country investors withdrew money from emerging markets. 
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This kind of investor behaviour is commonly associated with contagion effect arising 
from informational asymmetries (Scardovo, Gatti and Ventola 2010 and Račickas and 
Vasiliauskaitė 2011). 
The relative importance of institutional investors can potentially have an impact on the 
speed of herding. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in African markets institutional 
investors make up a large proportion of the investor population. For example the 
experiences of the current author in respect to Nigeria are that institutional investors 
(brokers and professional fund managers) dominate the markets because of relatively 
low levels of investment knowledge in the general Nigerian population.  
The current author would argue that having relatively large numbers of institutional 
investors is likely to speed up the process of herding. This is because investment 
networking effects are likely to be stronger and investment networks are likely to be 
more aristocratic in nature. Allied to the social networking issue, herding speed may 
increase due to reduced levels of conservatisms and increase in the impact of noise 
trading.  
It can be noted that although institutional investors are important in developed markets 
(for example fund managers) there are still large numbers of private and non-
professional investors who have relatively strong levels of investment knowledge. In the 
current author’s opinion, this means that institutional investors may be relatively more 
important in African markets than developed markets. This is one of the reasons why I 







A further feature of the 2007-09 crisis that may have strengthened the tendency for 
markets to herd was the tendency for investors to anchor on US market performance as 
extreme events that they felt they did not fully understand unfolded. Ricciardi and 
Simon (2001) suggest anchoring results in investors using a common reference point. 
This logic could have been applied by African investors during the 2007-09 financial 
crisis. For instance, the cost of information, especially in relatively small and illiquid 
markets (for example, Cote d’Ivoire and Botswana), would have left investors with no 
choice but to anchor on events happening in the US. Another possible reason for 
suggesting anchoring on the US by African markets could be caused by issues relating 
to the speed of arrival of information into these markets. As evident in Table 6.2, 
correlations in Botswana, Egypt, Morocco and even South Africa kept increasing from 
their previous correlation value in all four sub-periods. 
 
3. Decision fatigue 
As can be noted from the VIX in Figure 3.5 (Chapter 3), the distinguishing 
characteristic of the 2007-09 financial crisis is its long nature characterised by a series 
of sub-shocks. From a behavioural finance point of view, I asked how the attitude of 
investors changed as subsequent phases of the crises unfolded. Did they become 
habituated to crisis in the US and stop responding? My question is answered by 
examining how correlations changed in response to the low-integrated (mainly African) 
markets in this work. I contend that this shows evidence of decision fatigue in these 
countries. For instance, the correlations in Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt and Morocco 
show increasing levels from the stable period through to cumulative impact of sub-
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period 1-4, indicating that investors in these markets initially reacted in a standard way 
to each high volatility period tested. However, it can also be noted that the correlations 
from this group of markets dropped in the long period, suggesting behaviour changed. 
This, I speculate, was due to decision fatigue. Mood could have played a role in this 
regard. As the markets are small and moods are shared more quickly as a result of social 
network effects, the perpetual losses in the markets will be discussed repeatedly; 
eventually investors would stop responding to the crisis in the long run as they could not 
find a safe haven. Instead, the frequent decision changes required in response to the 
crisis eventually induced decision fatigue and the decision not to respond to events in 
the US. This may have been manifest in the eventual reduction in correlation in the long 
crisis period observed across all African markets (except South Africa). 
 
4. Disposition effect 
In the introduction to Section 6.6, I argued that the disposition effect may delay 
investors selling off stocks, as part of a loss-aversion bias, until market capitulation 
occurs. This could potentially account for some of the differences in correlation 
observed if capitulation occurred at different points of time in US and in Africa. 
From an African perspective, I suggest that capitulation may have occurred relatively 
early in the crisis as is evident from the early increases in volatility relative to the US 
market. The observed changes in correlations can be interpreted as showing that the 
sell-off was quicker in Africa. This could possibly have occurred because of a faster 
reaction to social networking effects or, alternatively, due to differences in African 
investors’ risk profiles in comparison with developed-market investors’ attitudes to risk. 
If we refer back to the prospect theory (Section 2.5.1.1), we can interpret African 
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investors as being more risk-averse, in that they cash in their profits early; as such, we 
see volatility in these markets increasing at the onset of the crisis. This behaviour could 
be amplified by the specific individuals who are the key opinion-formers within 
investor social networks (common in African institutional investors) offering advice to 
selloff in order to avoid further losses. 
 
5. Noise trading 
As discussed in Section 6.6.1, information is vital in financial markets and the lack of 
access to relevant or high quality information creates room for noise trading. Although 
financial integration mitigates information asymmetries (Schmukler 2004), the 
segmentation of African markets from the world market (i.e. the weakness of the 
relationship between markets (see: Hatemi-J and Morgan 2007, Bekaert et al. 2011, 
Berger, Pukthuanthong and Yang 2011)) would suggest information may get into 
African markets at a lower speed than to developed markets. In such circumstances 
investors are faced with information problems and the result can be that herding 
behaviour develops.  
Other vectors of noise trading that might have possibly played important roles in 
African markets are social influence and networking effects (Gai and Kapadia 2010, 
Olsen 2004). It has been reported that African markets are characterised by the 
concentration of trading in few stocks and the dominance of a few companies on their 
exchanges (Allen, Otchere and Senbet 2011, Tafirenyika 2012). This would suggests 
that individuals who are in control of these stocks or even own some of the listed 
companies might have great influence on the markets; information coming from them 
will spread quickly, either as low quality or high quality information. Whichever way, 
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this information can act as a vector of noise trading in the markets. This could, in turn, 
lead to herding behaviour and subsequent contagion effects even in uncorrelated 
markets, as evident in the African markets studied. 
 
6.6.3 Behavioural biases in developed markets 
 
1. Slow herding 
It can be noted from Table 6.2 that in the first sub-period of the crisis correlations 
actually fell between the US and; Canada, France, Italy, and showed no change in 
respect to the UK. This suggests that if herding did occur between developed markets 
the initial response was quite slow. 
As noted above, Hwang and Salmon (2007) argued that herding can be a relatively slow 
process (see also Redhead, 2008). Herding commonly experienced in the presence of 
information is usually referred to as rational herding. Examples can be cited suggesting 
that it can be a slowly drawn-out process. Park and Sgroi (2009:1) reported that Robert 
Shiller suggested it occurred in the US housing market over a number of years, 
culminating in the 2007 crisis. 
The slow speed of herding-based contagion effects spreading from the US to other 
developed markets can possibly be explained in terms of social networking effects. As 
identified in Section 6.6.1 above, the large number of high-status authoritative 
individuals in (the large) investor social networks may mean that it takes a considerable 






2. Loss aversion 
Slow herding in developed markets may also be partly a function of loss aversion. As 
identified in the introduction to Section 6.6, loss aversion can lead to a disposition effect 
whereby investors hold off realising their losses until a final market capitulation ensues. 
It may very well be that the combination of the impact of slow decision-making in large 
social networks and a disposition effect may explain the relatively slow process of 
herding becoming instigated between developed markets. This may have also 
potentially interacted with status quo bias. 
 
3. Status quo bias 
It is difficult to provide a rational explanation for suggesting evidence of status quo bias 
in the developed markets while observing the behaviour of their correlations during the 
crisis. As such, it is best to consider the behaviour of investors with regards to timing in 
the stock markets. For this reason, I suggest status quo bias in respect to long-term 
investors, who are common in developed markets. Investors exhibit reluctance in 
changing the investments they have already made and are used to, regardless of their 
changing environment (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1998). This, I suggest, could be the 
reason we saw no significant change in correlation during the crisis in highly integrated 
developed markets at its onset. It can be suggested that this bias is more prominent in 
Canada, France and Italy, which saw no contagion effect in the four sub-periods. In 
particular, Canada, which is the highest-correlated market with the US and also belongs 
in the same region, had only its long crisis correlation higher than the stable period 
correlation. This suggests strong reluctance to change during crisis.  
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As identified in Chapter 2, other biases influence investors to feel the status quo bias, 
but these biases, which include regret avoidance, drive for consistency, self-perception 
theory and illusion of control, need not occur at the same time. With this in mind, I 
suggest that the most relevant bias that led to the suggestion of the status quo bias in my 
sampled developed markets is regret avoidance, which is also related to loss aversion 
and rational herding. Another factor that could lead to the status quo bias occurring is 
the cost of information. Brown and Kagel (2009) suggested that status quo bias exists in 
an environment with a very low cost of identifying better-performing stocks. These 
types of environments, I suggest, are better attributed to developed-country markets. 
 
6.6.4 Behavioural bias and the 2007-09 financial crisis: some conclusions 
The problem any researcher faces when they try to apply behavioural bias theory to 
real-world examples is that many of these theories are strongly interconnected; there 
may indeed be a series of interaction effects between them, which makes disentangling 
different effects problematical. 
What, however, appears clear from my work is that I have identified clear differences in 
the speed with which herding occurred in African markets and developed markets. I 
have also identified a clear theoretical reason why there should be differences in these 
speeds; specifically, that secondary information is developed at a far quicker rate in 
small social networks than in large social networks. 
The existence of other behavioural biases/issues muddies the water somewhat in terms 
of distinguishing between herding in these two market types. Disposition effect is 
clearly an issue and, depending on the speed at which markets move from these to 
capitulation, will have a considerable impact on market correlations. There are clearly 
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other issues that need to be taken into consideration as well such as differences between 
African and developed-market risk profiles, decision fatigue and noise trading. All of 
these issues make disentangling the difference between behavioural effects in African 
and developed markets problematical. 
In Chapter 3, I developed a hypothesis that different behavioural factors would account 
for differences in contagion between African and developed markets. This was 
summarised as Figure 3.12. I now update this figure in light of the discussion of my 





Figure 6.5: Behavioural influences on contagion effects in African and developed markets 
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6.7 BEHAVIOURAL VS NON-BEHAVIOURAL CONTAGION CHANNEL 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AFRICAN AND DEVELOPED MARKETS: 
SOME FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
In Section 6.5, I identified a number of non-behavioural factors that could possibly 
partially explain differences in contagion between African and developed countries. 
These included major differences between their respective banking systems, the strength 
of trade linkages and also different levels of stock market liquidity. In Section 6.6, I also 
identified possible behavioural reasons for the differences found. It may very well be 
that there are links between the behavioural and illiquidity issues (through the impact on 
social networking effects). I am sure that if I had looked at these relationships in more 
detail, links between banking system differences, market illiquidity and behavioural 
factors (specifically, speed of herding) would also become apparent. 
Final analysis would suggest to me that the distinction between behavioural and non-
behavioural channels of contagion is not a very useful distinction to make. There are a 
considerable number of interactions occurring between a number of factors and the role 
of this thesis has been to try to identify the most important factors that result in 











7 CONCLUDING SUMMARY, THESIS CONTRIBUTION, 
LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND POTENTIAL 




The key objective of this research has been to assess the impact of the 2007-09 financial 
crisis on financial contagion in African markets. As part of the process of identifying 
the potential channels down which the contagion event developed, I also made a 
comparative study of contagion in developed markets. 
Contagion in this thesis is defined as “a significant increase in cross-market linkages 
resulting from a shock hitting one country or group of countries” (Forbes and Rigobon, 
2002:2223).  
The 2007-09 crisis was unique from a contagion perspective given that it was a truly 
global event that had a significant impact on most of the world’s financial markets. This 
has presented researchers with a unique opportunity to examine the impact of a single 
event on different types of markets (developed and emerging/frontier) and different 
geographical regions. 
The 2007-09 crisis has given researchers the opportunity to explore in more detail the 
existing debate on the importance that the degree of financial integration plays in 
contagion events. Given that the crisis also enables researchers to explore the impact on 
different market types, it also presents the opportunity to examine other factors 
influencing the process of the transmission of crisis in greater depth. A number of 
previous papers in the contagion literature have identified herding as contributing to the 
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transmission of crisis. My thesis developed a deeper and fuller behavioural finance-
based analysis of the transmission process by exploring differences between African 
and developed markets. Past research has failed to identify the importance of individual 
behavioural biases on contagion events. Published research has also failed to identify 
the importance of the speed of the herding process in the transmission of contagion. 
This thesis explores both of these issues. 
In comparing African (emerging/frontier) markets with developed markets the thesis is 
able to examine the importance of differences in financial integration on the contagion 
process. However, I submit that examining financial crisis contagion solely in terms of 
the level of integration alone is not sufficient. I argue that behavioural biases arising 
from human psychology play an important role in financial markets and that contagion 
also needs to be examined in the context of these. 
 
7.2 SUMMARY OF THE MAIN FINDINGS OF THE THESIS 
 
Theories of financial contagion, financial integration and behavioural biases were 
discussed in the literature review section (Chapter 2) as part of the process of 
identifying the gaps in the literature that research undertaken in this thesis could 
address. Within this chapter, I identified the potential novel contributions as: 1) 
examining alternative econometric methodologies; 2) applying contagion testing to both 
emerging and frontier African markets (an area of limited research in the literature); 3) 
examining contagion transmission channels from a behavioural finance perspective; 
and 4) examining differences in the contagion transmission channels of African and 
developed countries from a behavioural finance perspective. 
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Chapter 3 discussed the dataset and developed two sets of statistical hypotheses. The 
dataset consisted of a sample of ten African markets (namely, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia and Zambia), eight 
developed markets (namely, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, UK and the 
US) and two non-African markets included for comparative purposes, namely China 
and India. Using the VIX to identify potential contagion events, I identified what I 
describe as a long crisis period and four short sub-crisis periods. The statistical 
hypotheses set out in this chapter and subsequently tested in Chapters 4 and 5 were: 
• That contagion occurred during the 2007-09 financial crisis across both 
developed and emerging/frontier African markets from 15 September 2008 to 15 
October 2009 (long crisis period), 
• That contagion occurred in the four short sub-crisis periods (15/09/2008-
10/10/2008, 15/09/2008-17/10/2008, 15/09/2008-27/10/2008 and 15/09/2008-
20/11/2008). 
I also outlined a hypothesised theoretical model of contagion that would be examined in 
more detail in Chapter 6 in the context of the statistical findings from my research. This 
model was based on the hypothesis that (i) contagion effects, if found, would differ 
between developed markets and emerging/frontier African markets on the basis of 
differences in the degree of integration between the sampled markets and the US, and 
(ii) that differences in the degree of integration level would result in different 
behavioural factors affecting the contagion transmission process. 
Chapters 4 and 5 detailed the econometric analysis undertaken in the thesis. A number 
of different approaches to the measurement of market correlation were undertaken for 
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comparative purposes. These were used to investigate whether the crisis sourced in the 
US spread to African and developed country markets. 
In Chapter 4, constant correlation coefficient based analysis in three variations was 
examined. First, I followed Forbes and Rigobon’s (2002) approach as closely as 
possible using a single VAR system adjusted for heteroscedasticity bias. Second, I used 
raw log returns, also adjusted for heteroscedasticity in line with Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002). In the last variation of this approach, I made a statistical contribution to 
contagion literature by using two separate VAR systems divided into pre-crisis and 
crisis periods (which required no adjustment for heteroscedasticity). I concluded in this 
chapter that separate VAR systems approach is the preferred approach of the three. 
In Chapter 5, the hypotheses tested in Chapter 4 were rerun using a Dynamic 
Conditional Correlation coefficient (DCC) based analysis. This was followed in 
Chapter 6 by a discussion of the relative merits of my preferred methodology in 
Chapters 4 and my methodology in Chapter 5. After identifying DCC as my preferred 
methodology, I discussed the main differences between the econometric results of 
African and developed markets from both a correlation and a contagion perspective. 
Chapter 6 discussed the findings of the thesis from non-behavioural finance perspective 
and behavioural perspective and, finally, drew some conclusions in respect to 
differences between the process of contagion in African and developed markets. 
 
7.2.1 Review of key findings 
1. I found that the level of correlations between the US and African markets 
(except South Africa) were low before the crisis while all developed markets 
(except Japan) had high correlations before the crisis. China and India also had 
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low correlations before crisis. This finding enabled me to classify the sampled 
markets into low and highly (correlation of 40% or more) integrated markets. 
The low-integrated markets were Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Tunisia, Zambia, Japan, China and India, while the 
highly integrated markets were Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK and 
South Africa. 
2. Initial examination of correlations indicated that the crisis had primarily a short-
term effect in low-integrated markets and a long-term effect in highly integrated 
markets. 
3. My results suggested that linkages between African markets and the US changed 
during the 2007-09 financial crisis. There was an initial increase in correlation 
during the crisis across all African markets (except Nigeria, Tunisia, Zambia and 
Mauritius because of statistical issues). These increases were significant, and in 
the form of contagion effects, in Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Morocco, 
Namibia and South Africa. 
4.  I found an initial fall in correlation in the developed markets of Canada, France 
and Italy in sub-period 1. The correlation between the UK and US also saw no 
appreciable change between the pre-crisis period and sub-period 1. This 
indicated that the linkages between these developed markets remained the same 
at the onset of the crisis. 
5. Examination of differences in correlations and contagion event from a 
behavioural finance perspective indicated that non-behavioural characteristics of 
African markets, such as illiquidity and size of the markets together with low 
levels of integration, amplified the effects of biases such as social/networking 
effects and mood in small markets. These biases then led to other active 
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behaviours in the African markets. I argued that the African markets experienced 
the following biases during the 2007-09 financial crisis: fast herding, anchoring, 
decision fatigue, disposition effect and noise trading. For the developed markets, 
where many sources of information exist, and social networks tend to be 
significantly larger, consensus is reached more slowly in social networks. I 
argued that this results in herding developing more slowly. I concluded that the 
following behavioural biases were found to influence contagion/interdependence 
in developed markets: slow herding, loss aversion and status quo bias. 
 
7.3 REVIEW OF THESIS NOVEL CONTRIBUTIONS 
I believe that this research has made the following novel contribution to the financial 
contagion literature: 
• The thesis has added to our knowledge of contagion from the US to a broad 
cross-section of African markets. 
• The thesis has compared the contagion effects found in African markets with 
those found in developed markets and has found differences in these group of 
markets. 
• The thesis has contributed value to the analysis of the financial contagion from 
the perspective of behavioural finance theory both in African and developed 
markets. The principal finding being the differences in suggested behavioural 
biases affecting the two groups. 
• The thesis has identified that the use of a DCC to measure correlation is the 





7.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
Even though my study was performed on ten African markets, a number of important 
markets are missing because of limitations in respect to my data sources. Missing 
countries included Ghana and Kenya. A lack of access to a full set of data on interest 
rates for African markets also meant that interest rates were excluded from my constant 
correlation regressions in Chapter 4. I believe, however, that this is of only minor 
importance given that Forbes and Rigobon (2002) identified interest rates as having no 
material impact on their results. I also faced issues in respect to data cleaning in my 
sampled markets. Given that national holidays differ across the globe I had a number of 
non-corresponding days that had to be eliminated from the sample. Given the length of 
the sample, however, I do not believe this to be a major issue. 
 
7.5 FUTURE POTENTIAL AREAS OF RESEARCH 
A number of potential areas for future research can be identified. 
7.5.1 Spill-over effect 
An extension of this research could be to test for contagion as a spill-over effect in the 
African markets. Morales and Andreosso-O’Callaghan (2010) reported that a shock in 
the US had a direct effect on Egypt and that this may have had secondary spill-over 
effects on other major African markets because of inter-linkages among African 
markets. In this thesis, South Africa was found to be the most strongly integrated with 
the US in my study, which suggests that spill-overs from South Africa might be a 




7.5.2 Sector-based contagion 
A natural extension would be to investigate contagion within sectors from an African 
market perspective. Nigeria, for instance, is an oil exporter. This thesis found there to be 
no studies that examine whether a crisis in the oil sector creates a crisis in other market 
sectors in Africa. A study along these lines was carried out in respect to the US by 
Malik and Ewing (2009) in relation to volatility transmission between the oil sector and 
five US sectors. If this research is done with an African market, it will be an important 
contribution to the contagion literature.  
Another potential sector-based investigation could be to investigate contagion from the 
banking sector of the US to the banking sectors of other countries. This initiative was 
first considered during this thesis. However, lack of sector data in the African markets 
impedes this research. Perhaps in advanced markets this would be a reasonable 
extension of this research. 
 
7.5.3 Political crisis/uprisings in Africa 
Political crises in Africa and the Middle East have inspired researchers such as Asongu 
(2011a) to investigate the impact of political unrest from a contagion perspective. 
Asongu’s (2011a) research examined the Kenyan political crises. The author found 
some evidence of contagion. With this in mind and the recent waves of insurgency in 
Nigeria led by the militant group Boko Haram, one might wonder if contagion from 
Nigeria might be investigated. After a series of bomb blasts and mass killings that 
received little attention in the Western media, Boko Haram’s profile was increased by 
the mass abduction of almost 300 girls in Chibok, Borno state of Nigeria on 14 April 
2014 (BBC news). At the time of this research, the girls had been in captivity more than 
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100 days. A major question that could be posed subsequent to the abduction incident is 
whether or not the insurgency led to unexplained movement in Nigeria stock market and 
whether there was a contagion effect to other African markets? This is indeed an idea 























8 REFERENCE LIST 
4E Journal (2010) ‘A Behavioural View of how People make Financial Decisions’. The 
Official Publication of the Financial Planning Association of Malaysia 10 (4). 
Aduda, J., Oduor, O. E., and Onwonga, M. (2012) ‘The Behaviour and Financial 
Performance of Individual Investors in the Trading Shares of Companies Listed at 
the Nairobi Stock Exchange, Kenya’. Journal of Finance and Investment Analysis 
1 (3), 33-60. 
AfDB/OECD (2008) ‘Nigeria’. African Economic Outlook, 509-519. 
African Development Bank (2009) ‘Impact of the Global Financial Crisis and Economic 
Crisis on Africa’. Working Paper Series (9). 
African Securities Exchange Association, ASEA (2009) ASEA Year Book. 
African Securities Exchange Association, ASEA (2008) ASEA Year Book. 
African Securities Exchange Association, ASEA (2007) ASEA Year Book. 
Aghion, P., Bolton, P., and Dewatripont, M. (1999) ‘Contagious Bank Failures in a Free 
Banking System’. 
Agyei-Ampomah, S. (2011) ‘Stock Market Integration in Africa’. School of 
Management, University of Surrey, Guildford, 1-22. 
Ahnert, T. and Bertsch, C. (2014) ‘A Wake-Up Call Theory of Contagion’. 
Allen, F., Otchere, I., and Senbet, L. (2011) ‘African Financial Systems: A Review’. 
Review of Development Finance. 
348 
 
Ampomah, S. A. (2008) ‘An Empirical Examination of the Inter-Linkages between 
African Stock Markets’. University of Surrey, Guildford. 
Ang, A., Bekaert, G., and Liu, J. (2005) ‘Why Stocks may disappoint’. Journal of 
Financial Economics 76. 
Aparicio, F., and Estrada, J. (1997) ‘Empirical Distributions of Stock Returns: 
Scandinavian Securities Markets, 1990-95’. 
Arestis, P., Caporale, G., Cipollini, A., and Spagnolo, N. (2005) ‘Testing for Financial 
Contagion between Developed and Emerging Markets during the 1997 East Asian 
Crisis’. 
Asai, M. (2013) ‘Heterogeneous Asymmetric Dynamic Conditional Correlation Model 
with Stock Return and Range’. Journal of Forecasting 32 (5), 469-480. 
Asch, S. E. (1952) Social Psychology. New York: Prentice Hall. 
Asongu, S. A. (2011b) ‘Globalisation, Financial Crisis and Contagion: Time-Dynamic 
Evidence from Financial Markets of Developing Countries’. 
Asongu, S. A. (2011a) ‘Political Crises and Risk of Financial Contagion in Developing 
Countries: Evidence from Africa’. 
Babajide, A. A. and Adetiloye, K. A. (2012) ‘Investors’ Behavioural Biases and the 
Security Market: An Empirical Study of the Nigerian Security Market’. Accounting 
and Finance Research 1 (1), 219-229. 
Baig, T. and Goldfajn, I. (1999) ‘Financial Market Contagion in the Asian Crisis’. 
International Monetary Fund, Staff Papers 46 (2). 
349 
 
Baker, H. K. and Nofsinger, J. R. (2002) ‘Psychological Biases of Investors’. Financial 
Services Review 11 (2), 97-116. 
Banerjee, A. (1992) ‘A Simple Model of Herd Behaviour’. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 107, 797-818. 
Barber, B. M., Lee, Y., Liu, Y., and Odean, T. (2007) ‘Is the Aggregate Investor 
Reluctant to Realise Losses: Evidence from Taiwan’. European Financial 
Management 13 (3), 423-447. 
 Barberis, N., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1998) ‘A Model of Investor Sentiment’. 
Journal of Financial Economics 49. 
Barsky, R. B. (2009) ‘The Japanese Bubble: A ‘Heterogeneous’ Approach’. NBER 
Working Paper Series (15052). 
Bartlett, D. (2008) ‘Fallout of the Global Financial Crisis’. The Worldwide Audit, Tax 
and Consulting Network. 
Baxter, M. and Jermann, U., J. (1997) ‘The International Diversification Puzzle is 
Worse than You Think’. American Economic Review 87, 170-180. 
Becker, R., Clements, A., and McClelland, A. (2009) ‘The Jump Component of 
S&P500 Volatility and VIX Index’. Journal of Banking and Finance 33 (6), 1033-
1038. 
Beirne, J. and Gieck, J. (2012) ‘Interdependence and Contagion in Global Asset 
Markets’. European Central Bank Working Paper Series (1480). 
350 
 
Beirne, J., Caporale, G., Schulze-Ghattas, M., and Spagnolo, N. (2009) ‘Volatility 
Spillovers and Contagion from Mature to Emerging Stock Markets’. Deutsches 
Institut Für Wirtschaftsforschung, Discussion Paper (873). 
Bekaert, G., Harvey, C., Lundblad, C. T., and Siegel, S. (2011) ‘What Segments Equity 
Markets?’ Review of Financial Studies 24 (12), 3841-3890. 
Bekaert, G., Harvey, C., and Ng, A. (2005) ‘Market Integration and Contagion’. Journal 
of Business 78 (1), 39-70. 
Beltratti, A. and Stulz, R. (2012) ‘The Credit Crisis around the Globe: Why did some 
Banks Perform Better?’ Journal of Financial Economics 105, 1-17. 
Berger, D., Pukthuanthong, K., and Yang, J. (2011) ‘International Diversification with 
Frontier Markets ‘. Journal of Financial Economics 101 (1), 227-242. 
Bikhchandani, S. and Sharma, S. (2001) ‘Herd Behaviour in Financial Markets’. 
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 47 (3), 279-310. 
Billio, M. and Pelizzon, L. (2003) ‘Contagion and Interdependence in Stock Markets: 
Have they been misdiagnosed?’ Journal of Economics and Business 55, 405-426. 
Blasco, N., Corredor, P. and Ferreruela, S. (2011) ‘Detecting Intentional Herding: What 
Lies Beneath Intraday Data in the Spanish Stock Market’. Journal of the 
Operational Research Society 62 (6), 1056-1066 
Boamah, N. (ed.) (2014) Proceedings of 25th International Business Research 
Conference. ‘Global Integration of African Stock Markets’. Held 13-14 January 
2014 at Cape Town, South Africa. 
351 
 
Bollerslev, T., Chou, R. Y., and Kroner, K. F. (1992) ‘ARCH Modeling in Finance: A 
Review of the Theory and Empirical Evidence’. Journal of Econometrics 52, 5-59. 
Boyer, B. H., Kumagai, T., and Yuan, K. (2006) ‘How do crises spread? Evidence from 
accessible and inaccessible stock indices’. Journal of Finance 61, 957-1003. 
Brown, A., L. and Kagel, J., H. (2009) ‘Behaviour in a Simplified Stock Market: The 
Status Quo Bias, the Disposition Effect and the Ostrich Effect’. Annals of Finance 
5 (1), 1-14. 
Brunnermeier, M., K. (2008) ‘Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-08’. 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper (14612). 
Bryman, A. and Bell, E. (2011) ‘Ethics in Business Research’, Business Research 
Methods. Third edn: Oxford University Press. 
Bryman, A. and Bell, E. (2007) Business Research Methods. Second edn: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bunya, R. (2003) ‘Africa’s Equity Markets - A Synopsis’. in UNDP African Stock 
Exchanges Handbook. 
Burnham, K., P. and Anderson, D., R. (2004) ‘Multimodel Inference Understanding 
AIC and BIC in Model Selection’. Sociological Methods & Research 33 (2), 261-
304. 
Calvo, G., A. and Mendoza, E. (1998) ‘Rational Herd Behaviour and the Globalization 
of Securities Markets’. College Park, Maryland, University of Maryland. 
352 
 
Calvo, G. and Mendoza, E. (2000) ‘Rational Contagion and the Globalization of 
Security Markets’. Journal of International Economics 51, 79-113. 
Caporale, G., Cipollini, A., and Spagnolo, N. (2005) ‘Testing for Contagion: A 
Conditional Correlation Analysis’. Journal of Empirical Finance 12, 476-489. 
Carswell, J. (1960) ‘The South Sea Bubble’. 
Čekauskas, K. and Liatukas, V. (2011) Behavioural Biases of the Disposition Effect and 
Overconfidence and their Impact on the Estonian Stock Market. [Online] Bachelor 
Thesis: Stockholm School of Economics in Riga. 
Chen, G., Kim, K., Nofsinger, J., and Rui, O. (2007) ‘Trading Performance, Disposition 
Effect, Overconfidence, Representativeness Bias, and Experience of Emerging 
Market Investors’. Journal of Behavioural Decision-Making 20 (4), 425-451. 
Chen, G., Kim, K. A., Nofsinger, J. R., and Rui, O. M. (2005) ‘Behaviour and 
Performance of Emerging Market Investors: Evidence from China’. 
Cheng, H. and Glascock, J. L. (2006) ‘Stock Market Linkages Before and After the 
Asian Financial Crisis: Evidence from Three Greater China Economic Area Stock 
Markets and the US’. Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 
(RPBFMP) 9 (2), 297. 
Chenguel, B. M. (2014) ‘The Subprime Crisis Contagion Effect on Developed 
Countries’. Journal of Business and Management Research 3, 61-70. 
353 
 
Cheung, L., Tam, C., and Szeto, J. (2009) ‘Contagion of Financial Crises: A Literature 
Review of Theoretical and Empirical Frameworks’. Hong Kong Monetary Fund, 
Research Note 02. 
Chiang, T. C., Jeon, B. N, and Li, H. (2007) ‘Dynamic Correlation Analysis of 
Financial Contagion: Evidence from Asian Markets’. Journal of International 
Money and Finance 26 (7), 1206-1228. 
Ciarlone, A. and Piselli, P. (2009) ‘Emerging Markets’ Spreads and Global Financial 
Conditions’. International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 19, 222-239. 
Cipriani, M. and Guarino, A. (2010) ‘Herd Behaviour and Contagion in Financial 
Markets’. Institute for International Economic Policy. 
Claessens, S. and Forbes, K. (2004) ‘International Financial Contagion: The Theory, 
Evidence and Policy Implications’. 
Coeurdacier, N. and Rey, H. (2011) ‘Home Bias in Open Economy Financial 
Macroeconomics’. London Business School, CEPR and NBER. 
Collins, D. and Biekpe, N. (2003) ‘Contagion and Interdependence in African Stock 
Markets’. The South African Journal of Economics 71:1. 
Constantinos, A. (2010) Three Essays in Behavioural Finance: An Examination into 
Non- Bayesian Investment Behaviour. [Online] Doctor of Philosophy thesis or 
dissertation. Durham theses: Durham University. 
Consulate General of India, Chicago. (2014) India – U.S. Trade [online]. available from 
<http://indianconsulate.com/page/display/92/33> [17 August 2014]. 
354 
 
Cooper, M. J., Dimitrov, O., and Rau, P. (2001) ‘A Rose.Com by any Other Name’. 
Journal of Finance 56 (6), 2371-2388. 
Corsetti, G., Pesenti, P., and Roubini, N. (1999) ‘What Caused the Asian Currency and 
financial crisis?’ Japan and the World Economy 11 (3), 305-373. 
Coval, J., Hirshleifer, D., and Teoh, S. H. (2004) ‘Self-Deception and Deception in 
Capital Markets’. 
Crotty, J. (2009) ‘Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical 
Assessment of the ‘new Financial Architecture’’. Cambridge Journal of Economics 
33, 563-580. 
Cuñado, J., Gil-Alana, L. A., and Perez de Gracia, F. (2008) ‘Stock Market Volatility in 
US Bull and Bear Markets’. Journal of Money, Investment and Banking (1), 24-32. 
D’Anne, H. (2012) ‘VIX and VIX Futures Pricing Algorithms: Cultivating 
Understanding’. Modern Economy 3 (3), 284-294. 
Daniel, K. and Titman, S. (2000) ‘Market Efficiency in an Irrational World’. National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper (7489). 
DeMarzo, P., Vayanos, D., and Zwiebel, J. (2003) ‘Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, 
and Unidimensional Opinions’. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (3), 909-968. 
Diamond, D. W. and Dybvig, P. H. (1983) ‘Dybvig Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and 
Liquidity’. The Journal of Political Economy 91 (3), 401-419. 
355 
 
Dionne, G., Pacurar, M., and Zhou, X. (2014) ‘Liquidity-Adjusted Intraday Value at 
Risk Modeling and Risk Management: An Application to Data from Deutsche 
Börse’. 
Dornbusch, R., Park, C. Y., and Claessens, S. (2000) ‘Contagion: Understanding how it 
spreads and how it can be stopped’. The World Bank Research Observer 15 (2), 
177-197. 
Drazen, A. (1999) ‘Political Contagion in Currency Crises’. National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge Mass Working Paper 7211. 
Duan, J. and Yeh, C. (2008) ‘Jump and Volatility Risk Premiums Implied by VIX’. 
Duffie, D. and Pan, J. (1997) ‘An Overview of Value at Risk’. 
Dungey, M., Fry, R., Gonzalez-Hermosillo, B., and Martin, V. (2005a) ‘Empirical 
Modelling of Contagion: A Review of Methodologies’. Quantitative Finance 5 (1), 
9-24. 
Dungey, M., Fry, R., Gonzalez-Hermosillo, B., and Martin, V. (2005b) ‘Sampling 
Properties of Contagion Tests’. 
Dungey, M. and Zhumabekova, D. (2001) ‘Testing for Contagion using Correlations: 
Some Words of Caution’. Working Paper PB01-09. Centre for Pacific Basin 
Monetary and Economic Studies, Economic Research Department, Federal Reserve 
Bank of San Francisco. 
Dungey, M. and Martin, V. (2000) ‘Measuring Contagion in the East Asian Currency 
Crisis’. Australian National University Working Paper, Canberra. 
356 
 
Edwards, W. (1968) ‘Conservatism in Human Information Processing’ in Formal 
Representation of Human Judgment. ed. by Kleinmutz, B. : John Wiley and Sons, 
17-52. 
Edwards, S. (2000) ‘Contagion ’. The World Economy 23 (7), 873-900. 
EIB (2013) ‘Banking in Sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges and Opportunities’. European 
Investment Bank. 
Eichengreen, B. and Rose, A. (1999) ‘Contagious Currency Crises: Channels of 
Conveyance ’. in Changes in Exchange Rates of Rapidly Developing Countries. ed. 
by Ito, T. and Krueger, A., O. : University of Chicago Press. 
Eichengreen, B., Rose, A., and Wyplosz, C. (1996) ‘Contagious Currency Crises’. 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 98, 463-484. 
England, A. (2014) International Banks Ramp up Presence in Africa  
[online]. available from <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/600b6880-0fa0-11e1-
a36b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz39invOynp> [26 August 2014]. 
Engle, R. F. and Sheppard, K. (2001) ‘Theoretical and Empirical Properties of Dynamic 
Conditional Correlation Multivariate GARCH’. NBER Working Paper (8554). 
Engle, R. F. and Ng, V. K. (1993) ‘Measuring and Testing the Impact of News on 
Volatility’. Journal of Finance 48 (5), 1749-1778. 
Engle, R. F. (2002) ‘Dynamic Conditional Correlation: A Simple Class of Multivariate 
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity Models’. Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics 20, 339-350. 
357 
 
Ernst and Young (2014) Africa Attractiveness Survey 2014 [online]. available from 
<www.ey.com/ZA/en/Issues/Business-environment/EY-africa-attractiveness-
survey-2014> [23 August 2014]. 
Errunza, V., R. (1994) ‘Emerging Markets: Some New Concepts ‘. Journal of Portfolio 
Management, 82-87. 
Essaadi, E., Jouini, J., and Khallouli, W. (2009) ‘The Asian Crisis Contagion: 
A Dynamic Correlation Approach Analysis’. Panoeconomicus 2, 241-260. 
Evanoff, D., Kaufman, G., and Malliaris, A. (2012) ‘Asset Price Bubbles: What are the 
Causes, Consequences, and Public Policy Options?’ Chicago Fed Letter. 
Fielding, D. and Stracca, L. (2007) ‘Myopic Loss Aversion, Disappointment Aversion, 
and the Equity Premium Puzzle’. Journal of Economic Behaviour and 
Organisation 64. 
Fischer, B. (1986) ‘Noise’. The Journal of Finance 41 (3), 529-543. 
Forbes, K. (2012) ‘The “Big C”: Identifying and Mitigating Contagion ’. Jackson Hole 
Symposium, Hosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 23-87. 
Forbes, K. (2004) ‘The Asian Flu and Russian Virus: The International Transmission of 
Crises in Firm-Level Data’. Journal of International Economics 63, 59-92. 
Forbes, K. and Rigobon, R. (1999) ‘Measuring Contagion: Conceptual and Empirical 
Issues’. Mimeo, MIT. 
Forbes, K. and Rigobon, R. (2002) ‘No Contagion, Only Interdependence: Measuring 
Stock Market Co-Movements’. Journal of Finance 57 (5), 2223-2261. 
358 
 
Forgas, J. P. (1995) ‘Mood and Judgment: The Affect Infusion Model (AIM)’. 
Psychological Bulletin (117). 
Fortune, P. (1993) ‘Stock Market Crashes: What Have We Learned from October 
1987?’ New England Economic Review. 
Frehen, R. G., Goetzmann, W. N., and Rouwenhorst, K.G. (2011) ‘New Evidence on 
the First Financial Bubble’. 
French, D. (2006) ‘The Dutch Monetary Environment during Tulipmania’. The 
Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 9 (1), 3-14. 
Fry-McKibbin, R., Martin, V., and Tang, C. (2013) ‘Financial Contagion and Asset 
Pricing’. Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis. The Australian National 
University. 
Gai, P. and Kapadia, S. (2010) ‘Contagion in Financial Networks’. Proceedings of the 
Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Science 466(2120), 
2401-2423. 
Galesi, A. and Sgherri, S. (2009) ‘Regional Financial Spillovers across Europe: A 
Global VAR Analysis’. IMF Working Paper 09/23. 
Garber, P. (1990) ‘Famous First Bubbles’. Journal of Economic Perspectives 42 (2), 35-
54. 
Garber, P. (1989) ‘Tulipmania’. The Journal of Political Economy 97 (3), 535-560. 
Gardiner, K. (2012) ‘Euro Fatigue’. Wealth and Investment Management, Global 
Research & Investments. COMPASS, Barclays. 
359 
 
Ghalanos, A. (2013) ‘RMGARCH: Multivariate GARCH Models’. 
Gilmore, C. and McManus, G. (2002) ‘International Portfolio Diversification: US and 
Central European Equity Markets’. Emerging Markets Review 3, 69-83. 
Glosten, L. R., Jagannathan, R., and Runkle, D., E. (1993) ‘On the Relation between the 
Expected Value and the Volatility of the Nominal Excess Return on Stocks’. 
Journal of Finance 48 (5), 1779-1801. 
Goetzmann, W., Li, L., and Rouwenhorst, K.G. (2004) ‘Long-Term Global Market 
Correlations’. Yale International Center for Finance. 
Goldfajn, I. and Valdes, O. R. (1997) ‘Capital Flows and the Twin Crises: The Role of 
Liquidity’. Working Paper 97/87, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. 
Goldstein, I., and Pauzner, A. (2004) ‘Contagion of Self-Fulfilling Financial Crises due 
to Diversification of Investment Portfolios’. Journal of Economic Theory 119, 151–
183 
Green, H. (2011) Avoiding the Dreaded Decision Fatigue [online]. Available from 
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/work-in-progress/2011/09/07/avoiding-the-dreaded-
decision-fatigue/> [26 August 2014]. 
Haas, M., and Pigorsch, C. (2007) ‘Financial Economics, Fat-tailed Distributions’. 
Hansen, B. E. (2001) ‘The New Econometrics of Structural Change: Dating Breaks in 
U. S. Labor Productivity’. Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, 117-128. 
Harman, D. (2009) ‘Judgment and Decision-Making: Psychological Perspectives’. 
British Psychological Society and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
360 
 
Harvey, C. (1995) ‘Predictable Risk and Returns in Emerging Markets’. The Review of 
Financial Studies 8 (3), 773-816. 
Hatemi-J, A. and Morgan, B. (2007) ‘Liberalized Emerging Markets and the World 
Economy: Testing for Increased Integration with Time-Varying Volatility’. Applied 
Financial Economics 17, 1245-1250. 
Hede, P. D. (2012) Financial Decision-Making and Investor Behaviour. Ventus 
Publishing ApS. 
Henker, J., Henker, T., and Mitsios, A. (2003) ‘Do Investors Herd Intraday in the 
Australian Equities Market?’ 
Hentschel, L. (1995) ‘All in the Family: Nesting Symmetric and Asymmetric GARCH 
Models’. Journal of Financial Economics 39, 71-104. 
Hermandez, L. F. and Valdes, R. O. (2001) ‘What Drives Contagion: Trade, 
Neighbourhood or Financial Links?’ International Reviews of Financial Analysis 
10, 203-218. 
Higgins, M. L. and Bera, A. K. (1992) ‘A Class of Nonlinear ARCH Models’. 
International Economic Review 33, 137-158. 
Hirshleifer, D. (2001) ‘Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing’. Journal of Finance 56, 
1533-1597. 
Holmes, P., Kallinterakis, V., and Ferreira, M. L. (2011) ‘Herding in a Concentrated 
Market: a Question of Intent’. European Financial Management. 
361 
 
Hon, M. T., Strauss, J., and Yong, S. (2004) ‘Contagion in Financial Markets after 
September 11 - Myth or Reality? ‘. Journal of Financial Research 27, 95-114. 
Horta, P., Mendes, C., and Vieira, I. (2008) ‘Contagion Effects of the US Subprime 
Crisis on Developed Countries’. CEFAGE-UE Working Paper. 
Hosking, J. R. (1980) ‘The Multivariate Portmanteau Statistic’. Journal of the American 
Statistical Association 75 (371), 602-608. 
Hovde, J. G. (2014) ‘Behavioural Finance, a Challenge to the EMH’. in Modern 
Portfolio Theory and Behavioural Finance. ed. by Anon. 
Huang, H. (2000) ‘Financial Contagion: ABC Channels’. IMF Research Bulletin 1 (2). 
Huang, H. and Xu, C. (2000) ‘Financial Institutions, Financial Contagion, and Financial 
Crises’. IMF Working Paper (92). 
Huang, W. and Chen, Z. (2014) ‘Modelling Financial Crises and Contagion’. Division 
of Economics, Nanyang Technological University Singapore. 
Hwang, S. and Salmon, M. (2007) ‘Sentiment and Beta Herding’. Warwick Business 
School. 
Inci, A., Li, H., and McCarthy, J. (2011) ‘Financial Contagion: A Local Correlation 
Analysis’. Research in International Business and Finance 25 (1), 11-25. 
Inclán, C. and Tiao, G., C. (1994) ‘Use of Cumulative Sums of Squares for 
Retrospective Detection of Changes of Variance’. Journal of the American 
Statistical Association 89, 913-923. 
362 
 
Irving, W. (2008) ‘A Time of Unexampled Prosperity: The Great Mississippi Bubble’. 
EIR. Economic History, 38-47. 
Ishikawa, T. (2011) ‘Japan’s Bubble, Deflation, and Long-Term Stagnation: Review of 
an Oral History Study’. Economic and Social Research Institute Note (19). 
Jeanne, O. (1998) The International Liquidity Mismatch and the New Architecture. 
Jefferis, K., and Tacheba, A. Botswana Financial Sector Review (2009/2010). 
Johansen, S. (1991) ‘Estimation and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration Vectors in 
Gaussian Vector Autoregressive Models’. Econometrica 59 (6), 1551-1580. 
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (1982) Judgment under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979) ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
under Risk’. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 47 (2), 263-292. 
Kaminsky, G. L., Reinhart, C. M., and Vegh, C. A. (2003) ‘The Unholy Trinity of 
Financial Contagion’. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper. 
Kaminsky, G. L., Lyons, R. K., Schmukler, S. (2001, August) ‘Mutual Fund Investment 
in Emerging Markets: An Overview’. World Bank Economic Review Volume 15 
(2), 315-339. 
Kaminsky, G. and Reinhart, C. (2000) ‘On Crises, Contagion and Confusion’. Journal 
of International Economics 51 (1), 145-168. 
363 
 
Kaminsky, G. L. and Reinhart, C. M. (1999) ‘Bank Lending and Contagion: Evidence 
from the Asian Crisis’. Working Paper, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Kaminsky, G. L. and Reinhart, C. M. (1998) ‘Financial Crises in Asia and Latin 
America: Then and Now’. American Economic Review, American Economic 
Association 88 (2), 444-448. 
Kanas, A. (1998) ‘Linkages between the US and European Equity Markets: Further 
Evidence from Cointegration Test’. Applied Financial Economics 8 (6), 607-614. 
Kang, S. H. and Yoon, S. (2011) ‘The Global Financial Crisis and the Integration of 
Emerging Stock Markets in Asia’. Journal of East Asian Economic Integration 15 
(4), 49-73. 
Kasekende, L., Mlambo, K., Murinde, V., and Zhao, T. (2009) ‘Restructuring for 
Competitiveness: The Financial Services Sector in Africa’s Four Largest 
Economies’. in World Economic Reform. ed. by Anon, 49-81. 
Kassim, H. S. (2013) ‘The Global Financial Crisis and the Integration of Islamic Stock 
Markets in the Developed and Developing Countries ’. Asian Academy of 
Management Journal of Accounting and Finance 9 (2), 75-94. 
Khalid, A. and Rajaguru, G. (2006) ‘Financial Market Contagion or Spill-Overs 
Evidence from Asian Crisis using Multivariate GARCH Approach’. 
Khawaja, H. A., Bhutto, N. A., and Naz, S. (2013) ‘Investors’ Behavioural Biases and 
the Stock Market Development: An Empirical Study of the Pakistani Stock 
Market’. in Handbook on the Economic, Finance and Management Outlooks. ed. 
364 
 
by Anon Proceedings Book of ICEFMO, 2013, Malaysia: PAK Publishing Group, 
636-642. 
Kimmel, A. J. (2004) ‘Rumours and the Financial Marketplace’. Journal of Behavioural 
Finance 5. 
King, M. and Wadhwani, S. (1990) ‘Transmission of Volatility between Stock 
Markets’. Review of Financial Studies 3 (1), 5-33. 
Kirkpatrick II, C. D. and Dahlquist, J. (2010) ‘Technical Analysis: The Complete 
Resource for Financial Market Technicians’. FT Press. 
Kittiakarasakun, J. and Tse, Y. (2011) ‘Modeling the Fat Tails in Asian stock markets’. 
International Review of Economics and Finance 20 (3), 430-440. 
Kodres, L. and Pritsker, M. (2002) ‘A Rational Expectations Model of Financial 
Contagion.’ The Journal of Finance 57 (2), 769-799. 
Kodres, L. and Pritsker, M. (1996) ‘Directionally Similar Position Taking and Herding 
by Large Futures Market Participants’. in Risk Measurement and Systematic Risk: 
Proceedings of a Joint Central Bank Research Conference, Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve, 221-272. 
Kraay, A. and Ventura, J. (eds.) (2007) G7 Current Account Imbalances: Sustainability 
and Adjustment. ‘The Dot-Com Bubble, the Bush Deficits, and the U.S. Current 
Account’. Held June 1-2, 2005: University of Chicago Press. 
Kremer, S. (2010) ‘Herding of Institutional Traders’. Free University Berlin 1-44 
365 
 
Kudryavtsev, A., Cohen, G., and Hon-Snir, S. (2013) ‘Rational” Or “Intuitive”: Are 
Behavioural Biases Correlated Across Stock Market Investors?’ Contemporary 
Economics 7 (2), 31-53. 
Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1992) ‘The Impact of Institutional Trading 
on Stock Prices’. Journal of Financial Economics 32, 23-43. 
Lamoureux, C. G. and Lastrapes, W. D. (1990) ‘Heteroscedasticity in Stock Returns 
Data: Volume versus GARCH Effects’. The Journal of Finance 45, 221-229. 
Lau, L. J. and Li, K. (2001) ‘Lessons from the East Asian Currency Crisis’. Stanford 
University. 
Lee, H., Wu, H., and Wang, Y. (2007) ‘Contagion Effect in Financial Markets after the 
South-East Asia Tsunami’. Research in International Business and Finance 21, 
281-296. 
Lee, S. B. and Kim, K. J. (1993) ‘Does the October 1987 Crash Strengthen the Co-
Movements among National Stocks Markets?’ Review of Financial Economics 3 
(1), 89-102. 
Levine, R. and Zervos, S. (1998) ‘Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth’. The 
American Economic Review 88 (3), 537-558. 
Li, W. K. and McLeod, A. I. (1981) ‘Distribution of the Residual Autocorrelation in 
Multivariate ARMA Time Series Models’. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
Series B. 43 (2), 231-239. 
366 
 
Liew, V. K-S. (2004) ‘Which Lag Length Selection Criteria should we Employ?’. 
Economics Bulletin 3 (33), 1-9. 
Lin, J., Dinh, H., and Im, F. (2010) ‘United States-China External Imbalance and the 
Global Financial Crisis’. China Economic Journal 3 (1), 6-23. 
Lintenr, G. (1998) ‘Behavioural Finance: Why Investors make Bad Decisions’. The 
Planner 13 (1), 7-8. 
Ljung, G. M. and Box, G. E. P. (1978) ‘On a Measure of a Lack of Fit in Time Series 
Models’. Biometrika 65, 297-303. 
Lo, W. A. (2011) ‘Fear, Greed, and Financial Crises: A Cognitive Neurosciences 
Perspective’. 
Longin, F. and Solnik, B. (1995) ‘Is the Correlations of International Equity Returns 
Constant: 1960–1990?’ Journal of International Money and Finance 14 (1), 3-26. 
Lowies, G., Hall, J., and Cloete, C. (2013) ‘The Influence of Frame Dependence on 
Investment Decisions made by Listed Property Fund Managers in South Africa’. 
Journal of Economics and Behavioural Studies 5 (11), 805-814. 
Lutje, T., and Menkhoff, L. (2003) ‘Risk Management, Rational Herding and 
Institutional Investors: A Macro View’. University of Hannover Discussion Paper 
285. 
Mackay, C. (2011) ‘Behavioural Finance and Technical Analysis as the Solution to 
Fundamental Analysis and the Efficient Market Hypothesis: From the Preface to 
367 
 
the 1852 Edition of Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds’. 
United-ICAP. 
Magnus, F. J. (2008) ‘Capital Market Efficiency: An Analysis of Weak Form Efficiency 
on the GSE’. Journal of Money, Investment and Banking, 1-8. 
Malik, S. U., and Elahi, M. A. (2014) ‘Analysis of Herd Behavior Using Quantile 
Regression: Evidence from Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE)’. 55322 
Malik, F. and Ewing, B. (2009) ‘Volatility Transmission between Oil Prices and Equity 
Sector Returns’. International Review of Financial Analysis 18, 95-100. 
Malik, I. N., Ullah, S., Azam, K., and Khan, A. (2009) ‘The Impact of Recent Global 
Financial Crisis on the Financial Institutions in the Developing Countries: Global 
Perspectives’. International Review of Business Research Papers 5 (5), 85-95. 
Malkiel, B. G. (2010) ‘Bubbles in Asset Prices’. CEPS Working Paper, Princeton 
University. 
Masetti, O. and Mihr, A. (2013) ‘Capital Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa’. Research 
Briefing for Deutsche Bank. 
Masih, A. and Masih, R. (1997) ‘Dynamic Linkages and the Propagation Mechanism 
Driving Major International Stock Markets: An Analysis of the Pre- and Post-Crash 
Eras’. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance Volume 37 (4, Fall), 859-
885. 
Massa, I. (2009) ‘Stock Markets in Africa: Bidding for Growth amid Global Turmoil’. 
Overseas Development Institute. in Opinion (134). 
368 
 
Massacci, D. (2007) ‘Identification and Estimation in an Incoherent Model of 
Contagion’. 
Masson, P. R. (1998) ‘Contagion: Monsoonal Effects, Spill-Overs, and Jumps between 
Multiple Equilibria’. International Monetary Fund, Working Paper 98/142. 
Washington DC. 
Mathur, I., Gleason, K., Dibooglu, S., and Singh, M. (2002) ‘Contagion Effects from 
the 1994 Mexican Peso Crisis: Evidence from Chilean Stocks ’. The Financial 
Review 37, 17-34. 
Mendoza, E. and Quadrini, V. (2010) ‘Financial Globalization, Financial Crises and 
Contagion’. Journal of Monetary Economics 57, 24-39. 
Meric, G., Leal, R., Ratner, M., and Meric, I. (2001) ‘Co-Movements of U.S. and Latin 
American Equity Markets before and After the 1987 Crash’. International Review 
of Financial Analysis 10 (3), 219-235. 
Mobarek, A., Muradoglu, G., and Mollah, S. (2014) ‘Determinants of Time-Varying 
Co-Movements among International Stock Markets’. 
Morales, L. and Andreosso-O’Callaghan, B. (2010) ‘The Global Financial Crisis: World 
Market Or Regional Contagion Effects?’ Conference Papers, Dublin Institute of 
Technology. 
Moser, T. (2003) ‘What Is International Financial Contagion?’ International Monetary 
Fund, International Finance 6 (2), 157-178. 
369 
 
Moussalli, C. B. (2007) ‘Financial Crises, Panic and Contagion: Evidence from a Cross-
Country Comparison using Two Time Frames’. Journal of Business and Public 
Affairs 1 (2). 
Mulyadi, M. S. and Anwar, Y. (2012) ‘Return and Volatility Spillover across USA and 
Europe (Study of American and EU Crisis Period)’. African Journal of Business 
Management 6 (19), 5916-5926. 
Myers, D. (1989) Psychology. 2nd edn. New York: Worth Publishers, Inc. 
Nellor, D. (2008) ‘The Rise of Africa’s “Frontier” Markets, Finance and Development’. 
A Quarterly Magazine of the IMF, Finance and Development 45 (3), 30-33. 
Nofsinger, J. R. (2005) The Psychology of Investing. 2nd edn: Pearson 
Education/Prentice Hall. 
Obstfeld, M. (1986) ‘Rational and Self-Fulfilling Balance-of-Payments Crises’. 
American Economic Review 76 (1), 72-81. 
Odean, T. (1999) ‘Do Investors Trade Too Much?’ The American Economic Review 89 
(5), 1279-1298. 
Odean, T. (1998b) ‘Volume, Volatility, Price and Profit when all Traders are Above 
Average’. Journal of Finance 53, 1887-1934. 
Odean, T. (1998a) ‘Are Investors Reluctant to Realise their Losses?’ Journal of Finance 
53, 1775-1798. 
OECD (2012) ‘Financial Contagion in the Era of Globalised Banking?’ OECD 
Economics Department Policy Notes (14). 
370 
 
Office of the United States Trade Representative [online]. available from 
<http://www.ustr.gov/> [8 August 2014]. 
Okina, K., Shirakawa, M., and Shiratsuka, S. (2000) ‘The Asset Price Bubble and 
Monetary Policy: Japan’s Experience in the Late 1980s and the Lessons’. IMES 
Discussion Paper Series. 
Olsen, R. (2004) ‘Trust, Complexity and the 1990s Market Bubble’. Journal of 
Behavioural Finance 5 (4), 186-191. 
Olsen, R. A. (1997) ‘Investment risk: The experts’ perspective’. Financial Analysts 
Journal 53 (2), 62–66. 
Opiela, N. (2012) ‘Overcoming Decision Fatigue’. CFA Institute Magazine 23 (6), 35-
37. 
Owermohle, S. (2014) ‘Risk and Reward: Greenfields Growth in Africa’. 
Ozkan, F. and Unsal, F. (2012) ‘Global Financial Crisis, Financial Contagion, and 
Emerging Markets ’. IMF Working Paper. Strategy, Policy, and Review 
Department (293). 
Page, M. J. and Way, C. V. (Summer 1992/1993) ‘Stock Market Over-Reaction: The 
South African Evidence’. Investment Analysts Journal. 
Park, A. and Sgroi, D. (2009) ‘Herding, Contrarianism and Delay in Financial Market 
Trading’. 
Patev, P. and Kanaryan, N. (2006) ‘Stock Market Crises and Portfolio Diversification in 
Central and Eastern Europe’. Managerial Finance 32 (5), 415-432. 
371 
 
Pera, E. (2013) ‘The Evolving African Banking Landscape’. Presentation for Ernst and 
Young. 
Pesenti, P. and Tille, C. (2000) ‘The Economics of Currency Crises and Contagion: An 
Introduction’. Economic Policy Review 6 (3), 3-16. 
Plous, S. (1993) The Psychology of Judgment and Decision-Making. New York: 
McGraw-Hill, Inc. 
Prechter, R. R., (1999) ‘The Wave Principle of Human Social Behaviour and the New 
Science of Socionomics’. 
Prechter, R. R., (1985) ‘Popular Culture and the Stock Market’. in Pioneering Studies in 
Socionomics. ed. by Prechter, R. R. Gainesville.: New Classics Library. 
Pritsker, M. (2001) ‘The Channels for Financial Contagion ’. in International Financial 
Contagion. ed. by Claessens, S. and Forbes, K. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic, 
67-97. 
Pukthuanthong, K. and Roll, R. (2009) ‘Global Market Integration: An Alternative 
Measure and its Applications’. Journal of Financial Economics 94, 214-232. 
Rabin, M. (1998) ‘Psychology and Economics’. Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1), 
11-46. 
Račickas, E. and Vasiliauskaitė, A. (2012) ‘Model of Financial Risk Contagion in the 
Global Financial Markets’. Economics and Management 17 (1), 91-102. 
Račickas, E. and Vasiliauskaitė, A. (2011) ‘Channels of Financial Risk Contagion in the 
Global Financial Markets’. 
372 
 
Redhead, K. (2008) Personal Finance and Investments: A Behavioural Finance 
Perspective. 1st edn: Routledge. 
Ricciardi, V. (2008) ‘The Psychology of Risk: The Behavioural Finance Perspective’. in 
Handbook of Finance. ed. by Fabozzi, F., J. Wiley, 85-111. 
Ricciardi, V. and Simon, H. (2001) ‘Behavioural Finance: A New Perspective for 
Investors and Financial Professionals’. Working Paper. 
Rigobon, R. (2004) ‘Identification through Heteroscedasticity’. Review of Economics 
and Statistics 85 (4), 777-792. 
Rigobon, R. (2003) ‘On the Measurement of International Propagation of Shocks: Is the 
Transmission Stable?’ Journal of International Economics 61, 261-283. 
Rigobon, R. (2001) ‘Contagion: How to Measure it?’ MIT and NBER. 
Ritter, R. J. (2003) ‘Behavioural Finance’. Pacific Basin Finance Journal 11 (4), 429-
437. 
Ronn, I. E. (1998) ‘The Impact of Large Changes in Asset Prices on Intra-Market 
Correlations in the Stock and Bond Markets’. Working Paper, University of Texas 
at Austin. 
Rose, A. (2011) ‘International Financial Integration and Crisis Intensity’. Haas School 
of Business, University of California. 
Samuelson, W. and Zeckhauser, R. (1988) ‘Status Quo Bias in Decision-Making’. 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 7-59. 
373 
 
Satterthwaite, F. E. (1946) ‘Of Variance Components’. Biometrics 2 (6), 110-114. 
Scardovo, C., Gatti, S., and Ventola, D. (2010) ‘Market Crises, the Financial System 
and the Real Economy: Analysis and Implications for the Global Financial Services 
Industry’. Journal of Risk Management in Financial Institutions 3 (3), 211-230. 
Schachter, S., Hood, D. C., Andreassen, P. B., and Gerin, W. (1986) ‘Aggregate 
Variables in Psychology and Economics: Dependence and the Stock Market’. in 
Handbook of Behavioural Economics. ed. by Gilad, B. and Kaish, S. : JAI Press. 
Scherer, C. and Cho, H. (2003) ‘A Social Contagion Theory of Risk Perception’. Risk 
Analysis 23 (2), 261-267. 
Schinasi, J. G. and Smith, T. R. (1999) ‘Portfolio Diversification, Leverage, and 
Financial Contagion’. IMF Working Paper 99/136. 
Schmukler, S. (2004) ‘Financial Globalization: Gain and Pain for Developing 
Countries’. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Economic Review, Second Quarter. 
Scott, J., Stumpp, M., and Xu, P. (1999) ‘Behavioural Bias, Valuation and Active 
Management’. Financial Analysts Journal. 
Shalev, J. (1996) ‘Loss Aversion and Bargaining’. Game Theory and Information. 
Sharma, S. (2014) Global Financial Contagion: Building a Resilient World Economy 
after the Subprime Crisis: Cambridge University Press. 
Sharpe, W. F. (1964) ‘Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under 
Conditions of Risk’. Journal of Finance 19 (3), 425-442. 
374 
 
Shefrin, H. and Statman, M. (1985) ‘The Disposition to Sell Winners Too 
Early and Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence’. The Journal of Finance 
40 (3), 777-790. 
Shefrin, H. and Statman, M. (1994) ‘Behavioural Capital Asset Pricing Theory’. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 29 (3), 323-349. 
Shiller, R. J. (1998) ‘Human Behaviour and Efficiency of the Financial System’. 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper (W6375). 
Shiller, R. J., Konya, F., and Tsutsui, Y. (1996) ‘Why did the Nikkei Crash? Expanding 
the Scope of Expectations Data Collection’. The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, MIT Press 78 (1), 156-164. 
Shiller, R. J. and Pound, J. (1989) ‘Survey Evidence on the Diffusion of Interest and 
Information among Investors’. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation 
12, 47-66. 
Shiller, R. J., Konya, F., and Tsutsui, Y. (1988) ‘Investor Behaviour in the October 
1987 Stock Market Crash: The Case of Japan’. NBER Working Paper Series 
(2684). 
Shiller, R. J. (1987) ‘Investor Behaviour in the October 1987 Stock Market Crash: 
Survey Evidence’. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper (2446). 
Shimizu, C. and Watanabe, T. (2010) ‘Housing Bubbles in Japan and the United States’. 




Sin, C. and White, H. (1996) ‘Information Criteria for Selecting Possibly Misspecified 
Parametric Models’. Journal of Econometrics 71 (1), 207-225. 
Sinha, S. and Pachori, S. (2014) ‘A Study of the Relationship among the Financial 
Market Integration & Financial Crisis in Asian Countries’. International 
Conference on Technology and Business Management. 
Smith, L. (1991) ‘Rational Choice: The Contrast between Economics and Psychology’. 
Journal of Political Economy 99. 
Summers, L. (2000) ‘International Financial Crises: Causes, Prevention, and Cures’. 
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 90, 1-16. 
Suto, M., Menkhoff, L., and Beckmann, D. (2005) ‘Behavioural Biases of Institutional 
Investors under Pressure from Customers: Japan and Germany vs the US’. WIF-
05006, Institute of Finance, Waseda University, Japan, November 2005. 
Szyszka, A. (2010) ‘Behavioural Anatomy of the Financial Crisis’. Journal of Centrum 
Cathedra 3 (2), 121-135. 
Tafirenyika, M. (2012) Harnessing African Stock Exchanges to Promote Growth 
[online]. available from <http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-
2012/harnessing-african-stock-exchanges-promote-growth> [26 August 2014]. 
Taketa, K. (2004) ‘Contagion of Currency Crises across Unrelated Countries’. Institute 
for Monetary and Economic Studies (Bank of Japan, Discussion Paper 22). 
Tesar, L. and Werner, M. (1998) ‘The Internationalisation of Securities Markets since 
the 1987 Crash’. in Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services. ed. by 
376 
 
Robert, E., Litan and Anthony, M., Santomero. Washington, D.C: Brookings 
Institution Press, 281-372. 
Thaler, R. (1993) Advances in Behavioural Finance. New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation. 
Thaler, R. and Johnson, E. J. (1990) ‘Gambling with the House Money and Trying to 
Break Even: The Effect of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice’. Management Science 
36, 643-660. 
Thanyalakpark, K. and Filson, D. (2001) ‘Testing for Contagion during the Asian 
Crisis’. Claremont Colleges Economics Working Paper (23). 
Thiers, A. (1859) The Mississippi Bubble: A memoir of John Law. Trans. by Written in 
English. New York: W.A. Townsend & Company. 
Thomas, C. (2003) ‘The South Sea Bubble’. Student Economic Review 17, 17-37. 
Thompson, E. A. (2006) ‘The Tulip Mania: Fact or Artefact?’ 
Tierney, J. (2011) ‘Do You Suffer from Decision Fatigue’. 
Tonzer, L. (2013) ‘Cross-Border Interbank Networks, Banking Risk and Contagion’. 
FIW – Working Paper (129). 
Tsay, R. S. (2005) ‘Analysis of Financial Time Series’ 543. 
Tse, Y. K. and Tsui, A. K. (2002) ‘A Multivariate Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity Model with Time-Varying Correlations’. Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics 20 (3), 351-362. 
377 
 
Tuluca, S. A. and Zwick, B. (2001) ‘The Effects of the Asian Crisis on Global 
equity markets’. The Financial Review (36), 125-141. 
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1974) ‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases’. Science, New Series 185 (4157), 1124-1131. 
United Nations Development Programme (2003) African Stock Markets Handbook. 
United Nations. and African Union Commission (eds.) (2009) Meeting of the Committee 
of Experts of the 2nd Joint Annual Meetings of the AU Conference of Ministers of 
Economy and Finance and ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and 
Economic Development. ‘The Global Financial Crisis: Impact, Responses and Way 
Forward’. Held 2-5 June 2009 at Cairo, Egypt. 
Valdes, R. (1998) ‘Emerging Markets Contagion: Evidence and Theory’. Gerencia De 
Investigacion Economica Del Banco Central De Chile. 
Walter, A. and Weber, F. M. (2006) ‘Herding in the German Mutual Fund Industry. 
European Financial Management 12 (3), 375-406. 
Wang, D. (2008) ‘Herding Behaviour towards the Market Index: Evidence from 21 
Financial Markets’. IESE Business School – University of Navarra. Working Paper 
(776). 
Wang, J. (2004) ‘Empirical Tests on Crisis Contagion in 1997/98 Asia Crises’. 
Wang, K. and Thi, T. (2006) ‘Does Contagion Effect Exist between Stock Markets of 
Thailand and Chinese Economic Area (CEA) during the Asian Flu?’ Asian Journal 
of Management and Humanity Sciences 1 (1), 16-36. 
378 
 
Whaley, R. E. (1993) ‘Derivatives on Market Volatility: Hedging Tools Long Overdue’. 
Journal of Derivatives 1 (1), 71-84. 
Whittlesea, B. W. (1993) ‘Illusions of Familiarity’. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition 19, 1235-1253. 
Wongswan, J. (2003) ‘Contagion: An Empirical Test’. International Finance 
Discussion Papers 775. 
World Bank (2014) [online]. available from <http://econ.worldbank.org>. 
Xinhua. (2010) China-U.S. Trade is Win-Win Game [online]. available from 
<China.org.cn> [17 August 2014]. 
Yang, J. and Bessler, D. (2006) ‘Contagion around the October 1987 Stock Market 
Crash’. European Journal of Operation Research. 
Yang, T. and Lim, J. (2004) ‘Crisis, Contagion, and East Asian Stock Markets’. Review 
of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 7, 119-151. 
Zakoian, J. M. (1994) ‘Threshold Heteroscedasticity Models’. Journal of Economic 












Low Risk Research Ethics Approval 
 
Where NO human participants are involved and/or when using secondary data - 
Undergraduate or Postgraduate or Member of staff evaluating service level quality 
Project Title 
The 2007-09 Global Financial Crisis and Financial Contagion Effects 
in African Stock Markets 
 
Principal Investigator Certification 
I believe that this project does not require research ethics approval.   X 
I confirm that I have answered all relevant questions in the checklist honestly. X 
I confirm that I will carry out the project in the ways described in the checklist.  I 
will immediately suspend research and request a new ethical approval if the 




Name: Jaliyyah Ahmadu-Bello  
Date: 04/09/2014  
Student’s Supervisor (if applicable) 
I have read the checklist and confirm that it covers all the ethical issues raised by this 
project fully and frankly.  I confirm that I have discussed this project with the student 
and agree that it does not require research ethics approval. I will continue to review 
ethical issues in the course of supervision. 
 
Name: Timothy Rodgers  





Low Risk Research Ethics Approval Checklist 
 
Applicant Details 
Project Ref:  P26582 
Full name:  Jaliyyah Ahmadu-Bello 
Faculty:  [BES] Business, Environment and Society 
Department:  [EF] Economics, Finance and Accounting 
Module Code:   
Supervisor:  Timothy Rodgers 
Project title:  
The 2007-09 Global Financial Crisis and Financial Contagion 
Effects in African Stock Markets 
Date(s):  27/09/2010  - 12/09/2014 
Created:  04/09/2014 00:04 
 
Project Details 
The spread of financial crisis often referred to as “financial contagion” has sparked 
enormous research since the financial crises of the late 1990’s and the more recent 
(2007-2009) global financial crisis.  However, only a handful of these studies looked at 
Africa; mostly South Africa and some North African countries.  
 
With increase trade and financial linkages, it is possible that contagion occurred in a lot 
of African markets. This is why I aim to test for contagion during the recent financial 
crisis (2007-2009) from the US as the source of the crisis to a set of African markets. 
 
The research is based on secondary data available from Coventry University and other 
publicly available sources.  
 
 
Participants in your research  
Questions Yes No 
Will the project involve human participants?  X 
 
Risk to Participants 
381 
 
Questions Yes No 
Will the project involve human patients/clients, health professionals, 
and/or patient (client) data and/or health professional data? 
 X 
Will any invasive physical procedure, including collecting tissue or other 
samples, be used in the research? 
 X 
Is there a risk of physical discomfort to those taking part?  X 
Is there a risk of psychological or emotional distress to those taking part?  X 
Is there a risk of challenging the deeply held beliefs of those taking part?  X 
Is there a risk that previous, current or proposed criminal or illegal acts 
will be revealed by those taking part? 
 X 
Will the project involve giving any form of professional, medical or legal 
advice, either directly or indirectly to those taking part? 
 X 
 
Risk to Researcher 
Questions Yes No 
Will this project put you or others at risk of physical harm, injury or 
death? 
 X 
Will project put you or others at risk of abduction, physical, mental or 
sexual abuse? 
 X 
Will this project involve participating in acts that may cause 
psychological or emotional distress to you or to others? 
 X 
Will this project involve observing acts which may cause psychological 
or emotional distress to you or to others? 
 X 
Will this project involve reading about, listening to or viewing materials 
that may cause psychological or emotional distress to you or to others? 
 X 
Will this project involve you disclosing personal data to the participants 
other than your name and the University as your contact and e-mail 
address? 
 X 
Will this project involve you in unsupervised private discussion with 
people who are not already known to you? 
 X 
Will this project potentially place you in the situation where you may 
receive unwelcome media attention? 
 X 
Could the topic or results of this project be seen as illegal or attract the  X 
382 
 
attention of the security services or other agencies? 




Informed Consent of the Participant 
Questions Yes No 
Are any of the participants under the age of 18?  X 
Are any of the participants unable mentally or physically to give 
consent?   
 X 
Do you intend to observe the activities of individuals or groups without 
their knowledge and/or informed consent from each participant (or from 




Participant Confidentiality and Data Protection 
Questions Yes No 
Will the project involve collecting data and information from human 
participants who will be identifiable in the final report? 
 X 
Will information not already in the public domain about specific 
individuals or institutions be identifiable through data published or 
otherwise made available? 
 X 
Do you intend to record, photograph or film individuals or groups 
without their knowledge or informed consent? 
 X 
Do you intend to use the confidential information, knowledge or trade 






Questions Yes No 
Will this project involve collecting data outside University buildings?  X 
Do you intend to collect data in shopping centres or other public places?  X 
Do you intend to gather data within nurseries, schools or colleges?    X 
383 
 
Do you intend to gather data within National Health Service premises?  X 
Other Ethical Issues 
Questions Yes No 
Is there any other risk or issue not covered above that may pose a risk to 
you or any of the participants? 
 X 
Will any activity associated with this project put you or the participants 
at an ethical, moral or legal risk? 
 X 
 
Other Documents submitted 
 
 
